TL: A Nordic Twist [Redux]

Chapter 5: The late 1980s

Devvy

Donor
Chapter 5: The late 1980s.

flags.png

The Nordic state flags at a 1980s Nordek meeting.

The early years of Nordek had seen it take a very similar growth to that in the European Community. Joint work on nuclear energy, a growing economic union, and a generally ingovernmental approach co-ordinated by a joint secretariat. The Nordics had, by 1985, enjoyed the success of a full customs union, and growing intra-Nordic trade both in goods, food, and free movement of people. Nordatom had delivered new nuclear power plants, enabling cleaner energy - reducing fossil fuel usage - and also energy security, reducing the volume of imports of such material. By the 1980s however, the European Community was now looking at reforms, and exactly the same began to happen in the Nordics, helped by an improving global situation as the flare up in tension in the early 1980s reduced - aided by a notable PR win for the Nordics in the Reykjavik Summit between the two superpowers.

The introduction of the "CE" marking and declaration of conformity with European laws was mirrored in the Nordics with the "NN" symbol (short for NordeN), showing conformity with one of the Nordic members regulatory and technical standards for health, safety and environmental protections, on the basis that all Nordic national standards met minimum thresholds and should be mutually recognised. The hope was that this would reduce the administrative burden on manufacturers for selling devices manufactured in one Nordic state, could now be sold in all other Nordic states without further certification. Further action in the late 1990s would see a European-Nordic agreement on the harmonisation between CE and NN conformity, allowing joint declarations by manufacturers of "CE/NN" conformity.

The parallels mostly stopped there however. The European Community was admitting new states for accession now (Greece had acceded to the European Community in 1981, followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986), and the voting system had become rather complicated. In addition, many idealists sought to move the European Community on towards a closer federal union, and envisaged a new "European Union", with far greater centralisation at the "Union" level (or federal as some phrased it), and a reduction in member state influence. This proved to be highly controversial, and caused a great deal of debate in EC political circles, but the Maastricht Treaty ended up being signed and forming the new European Union (evolved from the European Community).

The Nordics took a separate move however. The Nordic mindset saw Nordek as a concept of co-operation between nation states, and a sense of scepticism towards supranational or federal integration. After all, three of it's members had only achieved true independence within the century - Norway in 1905, Finland in 1917 and Iceland in 1918 or 1944 depending on the person speaking (1918 saw independence in a personal union with Denmark, with the Danes handling foreign affairs and defence for the new state, whilst 1944 saw the establishment of the Icelandic Republic and the removal of all links to Denmark). All this meant there was little appetite for a full union above the Nordic member states, and to a Nordic mindset, the future was in further, deeper co-operation and "shared services", even if some political power would have to be centralised. Idealists and advocates for some counterpart "Nordic Union" also ran up against foreign policy issues too, with none able to square Danish, Norwegian and Icelandic membership of NATO with Finnish requirements for a high level relationship with the Soviet Union. Even from an economic viewpoint, Finland continued to do significant trade with the Soviet Union (and other Eastern Bloc countries) despite the Nordic customs union - the Soviet Union was treated equally to the European Community in the Nordics when it came to foreign trade in order to keep the great bear happy, and this had proven an advantageous relationship with a great deal of raw materials coming westwards.

In came Kalevi Sorsa to the Nordic Secretary-General seat in 1989, after a career in Finnish politics. The move was the culmination of Danish-Norwegian-Finnish attempts to ensure that Nordek did not become a sole vessel for Swedish economic dominance, and now each of the three had had a Secretary-General - presumably with a Swede next. Sorsa was a committed supporter of Nordek, seeing it as a vehicle for improving the Finnish economy and international relations - and also one day, potentially a vehicle for closer integration with the European economy as the Soviet Union stagnated. Sorsa had close links with his fraternal parties across the Nordics in SDP parties, whilst also high-level connections in Washington, and more importantly Moscow - adding a degree of credence to assertions he could gather acceptance for further Nordek integration with both the domestic Nordic governments and the Soviets next door.

sorsa.jpg

The new Nordek Secretary-General.

Many other ideas were being discussed by 1990, with ideas ranging across the entire political mindset with a few still pressing for a full federal union. This was not to be, but gaping cracks in the Soviet Union were suddenly visible, and for a couple of years, everyone watched events unfold to the east. One major policy initiative in 1990, shortly before the Soviet implosion was a "Nordic Airspace Agreement", which introduced the Nordek single market to the aviation market within the Nordic area. Aviation was a critical part of Nordic transportation, given the long distances and often unfriendly terrain, and the agreement introduced the concept of a "Nordic" air carrier - any airline of a member state, majority owned by the Nordics and principally based in the Nordics. Any Nordic carrier, after a transition period where rules on prices were deregulated, would be able to fly between any Nordic airports, whilst also competition rules were laid out on facilities and supporting processes (ie. air control, landing slots, ground services) to ensure freedom of access for all. Whilst there were fears about the future of more rural subsidised routes (which were still permitted), the introduction of smaller and more nimble regional airlines would often end up enhancing rural air connectivity with better services and lower prices.

Road signage was also be harmonised under members state agreement; the International E-Road Network was fully integrated in to national signage, which had proved difficult when E-roads were renumbered, with the Nordics refusing to resign the roads due to the expense it would cause. This led to the "E4" and "E6" roads being retained as they were. Major trunk roads (often called "national roads") which were not E-Roads would be renumbered, with the process scheduled to take up to 12 years with a slow rate of sign replacement and updating, with longer-distance roads receiving an Nxxx number - although the meaning of the "N" was never conclusively stated, and rotates between "Nordic", "Norden" or "National" in popular culture. Roads in the N1xx group were cross-border main roads - primarily in Norway and Sweden and to a lesser extent Finland, with subsequent numbers groups assigned: N3xx (Denmark), N4xx (Norway), N5xx (Sweden), N6xx (Finland) and N7xx (the Atlantic Islands; Greenland, Iceland and the Faroes) - with those national authorities then subdividing the numbering scheme as appropriate for them. However, the Atlantic Islands all elected not to participate - they had no land borders to standardise numbers on and had little in the way of truly "major" roads by wider Nordic and global standards. In terms of marketing, Iceland had branded it's ring road as "Highway 1", and the was reluctant to lose the clear signage, whilst Greenland had no interconnecting roads between their settlements, and the Faroes had a similarly tiny number of roads.
 
Talk about palme bungling the finnish relations with the ussr but i hope his uncompromising stance on apartheid is followed by the nordics as a whole.
 
Nice parallel development. What has been the European, particularly the French, reaction to Norden throughout the years?
 

Devvy

Donor
Talk about palme bungling the finnish relations with the ussr but i hope his uncompromising stance on apartheid is followed by the nordics as a whole.
Awkward overlap of responsibilities given there's no "Nordic Foreign Minister" - you're going to have people muddying the water all the time, exactly the same as EU in OTL. But at the same time, while the Palme might make life a bit uncomfortable for the Finns with regards to the Soviets, it amplifies the message that there is no political union - Palme can say what he wants, but he says it as the Swedish Prime Minister, not as part of Nordek at all. That's the message for the Finns to convey, difficult as it will be at times.

Nice parallel development. What has been the European, particularly the French, reaction to Norden throughout the years?

I would guess little changes; even combined, the population of the entire Nordics is roughly half that of just France. But it's worth noting that most industrial trade barriers for the Nordics had already been lowered by EFTA membership, and of imports to the Nordics from outside EFTA, roughly 2/3 came from the EC. There will be continuing trade, even if Sweden absorbs some of the industrial capacity initially provided by Germany (for whom the Nordics collectively are the largest export market for German finished goods), and likewise Denmark absorbs agricultural demand.

But I think France and Germany - particularly with the UK joining the EEC in 1975ish - would probably be looking already to some form of EC-EFTA more formal integration. Whilst pretty free trade in industrial goods is easy to negotiate under EC-EFTA agreement, and collectively the Nordics can strike a better deal then individually, better trade in agriculture will be more difficult. France won't want competition with it's newly found high agricultural demand; I think UK food imports will substitute Denmark for France at least partly. The higher Nordic agriculture subsidy will cause issues for free trade in agriculture though, and likewise fisheries will be a tad awkward given the nationally operated fishing areas. The losses of the UK market for the Nordic exports would be at least partly made up by an increase in intra-Nordics trade, and an ability to collectively get a better trade deal with the EC.

