TL-191: Navy Blue and Gray - Naval Forces of the USA and CSA

[RamscoopRaider]

#3 and #4 are realistically just as associated with Pearl Harbor as #5. The Sandwich Islands are a shield against Americans interfering with the British trade with the Orient, as well as a base to help provide supplies to Canada. Especially once the US cuts off the St. Lawrence, and even more so if the Americans can interdict or even capture Halifax.

#3 sure isn't, you aren't getting measurable amounts of supplies to the parts of Canada that matter via the Pacific, the railway cannot be held, Halifax and the mouth of the Saguenay can be for some time. The CSA can be supplied via the Pacific from Mexico, but that's much less tonnage efficient than Atlantic route, and harder to protect. #4 Requires global presence, Pearl Harbor can't really stop raiders from getting through too much Ocean to watch, #4 is all about escorts and distributed reaction forces

IMO Pearl's big role is serving as a base to hit Nitrate convoys from Chile to the US, as prior to the Haber Process the US needs those convoys, once the Haber process exists (presumably Germans shared in 191), need goes away. However that is so close to the start of the war that the US plans to hit Pearl are still active

 

[cortz#9]

I think you have gotten mixed up. The E-class was the one with a 12 pounder gun (76mm), the one further up with the large gun was the M2, and the K-class was an unusual design that was armed with several 4in and 3in guns, was extremely long, and used surface ship style steam turbines for power so it could keep up with the fleet.

The pics I got from Bing Images but the sites they were linked to had no info so I got that from Wikipedia. I might have gotten things mixed up or Wiki might have the wrong info.There's not a lot out there on non German subs when it comes to WWI.

 

[Sierra]

#3 sure isn't, you aren't getting measurable amounts of supplies to the parts of Canada that matter via the Pacific, the railway cannot be held, Halifax and the mouth of the Saguenay can be for some time. The CSA can be supplied via the Pacific from Mexico, but that's much less tonnage efficient than Atlantic route, and harder to protect. #4 Requires global presence, Pearl Harbor can't really stop raiders from getting through too much Ocean to watch, #4 is all about escorts and distributed reaction forces

Reaction forces and patrols that are more useful if you have a forward base to patrol the more direct routes towards the south. Pearl Harbor would be Britain's forward base in the area, to hopefully keep American cruisers further away from the South Sea Islands and the trade routes to the Pacific colonies. Further, Prince Rupert provides a valuable Pacific port for Canada, laying at the terminus of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway that runs to Winnipeg, the very thing that the US Army tried to cut for three long years. Vancouver would have been captured relatively quickly, but with Prince Rupert, there is an avenue for arms, munitions, and other supplies to enter Canada from the west after being shipped from Australia and Japan.

 

[cortz#9]

Graf Zeppelin would never exist in 191. OTL during WWI Germany was converting the Italian Liner Ausonia into a carrier, not named just letter I. Most likely 191 Germany does something similar and has a carrier of their own in the late teens/early 20's and develops from their. Graf Zeppelin was an abomination that resulted from a navy that never really experimented with full deck carriers and a design staff cut to the bone and mismanaged from Versailles restrictions, neither true in 191
Unlikely, ships are close enough to bespoke that their really isn't that much to be gained by doing so vis a vis designing their own. Getting US advice is much more likely

OK so the Germans might not build copies but they would probably build better designed carriers and be able to train their crews with US help as well participate in joint maneuvers and war game exercises.
So the TL-191 Hochseeflotte would be much better naval force than the Kriegsmarine ever was.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

Reaction forces and patrols that are more useful if you have a forward base to patrol the more direct routes towards the south. Pearl Harbor would be Britain's forward base in the area, to hopefully keep American cruisers further away from the South Sea Islands and the trade routes to the Pacific colonies. Further, Prince Rupert provides a valuable Pacific port for Canada, laying at the terminus of the Grand Trunk Pacific Railway that runs to Winnipeg, the very thing that the US Army tried to cut for three long years. Vancouver would have been captured relatively quickly, but with Prince Rupert, there is an avenue for arms, munitions, and other supplies to enter Canada from the west after being shipped from Australia and Japan.

You can't run enough patrols to really matter with that much open Ocean to deal with raiders. Sustained traffic sure, but what matters more is convoys, and ships stationed to be able to react to sightings of a raider

Didn't the US cut that railroad in 1914 or 15? I seem to remember that happening. Realistically Vancouver is more likely to hold than the railway, it's a point target in confined terrain, rather than a long line on open Prairie, whatever implausibility actually happened in 191 notwithstanding. It's a longer trip, arms and munitions are easier to send to Atlantic Ports, can make 2 or 3 round trips in the same amount of time, and don't risk the railway getting cut

 

[Sierra]

OK so the Germans might not build copies but they would probably build better designed carriers and be able to train their crews with US help as well participate in joint maneuvers and war game exercises.
So the TL-191 Hochseeflotte would be much better naval force than the Kriegsmarine ever was.

