TL: A Nordic Twist [Redux]

[Devvy]

Chapter 1: Introduction

Hilmar Baunsgaard; the original architect of Nordek.

The Nordic Confederation traces it's history back to the post World War 2 era. Denmark and Norway were recovering from German occupation, whilst Finland recovered from two wars with the Soviet Union (and in view of the Baltics, for the very existence of the Finnish nation). Sweden, whilst neutral, very much felt the effects of the War, whilst Iceland, despite being a long way away from the mainland, was a glorified military base for the United Kingdom and United States. The Nordic Council came about as a consultative inter-parliamentary body, with members put forward by the national parliaments of Iceland, Norway, Denmark and Sweden; Finland later joining in 1955 after the death of Stalin and improving relations. Freedom of movement in the form of a joint labout market was instigated in 1952 with a passport free area, later reformed in to the "Nordic Passport Union" in 1958. Further action in "Nordic Social Security Convention" which allowed migrants greater access to unemployment benefits was implemented in 1955. 1967 saw Sweden embrace the switch from left-hand traffic (as in the UK) to right-hand traffic (similar to the rest of the Nordics, and Europe); many of the vehicles there were European imports anyway which corresponded with the new side of road driving.

Efforts towards a wider Nordic economic treaty floundered in the late 1950s however due to differing economic priorities and geopolitical priorities. As such, Denmark and Norway had followed the United Kingdom in applying for membership of the European Communities in 1963 due to the strength of trade between the two Nordic states and the UK. This 1963 application, as well as a subsequent attempt in 1967 were both declined with a French veto due to the perceived transatlantic relationship between the UK and USA. In light of this, the Danish Prime Minister (Hilmar Baunsgaard) in 1968 proposed a Nordic version of the EC; full Nordic economic co-operation. Both Sweden and Denmark especially were interested in a full customs union - that is the cessation of internal barriers and a common external tariff), whilst Norway needed capital to continue developing it's infrastructure - as well as providing an opportunity to create a common fisheries policy to "level up" it's coastal communities. Significant numbers of politicians in both Denmark and Norway favoured EC membership over what had become known as "Nordek" (NORD Economic Kommunity"), but the position of du Gaulle as French President proved an insurmountable obstacle; a position entrenched following his success in the 1969 French referendum and with no end likely in the short term it seemed.

As such, with seemingly few other options, Nordek was presented to the wider Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland) for signature; all 4 were existing EFTA members or associates, although the door was left open for Iceland to join later. The Swedish Government heavily backed the proposal (as shown in some of it's commitments). Opinion polls showed Finns had the greatest backing for Nordek at around 50% backing it, and 25% being ambivalent. Questions remained for Finland however, due to the presence of the Soviet Union next door, and Soviet politicians were suspicious. It was in light of this, with continued French vetoing of northern European nations joining the EEC (by then European Economic Community), that additional clauses in the Nordek treaty allowed for the suspension of Nordek if any member country proceeded to later accede to the EEC, whilst the treaty explicitly mentioned that the economic union would have no bearing on member's independent foreign and defence policies. It was explicitly to be a "purely commercial arrangement - not political" as some analysts put it, although some shared commerce rules would inevitably be required. It was an excellent reflection on the shared Nordic mindset that many of these rules could be co-ordinated initially by inter-governmental agreement and implemented by national law, rather than the supra-national political approach taken by the European Community.

President of Finland, Urho Kekkonen had a tightrope to talk in balancing Nordek and Soviet relations.

Either way, the "Treaty establishing a Nordic Economic Community" (later popularly referred to as the "New Kalmar Treaty" in a nod to the historical union between Nordic countries) was signed by the 4 countries in May 1970 (delayed for several months by Finnish-Soviet talks, with their Friendship Treaty extended by 20 years), and later ratified by the national Parliaments. It would establish a full customs union within 10 years between the 4 countries - with a few product/policy areas taking longer, including provisions for agriculture and fishing. Details of Nordek did not preclude any signatory from attempting to migrate to EEC membership, but any such move would likely trigger a swift "guillotine" effect on the Nordek economic links as documented in the treaty itself, in order to protect Finnish interests and allow the begruding acceptance of the Soviet Union next door. Later research during the 20th Century in to declassified material for the time indicated that Soviet acceptance was rooted in a desire to avoid a fully integrated European neighbour; by allowing Nordek to proceed, with safeguards to avoid Finland becoming too entangled, hopefully keeping west/north Europe economically divided at least partly.

Financial co-operation will see the enactment of three funds; general, agricultural and fisheries, for structural improvements and stabilisation in order to modernise markets and industry. Cooperation in industrial policy would be concentrated on areas in which the Nordic countries have important common needs, for example, pollution, health, oceanic research, space research, atomic energy and automation. Negotiations are taking place on the building of a Nordic atomic energy company - of interest especially to Sweden and Finland - on the successful Scandinavian Airlines model. This would see coordination in research, development and use of reactors, as well as the fuel market. The importance of adopting uniform company laws as soon as possible was emphasised, as is also need for uniform rules on government bankruptcy, the protection of patterns, unfair competition and the like.

All this would be administered by the Nordic Ministerial Council - with a member from each of the Nordic Governments, with all decisions to be unanimously, and a committee of officials under them to prepare the decisions and matters of the Council; and everything to start on the 1st January, 1971.

-------------------------------------
Hi all, so this is a redux/ rewrite of my "Nordic Twist to Europe" TL I did back in....2014 it seems. Wow. Except I changed the PoD to 1970, and the original Nordek treaty being signed, which is based on du Gaulle winning his French referendum, therefore not stepping down, and therefore there still being no immediate likelihood of UK/Ireland/Denmark/Norway joining the European Communities.

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 2: The 1970s

Charles de Gaulle, even in death, would have profound effects on the Nordic community.

The early 1970s saw major growing pains in the Nordics. Nordek came in to existence in 1971, and within a year Iceland had also become signatory to the treaty, expanding economic co-operation to the Atlantic island between the ultimately Danish islands. Hilmar Baunsgaard, the former Danish Prime Minister, rapidly became the Nordic Secretary-General overseeing the implementation of Nordek. Nordek was predominately Danish-originated (under Baunsgaard) and thus it seemed only right for the chief architect of Nordek to become it's first secretary-general and lead the charge for it's implementation. It also served as a convenient post to move the former Prime Minister on from national politics in the Danish Parliament so the new Prime Minister (Krag) could continue without Baunsgaard's reputation.