In a wider scheme though, with the greatest of respects to a region I love, they don't have the largest of impacts on the global stage. I think Greece, Spain & Portugal will constitutionally change and join the EC in the mid 1980s still, Morocco will still be spurned, and the new entrants (along with UK and Ireland from the 1970s) will drive roughly OTL EC/EU evolution - from an EC point of view they've only lost Denmark over OTL.
 
So with Finnish farmers getting out-competed and turning to cities and other places in the "union" would a choice of destination be Denmark?
 
So with Finnish farmers getting out-competed and turning to cities and other places in the "union" would a choice of destination be Denmark?

It would be a destination, IMO. But not as much as Sweden which is closer, and where Finns can expect to be understood with their halting Swedish, or because there is already a sizable number of Finnish guest workers.
 
It would be a destination, IMO. But not as much as Sweden which is closer, and where Finns can expect to be understood with their halting Swedish, or because there is already a sizable number of Finnish guest workers.
Most of them would end up the suburbs of greater Helsinki area, like in OTL. And instead voting for Social Democrats, they'd be likely to vote for the Populist SMP, like they did historically. In OTL SMP peaked with a share of nearly 10% of the total vote in the parliemantary elections of 1983 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1983_Finnish_parliamentary_election
 

Devvy

Donor
So with Finnish farmers getting out-competed and turning to cities and other places in the "union" would a choice of destination be Denmark?

Largely due to what @DrakonFin and @Karelian said, Finns leaving the countryside will predominately head firstly to the cities, which in a country like Finland will largely be Helsinki, but also other cities (Turku, Tampere and Oulu to name a few). A not insignificant amount of Finns will emigrate as well; as mentioned, Sweden and Stockholm in particular will be a large magnet given the language, culture (existing ex-pat communities) and geographical distance. There will be political turbulence, especially in the late 1970s/early 1980s, as "Nordek" effects are felt. Finnish farming won't be eliminated by Nordek, but it's going to be under heavy competition against Danish bovine or pork products. Domestic farming will remain, particularly in crop farming which it seems is something that Finland can do reasonably well. Bear in mind, this TL "Nordic Agricultural Subsidy" was set up to offer greater subsidies the further north you are, so the net effect just like OTL EU CAP, is that the Finns get a greater subsidy then farmers in Denmark.
 
I'd have to check if it was a prior iteration of @Devvy 's Nordic federation interest that recently involved a formal political union with a directly elected union Ting (also with a bicameral upper house selected by the respective member governments) and went all wonky with a suggested electoral scheme and predicting the partisan make up of the resulting first Ting.

Whether such union might be in the cards by say ATL 2020s is not settled yet, but so far nothing like it is on the horizon even; the entire operations of Nordek hitherto are a matter of the separate sovereign states having treaties and appointing delegates to negotiate operations between them, no direct elections by the people in sight. Unless something paralleling the EU of OTL doing that with debatable relevance has slipped past me.

So I find it remarkable how interesting discussing the treaty coordination on a basis more parallel to NATO than to EU still can be. Here I've been kind of hoping for the eventual political union, but it never has to happen for Nordek to be an interesting thing to consider nonetheless.

Even the collapse of the USSR does not clear the way for a more tight political union after all. It bothers me that the unification of Europe under EU auspices seems to have hit a hard derail and is coming unglued OTL, but perhaps that is because I don't appreciate national patriotism enough. Meanwhile, while the collapse of the Soviet-Communist system was much ballyhooed as some kind of historic inauguration of a new era of peace, actual Western-Russian relations have remained strained with deep suspicion and deep reasons for it on both sides. Thus here Finland remains in a delicate place, and so finding a way for Nordek to bring palpable benefits to various Nordic nations while squaring the political circle of NATO/Russian polarization remains salient indefinitely, and this also highlights the different political cultures between Norway and Denmark's NATO membership and Sweden's armed and watchful neutrality. Agreeing to disagree on these aspects of governance without having to sacrifice the benefits of Nordek is pretty remarkable, and we still might see some benefit to at least some of the Baltic Republics assuming that the Russian successor state to the USSR cannot or chooses not to keep a Russian grip on these dissident nations. Estonia at any rate would seem to have an inside track to joining Nordek--and if the Russians can be confident this has no bearing on some sort of northern tier ganging up on Russia, the Russians might not be much opposed.

Actually if Nordek membership spreading tends to preempt some former Soviet republics from joining NATO as part of an EU package, and there are two separate international economic/technical unions in Europe, at least one of which is only loosely joined at the hip to NATO and with its strongest single power not in that alliance at all, they might have mixed feelings--despite the lack of explicit political and strategic alliance on matters of defense and foreign policy, if Estonia, still more Lithuania and Latvia, are in "Nordek" that does put some check on how much Russia can strongarm the little nations, and thus weakens Russian threats against Finland too. But vice versa if none of these nations are formally in NATO then in effect a buffer zone exists in the far north the Russians would only wish existed farther south--indeed Belarus splitting off from Russia formally gives Russia itself a bit of such a buffer zone between itself and a quite hostile Poland. It ties Russian hands from opportunistic ventures in the north, but similarly insulates Russian northwest frontiers from NATO highhandedness too, so given that presumably the Russians were motivated to release the Baltics had to do with recognizing trying to maintain Moscow's supremacy there was a painful diversion and political liability, Russian ambition does not lie directly to the west anyway. They'd rather focus on their south and southwest I suppose, and a wash wherein both Moscow and NATO are diverted away from that direct confrontation looks like a net win to the Russians.

Of course, if Nordek were then to merge into a stronger federal union, the resulting major state would be a major security concern for the Russians. So my guess is now, it does not happen. And that's OK. The whole issue of lost sovereignty is largely sidestepped and the union serves many good purposes but never becomes a security alliance as such--just the implicit hint of one, in the form, never formalized, that obviously messing with one of the members will be viewed with concern and sympathy for their partner by all others within the union, or most anyway, Which might be enough to make the Russians very skittish about even just Estonia (the most geographically proximate threat if I remember my Baltic republic geography correctly, to be sure, as well as the best fit to the current "Nordic" cluster culturally) let alone the other two joining. Lithuania in particular probably has to lean strongly on Poland.

Nor is it clear to me that any former Soviet republic or WP state would be viewed as an asset by Nordek anyway. Keeping Finland and Iceland on board might be as much stretching as any of the core three kingdoms can sustain.
 

Devvy

Donor
I'd have to check if it was a prior iteration of @Devvy 's Nordic federation interest that recently involved a formal political union with a directly elected union Ting (also with a bicameral upper house selected by the respective member governments) and went all wonky with a suggested electoral scheme and predicting the partisan make up of the resulting first Ting.
I'm guessing you mean (as I read it as well) this thread: linky. In which case, it wasn't me; personally, I don't think you can have (spoiler alert) a full federal union between the countries; in terms of foreign policy, there's too much divergence and the countries even when united aren't big enough to plot their own course.

Whether such union might be in the cards by say ATL 2020s is not settled yet, but so far nothing like it is on the horizon even; the entire operations of Nordek hitherto are a matter of the separate sovereign states having treaties and appointing delegates to negotiate operations between them, no direct elections by the people in sight. Unless something paralleling the EU of OTL doing that with debatable relevance has slipped past me.

So I find it remarkable how interesting discussing the treaty coordination on a basis more parallel to NATO than to EU still can be. Here I've been kind of hoping for the eventual political union, but it never has to happen for Nordek to be an interesting thing to consider nonetheless.

Same for me - and related to above... The Nordics can, in some ways, still end up better integrated than the EU. I won't go in to massive details yet, as it's still something I'm slowly fleshing out, but even in OTL there's a great deal of regional integration.

