Alight guys, here's Part 1. I'll try to have Part 2 up by mid-week. Enjoy!
Army Group East (Part 1)
Although stood up in the final few months of the Second Great War, Army Group East became one of the finest and most respected U.S. formations; second only to that of Army Group Central under General Morrell. The origins of this force can be traced back to the U.S. 7th Army in 1941. The 7th Army under General Daniel MacArthur had planned to push south into Virginia with the mission of drawing Confederate troops away from Ohio (though General MacArthur bombastically told the U.S. press that he would be in Richmond by the Winter of 1941). Unfortunately for General MacArthur and the soldiers of the 7th Army, the Army of Northern Virginia was fighting on excellent defensive ground and led by the competent General Hank Coomer. Although General MacArthur was able to get his troops over the Rappahannock River, the cost in U.S. lives was horrific and he was forced to halt on the south side of the river to reconsolidate and reinforce. This pause allowed General Coomer to strengthen his defenses in plan his “killing zones” (with some guidance from Jake Featherston who was visiting the front). By April, 1942 though MacArthur has successfully been able to reach the Rapidan River he changed the axis of advance to now include the capture of Fredericksburg, Virginia. This played right into the hands of General Coomer who had set up excellent positions on the heights to the south of the city. Far from the easy capture that MacArthur had predicted, 7th Army found himself slugging though the streets of Fredericksburg with increasing casualties for every yard advanced. Although Fredericksburg was eventually captured , the Confederates still held the high ground at Marye's Heights. Despite advice from General Abner Dowling, commanding II Corps, to flank the Heights and instead suppress them with artillery, MacArthur relied on the Custerite tactics of attrition warfare to wear down the Confederates. Predicting the outcome of the operation, General Dowling offered his corps to serve as a guard on the western flank. MacArthur was only too happy to take Dowling up on the offer as he felt that Dowling did no possess the "proper offensive spirit that will carry us to victory". The resulting battle 15 day battle was horrific with some U.S. divisions suffering 40% casualties. The weight of U.S. numbers was able to carry the day, however it came at a horrible price. General Nathan Rundstrom, commanding I Corps, was later quoted as saying: "The cost of this victory was bearable in a strategic sense. However, I nonetheless felt like a monster and murderer."
However, the campaign nearly ended in disaster for the U.S. when Confederate General George Patton (newly arrived from the Ohio Front) launched a counterattack into the U.S. western flank pushing out of the Blue Ridge Mountains. Fortunately for the U.S. General Dowling was able to hold the flank and organize a skillful withdraw and prevent Patton from getting into the U.S. rear positions. The “Great Retreat to Richmond” was lampooned in the U.S. press, but Congress found it no laughing matter. The campaign had cost the U.S. 54,000 casualties (of which 23,000 were KIA). General MacArthur was forced to defend himself before the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War. Though the U.S. War Department briefly considered relieving him of command, the new Confederate push into Pennsylvania quickly convinced it that some degree of stability in the command structure was necessary. MacArthur would be left in command, however, 7th Army was ordered to hold its ground and to undertake no major offensives outside of keeping Confederate troops pinned to the Rapidan Line. This was mainly due 7th Army having two corps removed and sent to the newly stood up Army Central in Pennsylvania. For the next year and a half, 7th Army would remain in place and serve as the main force on a secondary front; much to the chagrin on the incensed General MacArthur.