Trade barriers began to be removed; noticeably the Norwegian tariffs on Swedish cars gradually dropped, and all Nordic countries began to try and switch to Nordic agricultural suppliers (usually in Sweden or especially Denmark) where possible. Work to plan and develop the new Nordic Customs Union continued, although agreement over industrial products were difficult, given the wariness of Denmark and Norway over Swedish industrial hegemony, and certain product categories (notably chemicals) would be absent from the union until the start of the 1980s. However, almost immediately after Nordek began life, the death in early 1972 of Charles de Gaulle brought uncertainty in Europe, given that the former French President was a highly influential leader for the nascent European Communities.

A new presidential election was planned anyway for 1972, so Pompidou served as little more than a caretaker President, but the main point was the removal of the principal barrier to European Communities entrance by new countries. By 1973, the United Kingdom (and Republic of Ireland) were already arranging their cards in order to apply for EEC membership once more with the new French President Giscard seen as more amenable to EEC expansion; initial Danish feelers about a potential application by the PM Krag were generally positive too, although the Nordek "guillotine clause" would force the individual Nordic nations to apply for European membership rather than the Nordics as a whole - there was absolutely no possibility of Finland joining the European Community in any shape under the current geopolitical environment. Later on, the Danish general election in late 1973 had yielded highly mixed results, and so was later deemed the "Landslide Election"; existing parties took significant losses, parties with no seats returned, and two entirely new political parties took significant amounts of seats in Parliament. The Social Democrats under Krag were the largest party, and so Krag remained as Prime Minister, but Parliament under him was highly divided, and the European debate frequently cut across party structures.

With Parliament so divided amongst pro-European and pro-Nordic stances, a referendum was established for early 1975, while work gently continued in Nordek itself - but hardly at full speed given that it may all fall apart anyway in a few years. Public opinion polls had generally backed EEC entry historically, especially if the United Kingdom entered, given the level of Danish agricultural exports to the UK. The referendum question asked the public "if the Danish Government should open negotiations with the European Economic Community", and with such a clear question a mandate for negotiations would be established over the top of politicians. The public debate raged; was Nordek a suitable alternative to Europe? Was the larger European market a better fit for Danish exports than the other Nordic nations? Much of the "yes" side argument were founded on the economic gains, particularly for Danish agriculture, in exporting to the wider European Community as well as with their close partners in Great Britain. The problem with this approach is that it solely appealed to voter's wallets, and not their heads. In comparison, the "no" side offered many rebuttals. The notion that the European Community was on a journey towards a European super-state federation, which Denmark would be a mere municipality within, and in which Danish values and the Danish version of the "Nordic Model" would be watered down for the wider "capitalistic" European market. Instead of joining this European club, "no" proponents continued to espouse Nordek as a real alternative to Europe, with a sizeable market which is fundamentally built upon the Nordic economic model, in collaboration with the Danish soul mates in the other Nordic nations.

The Danish Referendum of 1975 cut the country in two.

It was not to be for the pro-Europe lobby. The pro-EEC side failed to explain their side sufficiently, even with the economic strength of the Danish Agricultural lobby, whereas the anti-EEC side played on the crippling effect it would have on Nordek (cutting themselves off from the Nordic countries), sabotage the planned fixed link to Sweden, surrender Danish sovereignty to European politicians (rather than the unanimous political decisions in Nordek) and lose control of Danish fishing and agricultural industries. The referendum threw up a shock result; 53% against opening negotiations; a large group of antipathic voters not bothering with the referendum, and a large group voting agains. The Norwegian Government did not hold a referendum; it was clear that, although significant, there was insufficient political or public backing for European negotiations to start with.

The Danish pro-EEC side were shocked, and it left few options for Denmark; it's only real option was to plunge in to Nordek along side the other Nordic nations. From a Soviet point of view, it marked a success for the political elite who had backed allowing Finland to join Nordek - and allow Nordek to come in to existence, as it had now by extension stopped further expansion of the western-aligned European Community to Scandinavia. There could be no doubt now, that all five Nordic countries were committed to the Nordek project, for they had no other options. The agricultural components of Nordek, although heavily negotiated, were never in doubt for Denmark could not afford to lose the Nordic export market. Modelled closely on the EEC, it was perhaps no doubt that an agricultural subsidy would become a Nordek function, with Nordic producers covering supplementary demands in other Nordic countries. Closely modelled on the European "Common Agricultural Policy", a subsidy to farmers would generally be paid to maintain prices, in part based upon the farm's latitude in order to compensate northern farmers who could not compete with the intensive farming of Denmark in the far south of the Nordics. Unlike the growing EEC however, fisheries remained a topic of debate. With Norway and Iceland almost completely dependant on their fishing industries, they were loathe to hand over control to another body, or allow foreign ships to fish in their waters without any say, and so the act of fishing remains predominately a national function, although the market in fish products would be opened up. Norwegian proponents of Nordek held this up high as a victory not just for Norway, but against the backers of EEC membership as proof that Norway had influence and power within Nordek, something she would not have in the EEC where Norway would have to fully hand over power in certain areas to a federation where Norway's voice mattered little. The European Communities "Common Fisheries Policy" had already forced the United Kingdom to open up her seas to European fishing vessels, and it proved a sharp lesson in European politics - especially for the Nordic nations who were nowhere near as large as the UK was.

The 1973 Oil Crisis also played it's part. Oil became rationed - not just for the petrol in cars, lorries and shipping, but also for heating, with limits on room temperatures, prohibitions on heating private swimming pools and limits on road lighting, all designed to save energy and especially oil requirements. As such, "Nordatom" was also set up in order to develop nuclear energy for the region and reduce the dependency on foreign energy where possible, with the Swedish Prime Minister an enthusiastic backer - not just to provide energy independence, but also as an outlet for the fledgling Swedish nuclear industry. This was balanced by the discovery of North Sea Oil in Norwegian waters; the state owned Statoil was established in 1972 by Norway, and was mirrored in Denmark with almost identical actions.

All this meant that Nordek was effectively following global events during the 1970s, and it was definitely at the mercy of them, but in some ways this proved the making of Nordek by merely surviving the baptism by fire. By the end of the 1970s, the United Kingdom and Ireland had joined the European Economic Community as full members. However, that route was no longer available to the Nordic countries, and the only option was to embrace Nordek (heavily modelled on the EEC as it was) in order to get through the economically bumpy 1970s. As the decade came to a close, all 5 nations decided to continue with the project (there being a 10 year exit clause in the original Nordek treaty), as the full customs union came in to place, for everything, in 1980 - the last objections to some industrial goods having been dropped in the late 1970s as Denmark attempted to salvage her reputation within Nordek following the European debacle.