Even the collapse of the USSR does not clear the way for a more tight political union after all. It bothers me that the unification of Europe under EU auspices seems to have hit a hard derail and is coming unglued OTL, but perhaps that is because I don't appreciate national patriotism enough. Meanwhile, while the collapse of the Soviet-Communist system was much ballyhooed as some kind of historic inauguration of a new era of peace, actual Western-Russian relations have remained strained with deep suspicion and deep reasons for it on both sides. Thus here Finland remains in a delicate place, and so finding a way for Nordek to bring palpable benefits to various Nordic nations while squaring the political circle of NATO/Russian polarization remains salient indefinitely, and this also highlights the different political cultures between Norway and Denmark's NATO membership and Sweden's armed and watchful neutrality. Agreeing to disagree on these aspects of governance without having to sacrifice the benefits of Nordek is pretty remarkable, and we still might see some benefit to at least some of the Baltic Republics assuming that the Russian successor state to the USSR cannot or chooses not to keep a Russian grip on these dissident nations. Estonia at any rate would seem to have an inside track to joining Nordek--and if the Russians can be confident this has no bearing on some sort of northern tier ganging up on Russia, the Russians might not be much opposed.

Well, as already aluded to, the Soviet Union is falling apart. With all due respect to the Nordics, it's not globally significant enough to change the course of major events. So the Soviet republics and WP nations will break away, at least in Europe where we are covering. Nordek vs Europe - integration in Europe from my point of view has always been based on economic matters, and political union has been really difficult due to the rich and large countries with long histories (predominately France and formerly UK). Nordek is built with an eye for economics, but on top of social and cultural matters which the Nordic Council since the 1950s has been fostering. Full freedom of movement (not just workers), access to social security, the language convention, etc etc, these are all great examples of the depth of Nordic co-operation which in some ways goes deeper than the EU and gives a base of non-economic union. Nordic co-operation isn't just there to make them all richer (although that's a great side benefit), it's also a matter of the heart.

Actually if Nordek membership spreading tends to preempt some former Soviet republics from joining NATO as part of an EU package, and there are two separate international economic/technical unions in Europe, at least one of which is only loosely joined at the hip to NATO and with its strongest single power not in that alliance at all, they might have mixed feelings--despite the lack of explicit political and strategic alliance on matters of defense and foreign policy, if Estonia, still more Lithuania and Latvia, are in "Nordek" that does put some check on how much Russia can strongarm the little nations, and thus weakens Russian threats against Finland too. But vice versa if none of these nations are formally in NATO then in effect a buffer zone exists in the far north the Russians would only wish existed farther south--indeed Belarus splitting off from Russia formally gives Russia itself a bit of such a buffer zone between itself and a quite hostile Poland. It ties Russian hands from opportunistic ventures in the north, but similarly insulates Russian northwest frontiers from NATO highhandedness too, so given that presumably the Russians were motivated to release the Baltics had to do with recognizing trying to maintain Moscow's supremacy there was a painful diversion and political liability, Russian ambition does not lie directly to the west anyway. They'd rather focus on their south and southwest I suppose, and a wash wherein both Moscow and NATO are diverted away from that direct confrontation looks like a net win to the Russians.

The Baltics are, granted, an awkward one. In my initial version of this TL many years ago, I had Estonia and Latvia join. Whether that still happens I haven't written yet; it's an awkward one. The Baltics will be absolutely fixated on NATO membership to secure their independence from the Soviet Union, and the Nordics/Nordek just can't give them that written assurance on it, for exactly the same reason; the Nordics don't want to upset the Soviets/Russians. But equally, I think at least Estonia would much rather join Nordek then the EC. Latvia and Lithuania not so sure about, but quickly get very complicated.

Of course, if Nordek were then to merge into a stronger federal union, the resulting major state would be a major security concern for the Russians. So my guess is now, it does not happen. And that's OK. The whole issue of lost sovereignty is largely sidestepped and the union serves many good purposes but never becomes a security alliance as such--just the implicit hint of one, in the form, never formalized, that obviously messing with one of the members will be viewed with concern and sympathy for their partner by all others within the union, or most anyway, Which might be enough to make the Russians very skittish about even just Estonia (the most geographically proximate threat if I remember my Baltic republic geography correctly, to be sure, as well as the best fit to the current "Nordic" cluster culturally) let alone the other two joining. Lithuania in particular probably has to lean strongly on Poland.

Nor is it clear to me that any former Soviet republic or WP state would be viewed as an asset by Nordek anyway. Keeping Finland and Iceland on board might be as much stretching as any of the core three kingdoms can sustain.
See prior comments! :)
 
Chapter 6: Confederation (early 1990s)

Devvy

Donor
Chapter 6: Confederation (early 1990s).

"Lika barn leka bäst."
Alike children play together best.

bridge.jpg

The Oresund Bridge not only links Denmark to Sweden, but was also a product of joint Nordic funding through Nordek.

By 1991, the proposals for closer Nordic integration had continued to be put forward, with the Soviet Union in a state of tumult, but by the end of the year, it was clear that the Soviet regime was on life support with a poor prognosis, and this threw open the doors of possibility for Nordek reform free of the need to play to a virtual Soviet veto. Ideas for federal union continued to be laid down by a mix of elite politicians, but were still unable to square a circle; Soviet/Russian fears of a Finnish slide to the west and to NATO, ending up with NATO only 400km from St Petersburg (Leningrad at that point). The US feared a slide of Danish and Norwegian partners in to ambivalence towards NATO (thereby setting a scene for NATO disintegrating in the face of a common enemy), as well as a loss of of the important military base in Iceland - critical for monitoring Soviet/Russian movements out to the Atlantic Ocean. Domestically, much of the Nordic political systems preferred continued practical "co-operation between equals" rather than lofty ideas of grand sweeping constitutional reforms.

Sweden and Denmark particularly had done well out of the Nordek economy and Norway had done well with Nordek subsidies to modernise itself and get it's energy economy operational. Iceland, however, not so much - unlike the neighbours in the Faroes and Greenland, being a sovereign country meant they received no domestic transfer payments from the richer Danish mainland and also being so small meant it received less attention. Whilst receiving funding, in particular to complete the road system around Iceland, it was clear that there were few "headline" projects for which Nordek could take credit and market itself. In Finland as well, the economy had been in a state of rapid transformation - there had been winners (usually the urban city population) and losers (the rural farmers) with a rapid trend towards a service-based and urban country as farmers left the rural lands. This had some contrary effects however, as farms merged and became larger, increasing scales of efficiency, with many farms now turning to forestry and logging instead of agriculture. Political earthquakes had been weathered, with the rise and fall of the populist SMP party representing the less affluent Finns, and the emigration of the Finns had been stemmed as companies opened offices and sites in Finland itself.

By 1993, firm new treaty proposals were tabled, named "Treaty establishing a Nordic Confederation". In order to avoid any pretension or illusion of political union, the Nordics would remain a firmly co-operative system, there would be no proposal for an elected Nordic Parliament, even if there was no real requirement to play for full Soviet acceptance any more. There seemed little point in offering any new frustrations with the new Russian neighbours, especially after the Russian-Finnish Agreement of 1992 had brought the previous "Treaty of Friendship" to an end, and the end of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" in the 1980s meant Russia was seemingly unlikely to militarily intervene in Finland without provocation. There was, however, a Nordic Assembly, made up of national Parliamentarians from the member states, in proportions reflecting the national Parliaments. Seats in the Nordic Assembly were granted on a regressive scheme with a minimum of 2 seats for the small autonomous territories; on 1990s statistics, Sweden (40), Norway (30), Denmark (33), Finland (32), Iceland (11), Greenland (2), Faroes (2), Aland (2). This would ensure greater co-operation between the various national Parliaments - crucial for the future if the Nordic scheme of discussion, compromise, and unanimity in decisions was to be retained.