Joint maneuvers and such, yeah. The Kriegsmarine's problem was that their ship design suffered due to the loss of the design department of the Imperial Navy, and its replacement with leadership made of line officers with no background in shipbuilding. Men who knew what they wanted, and knew what might or might not work in the field, but had no idea of the complexities of putting all of that into an effective package, and didn't effectively manage the resources they had to make it happen. Thus why so many of Germany's ships were excellent in may ways, but obsolete in others.

Graf Zeppelin herself was a fine carrier, but had some flaws that resulted from this inexperience, such as the planned reliance on compressed air catapults, the relatively low hangar capacity, and the inclusion of a heavy anti-ship battery of 15cm guns. This last was a common inclusion in carriers from the twenties and early thirties. Lexington and Saratoga had four twin 8in turrets. Akagi and Kaga had 7.9in guns in casemates, and also in a pair of turrets on their middle flight decks before their reconstruction. All from a time when naval aviation wasn't quite understood, and it was feared that a carrier would have to fight it out with enemy cruisers or destroyers. But all had them deleted, while i gather that the Germans might have intended to have Zeppy working as a surface raider. However, she had some excellent qualities as well, such as her high speed, which I am not sure has ever been equalled in a carrier, and her armor scheme, which provided as much protection as the Royal Navy's famed "armored carriers", without having all of the stresses resting on the flight deck and leading to irreparable structural damage later on.

 

[Sierra]

You can't run enough patrols to really matter with that much open Ocean to deal with raiders. Sustained traffic sure, but what matters more is convoys, and ships stationed to be able to react to sightings of a raider

Didn't the US cut that railroad in 1914 or 15? I seem to remember that happening. Realistically Vancouver is more likely to hold than the railway, it's a point target in confined terrain, rather than a long line on open Prairie, whatever implausibility actually happened in 191 notwithstanding. It's a longer trip, arms and munitions are easier to send to Atlantic Ports, can make 2 or 3 round trips in the same amount of time, and don't risk the railway getting cut

Remember, we are talking from the point of view of the pre-war British naval command, and the politicians who would have demanded some kind of coverage for the possessions.

And no. Morell and his battalion lead the effort that finally cut it in late 1916 or early 1917, prior to his being promoted to lieutenant colonel and put into barrels. Yes, its a longer trip, but it has the advantage of being less easy for the US to interdict. Meanwhile, Halifax would be much easier for the US to take. Its referenced multiple times in Walk in Hell that the US took everything south of the St. Lawrence, and from there its a relatively easy step to take St. Pierre and Miquelon, and interdict the entire Gulf of St. Lawrence. Form there, the only real option for the Entente is to push a railroad up through Labrador and Quebec, or try and ship things into Hudson Bay.

 

[Alterwright]

Confederate States Navy:

--- Submarines:

• CSS Bonefish
• CSS Bonito
• CSS Whelk

--- Cruisers:

• CSS Fort Sumpter

--- Commerce Raiders:

• CSS Swamp Fox

--- Unnamed Ships:

• CSS ??? - unnamed river monitor
• CSS ??? x4 - four unnamed "coastal defense ships"

As a fun little addition to this list, here are some ship names for potential Confederate Navy ships. This is just small list.

Based on Battles in Confederate History --- Manassas, Perryville, Camp Hill, Valverde, Front Royal, Cross Keys, Secessionville.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

Remember, we are talking from the point of view of the pre-war British naval command, and the politicians who would have demanded some kind of coverage for the possessions.

And no. Morell and his battalion lead the effort that finally cut it in late 1916 or early 1917, prior to his being promoted to lieutenant colonel and put into barrels. Yes, its a longer trip, but it has the advantage of being less easy for the US to interdict. Meanwhile, Halifax would be much easier for the US to take. Its referenced multiple times in Walk in Hell that the US took everything south of the St. Lawrence, and from there its a relatively easy step to take St. Pierre and Miquelon, and interdict the entire Gulf of St. Lawrence. Form there, the only real option for the Entente is to push a railroad up through Labrador and Quebec, or try and ship things into Hudson Bay.