 

[FinnishFury]

Looks great and I do think that when compared to your earlier Nordek story, the earlier POD makes things more interesting.
By the way, you have a small typo with the first post. The name of the Finnish president was Urho Kekkonen, not Urhu.

 

[Devvy]

Looks great and I do think that when compared to your earlier Nordek story, the earlier POD makes things more interesting.
By the way, you have a small typo with the first post. The name of the Finnish president was Urho Kekkonen, not Urhu.

Thanks - corrected!

The extra 20 yrs means we can achieve a lot more hopefully...

 

[Jürgen]

Thanks - corrected!

The extra 20 yrs means we can achieve a lot more hopefully...

I have already this thread on watched, I think avoiding the whole anti-nuclear movement in Denmark would be a net good, but at the same time it risk killing off the Danish windmill industry, which may result in windmill being two decades behind and likely never becoming competitive. Through that may not be a sure thing as the early windmill industry was very much a bottom up process dominated by small and medium sized north west Jutish companies.

A Denmark without a strong anti-nuclear movement would open uranium/rare earths mines in Greenland resulting in greater economic development of Greenland and likely the development of other local mining industries as know how is build up, of course that will come at the cost of a greater Danish/Scandinavian population there[1], which would have some effect on Greenlandic politics.

Of course Denmark focusing on nuclear energy may decide to throw money after thorium nuclear energy, which would be interesting as it’s a much cheaper and common material, and it can’t be used in breeder reactor to make fissile material to nuclear weapons. I think Denmark and Finland would be the countries most interested in thorium reactors[2].

[1] a few thousand miners from Denmark and Scandinavian would radical transform Greenlandic demography simply because the local population is so low.

[2]Sweden’s nuclear reactors are breeder reactors, because Sweden wanted to be able to build nuclear weapons if necessary, while the Finns reactor are much safer, but doesn’t produce fissile material which could potential used in nuclear weapons.

 

[Devvy]

I have already this thread on watched, I think avoiding the whole anti-nuclear movement in Denmark would be a net good, but at the same time it risk killing off the Danish windmill industry, which may result in windmill being two decades behind and likely never becoming competitive. Through that may not be a sure thing as the early windmill industry was very much a bottom up process dominated by small and medium sized north west Jutish companies.

A Denmark without a strong anti-nuclear movement would open uranium/rare earths mines in Greenland resulting in greater economic development of Greenland and likely the development of other local mining industries as know how is build up, of course that will come at the cost of a greater Danish/Scandinavian population there[1], which would have some effect on Greenlandic politics.

Of course Denmark focusing on nuclear energy may decide to throw money after thorium nuclear energy, which would be interesting as it’s a much cheaper and common material, and it can’t be used in breeder reactor to make fissile material to nuclear weapons. I think Denmark and Finland would be the countries most interested in thorium reactors[2].

[1] a few thousand miners from Denmark and Scandinavian would radical transform Greenlandic demography simply because the local population is so low.

[2]Sweden’s nuclear reactors are breeder reactors, because Sweden wanted to be able to build nuclear weapons if necessary, while the Finns reactor are much safer, but doesn’t produce fissile material which could potential used in nuclear weapons.

Thanks for the comments, and defo noted. I have some thoughts on Danish nuclear possibilities, but there’s a thin window of possibility between 1970 and the events of Three Mile (compounded a few years later by Chernobyl). OTL nuclear lover Sweden had its nose out of joint at those incidents, let alone tentative Denmark!

 

[Jürgen]

Thanks for the comments, and defo noted. I have some thoughts on Danish nuclear possibilities, but there’s a thin window of possibility between 1970 and the events of Three Mile (compounded a few years later by Chernobyl). OTL nuclear lover Sweden had its nose out of joint at those incidents, let alone tentative Denmark!

Ye#, but with the oil crisis hitting and without or with lesser Soviet funding for the anti-nuclear movement, Denmark will likely have begun building nuclear power plants, and if we have begun building it, it’s unlikely we will stop. But there’s also another element Greenland is rich in thorium and thorium reactors doesn’t risk meltdown, at most we can see a leak. So if Denmark have build nuclear power plant when Three Mille and Chernobyl happens, we can see a move toward trying to make thorium reactors to avoid similar accidents.

 

[tukaram bhakt]

I think Denmark and Finland would be the countries most interested in thorium reactors[2].

Maybe collaborating with india could be in order?

 

[Jürgen]

Maybe collaborating with india could be in order?

It would be several decades earlier.

 

[Shevek23]

at the same time it risk killing off the Danish windmill industry, which may result in windmill being two decades behind and likely never becoming competitive. Through that may not be a sure thing as the early windmill industry was very much a bottom up process dominated by small and medium sized north west Jutish companies.

I don't really know all the facts of course, but all experience with nuclear power I know of suggests that while it might in fact be safe enough, and secure in the sense that if one makes the investment and has the supply chain (including waste storage!) in hand, the kilowatts will be there--nothing suggests that this power would ever be cheap. "Power too cheap to meter!" was the sort of gung ho thing being talked about in the USA in the 40's and '50s before there were many plants designed to actually produce power commercially. US fission plants for power generation rather than research were all in the first generation anyway taken from the USN designs developed under Admiral Rickover's direction, to provide propulsion for USN submarines and then it was hoped the entire fleet. So perhaps we should guess that American nuclear power never being cheap was a fluke based on overdependence on a military design favoring performance and reliability over cost-effectiveness?

But we've had over a half century to improve this design, and many competing designs have been offered. None of them achieve great cost-effectiveness. I think it would probably be good to develop some kind of thorium reactor to be sure, but while the ores feeding it might be far cheaper in being far more common, I suspect initial ore mining is just a tiny part of the total price tag of a megawatt/hour from a nuke plant. One thing that causes me to roll eyes at the kind of advocates of fission power who assert the very survival of humanity depends on going nuclear yesterday is they harp on the high actual safety record of operators in real life (including the USN record) but then turn around and scorn the expensive safety measures built in as a major driver of high cost of nuclear fission power. Well gosh, the respectable safety record was achieved with those expensive measures in place! If we remove some of them on the grounds that "nuclear power has a proven high safety record!" aren't we more likely to have exactly the kinds of accidents they are boasting we have largely avoided?