Fundamentally, the concepts of Nordek and the Nordic Council would be unified, with the bureaucracy merged and the Nordic Council becoming the institution which managed Nordek and a host of other pan-Nordic programmes, with the administration known as the "Nordic Executive". The Nordic Council would gain it's own international legal identity, allowing for membership of the World Trade Organisation - directly comparable to the moves the European Union was making. More fundamentally would be the introduction of direct "Nordic Law" in policy areas where the member states had agreed to integrate; commercial & economic especially, as well as a host of business policy issues such as corporate bankruptcy and how firms should handle cross-border staff, in order to create a single, clear set of rules - which would then also have the advantage of being challenged if needed in a clear Nordic administrative court system. While there was a great desire to spread the Nordic institutions out from Gothenburg, to other countries, there was a major hurdle; most felt it would be advantageous to be situated away from national capitals, and all non-capital cities in the Nordics bar Gothenburg were small and had poor transport connections, except Malmo (also in Sweden). In the end, to avoid long debates, arguments and protracted political trading over locations, the new Nordic institutions would continue to be located in what had become known as the "Nordic Quarter" in Gothenburg, which was rapidly rebuilding the north shore of the Gota Alv.

The economy was to be boosted by the harmonisation of VAT rules; the entire Nordics would now be a single VAT bloc (except the Aland Islands and Greenland which did not charge VAT), eliminating the "customs-free" purchases available on most cross-border flights or ships. Whilst the elimination of customs-free purchases at the airport was briefly unpopular, it did hugely simplify cross-border purchases, and allowed the Danes, Norwegians and Swedes especially, but also the Finns and to a lesser extent Icelanders, to cross the border, purchase what they wanted, and return home with no risk of further taxes being imposed at the border, whilst VAT would always be charged on the location of the seller to avoid complex cross-border tax collections. A new Nordic currency would be established by the 2000s, in all member states, inherently implying a closer economic, banking and financial union, although steps on how to implement this were to be left for another time. Co-operation or integration would be sought in media and telecommunications, transport (road, rail and aviation), commercial policy (to better govern the rapidly emerging cross-border economy) - and other areas later if members decided to do so unanimously. Smaller steps also borrowed from European practise, with a common passport design, although there would be no copying of the European principle of citizenship. This would remain solely a prerogative of the Nordic member states, although it was worth noting that Nordic rules from the 1960s meant that any Nordic state citizen moving to another Nordic state could become as a citizen in their new place of abode under a streamlined process after reaching a (usually shortened) amount of time in residence. A flag symbolising the Nordic Confederation would also be established, modelled on the common Nordic Cross design, and featuring the common colours; red, blue, white and yellow, whilst a new "Nordic Swan" emblem signifying the Nordic Executive would feature on joint schemes such as the common passport design.

flag.jpg

A new flag for the Nordic Region/Nordek.

Shared agencies/bodies would be, in principle, be operated by a chairman appointed by the Nordic Executive, and monitored by a board of directors with each member state (excluding the autonomous territories) being represented by one director, with the Nordic Executive appointed chairman also present. In this way, the Nordic Council became the mechanism for administering the co-operation between the member states. With such linguistic diversity across the Nordics - covering three primary language groups and a smaller group (Inuit languages in Greenland, "Old Norse" in Iceland and the Faroes, "Scandinavian" in Denmark, Norway & Sweden, and Finnish...in Finland), naming institutions that would be simple and recognisable became increasingly challenging, sometimes just opting for a neutral English name. In future, the shared bodies would use a single name where ever they operated (ie. "Nordmat" for the Nordic Food Standards Agency), but would always be accompanied by a distinct typographic logo representing that body. With the "Nordic Swan" representing the Nordic Executive, many of the bodies would feature a logo combining the swan with a representative second logo (ie. a head of wheat for the Nordic Agricultural Fund, a simplified passport emblem for the Nordic Border Agencies, simplified coins for the future Nordic Central Bank), thus aiding different language speakers to recognise the body.

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PS: I would add that so far, to the end of this chapter, the Nordic Confederation is agreed at the Nordic level, but will still need enactment in constitutionally required referendums in several countries...to be covered.
 
Chapter 7: The mid 1990s

Devvy

Donor
Chapter 7: The mid-1990s

"Ei ole koiraa karvoihin katsominen."
You don't choose a dog according to it's hair according to Finns.

referendum.jpg

Referendums all around in the 1990s.

Initially, the early 1990s (and indeed very late 1980s) were dominated by an international context; the cracking and eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union. This would have profound impacts on the Nordic states, and Nordek in particular. Support for new liberal and nationalist groups from western leaders was to a lesser extent mirrored in the Nordics, although notably Finnish politicians continued to ignore the issue, unwilling to "provoke the bear" themselves and commenting that unrest was an "internal Soviet matter". The three Baltic states / ex-Soviet republics would rapidly gain independence and recognition (by virtue of UN membership) by 1991 - and corroborated by the "new" Russia as independent, with troops gradually leaving - also echoed by a new Russian-Finnish Treaty of Friendship. All three states would join NATO over the next 10 years (fully acceding in the early 2000s), keen to fully cement their newly regained freedom, but economic co-operation was another question. Lithuania looked south and west, with Poland, towards European integration. Estonia looked north, keen to advertise it's "Nordic-ness".

The former Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, had been one of the largest obstacles to Nordic deeper integration due to his outspoken nature on foreign affairs, and the need for Nordic balance between placating the Soviet Union and co-operation with the United States & NATO. He was especially vocal and critical of the Soviet Union during the turbulent early 1990s, when the Baltic states where pushing for independence. Now those same Palme comments became the biggest proponent of Nordic integration, with Palme's backing of the Baltic states providing a feeling of goodwill between Sweden (and to a lesser extent the wider Nordics), and the Baltic nations. Palme's comments have often been seen as a great example of the high-minded principles of the Nordics, acting against colonialism where ever seen and speaking out against it - but equally those very comments made life difficult for Finland's special position with Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union, and general warming of relations between the Russian Federation and Finland (and by extension the Nordics) allowed huge steps forward by the Nordics. The signing of the new treaty governing relations between Finland and Russia re-affirmed the territorial integrity of both parties, by extension refuting the concept of any irredentist claims to land held by the other side, also allowed the ending of the previous "friendship" treaty between Finland and the Soviet Union (for whom Russia was treated as the legal successor). The actions allowed Finland to drift closer to the Nordics in it's foreign stance, less looking over it's shoulder at "Mother Russia".

All these actions, and dissolution of the Soviet Union, combined to allow a new spirit of "1990s optimism" - despite financial problems in the early 1990s, especially in Sweden but also across much of the Nordics. This new found optimism led to the agreement of the "Nordic Confederation" treaty between Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland, and also co-signed by Greenland, the Faroes, and Aland Islands, in which the signatories agreed to deeper integration predominately in the economic realm, with the potential for further co-operative integration if desired. The treaty, whilst not centralising a significant amount of power, did raise new constitutional questions due to the direct effect of Nordic law in the economic and commercial realm, and would legally require a referendum in several of the signing countries (and desired to eliminate any legal issues in others). In to this complex field, somewhat unintentionally, waded Estonia - and to a lesser extent Latvia and Lithuania who began to enquire about membership in the new Nordic Confederation. The Baltics were very different from the general "Nordic Model" which seemingly was at the heart of each of the 5 Nordic nations. A generally free market, with strong legal and social safeguards. A high-tax system, with high benefits and governmental spending, generally strong Parliamentarianism (although the Finnish Presidency had only recently allowed political power to flow back towards the Prime Minister) and a united economy. Even with Estonia sharing a linguistic family with Finland, and thus being the closest, they didn't seem great fits - both emerging post-Soviet nations, significantly poorer, and potentially jeopardising Russian relations given the historic Russian position on the shores of the Baltic and the continued existence of the Kaliningrad exclave.

The approach divided the Nordics, and the spirit of friendly relations and harmony between the Nordic nations. Some were in favour - Finland especially backed Estonia, as did Sweden partly who saw new markets to operate in - although many Swedes were unsure about admitting a bloc of 8 million people in to Nordek, many of whom were likely to migrate to richer countries, which would often be Sweden for various reasons. Denmark and Norway were more unsure, and were sceptical of their "Nordic identity" as well as the cost of integrating ex-Soviet republics in to the (at the time) Nordek system. Iceland, Greenland and the Faroes were somewhat ambivalent - they were hardly going to be a major target for migration or have to pay substantial amounts to modernise the Baltics, but there was an unease about the potential redirection of funds used in the three islands to instead subsidise the Baltics. The Icelandic Prime Minister, David Oddson, was caught making less than polite comments about the Baltics, whilst a Dane in Government asked "Who on earth are these people? They aren't historically Nordic, culturally Nordic or linguistically Nordic, and so they shouldn't be in Nordek", apparently blissfully unaware of Swedish history in Estonia and Latvia (and even the Danes in Estonia before that). The comments also highly irritated Finns (and to a lesser extent the Greenlanders, who were still ultimately under Danish rule), whose language was not Scandinavian and was a Finnic language similar to Estonian, and saw it as yet more "linguistic imperialism" by the Scandinavians to their detriment. This was notwithstanding the fact that the three Baltic nations, due to the regressive allocation of Nordic Assembly within the future Confederation, would collectively have more influence than any other existing Nordic nation.

