The C.S. Army of the Second Great War 1941-1944
From the period of 1935-1941 the Confederacy had spent more of the nation’s GDP on re-arming than any other nation, save perhaps France. From the beginning of the Confederate Re-armament the Confederacy had spent an average of 24% of their GDP on re-armament with it ultimately rising to 49% on the eve of the war. By the outbreak of war the Confederacy had more Barrels and aircraft per 10,000 than any nation. While most histories focus on the mad genius of President of the Confederacy Jake Featherston. Few acknowledge the career soldier that made this re-armament possible. These four pillars of the Confederate Army’s returned to greatness include J.E.B. Stuart II, Simon Bolivar Bruckner Jr, George Marshall and N.B. Forrest III.
Aftermath of the Great War
The ceasefire agreement signed with the United States on 1917 forced the Confederate Army to discharge all but 50,000 men and officers. It further required the surrender of all heavy equipment including artillery, barrels, aircraft and limited the number of heavy machine guns. This loss of men and equipment leftmost on the Confederate General Staff with a sense of horror that they would not only be incapable of defending against an external attack, but incapable of defeating internal revolt. The Confederate Army leadership was forced to deal the existential question of why does it exist at all? This horror was only reinforced when in the immediate days following the end of the Great War, the remnants of the Army of Northern in Virginia which totaled no more than a regiment of Army regulars was almost overrun by a force of recently released veterans attempting to storming the capitol building. From there on things only got worse. Lack of equipment and numbers, forced the government to rely on volunteer private militias to put down the remaining of the red rebellion.
This dire situation is believed to be one of the cause of then Chief of Staff Clifton Rodes Breckinridge and many other Staff officers to join the Sellars coup. The failed coup further eroded the prestige of the Army as an institution. A severe drop from before the war when the common joke was that the Confederacy is an Army with a state. It was in that period that first pillar J.E.B. Stuart II rose to leadership. Stuart II had been one of the outstanding Staff officers of the Great War. Despite the implications by later President Featherston that he stifled an investigation that could have uncovered the Red Rebellion. He was one of the few officers that retained reputation as being quick to adapt to changes and always quick to realize the second and third order effect of any action. By warning of the Sellars Breckinridge Coup he saved the honor of the Confederate Army. It was under his leadership that the Confederate Army began to plan for its inevitable re-armament and work around the limitations of the Arlington Treaty.
Post-Great War Re-organization
Through the creation of the “Black Staff” the Confederate army organized a covert operation to eliminate Confederate citizen’s cooperating with US treaty inspectors, hide heavy weapons, send volunteers to fight in wars in Latin America and even produce weapons in other countries restricted by the Treaty. Headed by former Army of the Mississippi Commander Richard Taylor Wood. This group succeeded in producing next generation Barrels and aircraft. The group also helped organize right wing civilian militias that could be rapidly reorganized into the military. Overtly the Army under Stewart began training large numbers of troops and noncommissioned officers to lead a future army. While the Treaty forbade conscription all through the 1920’s, most confederate universities continued to require their students participate in ROTC programs. Through new post war legislation the Confederate army tightly controlled the ROTC’s training programs in a way it had not done so in the pre-great war army. Despite only having an army no larger than 100,000; the Confederacy continued to produce a large number of officers for any future war. The best of whom were chosen for full time employment in the much-reduced army. These select Officers were all trained to operate units two orders bigger than what they led at the moment. So lieutenants were trained not only to lead platoons, but companies and battalions as well. This in theory would allow the rapid expansion of the army. Conversely it created an emphasis on tactics over strategy and planning.
The leader of this program was the Head of the Troop Training division, in the pre-rearmament period, a post second only to the Chief of Staff. From 1920 to 1933 this post was held by Simon Bolivar Bruckner Jr, architect of the Confederacy’s only victory in the latter half of the First Great War and Commander of the Army of Kentucky in its conquest of Ohio. Bruckner had been a the leading proponent deep infantry assault or Foot Cavalry tactics. This emphasized bypassing enemy hardpoints, attacking weakpoints and enveloping hard points through attacks into the rear of the US lines. Bruckner was quick to realize the usefulness of the Barrel in spearheading these kinds of attacks. His success in Thirteenth Battle of the Roanoke saved him from being released from the Army like many of his peers. Bruckner an early member of the Black Staff guided its report on to why the CSA lost the Great War and dominated its recommendations for a future war. Bruckner controlled the curriculum for ROTC programs and Staff schools. Resorting to having new young officers train with automobiles serving as mock-barrels.