As I said never mind the implausibility, it is much easier to interdict, your talking about protecting about 1000 miles of railway without significant terrain features and with low troop density. That the US was somehow incompetent enough not to is not something prewar Britain should rely on

Halifax is much harder to take. Nova Scotia being a psuedo Island makes me think it was not counted in the South of the St. Lawrence bit. Getting on there requires an amphibious landing or forcing through multiple bottlenecks 15-25 miles wide. Much easier to defend than just Winnipeg, let alone the whole railroad. Then even if it falls you still have to take St. Pierre and Miquelon, which is not easy as St. Pierre the decent port is not a big island and opposed landings at this point in time are a PITA. And that only closes the Southern entrance, the Northern one is still open, you need more than just St. Pierre to dominate the whole gulf

Just because something happens in an AH novel does not make it a logical outcome

 

[Sierra]

Just because something happens in an AH novel does not make it a logical outcome

Given, but that isn't really the point. We are discussing things to flesh out the world of an AH novel. Regardless of whether you think it is logical or not, it happens in said novel nevertheless, so we must work around that.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

Given, but that isn't really the point. We are discussing things to flesh out the world of an AH novel. Regardless of whether you think it is logical or not, it happens in said novel nevertheless, so we must work around that.

That it happened sure. That people planned on it happening or expected it to happen, is something else. Unless the novels say people thought otherwise, I would expect their plans and expectations make real world sense

 

[bguy]

One thing I'd think is that the British ships at Pearl Harbor and the Battle of the Three Navies might be Pre Dreads and other such relics of the past

Realistically British priorities will be thus

1. Maintain Control of the North Sea
2. Maintain control of the North Atlantic Sea Lanes so that they aren't starved into submission
   
3. Control the Sea routes to Canada and the CSA to keep them in the fight distracting the US
4. Keep raiders away from their sea lanes outside the North Atlantic
5. Go on the offensive against the US

I agree that those should be the most sensible British priorities with the exception of #3 as realistically I don't see how the British can keep the sea route to Canada open in the face of the entire US Atlantic Fleet.

Otherwise while I agree the British should be prioritizing the North Sea, I could still see the pre-war British Admiralty putting at least one squadron of battlecruisers in Pearl Harbor as pre-Haber process the prospect of potentially cutting the US nitrate imports is going to be awful tempting. The British also might have also felt they needed to keep at least one modern battle squadron at Pearl just to keep the Japanese honest.

 

[Sierra]

That it happened sure. That people planned on it happening or expected it to happen, is something else. Unless the novels say people thought otherwise, I would expect their plans and expectations make real world sense

And it makes real world sense to have contingencies in place. I doubt the Imperial General Staff just looked at a map, said "Halifax and Winnipeg will never fall, so we don't have to worry at all." then broke for brandy and cigars.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

And it makes real world sense to have contingencies in place. I doubt the Imperial General Staff just looked at a map, said "Halifax and Winnipeg will never fall, so we don't have to worry at all." then broke for brandy and cigars.

Sure but when discussing something like this we have to fit with what the books say, beyond that we have to use logic to figure out what those were. Such contingencies would thus be meant to respond in proportion to likeliness and necessity. IE the IGS would expect Winnipeg to fall fast and plan around that happening, while not expect the same for Halifax, thus do much less planning for that happening. Likewise they would consider it much more important to hold Halifax than to hold Winnipeg and deploy units accordingly. That Winnipeg held indicates that there were significant Canadians there, probably as a "hold as long as possible to ensure as much grain goes East then bug out force", and the US sent only a token force to oppose them until 1917

 

[Sierra]

True, but if they expected Winnipeg to fall quickly, they would also be concerned about Canada west of Winnipeg. There is plenty there, including Calgary, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Regina, and the rest of Canada's breadbasket. It would be logical to prepare some way to support these areas in the eventuality of Winnipeg's fall. Therefore, arrangements to use Prince Rupert as a port on the pacific to ship in supplies to keep West Canada a going concern.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

True, but if they expected Winnipeg to fall quickly, they would also be concerned about Canada west of Winnipeg. There is plenty there, including Calgary, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Regina, and the rest of Canada's breadbasket. It would be logical to prepare some way to support these areas in the eventuality of Winnipeg's fall. Therefore, arrangements to use Prince Rupert as a port on the pacific to ship in supplies to keep West Canada a going concern.

Those areas aren't anymore defensible than Winnipeg, no terrain bottlenecks to allow outnumbered Canadian forces to avoid being outflanked. Realistically everything West of Thunder Bay bar Vancouver and Prince Rupert should have been written off as indefensible, with the limited forces available to defend Quebec, Ontario and Nova Scotia, where water features make defense much easier, and there is much more population and industry

I agree that those should be the most sensible British priorities with the exception of #3 as realistically I don't see how the British can keep the sea route to Canada open in the face of the entire US Atlantic Fleet.

Otherwise while I agree the British should be prioritizing the North Sea, I could still see the pre-war British Admiralty putting at least one squadron of battlecruisers in Pearl Harbor as pre-Haber process the prospect of potentially cutting the US nitrate imports is going to be awful tempting. The British also might have also felt they needed to keep at least one modern battle squadron at Pearl just to keep the Japanese honest.