So nukes are costly I gather because 1
) it is very expensive to develop, test and certify a new plant design, which is a major reason so much power is being generated by essentially Hyman Rickover's design;
2) basic design in whatever approach, conventional or radical, a designer takes must include a lot of failsafes to prevent major nuclear accidents;
3) having designed and tested a plant, actually building operational instances of them is another inherently expensive investment, and then operating it by meticulous standards is costly as well;
4) waste disposal is a cost, and a problem not yet solved to the full satisfaction of citizens.

So nukes may be many things, and underapprecated perhaps, but no one in over half a century of nuclear engineering or plant operations has ever shown they are inexpensive!

Therefore even if everything goes well for NORDATOM and a good reliable design is chosen and activated, so by 2020 the Nordic community is getting as much power per capita from nukes as France is OTL, that baseline of power cannot be too cheap.

I can see two ways you might think the nukes cause the windmill development to be aborted, well three:
1) a lot of people feel the windmills are unnecessary because the nukes will solve all problems down the line and so it is frivolous to develop some dubious unneeded alternative.
Against that--the Danish anti-nuke movement might be less successful than OTL, but I hardly think everyone involved in it OTL will just go off smiling when their government tells them not to worry. They might be wrong, they might be less wrong than the five governments in consensus like to think, but wrong or right they won't shut up. They might not prevail in turning majority public opinion against allowing nuclear power as OTL, but doubts will be raised, and so at least as a concept, development of alternatives will have some support as a suspenders and belt sort of thing. Meanwhile as you note, the actual windmill developers of OTL were not some megaproject funded by some consortium of major industry and the government; they were grassroots, garage operations on funding shoestrings. So it doesn't matter if only half as many people are interested, that might slow down the early days but not stop it, and clearly OTL it took off because darn it, the wind was right there, and the mills to catch some wattage from it were cheap enough to take a chance on--then proved to deliver useful power.
2) the powers that be point out that early windmill developers want support and subsidy, their first models are hardly cost-effective and it is an act of faith in their future to catalyze them..,but the Nordic community members are already paying a subsidy for their chosen "green" alternative, nuclear fission, and the taxpayers cannot be asked to bear a double burden in these alternative tech subsidies as well.
Against that--I suppose that the actual cost of supporting these marginal operations is quite low and amounts to a rounding error versus the high cost of the nuclear program. If we have a regime that is just short-sighted, or more invidiously actually afraid that proving the windmills workable would discredit their wisdom and embarrass them, they might strain at this little gnat of catalytic cost while forcing the taxpayers to annually swallow the fission subsidy camel. But my impression of Scandinavian politics is that your citizens are pretty well educated and active, and while perhaps the majority parties on both sides of the socialist/capitalist divide have institutional "not invented here" or worse reasons to resist, someone's representative is going to be more proactive and sensible and point out how cheap this venture would be and that if the establishment types want Nordic citizens to go on bearing the nuke subsidy uncomplainingly, they had best be reasonable and allow such alternatives as wind and solar to have at least some token funding. And that this alternative approach might be marketable as reasonably cost-effective to persons and communities around the world that can hardly afford to buy a fission plant; success on both fronts would be complimentary, not mutually exclusive.
3) We certainly shouldn't fear that a successful nuclear program would result in the Nordic Union having fission power that is so cheap that alternative solar, wind, geothermal etc are just plain undercut. Nuclear fission at its most successful is at least as expensive as conventional coal, gas turbines, etc, and indeed I believe has proven considerably more so--arguments for affordability of fission mainly have to focus on the idea that prices for conventional carbon-burning generation systems will rise in the future and then the nukes are no more costly, at this higher price. Whereas what has happened OTL is that decades ago, such approaches as solar and wind were indeed yet more costly per kilowatt-hour overall, as well as being less steady in output and other objections. But over time as the state of the art improved the price per kw-hr has come down and down, until it now is dropping below current costs of carbon-emitting conventional power generation, whereas the nukes remain expensive. The nuclear advocates have other cards to play still, and might prove the case that some fission is vital to overall viability. But certainly, whether nukes are promised or not, enthusiasts and visionaries working on the windmills can probably foresee the day their systems become at any rate cheaper than the nukes.

 

[Karelian]

Modelled closely on the EEC, it was perhaps no doubt that an agricultural subsidy would become a Nordek function, with Nordic producers covering supplementary demands in other Nordic countries. Closely modelled on the European "Common Agricultural Policy", a subsidy to farmers would generally be paid to maintain prices, in part based upon the farm's latitude in order to compensate northern farmers who could not compete with the intensive farming of Denmark in the far south of the Nordics.

This is a monumental change for Finnish society, since the country was a net exporter of agricultural goods to the Soviet Union. With EEC-type subsidies system and internal competition between the other Nordic products in place by the time the oil crisis hits, the structure of Finnish agriculture will be affected - and since the 1970s was a time of renewed regionalism and rise of the populist SMP party in Finnish politics, things will get rather interesting.

 

[DrakonFin]

This is a monumental change for Finnish society, since the country was a net exporter of agricultural goods to the Soviet Union. With EEC-type subsidies system and internal competition between the other Nordic products in place by the time the oil crisis hits, the structure of Finnish agriculture will be affected - and since the 1970s was a time of renewed regionalism and rise of the populist SMP party in Finnish politics, things will get rather interesting.

Finland ITTL will probably be seeing an even bigger "flight from the countryside" than IOTL in the 70s, especially from the north and the east, and there likely would be more work-based emigration to Sweden (which was massive already IOTL), and now likely more to the other Nordics as well. It will be somewhat like the "structural change" of the 1970s and the effects of the the EU in the 1990s rolled into one, quicker process. The end result will likely be a more urbanized, more modern and services-oriented Finland sooner than IOTL, but the transformation will probably be more painful on the countryside. The effects on Finnish politics and especially the *SMP and the Centre Party would be, as you said, interesting.

 

[Devvy]

This is a monumental change for Finnish society, since the country was a net exporter of agricultural goods to the Soviet Union. With EEC-type subsidies system and internal competition between the other Nordic products in place by the time the oil crisis hits, the structure of Finnish agriculture will be affected - and since the 1970s was a time of renewed regionalism and rise of the populist SMP party in Finnish politics, things will get rather interesting.