Inter-War Organization and Strategy
The strategy of the Confederate Army in this period was one of national defense. Because the treaty did not forbid construction of defensive structures the Confederacy spent what little money it did have on fortify strategically important geography like: the Rapidan River, Deep Water Harbors, the Tennessee River, Nashville, Chattanooga and other passes through the Appalachians. These were often built to include and protect equipment banned by the treaty. The Army was organized into 6 divisions that would become the Core of the Armies in the Second Great War. With 1st Division assigned to Virginia, 2nd to Tennessee, 3rd to West Tennessee and Arkansas, 4th Division to Texas, 5th to Cuba and 6th Reserve Division assigned to Alabama and Mississippi.
If the US invaded the chief Plan was to immediately mobilize all state militias and civilian militias. Attempt to attrite the US invading Army with a defense in depth while preparing for a guerilla war. This remained the principal war plan until well into Featherston’s presidency. It was not until 1936 and the dismissal of Stuart II that the Confederacy began planning for offensive operations against the US in earnest. Chief of Staff Marshall proved an organizational genius, which was invaluable to the Confederate military buildup - without his efforts, it’s unlikely that Featherston could have unleashed his war machine as early as 1941. Marshall appointed a young officer N.B. Forrest III, a protege of General Bruckner Jr, to plan offensive operations against the U.S. General Bruckner was considered politically unreliable, because of strong familial attachments to the Whig party.
Organization
Under the General N.B. Forrest III’s plan the Army was divided into Army groups, but kept their historical names for tradition and morale reasons. The bulk of the Army would be deployed in the Ohio River Valley, to support Operation Blackbeard. Blackbeard had its origins in the post war assessments chaired by General Bruckner Jr. The Commands of the separate wings of the Army were dispersed in frontier cities across the country.
Army of Northern Virginia, Headquartered in Spotsylvania, Virginia
Command A Headquartered in Rapidan, Virginia
Command B Headquartered in Fredericksburg, Virginia
Army of Kentucky, Headquartered in Nashville, Tennessee until 1940; Florence Kentucky.
Command A Headquartered in Butler, Kentucky
Command B Headquartered in Hebron, Kentucky
Command C Headquartered in Sparta, Kentucky
Army of Mississippi, Headquartered in Dyersburg Tennessee
Army of Texas, Headquartered in Abilene Texas
Command A Headquartered in Paris Texas
Command B Headquartered in El Paso Texas
Army of the Caribbean, Headquartered in Mobile Alabama
Training and Manpower
Much of the C.S. Army’s management of manpower and training came out of the post-war assessments conducted by J.E.B. Stuart II and Simon Bolivar Bruckner Jr. These addressed problems with inefficient conscription drives, insubordinate state appointed militia commanders, and inconsistent training standards. In the Great War the still heavy emphasis on the power of state governments meant that each state was responsible for conscription. By the mid-1930s the Featherston regime had done much to consolidate all power under his regime. As a result the War Department in Richmond to direct responsibility for the conscription and training. The War Department also removed all but ceremonial power over the state Militias. As a result Texas had to call on the Texas Rangers, mere law enforcement to arrest Confederate Army Commanders and Population Reduction Camp leadership.
Tactics
The key to the Confederacy’s early success was through the implementation of mission-based tactics (rather than detailed order-based tactics), and an almost proverbial discipline. Once an operation began, whether offensive or defensive, speed in response to changing circumstances was considered more important than careful planning and coordination of new plans.