Quickly, Lithuania looked elsewhere. Despite being a planned entrant to NATO (much to Russia's concern), economic stability was equally important, and Lithuanian politicians - widely - felt that Nordek could not offer the markets and the economic freedom to allow Lithuanian progress. The geographical position of Lithuania, right between Russia and it's Kaliningrad exclave realistically left it with little alternative, especially with at the very least, Nordic ambivalence towards any chance of membership to the north. Estonia, on the other hand, would not be dissuaded; it was a Nordic nation, shared a language family with Finland and had a history with both Sweden and Denmark. One of post-Soviet activities of Estonia in 1993 was to adapt it's classic Estonian flag in to a Nordic cross design, to try and nail down it's Nordic credentials in the public mind in Scandinavia. Latvia was caught in the middle, undergoing an identity crisis as to it's future roadmap.

estonia.jpg

The new Estonian flag.

The removal of Lithuania - in the early 1990s accounting for just shy of half the Baltic people - simplified the equations significantly, reducing the potential entrants to just Estonia and Latvia with approximately 4 million people - less than any Nordic nation bar Iceland and the territories. The later decoupling of the issue - with the concepts being divided in to two questions on the referendum also removed some momentum from the "anti-expansion" groups, and allowing the two separate points to be debated without clouding each other. It allowed the proponents to paint the treaty questions in simpler terms; simplifying and reducing the bureaucracy by bringing together the Nordic Council and Nordek (and the dozens of other Nordic conventions), simplifying the framework for business by removing different national interpretations of the same written Nordek law, and introducing a common currency. Other activities were possible, but only unanimously - and thus retaining a national veto. Of the voices, predominately Danish, wanting better opportunities for trade with Europe, this was one area did attract criticism over Nordek not doing enough, but the fact that the Nordics were better negotiating together as a bloc rather than individually for European Union membership was a difficult point to counter.

Legislation was tabled rapidly following the treaty signing, with governments aiming for referendums in the summer of 1994; May would be "Referendum Month" across all the Nordic nations & territories, with the summer generally proving an easier time to get people out and vote instead of the wet, and very cold winter. The lead-up was remarkably similar in most Nordic countries; proponents advocated the larger Nordic market, the better business environment, and new opportunities for both business and the individual man & woman on the street - whilst also pointing out the lack of other options, with the loss of trade from the dissolved Soviet Union, and an already rejected European Union. Critics derided a loss of national sovereignty, lack of democratic oversight of Nordek (and the proposed Nordic Confederation), and the fact that even combined, the Nordics would still rank as a mid-European country by population, and a "high, but not at the top table" country by GDP - proper European membership was needed in order to offer better business opportunities. The Danes went first - given the previous referendum, everyone thought it wise to let Denmark vote first, on Tuesday 17th May. The Danes were then followed by Norway, Iceland, Greenland, Sweden, the Faroes, Aland and finally Finland over the course of the next 6 weeks - which exactly spanned 1.5 months, lending some peculiar phrasing to the slogan "Referendum Month".

The question on the Nordic Confederation "Should <country> accept the proposed 'Treaty establish the Nordic Confederation' ?", gave an unambiguous answer. Each country voted yes, although some by more than others, with enthusiasm predominately in the primary Scandinavian Three (Denmark, Norway, Sweden). This was likely based on the geographically short distances between them - the "no barrier" borders were clearly advantageous among three, with Copenhagen residents now moving across to Malmo and the wider Skane area with cheaper property prices and commuting across the Copenhagen every day. Finland also backed the treaty, considering the severe drop in trade from the dissolved Soviet Union left it with little other choice. Enthusiasm was far less prominent in the Atlantic however, Greeland, Iceland and the Faroes all approved the Treaty with lower turnouts and closer results, with Greenland in particular running somewhat close to the line with 53% approving the Treaty - something rescued by the more enthusiastic Danes living in Greenland (keen to preserve maximum links with Denmark) over the more negative view amongst the local Inuit.

The question on expansion "Should <country> accept applications from Estonia and Latvia to join the proposed Nordic Confederation?" was far more controversial. In light of opinion polls indicating a potential "no" vote in some countries (predominately Denmark), a compromise was quickly arranged. Estonia and Latvia would accede to the economic community as proposed, but their right to join the passport union and many other underlying Nordic agreements would be postponed for 5 years - having the effect of preventing freedom of movement from Estonia and Latvia to the existing Nordic states until those 5 years were over. The hope was that within those 5 years, Estonia and Latvia could be better integrated in to the "Nordic System", and so by the end of the period there would be no large scale migrationary movements or "brain drains" from Estonia or Latvia - and likewise the legal environments in those countries would be ready for compliance with things like the Nordic Extradition Agreement, and other Nordic conventions. Estonia made plenty of effort, but would it be enough?

The answer was yes - just, with an average of 54% approving of the enlargement; it seemed the 5 year "transition window" had convinced just enough voters that enlargement was suitable. Denmark was the closest, with a mere 51% approving of Estonia and Latvia joining.

------------------------------------
I don't think the Nordic Confederation will be massively controversial; there will be a load of "no" voters - nationalists and those who favour Europe, but I think "yes" will be reasonably comfortable here, maybe around two thirds in favour across the region. Estonia and Latvia joining is far more touch and go. Given that Estonia and Latvia are in NATO for defence purposes from Russia allows the Nordics/Nordek to continue as a purely economic community; if they can manage Finland's relationship with the Soviets, Estonia/Latvia with the new Russia should not be "too" difficult. Their accession also dilutes the DK/SE/NO strong influence on Nordic direction due to the regressive seat allocation, gives Finland a closer ally in the Nordics, and presents a nice new market (or two) for Nordic businesses.
 
Too bad about Lithuania though, acceptance could have done it some good esp. on brain drain.

Does Nordic look to Africa at all?
 
Too bad about Lithuania though, acceptance could have done it some good esp. on brain drain.
Perhaps they can leverage their position being willing to join the EC as the EC "gateway to Russia" and unique Baltic member, especially with NATO probably seeing Latvia and Estonia as somewhat ambiguous in their NATO commitment and NATO hawks therefore seeking to double down on Lithuania and therefore advocate conciliation.

Obviously, Nordek is not an antagonist to the EC, and the non-NATO Nordek nations are not enemies of NATO. But in both the civil and geopolitical senses, the northern grouping stands aside and therefore would seem less reliable. Presumably Estonia and Latvia are very keen to preserve NATO standing, being otherwise pretty vulnerable to latter-day Russian revanchism or just plain ambition, but looking at Nordek even as purely civil bloc (ostensibly) I imagine the more hard line NATO advocates have a bit of doubt about how much Norway and Denmark and even Iceland can be relied upon (indeed OTL Iceland has gotten pretty assertive about limiting US presence). In strictly civil-economic terms, Lithuania joining the EC and not Nordek really ought to get that country some special regard. The convergence of uncompromised NATO geopolitical allegiance and EC economic union option should make Lithuania able to get a better deal than OTL.
Does Nordic look to Africa at all?
I don't see anything much changing things versus OTL. Formally, no Scandinavian nation has ties to Africa any time recently, closest thing being Denmark having held what are now the US Virgin Islands until the Wilson administration purchased them. Meanwhile, of course all Nordek nations, or anyway most, are active on a governmental level as offering volunteers to serve as UN "blue helmet" peacekeeper forces, and I suppose Nordic nations have been very forthcoming in the private/NGO nonprofit sector offering humanitarian aid of many kinds, and I gather that a thing that happened OTL in the 2000s and 2010s was lots and lots of refugees moving into Europe from Africa generally, with major Scandinavian nations (Sweden and Denmark at least) accepting many of these, and a subsequent political backlash spanning a pretty wide political spectrum--some people being outright racists, others proposing or anyway claiming that it would be better to double down on efforts to mediate and improve things in the refugees' homelands and thus enabling and encouraging them to stay there.

