The U.S. Army of the Second Great War 1941-1944
Organization
The Army of 1941 paled in comparison to the Army of 1914. The Army at the outset of the Great War was the product of nearly two generations of rationing and marshaling of resources. In contrast the Army of 1941 had an Army of occupation for the last twenty years. It had been neglected by successive Socialist administrations. In this period military spending was on average 2.6% of the GDP, briefly rising to 2.9% during the Canadian uprising of 1914. This changed with the outbreak of the Pacific war in 1932. President Blackford, began a slow military build up which continued into the Hoover and Smith administration. Chief of Staff Sturgis oversaw this gradual build up of U.S. forces, which increased defense spending to 3% of the GDP. The U.S. briefly increased its military spending in 1940 to greater than its pre-Great War levels of 3.9%, as a part of President Smith deal with Democrats for a plebiscite. This is in comparison to the rapid military build up beginning in 1934 under Chief of Staff Marshal, which climaxed at 24% of their GDP in 1940-1941. Thus the U.S. Army was nominally larger than their Confederate counterpart, but was not nearly as well equipped. One of the first changes made by incoming Chief of Staff McNair in 1940, was the re-organization of the Army under Army Commands. By the commencement of Operation Blackbeard in June of 1941, the U.S. had re-organized and reconstituted Six Army’s, each with designated zones of operation and Defense. These nominally conformed to their previous zones of operation in the Great War.
First Army, headquartered in Fort Leavenworth
Second Army, Evansville, Indiana
Third Army, Columbus, Ohio
Fourth Army, Ottawa, Military District of Ontario
Fifth Army, Warrenton, West Virginia.
Sixth Army, Phoenix Arizona
Seventh Army, Winchester West Virginia
Unfortunately these armies were vastly under strength in the summer of 1941. The average U.S. Army of 1914 had nine divisions. When the balloon went up in June of 1941, Only Fifth was at full strength. The average Army was only at six divisions, with Sixth and Seventh Army at roughly two Divisions apiece. After the invasion of Ohio the U.S. rapidly mobilized and increased in size. By Late July the core armies, 1st,2nd,3rd and 5th taking the brunt of the fighting, had reached planned strength of nine divisions or 135,000 to 150,000 men. Once it was clear that the U.S. was not going to surrender, despite being split in two, the U.S. Army grew exponentially. Most astute officers realized that which ever side could carry out simultaneous operations in two major theaters would likely be the winner. The U.S. won this race in the summer of 1943 when U.S. invaded south of the Ohio River and launched a heavy attack against the Jackson line in Northern Virginia. By then the U.S. had expanded to Eleven Armies, albeit Tenth and Eleventh Army had roughly six divisions between them. The Core fighting Armies the First, Second, Third, Fifth and Seventh Army had expanded to four divisions a corp. Each then had twelve divisions per Army.
Eighth Army Grand Junction, Colorado
Ninth Army Stafford, West Virginia
Tenth Army Honolulu, Hawaii Military District
Eleventh Army Clovis, New Mexico
The Army Division began the war with the old “four square” organization, which consisted of two brigades one with two regiments of infantry and the other with one infantry and one artillery/support regiment. However after the success of Operation Blackbeard and the ascension of Deputy Chief of Staff Wedemeyer the Army re-organized into the triangle division structure. The Triangle Division was composed of three Infantry Regiments Combat teams, which added a battalion of artillery or Barrels to each Regiment. In 1943 General Morrell began the introduction of Barrel divisions, which were made up of two Barrel Regiments, a motorized then later mechanized reserve infantry regiment. Army Group West under General Morrell even went so far as to establish Armored Corps, like that of General Patton. Other Army Groups copied General Morrell beginning in 1943, but emphasized the Combined Arms Regimental Combat Team over the Barrel. These added a battalion of Barrels and artillery to each infantry regiment. The exception being Sixth and later Seventh Armies under General Dowling, who copied General Morrell. At the start of the war each division had a strength of 15,000, however thanks to the high attrition rates of 1942 and divisions on average became roughly 10-12 ,00 and remained so the rest of the war.