It's not going to be the whole Atlantic Fleet. A good chunk of the modern elements is going to be keeping the CSN honest, unless the CSN does something stupid and gets itself wrecked, the USN is going to try keeping it in port

I'm not sure they have enough battle squadrons to go around, battlecruisers maybe, but they only can justify so much yard space IMO, which limits their number of modern BB more than funds

 

[Sierra]

Probably quite a few pre-dreadnought battleships at Pearl and Singapore, as well as a squadron of battlecruisers in Pearl, and a squadron of dreadnought battleships at Singapore. These latter are in a position where they can be pulled back to Britain via the Suez Canal, but also are in position to back up Pearl Harbor. They would then be the core of the British contribution to the Anglo-Japanese Fleet that later engaged in the Battle of Three Navies.

 

[bguy]

It's not going to be the whole Atlantic Fleet. A good chunk of the modern elements is going to be keeping the CSN honest, unless the CSN does something stupid and gets itself wrecked, the USN is going to try keeping it in port

Mahanic Doctrine is very, very emphatic about keeping the battle fleet together, so it is extremely unlikely the US would split up their Atlantic Fleet dreadnought force. Nor is the CSN likely to be enough of a threat to justify dispatching any dreadnoughts south. The Confederates are unlikely to have any more than 3 or 4 dreadnoughts. That's not enough to far blockade the US east coast, and if a dreadnought force that small tries to come in close to New York or Boston or any other US port they will be easy pickings for US subs, torpedo boats, and mines. Nor can the US fleet realistically keep the CSN in port. The Confederates have too many ports with too much coastline to be effectively blockaded when the USN also has to worry about the Royal Navy. Thus the rational move for the US Atlantic Fleet is to ignore the strategically insignificant Confederate surface fleet and concentrate on blockading Halifax.

And if the US Navy does concentrate around Halifax then there is no way the British can realistically reinforce Canada. Afterall, if we assume the US Atlantic Fleet has around 10 dreadnoughts (which is probably low balling it), then the British have to send a minimum of 10 dreadnoughts as part of any Canadian relief convoy just to guarantee an even fight. (Yes, realistically, the US Atlantic Fleet probably won't have all 10 dreadnoughts ready to go at any one time, but the British can't count on that, so they have to assume they will be facing all 10 dreadnoughts.) And even then the Americans are at an advantage in any fight near Canada as they would be fighting much closer to their home base then the British would be. But regardless in OTL the British margin over the Germans in the North Sea at the beginning of World War 1 was only 7 dreadnoughts. Even if we assume the Royal Navy in TL-191 is somewhat bigger than its OTL counterpart (and that the Germans don't also build more dreadnoughts in response), dispatching 10 dreadnoughts to escort a convoy to Canada pretty much completely erases their margin in the North Sea. (And that's just to guarantee an even fight in North American waters. If they want to send enough ships to guarantee they can beat the American fleet they have to surrender their margin in the North Sea entirely.)

So bottom line, the British can control the North Sea or they can try and reinforce Canada. They can't realistically do both which means they need to write off trying to reinforce Canada by sea.

I'm not sure they have enough battle squadrons to go around, battlecruisers maybe, but they only can justify so much yard space IMO, which limits their number of modern BB more than funds

Well IOTL the British had a lot of yard space dedicated to building dreadnoughts for other countries. (IIRC they were building the 2 Turkish dreadnoughts and 2 dreadnoughts for Chile at the start of World War 1). In TL-191 they could always forego those foreign orders to free up yard space for more British dreadnoughts.

 

[Sierra]

Well IOTL the British had a lot of yard space dedicated to building dreadnoughts for other countries. (IIRC they were building the 2 Turkish dreadnoughts and 2 dreadnoughts for Chile at the start of World War 1). In TL-191 they could always forego those foreign orders to free up yard space for more British dreadnoughts.

OTL, they simply took those dreadnoughts over for their own usage. The Chilean ones were given to Chile once the war was over. The Turkish ones were one of the major causes of the Ottoman Empire declaring war on Britain.

 

[bguy]

OTL, they simply took those dreadnoughts over for their own usage. The Chilean ones were given to Chile once the war was over. The Turkish ones were one of the major causes of the Ottoman Empire declaring war on Britain.

Sure. My point was just the British had the shipyards necessary to build a larger fleet than what they had IOTL (as shown by the fact that they were building dreadnoughts for other nations pre-WW1 IOTL). Thus the TL-191 Royal Navy could have a force comparable to OTL's Grand Fleet in the North Sea and still maintain a squadron out at Pearl Harbor. (i.e. Just take the 3 dreadnoughts the British IOTL built for the Brazilians and the battlecruiser they built for Japan pre-WW1, and you've got a Pacific squadron.)