I guess the question to ask is, do any of the ATL Nordek provisions change the general calculus that governed these trends OTL? If so, how?

The major thing would be if the passport movement legally had to be extended automatically to refugees accepted by any sovereign member of Nordek. That would mean someone might be given refuge or asylum in one nation, say Denmark, and then have the freedom to relocate to anywhere in Nordek (at least the parts accepted within the passport union, at this point everywhere but Latvia and Estonia) without the locals there being able to veto it. I doubt that is how grants of asylum and refugee settlement work legally though; I imagine that any refugees who were not formally accepted as naturalized immigrants would be in a bit of a discretionary twilight zone and other Nordek members would remain able to accept or reject any applications they might make to relocate there per their separate general national laws. Someone who was formally naturalized would of course enjoy the freedom and rights any other subject/citizen of their host kingdom/republic would have, so after that step it would be true that an African refugee naturalized to Swedish citizenship could in fact settle in Iceland if they have a mind to. But while I have not studied the matter, I am guessing Nordek member countries generally would have pretty strict procedures and quotas for actual full naturalization.

So there would be few naturalized refugees, and the general politics and legalities of it all would be pretty much as OTL, for good or for bad, and nation by nation.

Certainly it would be possible in the ATL for Nordek policy makers to decide to reorganize a collective Nordek immigration and interim residence rights and obligations policy, but I suspect the politics would be divisive and controversial enough that letting status quo ride with each nation doing its own thing ad hoc would seem wiser, and the union just passes over in silence.

Advocates of a more collectively settled policy who are coming from a position of humanitarianism might even more aggressively push for Nordek to unify on collective foreign policy to attempt to leverage collective Nordic economic and cultural influence to stabilize and improve conditions in Africa (and other refugee sources). But while I would find success in such noble causes inspirational, it is a long shot at best and cynically speaking, even with the peoples of Nordek all allied in the matter (instead of at least some factions being against it as realistically many would be) the global conditions creating general global misery are deeply rooted in the legacy of the powers that be in the world, and Nordek will not be able to prevail, at least not without major political earthquakes. Meanwhile domestically it is hardly realistic everyone will line up to unstintingly support it.

Basically Nordek nations will be told by the more cynical power brokers of the world, "if you want to help out these poor souls by taking them in, knock yourself out. But you have no business lecturing us about how we do business in the world, so stay out of it if you don't want to be laughed off the stage."

I'd like to believe there is a place in geopolitics for moral leadership and suasion, and hope that in the future the Nordic nations will shine an edifying and improving light, and perhaps even come to be serious heeded advisors and leaders in general world improvements based on moral and intellectual clarity. I am not holding my breath for this sort of thing prevailing though, not in the near future anyway.

So to the best of my knowledge Nordek nations would be about as OTL on these matters.
 

Devvy

Donor
Too bad about Lithuania though, acceptance could have done it some good esp. on brain drain.

Does Nordic look to Africa at all?

Perhaps they can leverage their position being willing to join the EC as the EC "gateway to Russia" and unique Baltic member, especially with NATO probably seeing Latvia and Estonia as somewhat ambiguous in their NATO commitment and NATO hawks therefore seeking to double down on Lithuania and therefore advocate conciliation.

Obviously, Nordek is not an antagonist to the EC, and the non-NATO Nordek nations are not enemies of NATO. But in both the civil and geopolitical senses, the northern grouping stands aside and therefore would seem less reliable. Presumably Estonia and Latvia are very keen to preserve NATO standing, being otherwise pretty vulnerable to latter-day Russian revanchism or just plain ambition, but looking at Nordek even as purely civil bloc (ostensibly) I imagine the more hard line NATO advocates have a bit of doubt about how much Norway and Denmark and even Iceland can be relied upon (indeed OTL Iceland has gotten pretty assertive about limiting US presence). In strictly civil-economic terms, Lithuania joining the EC and not Nordek really ought to get that country some special regard. The convergence of uncompromised NATO geopolitical allegiance and EC economic union option should make Lithuania able to get a better deal than OTL.

I don't see anything much changing things versus OTL. Formally, no Scandinavian nation has ties to Africa any time recently, closest thing being Denmark having held what are now the US Virgin Islands until the Wilson administration purchased them. Meanwhile, of course all Nordek nations, or anyway most, are active on a governmental level as offering volunteers to serve as UN "blue helmet" peacekeeper forces, and I suppose Nordic nations have been very forthcoming in the private/NGO nonprofit sector offering humanitarian aid of many kinds, and I gather that a thing that happened OTL in the 2000s and 2010s was lots and lots of refugees moving into Europe from Africa generally, with major Scandinavian nations (Sweden and Denmark at least) accepting many of these, and a subsequent political backlash spanning a pretty wide political spectrum--some people being outright racists, others proposing or anyway claiming that it would be better to double down on efforts to mediate and improve things in the refugees' homelands and thus enabling and encouraging them to stay there.

I guess the question to ask is, do any of the ATL Nordek provisions change the general calculus that governed these trends OTL? If so, how?

The major thing would be if the passport movement legally had to be extended automatically to refugees accepted by any sovereign member of Nordek. That would mean someone might be given refuge or asylum in one nation, say Denmark, and then have the freedom to relocate to anywhere in Nordek (at least the parts accepted within the passport union, at this point everywhere but Latvia and Estonia) without the locals there being able to veto it. I doubt that is how grants of asylum and refugee settlement work legally though; I imagine that any refugees who were not formally accepted as naturalized immigrants would be in a bit of a discretionary twilight zone and other Nordek members would remain able to accept or reject any applications they might make to relocate there per their separate general national laws. Someone who was formally naturalized would of course enjoy the freedom and rights any other subject/citizen of their host kingdom/republic would have, so after that step it would be true that an African refugee naturalized to Swedish citizenship could in fact settle in Iceland if they have a mind to. But while I have not studied the matter, I am guessing Nordek member countries generally would have pretty strict procedures and quotas for actual full naturalization.

So there would be few naturalized refugees, and the general politics and legalities of it all would be pretty much as OTL, for good or for bad, and nation by nation.

Certainly it would be possible in the ATL for Nordek policy makers to decide to reorganize a collective Nordek immigration and interim residence rights and obligations policy, but I suspect the politics would be divisive and controversial enough that letting status quo ride with each nation doing its own thing ad hoc would seem wiser, and the union just passes over in silence.

Advocates of a more collectively settled policy who are coming from a position of humanitarianism might even more aggressively push for Nordek to unify on collective foreign policy to attempt to leverage collective Nordic economic and cultural influence to stabilize and improve conditions in Africa (and other refugee sources). But while I would find success in such noble causes inspirational, it is a long shot at best and cynically speaking, even with the peoples of Nordek all allied in the matter (instead of at least some factions being against it as realistically many would be) the global conditions creating general global misery are deeply rooted in the legacy of the powers that be in the world, and Nordek will not be able to prevail, at least not without major political earthquakes. Meanwhile domestically it is hardly realistic everyone will line up to unstintingly support it.

Basically Nordek nations will be told by the more cynical power brokers of the world, "if you want to help out these poor souls by taking them in, knock yourself out. But you have no business lecturing us about how we do business in the world, so stay out of it if you don't want to be laughed off the stage."

I'd like to believe there is a place in geopolitics for moral leadership and suasion, and hope that in the future the Nordic nations will shine an edifying and improving light, and perhaps even come to be serious heeded advisors and leaders in general world improvements based on moral and intellectual clarity. I am not holding my breath for this sort of thing prevailing though, not in the near future anyway.

So to the best of my knowledge Nordek nations would be about as OTL on these matters.