Finland ITTL will probably be seeing an even bigger "flight from the countryside" than IOTL in the 70s, especially from the north and the east, and there likely would be more work-based emigration to Sweden (which was massive already IOTL), and now likely more to the other Nordics as well. It will be somewhat like the "structural change" of the 1970s and the effects of the the EU in the 1990s rolled into one, quicker process. The end result will likely be a more urbanized, more modern and services-oriented Finland sooner than IOTL, but the transformation will probably be more painful on the countryside. The effects on Finnish politics and especially the *SMP and the Centre Party would be, as you said, interesting.

Given that Nordek was supposed to be a Nordic implementation of the EEC, and the aims of the 5 nations, I can't see agriculture being left out of the economic union. Which means that, similar to the EEC, agricultural funding has to be "Nordicised". Given that agricultural funding was pretty high in the Nordics pre-EU days, I'd guess any Nordic Agricultural Subsidy (or NAS for short now) will continue with a fairly high level in order for domestic products, but maybe exports to a lower level. The EEC agricultural subsidy was markedly lower it seems.

Bear in mind that Norway is hardly a massive agricultural nation, despite attempting self-sufficiency in prior years, and neither is Iceland (despite the small population there), whilst the population in Sweden is pretty large - the Nordic domestic market in 1980 is approx 22-23m., plus the trade to the Soviets. Collectively, the Nordics is a reasonably sized market.

 

[Karelian]

Given that Nordek was supposed to be a Nordic implementation of the EEC, and the aims of the 5 nations, I can't see agriculture being left out of the economic union. Which means that, similar to the EEC, agricultural funding has to be "Nordicised". Given that agricultural funding was pretty high in the Nordics pre-EU days, I'd guess any Nordic Agricultural Subsidy (or NAS for short now) will continue with a fairly high level in order for domestic products, but maybe exports to a lower level. The EEC agricultural subsidy was markedly lower it seems.

Bear in mind that Norway is hardly a massive agricultural nation, despite attempting self-sufficiency in prior years, and neither is Iceland (despite the small population there), whilst the population in Sweden is pretty large - the Nordic domestic market in 1980 is approx 22-23m., plus the trade to the Soviets. Collectively, the Nordics is a reasonably sized market.

It's not about the subsidies, it's about competition in the internal markets. Agriculture was also a major political and economical factor in Finland at this time, since the Agrarian Alliance, the Party of Kekkonen, was the kingmaker in Finnish politics.

As a result of their pro-agrarian policies, by early 1980s the OTL Finnish agricultural sector annually produced c. 50 million kg of beef, 15 million kg of butter and 25 million kg of eggs for export, mainly to Soviet markets. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-autarky-in-1950s.426826/page-3#post-15756893

WI: USSR achieves food autarky in 1950s?

And Poland was never a significant wheat producer (the main export of Tsarist Russia). Finland, for obvious reasons, has never been a major food producer, not really able to feed its population. It should tell you something then, when I say that the farms of Poland and Finland were relatively...

www.alternatehistory.com

 

[Devvy]

It's not about the subsidies, it's about competition in the internal markets. Agriculture was also a major political and economical factor in Finland at this time, since the Agrarian Alliance, the Party of Kekkonen, was the kingmaker in Finnish politics.

As a result of their pro-agrarian policies, by early 1980s the OTL Finnish agricultural sector annually produced c. 50 million kg of beef, 15 million kg of butter and 25 million kg of eggs for export, mainly to Soviet markets. https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...-autarky-in-1950s.426826/page-3#post-15756893

WI: USSR achieves food autarky in 1950s?

And Poland was never a significant wheat producer (the main export of Tsarist Russia). Finland, for obvious reasons, has never been a major food producer, not really able to feed its population. It should tell you something then, when I say that the farms of Poland and Finland were relatively...

www.alternatehistory.com

To try and illustrate my thinking; Finnish agriculture won't be destroyed due to subsidy change (as you say, the farming industry is well represented politically), but it will open up Nordic markets to Danish (and south Swedish) agriculture and foods. Finnish agriculture will have to change; becoming more niche/local, more efficient, and accepting it's not going to be able to compete against large scale Danish imports. Same as with Scotland in the UK; despite the plentiful farm lands of England, Scotland still farms away - it just specialises in certain areas.

 

[Karelian]

To try and illustrate my thinking; Finnish agriculture won't be destroyed due to subsidy change (as you say, the farming industry is well represented politically), but it will open up Nordic markets to Danish (and south Swedish) agriculture and foods. Finnish agriculture will have to change; becoming more niche/local, more efficient, and accepting it's not going to be able to compete against large scale Danish imports. Same as with Scotland in the UK; despite the plentiful farm lands of England, Scotland still farms away - it just specialises in certain areas.

Note that I merely talked about structural changes in my original message. In the long term this is beneficial for Finnish society as a whole, as well as the Finnish agriculture that really suffered from the OTL 1990s.

However, in the short term this is political dynamite for the SMP.

 

[Shevek23]

I've noticed how important it is for Nordek, pre-1991 anyway, to thread the geopolitical needle between Norway and Denmark's NATO status, Sweden's armed neutrality (everyone in both blocs reckoning Sweden would be a de facto Western ally in case of open war between NATO and Warsaw Pact to be sure) and Finland's nervous relationship with the Soviet giant. And perhaps that doesn't change much with the collapse of the USSR--the Western NATO still exists and Russians assume it is aimed at them; Finland must still worry about some drastic action by post-Soviet Russia anyway, and Sweden remains armed (to a lesser degree, but still armed) against Russian misadventures in fact. Therefore Nordek avoids any hint of foreign policy coordination, which probably means no overt agreements to consolidate military procurement. Denmark and Norway remain under pressure to buy stuff from NATO arms manufacturers--if not strongarmed to buy an American product, then French, British, possibly German or Italian, maybe Dutch or Belgian--buying stuff made in Sweden is sort of frowned on, except that actually Sweden manages to penetrate or even lead in certain markets sometimes. Many sectors of the Swedish arms industry thus produce mainly for domestic Swedish purchases (with odd sales to such nations as Switzerland and Austria) whereas Danish products might more easily find a market among NATO buyers generally. Iceland and Finland do not figure as arms makers.

So I wonder whether Nordek can change this equation at all, anyway after the Soviet collapse. Perhaps for instance Russia will purchase some SAAB products, giving an implicit green light to Finland to buy some too?

In particular I have noticed that OTL Sweden abandoned fission power, but still sought to develop air-independent submarines, focusing on fuel cells for very quiet electric power. This works well at the short ranges Swedish subs might try to operate at.