Infantry Weapons
Unlike the Great War the average U.S. infantryman entered the war with less firepower than his Confederate counterpart. The standard infantry weapon was the venerable M1903 Springfield. A bolt-action, .30-06 weapon, which entered service that year and saw extensive use for more than four decades. This gave the average U.S. Infantry squad a significantly smaller rate of fire than their Confederate counter part. Confederates infantrymen were equipped with the C.S. Tredegar Automatic Rifle [TAR] with a twenty round clip. To compensate the U.S. Army began issuing the Thompson sub-machine gun. A big, heavy, brutal looking weapon with a slower rate of fire than its Confederate equivalent. Nevertheless, with its .45 caliber bullets, it was an effective and robust weapon. To compensate for the firepower deficiency, U.S. soldiers often dropped their own rifles for TARs. In recognition of this the U.S. Supply Corp began distributing ammunition and spare parts for the weapons by the summer of 1943. The squad light machine gun was the M1918A2 Browning Automatic Rifle, an improvement on the model introduced in the last months of the Great War. Weighing 15 lbs it could fire 500-650 rounds a minute. This again was significantly less the less the C.S. Army air cooled TLMG 39 which at 25lbs could fire 800- 900 rounds a minute. It was completely outclassed by the TLMG 42 which could fire up to 1200 rounds a minute. The average grenade was the M36 which was an improved copy of the C.S. pineapple grenade of the Great War.
Mortars and Artillery
Luckily the U.S. Infantry Battalion had access to greater indirect fire than their CS counterparts with U.S. Companies being equipped with 4-6 M1 81mm mortars. Each Infantry battalion was equipped with 6 M2 105mm mortars. US models on average were larger and more reliable than their C.S. counterparts. In the FGW U.S. Artillery out-classed its Confederate opponent in all aspects, save the excellent Confederate field gun the 75mm. At the outset of the SGW the U.S. and C.S. Artillery was equal, in fact it was identical. Confederate Dictator Jake Featherston a former artilleryman of the Great War, remembered the U.S. superiority in nearly all facets of indirect fire. President spurred by the C.S. spies to capture U.S. weapons designs, organizational charts and fire direction techniques. As a result both U.S. and C.S. divisions began the war with thirty six 105mm howitzers and twelve 155mm howitzers. However as the U.S. industrial base continued to grow so to did the number of U.S. guns per division. While the Confederate numbers did not change, by summer 1943 each U.S. division had fifty four 105mm and twelve 155mm howitzers. Eighteen of the 105 were under direct regimental command. The Confederates responded to these increases with the introduction of rocket artillery batteries in 1943. The U.S. also far outstripped its confederate opponents in self-propelled howitzers. Beginning with the formation of Barrel regiments and later divisions in 1942, each Barrel Battalion was given six self propelled 105mm howitzers, nicknamed the reverend. These were 105mm howitzers were placed on an M-4 tracked mount, it was nick-named reverend for its pulpit like appearance. As the war dragged on the superiority of U.S. industry showed. By 1943 it was clear the metallurgy in U.S. cannon barrels was far superior leading to a slower wear down of the bore and which resulted in less friendly fire. U.S. artillery also improved its accuracy thanks to introduction of wireless range finding to detect incoming enemy fire and using its incoming angle to compute counter battery fire. Despite the introduction of so many new instruments of death, the artillery remained responsible for causing the greatest number of battlefield deaths .
Barrels
Like Artillery in the Great War the Second Great War is widely considered the apotheosis of Barrel warfare. The beginning of the war can be characterized as the U.S. being outclassed in both barrel design and tactics by the Confederacy. In 1941 Barrels were controlled as a division weapon, like artillery, and used to support the infantry attack. Meaning companies of Barrels were often used to support an infantry battalion’s attack or defensive operation. The U.S. began the war with the Mk. II, Nicknamed the 'Custer.' When it rolled off the production line in 1934 the ‘Custer’ was advanced for its time. It carried a crew of 5; had sloped armor mounted a 37mm gun, and carried at least 2 machine guns. However the failure of successive Socialist administrations to fund Barrel development meant by the outbreak of the war it was inferior to the C.S. Army Mk 3, which had 50mm gun, at least 2 machine guns. By 1942 the U.S. Barrel factories began production on the Mk II.V a quick up grade that consisted of a Custer barrel body with an upgraded turret. It carried a crew of 5; and mounted 60mm gun, at least 2 machine guns. This was done to compete with the Confederate Mk 4 introduced in 1942. Despite its inferiority design the Mk. II.V. served admirably under General Morrell’s reorganization of Barrel forces. Beginning in 1943 the U.S. Armies beginning with General Morrel and then also being employed by Generals Krueger and Dowling, switched to a more barrel centric doctrine. This employed Barrels in larger formations being the spearhead of the assault, being supported by infantry. Arguably the same tactics used by Custer’s First Army in the Great War.
It was not until the spring of 1943 that the U.S. finally began producing a barrel design superior to any thing in the confederate vehicle park. The Mk. IV was powerful, heavily armored with "perfectly" sloped armor, and carried a mounted 90mm cannon along with three 50. Caliber machine guns. The U.S. would go on to produce more of these vehicles then any other Barrel model on the earth. To stem the Yankee tide the Confederate produced the Mk 5. A beast of a weapon, it sported a low hull, superbly sloped and thick armor that increased crew survival rates, and a high-velocity long-range 4.5 or 5-inch (120mm) gun. While superior to all US barrels, they were introduced too late and in too few to stem the yankee onslaught.