In offensive operations the infantry formations were used to attack more or less simultaneously across a large portion of the front so as to pin the enemy forces ahead of them and draw attention to themselves, while the mobile formations were concentrated to attack only narrow sectors of the front, breaking through to the enemy rear and surrounding him. Some infantry formations followed in the path of the mobile formations, mopping-up, widening the corridor manufactured by the breakthrough attack and solidifying the ring surrounding the enemy formations left behind, and then gradually destroying them in concentric attacks. One of the most significant problems bedeviling Confederate offensives and initially alarming senior commanders was the gap created between the fast-moving "fast formations" and the following infantry, as the infantry were considered a prerequisite for protecting the "fast formations" flanks and rear and enabling supply columns carrying fuel, petrol and ammunition to reach them.
In defensive operations the infantry formations were deployed across the front to hold the main defence line and the mobile formations were concentrated in a small number of locations from where they launched focused counter-attacks against enemy forces who had broken through the infantry defence belt. By late 1943 Brigadier General Clarence Potter and Jerome Napoleon Bonaparte III, argued that in face of overwhelming US air power, the tactic of employing the "fast formations" concentrated was no longer possible. The CSA could no longer actually move quickly enough to reach the threatened locations because of the expected interdiction of all routes by Allied fighter-bombers. In a 1943 Memorandum to the General Staff Major General Bonaparte suggested scattering armored units across the front just behind the infantry. His commanders and peers, who were less-experienced in the effect of Allied air power, disagreed vehemently with his suggestion, arguing that this would violate the prime principle of concentration of force.
Small Arms
The standard infantry weapon of the war was the Tredegar Automatic Rifle. A basic gas-operation design. light enough to be easily carried and fired by one man. In order to increase the magazine capacity to twenty (and to prevent the US from easily appropriating the weapons), it was chambered for an intermediate round, and was unsuitable for the .30-06/.303 rifle cartridge which was used in most countries. Confederate troops used the weapon to great effect in the 1940s, as a small number of TAR-equipped soldiers could overwhelm a larger bolt-action armed force with much a much greater volume of fire. US troops did indeed take to scrounging these weapons when they could, although until they went on the offensive, ammunition was hard to come by.
Along with Griswold submachine gun (a shoddy, inaccurate weapon of welded stainless style which fired handgun rounds, it was unsuited for engagements of much more than 50 yards and was issued mainly to officers and rear-area personnel), it was the standard infantry weapon of the Confederate ground forces and was widely considered the most effective light arm that either side produced. It was licensed to the French in 1939, and became their standard arm as well, though the British and Russians developed their own automatic weapons.
Barrels
While the Stewart commission had great foresight on many issues, the role of the Barrel was not one of them. Like their U.S. counterpart the Confederate General Staff had convinced themselves that the success of the Tennessee Barrel offensive of 1917, was the result of the poor shape of the Army of Kentucky. This became the standard analysis of the events of 1917, until the election of President Featherston. General J.E.B Stuart II as Chief of Staff saw the importance of the weapon, but continued to view them in a role similar to 1916. He outdated thinking can be seen in his insistence that all official Army documents continue to refer to them by their British name “Tank.” It was Featherston that pushed barrel enthusiasts like Patton, Forrest and Bruckner. While the Confederate Army continued to develop new barrels, they were still seen as a weapon to augment infantry until Featherston’s ascension.
Following the Confederate defeat in the Great War, barrels were one of the weapons forbidden to the Confederates, along with submersibles, airplanes, and poison gas. After the War, the US established a barrel research and development facility: the Barrel Works in Leavenworth, Kansas. Meanwhile the Confederate Black Staff continued to covertly develop barrels in Mexico. When the Mexican Civil broke out in 1919, Confederate leadership secretly sponsored many of the nation’s leading barrel experts to relocate to the Mexican Empire. By 1921 confederate engineers had arguably designed the world’s most advanced barrel, equipped with a turret mounted 37mm gun. These crews and engineers gained invaluable operational experience in the Mexican Civil War. After the end of the Mexican Civil War, the Mexican government could not afford to retain a large barrel force. Instead beginning in 1921 Confederate secret barrel production shifted to Britain.
The In 1921 the Conservative government returned to power and began rolling back some of the Labour government’s disarmament programs. The Labour government had also outlawed any secret dealings with the C.S.A. because of its actions during the Red Rebellion. The return of the Conservative government meant the signing of the Rotherham Treaty in 1922, which allowed Confederate and French weapons designers to work in Britain. In exchange Britain promised to share the fruits of their labor. Unfortunately the Imperial General Staff had yet to be dominated by its own tank experts like Liddell Heart and Fuller. Still many C.S. barrel engineers found employment with the Vickers – Armstrong Company, Britain’s leading tank producer.