But if we have an ATL Nordek consensus to develop fission, possibly taking a risk on pioneering thorium fission, in part for economic reasons (the greater availability of thorium ores, within Nordek boundaries in Greenland in particular, will probably create a price savings worth noticing though not large I think, if world consumption of uranium ore rises considerably) but also perhaps, aside from the prestige of being the first nation(s) to actually bring a practical thorium power plant to market, to telegraph by subtext that Nordek's nuclear initiatives shall in no way be construed to be sneaking up on a weapons program such as Sweden had until the mid-60s. Thorium wastes might make a dirty bomb with nasty radioisotopes dispersed by conventional explosive, but not breed weapons grade stuff.

It would however, depending on design anyway, be possible to have a thorium reactor for a fission powered submarine (or any ship in general but there is little reason for surface ships to do that. (Such a navy as the USN can make a better case for it, being deployed globally, anticipating conflicts in the wide Pacific and Indian oceans--but even the USN has backed off from the all-nuclear fleet concept, finding such power plants very costly for smaller vessels such as destroyers, using turbine combustion generators for these instead nowadays).

If the Swedes can piggyback on Nordek fission research to develop a submarine powerplant that does not suggest any acquisition of nuclear weapons (alternative fuel mixes using uranium that cannot be processed into weapons grade material might be in the cards too) then they might not save any money on their own navy, since only a few air-independent subs are needed and I'd bet the fuel cell approach is far more cost-effective overall, given the short ranges and endurances needed in the Baltic. Norway and Denmark might want Atlantic cruising submarines of their own if they can afford them, but of course they are expected to rely on USN, RN, and French subs. If Sweden can offer a long-legged sub at prices Denmark and Norway can afford, I suppose the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy, perhaps Spain, might be interested, perhaps even Turkey and Greece, and that is just in Europe. (Again the Russians might try to buy some). India, Egypt, Israel, Thailand, Indonesia, Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan (if Nordek doesn't worry too much about the PRC objecting)--even Japan or South Korea. And if Nordek alone has invested in thorium fission and this is what the sub plant uses, only Nordek can supply fuel elements for such customers. (Surely France, USA, Russia, China and Britain along with Germany can all replicate the feat using a different approach to avoid patent disputes once someone has demonstrated the practicality, though most likely those powers with a good relationship with Nordek nations will license the developed Nordek tech).

Also of course if the thorium plants are especially safe, France at least will want to license the design for domestic power production; the ambitious desire to re-enrich and recycle once-through conventional plant wastes via breeder reactors is a major stumbling block to the overall French commitment to 100 percent nuclear; the regular power plants have had good operating records but the high tech breeder plants have run into a series of issues, I gather. Phasing in thorium based plants gradually is not good news for the weapons procurement part of the overall French initiative, but settles the question of what shall France do if plutonium breeders prove as problematic as they have so far.

If Russia is not leaning so hard on Finland, and Moscow accepts a stronger Finnish defensive posture integrated into Swedish armed neutrality, perhaps via some negotiated arms limits, would Nordek perhaps have a freer hand to morph into a security alliance with coordinated doctrines and munitions commonality,perhaps going so far as to create a consolidated set of services? This would probably require Denmark and Norway to pull out of NATO of course.

I also wonder if a practical Nordek thorium power plant approach might involve leapfrogging past conventional features of normal fission plants--that is, reliance on fission heat to generate steam to drive steam turbines. The variant of using low pressure cores with liquid metal such as sodium to cool the cores (still with the hot metal boiling water) was tried fairly early on, at sea with the USS Seawolf, which had problems--IIRC Soviet Alfa subs also used a metal cooled design. But various advanced variants would include using the liquid metal to drive gas turbines, or using different fluids such as molten salts which for some reason or other is often associated with thorium designs. Really advanced approaches involve dissolving the fissionable material itself in a liquid (for super wonder Atomic Rockets sorts of schemes, in a gas or plasma) which has the feature that in principle one could filter out accumulating byproduct fission daughter products and continually salt in more fissionable material to keep the core running at near optimum conditions--this pretty much builds fuel element re-enrichment into the process of power generation itself. (Also, if one can extract fission "ash" from the core continuously as it runs, the more obnoxious isotopes can be sequestered and perhaps even fed back in special locations in the plant where they will be bombarded with neutron flux which can "cook" the more nasty wastes to a less obnoxious form by transmutation, leaving significantly less dangerous waste to dispose of).

 

[Snufkin]

If Nordek would provide economical integration of the Nordics it would boost the flow of the (especially Swedish) capital to Finland. IOTL Finland in 70s was greatly in need of foreign investment, but the culture was stagnant and maybe even protectionist. Swedish investments to mining, forestry and manufacturing would change the landscape of big company ownership in Finland. Swedish companies could start new factories in Finland as work costs were lower than in Sweden. Flow of capital would help Finland to thrive, but of course it would create "daughter company economy" which would shift lot of the economic power to Sweden (and Wallenbergs).

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 3: NordAtom

Agesta Nuclear Plant was an early initiative in Sweden to generate nuclear electricity, with a convenient potential by-product of plutonium for military use.

The modern day Nordatom company owes it's existence to the proposal for a "NordAtom" international Nordic group, modelled on the successful Nordic joint-venture in air traffic; the "Scandinavian Airlines System", but for atomic energy. In the 1950s and 1960s, electricity usage had substantially risen, with much of Nordic electricity generated from fossil fuels, although diversification was well under way; Sweden had built hydroelectric dams across many of it's northern rivers, and the Nordic General Fund under Nordek was now helping fund corresponding massive Norwegian hydroelectric dams. Co-operation in nuclear matters has had a long history in the Nordics, with many significant research sharing, and joint planning. The "Kontaktorgan" has long been a Nordic-wide shared programme, sharing research and safety information, since the 1950s, and largely continues today in smaller form, acting as a liaison between the national nuclear regulators and safety agencies. It has also allowed joint inspections of facilities - particularly the Barsebeck nuclear plant, given it's location relative to Copenhagen - as well as joint emergency & disaster planning. But the Nordatom company came about eventually by mergers between Swedish owned ASEA-Atom, and other component manufacturers jointly owned by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. Despite the fact that Sweden and Finland had projects on the way anyway to deliver nuclear power, the initial idea for Denmark and Norway to also participate by 1972 had become cooler, with some Danes foreseeing continued low oil prices making nuclear power economically unviable. Iceland was also involved in the early days, but now maintains a general distance as an observer, allowing the primary 4 (later 3) participants to continue with deeper co-operation, given that Iceland generates all it's power from either hydroelectricity or geothermal schemes.