@Shevek23 said it pretty well. To round things up in my view:

Finland: Feels a bit isolated in the Nordics, as the only "non-Norse" nation. Eager for Estonia and Latvia due to common geopolitical interests and common culture/language, will dilute the DK/SE/NO strong influence on Nordek decision making.
Estonia & Latvia: Eager members of NATO. Whilst I like the idea of Swedish Saab jets being more successful, these two nations will be buying all-American and cementing their place in NATO at light speed. After 50-odd years under Soviet rule, the idea of a predominately intergovernmental union is appealing, as is embracing the Nordic model, but is all too aware of the need to cement NATO status for security. Hoping to emulate Finland with regards to Russian relations, although the large Russian minority residing in Estonia and Latvia complicates things.
Lithuania: Is all too aware of the lack of enough cahones to go eye to eye with Russia by the Nordics. Needs NATO alliance for security, but also EU for economic/diplomatic security given the access to Kaliningrad, and support for Lithuanian-preferential deal on transit visas (see OTL: facilitated transfer documents), etc. The fact that Lithuania had circa 3.7m population in early 1990s doesn't help either with the scare of a wave of poor immigrants from an ex-Soviet republic either (rightly or wrongly), and a fear of the Nordic nations losing political control of their project. The population is high, and culturally is just not Nordic. Estonia can point to a history under Danish and Swedish rule, a Finnic language. Latvia has some cultural traits too. Lithuania is big and lacks many of those, and just won't fly in the Nordics I think.

With regards to NATO membership by DK/NO/IS; there was a Nordic Batallion in Yugoslavia during the breakup; I'd love for that to be better established in future as a rapid deployment force acting under UN mandate. Purely intergovernmental (no role for Nordic Executive) as the Nordics has no foreign or defence policy remit.

I did look round to see if any "special" relations were possible overseas; the best I can find is the US Virgin Islands and St Barthelmy. Neither are exactly interesting in a foreign policy context. The interaction the Nordics will have with Africa will be largely minimal bar South Africa which will have reasonable relations post-Apartheid given the support for anti-apartheid from the Nordics. But even then; what could they achieve together bar a bit of trade?

With regards to the passport union. The treaty is largely unchanged in spirit from OTL, as it predates the PoD. Citizens can travel and migrate freely between signatory states (which technically does not cover Greenland, but de facto does). Visitors can travel freely within the Nordics once admitted by one Nordic state as long as the Nordic states are happy they are authentic short-term visitors and have the means to fund themselves, and any foreigner with a residence permit in one Nordic nation is allowed to visit the other visa-free (unless expelled from those country/ies, in which case he must return to his country of residence). Refugees are not mentioned, but international obligations would require them to assess their entitlement to asylum (I think), and if granted a residence permit in the country (regardless of entitlment to work), would have the right to visit the other Nordic nations unless they were then expelled from other Nordic nations. As soon as the refugee naturalises as a Nordic citizen, all restrictions disappear.

The Passport Union treaty also states that all signatories should reject any foreigner/traveller who does not possess a valid passport or means of identifying the person and nationality (ie. ID card/passport card), as well as rejecting any foreigner/traveller who does not have the means to fund themselves during their visit and fund their exit from the Nordics. If a refugee gained a "refugee visa" first, then they can enter any Nordic country to transit on to the country they have the visa for.

Put simply, any significant refugee wave will severely test the passport bloc. I can't see any centralisation of power like that; the Nordics are intergovernmental in spirit and practise, and such a scheme would be seen as trampling on the rights of the nations.
 
I did look round to see if any "special" relations were possible overseas; the best I can find is the US Virgin Islands and St Barthelmy. Neither are exactly interesting in a foreign policy context. The interaction the Nordics will have with Africa will be largely minimal bar South Africa which will have reasonable relations post-Apartheid given the support for anti-apartheid from the Nordics. But even then; what could they achieve together bar a bit of trade?

I think if the Nordic countries have any special relationship it will be with the former Yugoslavia, both because of the close Swedish-Yugoslav relationship in the Cold War, but also because Nordek have served as a kind of fellow third way faction in the Cold War (even if it was not true), I could also see Romania under Ceausescu having developed a relative close relationship with Nordek and even after the Revolution keep that relationship.
 

Devvy

Donor
I think if the Nordic countries have any special relationship it will be with the former Yugoslavia, both because of the close Swedish-Yugoslav relationship in the Cold War, but also because Nordek have served as a kind of fellow third way faction in the Cold War (even if it was not true), I could also see Romania under Ceausescu having developed a relative close relationship with Nordek and even after the Revolution keep that relationship.

Following on from the "Nordic Batallion" comments, I think it would remain significantly involved in the former Yugoslav areas during the 1990s (assuming the conflicts take a similar schedule to OTL). I can't see any of the Nordics being particularly friendly with Serbia after what occurred, but longer term peacekeeping efforts by a combined Nordic force in Bosnia is a definite possibility.
 
Chapter 8: Communications in the mid 1990s

Devvy

Donor
Chapter 8: Hearts and Minds (mid-late 1990s), Part 1

postal.jpg

Even Santa Claus has a mailing address in Finland.

With the Finnish Secretary-General of Nordek - now of the Nordic Executive - Kalevi Sorsa stepping down in the mid 1990s after successfully introducing the Nordic Confederation and expansion to Estonia and Latvia, a new leader had to be decided. After Danish (Baunsgaard), Norwegian (Nordli) and Finnish (Sorsa) leaders, and given general Swedish business enthusiasm for new markets in the new entrant to the Nordics, it was almost a foregone decision that the new leader would be a Swede. It was also apparent that the new leader would have their work cut out to better win over the hearts and minds of Nordic citizens, to really deliver new initiatives which improved their lives, as well as successfully integrate Estonia and Latvia in to the Nordic fold. The former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme was not widely acceptable due to his foreign policy, but his opponent Carl Bildt turned out to be acceptable to the Nordic member states. He was a proponent of Nordic and European integration, had been a strong advocate for Estonian and Latvian membership of the Nordics, and was not someone who would advocate for Nordic centralisation.

The 1993 Nordic Treaty, amongst other things, expressed a desire to closer co-ordinate and unify communications policy. An easy early decision was to harmonise the various postal code systems, leading to a system which had 3 letters (signifying the local area) and 3 numbers (signifying the exact area), and allowed the reuse of a fair part of the existing postal code systems. The reform solved a problem with growing urbanisation in the Nordic cities placing pressure on existing city postal codes, with previous 4-digit postal codes in Denmark (including Greenland), Norway and Latvia, 5-digit codes in Sweden, Finland and Estonia, and 3-digit codes in Iceland and the Faroe Islands. For example, rather than 00xx to 12xx being Oslo in Norway, this would now be "OSL xxx", with each city or local government area having 999 possible codes under it. Stockholm became "SKH", Helsinki "HSK", Copenhagen "CPH", Gothenburg "GTB" and Reykjavik "RVK", and this eventually allowed quick mail handling as well as the non-requirement any more of a country marking to indicate which Nordic country the mail was addressed for intra-Nordic shipments. In the longer term, with the introduction of satellite navigation in vehicles, it also made cross-border destinations easier to input without needing to enter a postal code and a country.

With regards to telecoms, a 1992 policy in the European Community to concentrate all emergency services on the number "112" was also of interest the Nordics, in simplifying and unifying all emergency services. This would sweep away the current numbers - 90 000 for police in Sweden for example, and establish a clear single emergency number across the whole of the Nordics to access police, fire & rescue, ambulance, coast guard and mountain rescue, and the scheme was easily agreed mutually, and rolled out via national policy across all of the Nordics in 1995/1996. The international dialling prefix would also be standardised at "00". But more importantly, growing cross-border movements between the Nordic nations - and especially the long land border between Sweden and Norway, was beginning to show a demand for better roaming for the slowly growing mobile phone market, whilst increased cross-border commerce was leading to more international phone calls - profitable for the telecoms companies, but hampering growth. The ex-pat communities - often Finns in Sweden - wanted cheaper ways to keep in contact with family and friends at home, rather than calling an international number to speak to them.