In the interwar period and particularly the 1930’s that the C.S. surged ahead in barrel development. The coming to power of the Churchill-Moseley government allowed for the open development of barrels with both C.S.A. and French designers. When the C.S.A began re-arming in earnest in 1936, these weapons designers returned home with blue print that surpassed anything the U.S. had. Thanks to President’s Featherston’s investment in mechanized agriculture, when the C.S.A began re-arming in earnest it had the factories to produce one of the largest and most advanced Barrel Forces in the world.
At the outset of the war the Confederate main battle barrel was the Confederate Mark 3 barrel's heavier 50 mm gun was sufficient to destroy the US Custer barrel, however, despite its sloping armor. The Confederates used sloping armor in their new Mark 4 barrel, along with a heavy 76 mm cannon, which made it vastly more powerful than the US Mark 2 and Mark 2.5. The US finally came out with a truly effective barrel design of its own in the Mark 3, which was even more heavily armed and armored than the Confederates' Mark 4, and produced it in sufficient numbers to overwhelm Confederate armored forces. The Confederates' late-war development of the highly advanced Mark 5 "superbarrel" did not help them. The Mark 5 Barrel weighed almost 70 tonnes, and was protected by 100 to 185 mm (3.9 to 7.3 in) of armour to the front. It was armed with the long barrelled 8.8 cm Tredgar anti-tank cannon. The chassis was also the basis for the Barrel Buster Mark 2. The Mark 5 was issued primarily to heavy barrel battalions in the Freedom Guard.
Confederate States Models:
- Mark 1 (Great War) - Rhomboid barrel; 10 man crew; two 50mm guns, 3 machine guns.
- Mark 2 (Between the Wars) - More familiar shape, with rotating turret. Crew of 5-6; Estimated 37mm gun, 3 machine guns.
- Mark 3 (Second Great War) - Upgraded version of Mk2. Crew of 5; 50mm gun, at least 2 machine guns.
- Mark 4 (Second Great War) - It held a crew of 5; mounted a 75mm cannon, and had 2 machine guns.
- Mark 5 (Second Great War) - The latest Confederate model, it sported a low hull, superbly sloped and thick armor that increased crew survival rates, and a high-velocity long-range 4.5 or 5-inch gun. While superior to all US barrels, there were too few to stem the tide.
Barrel Buster
The C.S. general staff responded to the overwhelming superior numbers of U.S. Barrels by introducing “Barrel Busters” or tracked elf propelled anti-barrel weapons. Barrel busters proved quite adept at killing barrels at long range with single hits. Also, the heavier cannon of barrel busters proved to be quite useful for destroying soft targets, such as infantry fighting positions and buildings. In addition, due to their lacking a turret, barrel busters had a lower profile, an advantage in defensive operations. However these were offset by the barrel buster lack of a turret, which gave a barrel buster a narrow field of fire. This made the barrel buster more vulnerable to enemy fire. In addition, the barrel buster lacked any anti-infantry machine guns. This allowed enemy infantry to close readily with a barrel buster and engage it with hand grenades and Featherston Fizzes. The confederacy also tried to compensate by introducing the stovepipe (an anti-barrel rocket launcher) and a number of other rocket artillery weapons.
Artillery and Rockets
In the FGW U.S. Artillery out-classed its Confederate opponent in all aspects, save the excellent Confederate field gun the 75mm. The 75mm’s deficiencies and lack of reliable recoiled heavy artillery in numbers equal to the U.S., was one of the first conclusions drawn by the Stewart Commission. Throughout the 1920’s C.S. Army intelligence kept a close watch on the development of U.S. artillery. Jake Featherston, a former artilleryman of the Great War, was obsessed with matching U.S. artillery superiority. President Featherston spurred by the C.S. spies to capture U.S. weapons designs, organizational charts and fire direction techniques. At the outset of the SGW the U.S. and C.S. Artillery was equal, in fact it was identical. As a result both U.S. and C.S. divisions began the war with thirty six 105mm howitzers and twelve 155mm howitzers. However as the U.S. industrial base continued to grow so to did the number of U.S. guns per division. While the Confederate numbers did not change, by summer 1943 each U.S. division had fifty four 105mm and twelve 155mm howitzers. By 1943 each C.S. Division was equipped with just 54 guns, of both caliber. The U.S. also created specialized artillery Brigades and even Divisions. The Confederates continued to keep artillery at the Divisional levels.