As always with the early years of Nordek, global events took over. The 1973 Oil Crisis roughly tripled the international cost of oil, and the later 1979 Oil Crisis raised it further to roughly 5 or 6 times the original cost. Although North Sea Oil was beginning to flow in to Norway and beyond now, the price was still high, and invalidated earlier economic predictions. Questions over energy sovereignty flared up, especially due to price-fixing mechanisms in the Middle East due to global events, and suddenly the issue of energy security was thrust to the forefront of Nordic politics. A switch to domestic supplies, immune from worldwide events, seemed particularly appealing, whilst in light of economic issues further joint projects to provide employment and industry were desired. Norway was another casualty however, switching to observer status, when the Norwegian Government decided not to pursue nuclear power and instead continue to build on it's abundant hydroelectric power potential. Sweden and Finland continued to be more enthusiastic; both had fewer possibilities for moving away from oil and gas, and Finland in particular had little in the way of natural resources. Danes continued in the programme, somewhat half-heartedly, choosing not to invest in Nordic Nuclear, although they were the only country to build a new nuclear power plant under the involvement of the group, with the reactors sourced from the group for a new nuclear site; Storstrømsværket.

Further reactors were procured from the group for use in the Finnish and Swedish nuclear stations; Forsmark, Ringhals, Oskarshamn and Olkiluoto. All the nuclear power plants were located on the coast for access to cooling water. However, during this mini construction boom in the nuclear industry, the "Three Mile Incident" occurred in the United States. Public and political opinion began to swing, and in both Denmark and Sweden, politicians decided that the reactors currently under construction would finish, but no more reactors would be authorised. By 1985, the nuclear industry was generating plentiful electricity; approx 70TwH/y in Sweden, 25TwH/y in Finland, 5TwH/y in Denmark, although future prospects were uncertain with the new political climate. Any hope of return to normal was later dashed by the Chernobyl Disaster in Ukraine; public opinion turned decisively against nuclear power in the years following, and the new safety procedures and costs significantly altered the financial models previously in use. In the Nordics, it was well known it was unrealistic however to simply turn off all the nuclear power stations however, despite what pressure groups may insist; the amounts of electricity generated were massive, and not easily replace.

Laws were introduced however, forcing nuclear operators to dispose of the waste domestically (meaning within the Nordics) in order to continue to be permitted to generate electricity. Joint Swedish-Finnish efforts, involving Nordatom in discussions, therefore created two joint deep geological repositories, one in each country in order to accommodate long-life nuclear waste. The repositories worked in tandem, using the same processes and overall design, burrowed hundreds of metres down in to the ground at Forsmark in Sweden and at Onkalo in Finland. All this created the conditions for further research in to thorium-based nuclear power given the far lower risks and substantial reduction in waste products. Agesta Nuclear Plant, recently decommissioned, was to be reconditioned to host a small thorium reactor for research and small scale electricity production, and in the early 1990s began functioning on a small scale, and closed in the early 2010s. Nordatom continues to work on scaling up thorium based systems for wider use, especially in light of the 21st Century push for greater renewable energy sources.

By the early 1980s, Denmark was in full swing of adopting wind power, both on land and at sea. Storstrømsværket and it's 2 reactors continued operating, considering they substantially reduced Denmark's reliance on fossil fuels, and continued to be known as "Denmark's dirty little secret". Peak demand, similar to the rest of the Nordics, is largely met by waste incinerators, which both generate electricity as well as heat for district heating systems. Sweden decided not to build further nuclear power stations, but allowed half the reactors to eventually be retired in obsolescence, and replaced by renewable sources (chiefly on land wind power, and eventually solar power in the south). The other half continue to be maintained and supply electricity to the market. In Finland, a lack of natural resources meant that nuclear power had little alternative; indeed a third nuclear power plant was built in the early 2000s due to the electrical demands, whilst Nordatom has also been involved in building a new nuclear power plant in Estonia during the 2010s to supply electricity and reduce energy dependence on Russia.

-----------------------------
Notes: Considering the large amount of talk about the possibilities for nuclear in this thread, this has been a stab at answering them. A lot of my research came from here: http://www.nks.org/scripts/getdocument.php?file=111010111119615. I'm definitely not an expert in nuclear energy, so I'm not precluding a re-write of anything neccessary, but I *think* it's all fine. There's a few comments on thorium technology there, but I'd rather not deviate significantly there; I have no expertise to judge whether thorium is a realistic option given that there's media backing and opposing it on a multitude of facets.

Nuclear power in this TL is a little more widespread and accepted in lieu of real alternatives. I don't see a massive issue there. There's one nuclear plant in Denmark, roughly the same amount in Sweden (most with perhaps an extra reactor), and the same amount in Finland (again with an extra reactor each). Rather than demanding they close (as in OTL), Sweden and Denmark here have both adopted a phrase of "no more nuclear plants", whilst Finland after a pause has continued to embrace nuclear power, with thorium research beginning in the 2010s. The Danish plant continues, although Sweden is decommissioning some of their reactors.

 

[Devvy]

Chapter 4: The early 1980s

The Carter-Brezhnev signing of an agreement in 1979; a few years is a long time in international politics.

"Kemst þó hægt fari."
"You will reach your destination even though you travel slowly" (roughly)...was probably the unofficial motto of the Nordic Economic Kommunity.

If the 1970s had been the birth of the Nordek in fire - the full embracement of Nordek by all five participants was held back until the economic woes following the 1973 Oil Crisis and "Danish Debacle" forced their hands, then the early 1980s was a difficult maturing, a time of gradual Nordek expansion. Tensions between east and west took a substantial turn for the worse, leaving the Nordics - straddling both camps - in a difficult position. The rate of integration slowed anyway as, legally speaking, the full customs union between the Nordic nations was mostly achieved, allowing the full movement of people, goods, food, capital, but the ability to work together as a single Nordic bloc became more difficult the more hostile the two opposing east and west camps became. As it was, thankfully the economy was recovering anyhow after the turbulent 1970s, and the integration had made the Nordics a mix of "Icelandic fish, Danish agriculture, Norwegian energy, Swedish industry, and Finnish know-how!", to quote a Finnish politician - although the reality was a steady stream of Finnish migrants moving west for jobs, usually to Sweden, and perhaps "Finnish forestry" was a better suggestion.