The obvious example for telecommunications harmonisation was, globally speaking, the North American Numbering Plan. This was a major inspiration as the only other major internationally-shared telephone system, but also that it was shared between multiple countries and territories, in an uncontroversial manner, which did not appear to give any issues of impinged sovereignty. Although devised in the 1940s, it had spread out from the United States, and now covered Canada and several Caribbean islands with a national standard for the numbers. This was a system which covered hundreds of millions of people - far in excess of what was needed in the Nordics however. A similar numbering system, but using European area code concepts for the Nordic market would be embraced; a 3-digit area code, a 2-digit exchange code, and a 5 digit subscriber number (or often just a 7-digit subscriber number depending on the system being transferred) - but would also be a fully unified system, with calls between Nordic countries charged at the long distance rate rather than the international rate and in the long run a single unified mobile phone system. The 06xx personal numbering system was later re-used after the non-adoption of personal numbering, with mobile phone numbers being ported to the 06xx category which would be operator-independent and fulfil number portability between operators. To support, this, the area code actually became an "06" area code, with a 9-digit subscriber number.

00: International phone calls
01xx: Not used
02xx: Geographic fixed lines
03xx: Reserved for future
04xx: Non-geographic & business (local rate)
05xx: Reserved for future
06xx: Personal numbering (later used for network independent mobile numbering, to aid number portability)
07xx: Mobile telephony (later deprecated following switch to 06xx)
08xx: Free phone numbers
09xx: Premium rate services

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Nordic Mobile Telephony handsets; mobile communications had a long history in the Nordics.

The recent dissolution of East Germany also conveniently freed up an international code; +37 in which to achieve this. The initiative, later branded as a "Nordics 2000" project, was one of several projects to better link up the Nordics in terms of communications, allowing better cross-border personal connections, instead of creating the physical connections between areas in earlier years and decades (such as the Oresund Bridge and Great Belt Fixed Link). The (in contrast to today) small amount of mobile phones were ported firstly, to new +37 7xx phone numbers, with special (cheaper) international tolls applying for calls between the new +37 systems and the legacy national systems. With their membership applications for the Nordic Confederation accepted, Estonia and Latvia would transition early on to +37 (away from +7 used in former Soviet times) in 1996, with each country receiving an area code. This was regarded as the simplest transition; both countries already used a system internally of 2 digit area codes (which were re-used as the exchange codes) and 5 digit subscriber numbers, which now sat within the national area code.

The Atlantic zones were then moved next, with Greenland, Iceland, the Faroes and smaller Norwegian islands migrating in the late 1997. Whilst all historically used shorter telephone numbers and had smaller area codes, these too used legacy area codes as the exchange codes roughly speaking, and so resident's land line telephone numbers remained little changed (although sometimes padded with a "1" to lengthen a shorter Greenlandic or Faorese telephone number) - although now belonging to a larger local area. In Iceland, +354 421 1234 became +37 122-42-11234, although within a few years, notation across the Nordics has settled on +37-122-4211-234 with a 3-4-3 digit system (and retaining a clear area code).

Finally, after some intensive preparation work to shift phone numbers around, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland (including Aland) all migrated to the new numbering plan under +37 - just in time to fulfil the "Nordics 2000" branding. Subsequent to this, the former international dialling codes were all released back to the international telecommunications union for reuse. The released numbers eased pressure in Europe and aided planning for the aim to transition to a single European Union telephone numbering scheme, with the EU aiming to copy the Nordics in the long run; the initial idea was for non-European Union countries to use +3x, and for the European Union to use +4, but the number of subscribers and amount of national and mobile telephone networks greatly complicated work within the EU. The European Union scheme later failed due to complexity and political squabbling over control, with a regional scheme in the Benelux region being the sole recognisable outcome.

One of the short-term impacts of this was the sharp reduction in business lines used. Business integration had begun in the 1990s, but really accelerated in the 2000s, with the Nordics in particular seeing single instances of sales and support companies operating pan-Nordics. The reduction in telecommunications (having a single point of contact, rather than a Danish one, a Swedish one, Norwegian, Finnish etc) meant the concentration of a lot of businesses under the 04xx telephone numbers - with many call centres locating in Norway due to the wider understanding of both Danish and Swedish or Finland due to understanding of both Swedish and Finnish. This was then followed by the widespread, but unofficial, language system, with the first telephone contact requiring the caller to press a button for which language, which mostly reflected the alphanumeric keypad buttons; 3 (Dansk/Danish), 4 (Islensku/Icelandic), 5 (Kieli - Finnish for "language" due to a conflict for "S"), 6 (Norsk/Norwegian), 7 (Svenska/Swedish). The Finns were the only ones to not get the correct number button for their language, "suomi", which only led to further frustration in Finland - rightly or wrongly. Finland had been economically turned upside down, especially in the 1980s, due to the effects of Nordic integration, and tiny impacts like this felt like a thousand tiny cuts to those who perceived the Nordics as a Scandinavian owned construct with Finland a second rate player - although Estonia and Latvia held promise for balancing that out in future.

Despite mobile communications being an early adopter of the +37 7xx regional area codes, an issue early on was the unified mobile network, and the difference in mobile phone contracts. Early on, national currencies forced providers to process contracts in each country, but as a Nordic currency rolled out, providers were quicker to consolidate with just 3 major mobile operators available today - Telia, Telenor and Elisa (and a host of virtual network operators). The unified market today allows the purchase of communications services cross-border - an Icelandic resident can purchase a mobile phone from (Swedish) Telia, and use it in Iceland or anywhere else in the Nordics completely equally.

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Notes: So the Nordics needs to prove it's relevant for the man and woman on the street, and win "hearts and minds", as the Nordics has definitely caused economic issues in the 80s during economic transformations, and the early 90s economic wobbles.

So a shared postal code system to aid mail processing; very uncontroversial, easy to implement (just internal processes to adapt), and low-moderate benefit. Phone number changes take time (circa 5 years here), and shouldn't be too controversial in terms of "control and sovereignty" - if the United States, Canada and dozens of smaller Caribbean islands can share a numbering scheme, then the Nordics should be able to. The main difference from North America is the provision of 06/07 for mobile communications as is standard in Europe, and the Nordics-wide billing scheme / connection rates. Much more difficult to implement, but will have a huge benefit, to both business/organisations as well as to residents. Mostly inspired by the OTL EU 1990s proposal for integration under +3 for all of EU.
 
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Would the example of Nordic allow the E.U. top sidestep some teething issues? Will two political and economic encourage unions in Europe be more encouraging of further attempts across the world?
 

Devvy

Donor
Would the example of Nordic allow the E.U. top sidestep some teething issues? Will two political and economic encourage unions in Europe be more encouraging of further attempts across the world?

There's a few (but not many) other places I could see it being replicated. Even in OTL, there have been several "announcements" of regional systems to emulate the successes of the EU. I don't think many have got going at all, and only a few have made any tangible progress. The only areas I think have the stability, cultural similarities and relations to make any real (if small) progress on this would be:
  • Southern Africa (maybe a deepening of the existing economic partnership between S.A., Botswana, Namibia, eSwatini, Lesotho, maybe Zimbabwe?). Existing predominately economic union.
  • Central America (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama...and later maybe Belize?). Existing free travel area.
  • Andean Community (Columbia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, and then maybe Chile which with a customs union would perhaps address the Bolivian export access to sea). Existing free travel area.
  • Possibly you could see Australia - New Zealand relations forming something similar, although both sides seem reluctant to embrace a customs union. With only two participants though, the power will always favour Australia over NZ which is hardly a great basis for balance. Lots of bilateral agreements already in place.
As for the EU, I think it'll actually complicate things somewhat. The accession in the 1990s of Sweden, Finland (and Norway in principle although that obviously failed at last hurdle) was supposed to financially counterbalance the accession of a load of poorer east European states acceding. This obviously becomes harder now, and personally I think the EU construct continues to flail about. Is it "quasi-federal union" (as per most European states) or a trading bloc (as per UK and some other richer states), is it a wider European bloc, or a French-German construct with others. The mix of states in this version of the EU (which is OTL EU minus DK, SE, FI) is no better on these questions, and probably continues roughly as it did OTL, maybe without the accession of the much poorer Romania and Bulgarian states (rightly or wrongly).
 
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