Luckily for the C.S. rocket laboratory in Huntsville again came up with a weapon that helped level the playing field. Mobile Rocket-Artillery launchers (MRAL) invented in Huntsville, Alabama were mounted on many platforms during the SGW, including on trucks, artillery tractors, barrels, river monitors and armored trains. Confederate engineers also mounted single MRAL rockets on lengths of railway track to serve in urban combat at Pittsburgh and Cleveland. First tested in 1938, they were originally deployed on the Kentucky bank of the Ohio river as part of the opening bombardment Ohio. At the time they were not mobile. The success at demolishing the fortifications around Cincinnati convinced the C.S. General Staff to begin testing a mobile version, which came online in the summer of 1943.
The design was relatively simple, consisting of racks of parallel rails on which rockets were mounted, with a folding frame to raise the rails to launch position. Each truck had 14 to 48 launchers. The R-13 rocket of the R-13 system was 80 cm (2 ft 7 in) long, 13.2 cm (5.2 in) in diameter and weighed 42 kg (93 lb).
The weapon is less accurate than conventional artillery guns, but is extremely effective in saturation bombardment, and was particularly feared by U.S. soldiers. A Battery of four R-13 launchers could fire a salvo in 7–10 seconds that delivered 4.35 tons of high explosives over a 400,000-square-metre (4,300,000 sq ft) impact zone, making its power roughly equivalent to that of 72 guns. With an efficient crew, the launchers could redeploy to a new location immediately after firing, denying the enemy the opportunity for counter battery fire. MRAL batteries were often massed in very large numbers to create a shock effect on enemy forces. The weapon's disadvantage was the long time it took to reload a launcher, in contrast to conventional guns, which could sustain a continuous low rate of fire.
The distinctive howling sound of the rocket launching terrified the U.S. troops and could be used for psychological warfare. Unfortunately for the C.S. war effort the introduction of these along with the many other Rocket weapons concocted in Huntsville was not enough to slow the green-grey tide.
Logistics
The Confederacy had secretly mobilized for total war as early as 1939, unlike most Quadruple Alliance and Entente nations did not mobilize for total war until the fall of 1941. Despite being the smallest economy of the Entente Powers the Confederate Army had more Barrels, aircraft and artillery per 10,000 soldiers than any army in 1941. This allowed the Confederacy to punch far above it’s weight.
The In public opinion, the Confederate military was and is sometimes seen as a high-tech army, since new technologies that were introduced before and during the Second Great War, which influenced its development of tactical doctrine. These technologies were featured by propaganda, but were often only available in small numbers or late in the war, as overall supplies of raw materials and armaments became low. For example, despite the larger Confederate Automobile industry, for most of the war the Confederate was only able to equip a third of their army with motorized transport. These became the vaunted Mechanized Corps of the Army of Kentucky.
Luckily Warfare on the Virginia Front was fairly Static which allowed the Army of Northern Virginia to rely heavily on rail and horse transport. The other divisions continued to rely on horses for towing artillery, other heavy equipment and supply-wagons and the men marched on foot or on bicycles. As a rich and heavily industrialized state, the invasion of Ohio captured tens of thousands of trucks and automobiles that augmented the Confederates logistical Corp. At the height of motorization only 38 per cent of all units were fully motorized. Much larger force invading the Ohio and Indiana in June 1941 numbered only some 150,000 trucks and some 625,000 horses (water was abundant and for many months of the year horses could forage – thus reducing the burden on the supply chain). However, production of new motor vehicles by the CSA, even with the exploitation of the industries of occupied territory, could not keep up with the heavy loss of motor vehicles during the winter of 1942–1943.