Nevertheless, the results were impressive given the (globally speaking) smaller sized countries - Danish agriculture especially expanded to feed the wider Nordic market, aided by smaller agricultural regions in Sweden (particularly in the south), Norway and Finland. Swedish industry expanded to manufacture across the Nordics and several of the largest Nordic companies today owe their history to this period of expansion, and a large part of this Swedish industrial expansion was fuelled by the (comparatively speaking) poorer Finnish migrants moving to Sweden in search of better jobs. The shifting economy of Finland, which had previously aimed for self sufficiency, led to instability in Parliament in the late 1970s as the Finnish agricultural lobby demanded more protection from the onslaught of Danish farming. As farms were sold, and merged to create better economies of scale, former farmers then went searching for jobs in the towns and cities or moved to another Nordic nation in search of those things, and often switched party allegiance to Social Democratic parties. It was a time of rapid transition for Finland, with increasing urbanisation and economic shift away from agriculture and self-sufficiency, and towards greater urban life in the service-sector and a small - but increasing - amount of manufacturing moving to Finland in search of cheaper costs. Other "harmonisation" took on smaller roles where they actually came to fruition. The planned introduction by 1992 of a common Nordic driving license would start with full mutual recognition of each nation's driving licenses in 1982 (*1), allowing holders to drive in any country for an unlimited period of time. In due course, this would become a single Nordic driving license, awarded by each nation in accordance with their law, but would allow cross-border penalty points to be awarded, and potentially revocation of the license under severe circumstances.

The retirement of Baunsgaard from the Secretary-General of Nordek after almost 10 years of leading the economic union he had initiated as the Danish Prime Minister led to a search for a successor. Eventually, the hunt led to a Norwegian successor in the form of ex-Prime Minister Odvar Nordli, who seemed content to mediate between the five Nordic nations and gently push the agenda along. In all likelihood, this was partly due to his health issues, but that was perhaps part of the reason for his nomination to the role over the idealistic Baunsgaard, that Nordli would take a step back and allow the 5 Nordic states a chance the breath and ascertain where their futures lay. This new spirit of intergovernmental co-operation to achieve integration (in part required due to the need for unanimity in decisions) stood in sharp contrast to the EEC, where centralisation of power under a supranational commission led to continuous debates over decisions and the future of the EEC - supposedly "ever closer to federation". This meant there was little formal need for a Nordic Parliament like the European Parliament, as each country agreed to measures and decisions themselves, and the shared "Nordic mindset" allowed much of this to happen in the spirit of that co-operation. It also conveniently avoided any constitutional requirements for referendums to ratify, as all decisions were implemented via standard national Parliamentary mechanisms.

The new Secretary-General in his previous role as Norwegian Prime Minister.

One of the early issues Nordli had to deal with was the burgeoning "Home Rule" states; Greenland, the Faroes, and Aland. All three were not sovereign, and were part of either Denmark (for the first two) or Finland (for the latter), but by the early 1980s either were in the midst of being granted, or already had received self-governing status. The Faroes and Aland had been in the Nordic Council since 1970, but Greenland would be a new entrant as a constituent country of the Danish Realm. Thanks to the Norwegian red lines over fishing during the initial Nordek negotiations, in that a nation's waters may only be fished in by that nation, although the resulting products may then be shipped within the customs union, membership of Nordek was largely uncontroversial, but the burgeoning powers of self-rule (and thus legal control over affairs co-ordinated at a Nordic level) meant a requirement to involve them fully in Nordek processes. The so-called "5+3 Agreement" introduced full representation for Greenland, the Faroes and Aland in the Nordek administration. Although legally unclear at the time as to whether those members had the right of veto over Nordek, in practise the communal discussions and agreements meant that the power of veto was rarely used and the legality was a moot point. As part of the agreement, Greenland formally became party to the Nordic Passport Union.

Actions by the Swedish Prime Minsiter, Olof Palme, in the realm of foreign affairs were less welcome though, as they were sometimes perceived (rightly or wrongly) as the voice of Nordek collectively. Palme's criticism of the Soviet Union in 1979 (for their invasion of Afghanistan) meant that Finnish President Kekkonen, and later Koivisto, had to walk on "tightrope covered in oil" to manage the relationship with the Soviets, and maintained the Finnish veto on a more co-ordinated foreign policy regarding trade in order to preserve relations with the Soviets. The early part of the 1980s, having seen a deterioration in east-west relations, led to strained foreign relations all around (although none as complex as Finnish-Soviet relations), although Palme's ability to alienate both sides did further the image of Sweden and Nordek-itself as more neutral instead of being closely aligned with the west. Trade continued with both west and east however, with exports to the EEC under the EFTA conventions which Finland had duly signed in the late 1980s, and to the Warsaw Pact countries (especially the Soviet Union) - with Nordek rules making some special exemptions for the Soviet Union given the Finnish position. Palme's criticism of the United States, and visit to Iran, caused equally negative reactions from US politicians as well, although the work of Icelandic, Danish and Norwegian partners of the USA in NATO was much easier given the somewhat lower risk of a military reaction by the United States.

Equally elsewhere, much of the political capital and time was spent on matters outside Nordek, given the geopolitical situation in the early 1980s. Whilst Palme spoke about the world, Finland traded with the Soviet Union and attempted to diplomatically handle the relationship, Denmark reformed their domestic economy and Norway continued to set up and evolve it's oil industry. Nordek itself predominately established more of it's administration, with the creation of the agencies to administer the economic union. Much of this bureaucracy was located in Malmo, extremely close to Copenhagen, but after discussions in 1985, the Nordek machinery moved further up the Swedish coast in to new buildings in Gothenburg in order to be closer to Oslo and Stockholm and more neutral with regards to Denmark. Gothenburg was a metropolitan centre already, and roughly equidistant from Oslo, Copenhagen and Stockholm - although Helsinki was still a distance away, as was Reykjavik.

A range of newer - and better designed - buildings for the bureaucracy and administration for the Nordics would be built in a new suburb on the north side of the river. This would take the place of former shipyards, which had largely deserted Gothenburg during the shipbuilding crisis, with the land sold on from the shipyards regeneration programme; Swedeyard. Whilst not providing a like-for-like set of replacement jobs for shipbuilders, it tied in with Gothenburg City Council's vision to transform the city from an "industrial city" to a "knowledge-intensive city", and thus would provide a new industry of civil service, bureaucratic and support jobs for the new intergovernmental institution.

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(*1) I can't find any info online about whether Nordic driving licenses had mutual recognition pre-EEA/EU/EEC. If so, read this as "better mutual recognition" in the aim of a unified driving license in the future!