Despite the mountains of equipment captured in the invasion of Ohio in the Summer of 1941. From June 1942 to march 1943 the C.S. forces in Pennsylvania lost some 75,000 trucks to mechanical issues and combat damage. This was effectively half the number they had at the beginning of the campaign. Most of these were lost during the retreat in the face of the U.S. counter-offensive from December 1942 to February 1943. Another substantial loss was incurred during the defeat of the Army of Kentucky at Pittsburgh. So there were periods in which the percentage of motorized units was reduced to as few as 10%.
Air Support
To CS Army Air Corp Mu-87 Mule or “Ass Kicker” Dive Bomber, is one of most iconic weapons of the Second Great War. And like so many of the Confederacy’s most effective weapons during the conflict, its has its origins in the United States. The US had been experimenting with close air support since the Great War. Air Squadron specifically tasked to keep up with barrels that had out ran artillery coverage was a key component of General Custer’s 1917 Barrel Offensive. The air-ground cooperation in the Barrel Offensive was the responsibility of Colonel Charles T. Menoher, a former artilleryman turned airman. After the war now Brigadier General Menoher was tasked with developing a close air support doctrine.
Like most Army research and development projects it languished during the post war cuts. Only to be revived in the military budget expansions during the Second Pacific War. The project was then picked up by the navy, which tasked the Curtiss Wright Aircraft company to come up with a tough armored fighter aircraft which could be used to attack enemy vessels and support Marine landing operation. In response the Curtiss Wright produced the Curtiss SBC Helldiver in 1933. SBC stood for Scout Bomber Craft, it was a two seat metal biplane, capable of carrying a 500 lb bomb-load. The US produced only 257 of these aircraft, mostly after the end of the Pacific War. The US army acquired three dozen in 1934 but prevailing aircraft doctrine focus on heavy bombers meant the US stopped developing them.
In 1935 the US sold their remaining Hell divers to the French Army, which through the vagaries of the Versailles Treaty were permitted the use of fighter aircraft, but only in its colony. The French used the aircraft to great effect in their suppression of a revolt in Cote D’Ivoire. Confederate Foreign Observers relayed their effectiveness to the War Department and convinced the chief of the non-existent Confederate Army Air Corp to purchase designs for the Helldiver from the French along with three copies. Three Squadrons worth of helldiver copies were ready and in service of the Confederate Citrus Company. Just in time to participate in the Featherston administrations occupation of Louisiana. The squadron's success convinced the General Staff that a close air support would play an integral part in any future battlefield.
By 1939 the Confederate States Air Corp had begun mass production of the MU-87 mule or asskicker. Widely considered the best dive bombers in the world at the time. Mules served as "airborne artillery," bombing specific targets that conventional artillery and armor could not reach by diving down at an almost vertical angle and pulling up at the last moment.
Its gull wing structure made it easy to identify for US forces. It made a terrifying whine as it moved to attack targets, and was effective during Operation Blackbeard and the invasion of Ohio. However, their slow speed and limited maneuverability made them easy targets for enemy fighters and therefore required them to have a fighter escort in areas where the Confederacy did not have air superiority.
The MU-87 was see its greatest successful employment in the summer of 1941. General Bolivar Bruckner Jr., one of the creators of the combined-arms tactical doctrine, believed the best way to provide cover for the crossing would be a continuous stream of ground attack aircraft on yankee defenders. Though few guns were hit, the attacks kept the U.S. under cover and prevented them from manning their guns. Aided by the sirens attached to Asskickers, the psychological impact was disproportional to the destructive power of close air support. In addition, the reliance on air support over artillery reduced the demand for logistical support through Ohio. Though there were difficulties in coordinating air support with the rapid advance, the Confederates demonstrated consistently superior CAS tactics to those of the US defenders. Later, in Eastern Ohio, the Confederates would devise visual ground signals to mark friendly units and to indicate direction and distance to enemy emplacements.
Despite these accomplishments, Confederate CAS was not perfect and suffered from the same misunderstanding and interservice rivalry that plagued other nations' air arms, and friendly fire was not uncommon. For example, on the eve of the Blackbeard offensive, General Forrest cancelled his CAS plans and called for high-altitude strikes from medium bombers, which would have required halting the offensive until the airstrikes were complete. Fortunately for the Confederates, his order was issued too late to be implemented. Despite the myth that the Confederate Army Air Service Corp was primarily a tactical bombing force, only 15% of aircraft were dedicated to tactical bombing or close air support. The was due largely President Featherston’s obsession in being able to match the United States in strategic bombing capability in the interwar period.
Freedom Party Guard Units
The Freedom Party Guards were the paramilitary arm of the Confederate Freedom Party. They were tasked with duties such as protecting political leaders, staffing concentration and extermination camps, and carrying out extralegal activities, including the enforcement of the ban on political opposition and murdering enemies of the Featherston Administration.
They grew in importance through the 1920s and '30s as the armed bodyguard of Confederate President Jake Featherston, and then enjoyed extended powers as his personal troubleshooters. Following the coup attempt of Vice President Willy Knight in December 1938, the more ruffian-like Freedom Party Stalwarts lost prestige and importance to the elitist Guards.
Before 1940 the Freedom Party Guards wore butternut uniforms just as the Confederate Army did, but once they became a more prominent part of the Confederacy's power structure they switched to gray uniforms to distinguish themselves from the Army.
As the tide of the Second Great War began to turn against the C.S.A., Attorney General Ferdinand Koenig set aside a branch of the Justice Department to train Freedom Party Guards for combat roles, supplementing the Confederate Army with thousands of ideologically-motivated troops. While proving themselves brave and willing under fire -- at one point even halting a U.S. Army attack in Texas -- the Armed Guards did not have the extensive training that the Regular Army or even the conscripted National Army had, including leadership skills that would've been learned at the Virginia Military Institute or the Citadel. However, what they lacked in training and skill, they more than made up for in pluck and verve. In general, the Freedom Party Guards held their ground and fought to the death. In addition, as the tactical situation degenerated, the Freedom Party Guards sometimes turned their guns on retreating Confederate Army forces.
The Guards were well-equipped with the best weapons the Confederate States produced, such as automatic rifles, anti-barrel rockets, advanced machine guns, new-model barrels, and Barrel Busters. To distinguish themselves from both the Army and the Freedom Party Guards operating away from the front lines, the Armed Guards wore uniforms with camouflage patterns, most prominently in shades of tan and brown, ranging from sand to mud.
National Assault Battalion
Established in mid-1944. The Force was a home guard militia, consisting of old men and young boys, intended to stem the tide of the United States Army. It mainly consisted of boys as young as eight and meny as old as seventy. The brainchild of Confederate Propaganda Chief Saul Goldman, the origins of the national assault are primordial in both US and CS. It harkens back both American Republics frontier origins, where every able bodied male regardless of age was required to defend their settlement. In late 1944 wartime broadcasts Goodman referred to it as the muster. Goldman ordered the production of a series of high budget films glorifying instances of ordinary confederates defending their homes. His largest was finished in October 1943 and glorified the Tennessee Governors calling of a Levee- en mass to help throw out the remaining Yankee forces in October 1863. The production required a whole reserve division for extras, which interfered with operations.
With the Freedom Party in charge of organizing the National Assault Force, the Freedom Party District Leader, was charged with the leadership, enrollment, and organization of the National Assault Force in their district. The basic unit was a battalion of 642 men. Units were mostly composed of members of the Freedom Youth, invalids, the elderly, or men who had previously been considered unfit for military service. Further desperation showed when on 12 March 1944, the Freedom Party conscripted Confederate women and girls into the auxiliary units. Correspondingly, girls as young as 14 years were trained in the use of small arms, Stovepipes, machine guns, and hand grenades.
Municipal organization:
- A Bataillon in every County.
- A Company in every local chapter or township.
- A Platoon in every Freedom Party Precinct. Corresponding to a ward in a city.
- A Group in every city block.
The National Assaults Organization and recruitment was put under the responsibility of the Freedom Party. As a result there was near constant fighting between party officials and military commanders. This infighting severely impacted its effectiveness. The impact of the National Assault Force was minimal. US troops were ordered to treat them as POWs, not francs-tireurs.