The C.S. general staff responded to the overwhelming superior numbers of U.S. Barrels by introducing “Barrel Busters” or tracked elf propelled anti-barrel weapons. Barrel busters proved quite adept at killing barrels at long range with single hits. Also, the heavier cannon of barrel busters proved to be quite useful for destroying soft targets, such as infantry fighting positions and buildings. In addition, due to their lacking a turret, barrel busters had a lower profile, an advantage in defensive operations. However these were offset by the barrel buster lack of a turret, which gave a barrel buster a narrow field of fire. This made the barrel buster more vulnerable to enemy fire. In addition, the barrel buster lacked any anti-infantry machine guns. This allowed enemy infantry to close readily with a barrel buster and engage it with hand grenades and Featherston Fizzes. The confederacy also tried to compensate by introducing the stovepipe (an anti-barrel rocket launcher) and a number of other rocket artillery weapons. One criticism of Chief of Staff McNair, was that he favored towed anti-barrel artillery over self-propelled Barrel Busters, even after it had become apparent that Confederate forces were converting their anti-barrel forces into self-propelled guns as soon as such vehicles could be produced. Due to inherent delays in deploying such towed guns, combined with greatly increased crew exposure to Confederate small arms and mortar fire, American towed anti-barrel artillery was never really effective during the war. When U.S. anti-barrel guns were used against Confederate Barrel and defensive emplacements, the towed battalions suffered disproportionate casualties compared to the self-propelled Barrel Buster battalions
Training and Manpower
McNair also come under criticism for his approach to training and replacing casualties. The U.S. began the war with a large pool of reserves and previously trained personnel, with experience fighting insurgents in Kentucky, Houston, Sequoyah and Northern Virginia. The Army had learned a lot form the Great War and spent a great deal of time training not only instilling discipline and marksmanship, but small unit leadership and tactics. Thanks to large numbers of soldiers captured in the invasion of Ohio and horrific casualties in Northern Virginia this pool began to run shallow. Under pressure to quickly produce huge numbers of soldiers, McNair resorted to cutting back basic and advanced combat training, particularly in the areas of combat initiative (small-unit leadership exercises for enlisted troops, where all NCOs and officers have been ruled killed or wounded, combat acclimatization, weapons proficiency, and small unit tactics. With the exception of elite combat units such as airborne forces, who received intense physical training as well as realistic weapon and unit combat instruction, McNair used the bulk of the training cycle to train Army inductees in their particular specialty or classification. The faults in this system were soon exposed after the Battle of Fredericksburg.
Another problem surfaced with the individual replacement system (IRS), a concept devised by General Davis and implemented by McNair. Instead of learning from combat veterans in the same units, replacements were first trained at a variety of facilities, and then sent to replacement depots (repple-depples). Shipped without unit organization or strong command, they were passed from one temporary duty station to another, often spending months between leaving their original organizations and assignment to a unit. During this time they became physically soft, their discipline slackened, and their acquired basic infantry or combat skills tended to be forgotten. It was at this point that the individual army replacement was transferred to an active duty unit, frequently a fighting arm such as armor or infantry that was 'on the line' (currently engaged in combat operations). In addition to this, U.S. commanders frequently encountered replacement soldiers that had received no training on their individual rifle or assigned weapons system at all. As the IRS plan began to break down completely in late 1944, other men, including older individuals and those physically incapable of rigorous physical duty were taken from other army specialties (clerk-typist, cook etc.) or training programs and hurriedly given six weeks' infantry training, upon which they were reassigned as combat infantry replacements. In consequence, casualty rates skyrocketed; in many frontline units, replacement soldiers lasted an average just three to four days before being killed or wounded. At the same time, veteran soldiers were retained on the line until they were killed, wounded, or became incapacitated by battle fatigue or physical illness.
Air Support.
The Confederate use of Close Air Support in the Invasion of Ohio, had a profound affect on of Chief of Staff McNair and the rest of the army. General Bruckner’s, one of the creators of the combined-arms tactical doctrine, believed the best way to provide cover for the crossing would be a continuous stream of ground attack aircraft on U.S. defenders. Though few guns were hit, the attacks kept U.S. soldiers under cover and prevented them from manning their guns. Aided by the sirens attached to Asskickers, the psychological impact was disproportional to the destructive power of close air support. At the start of the War, the United States Army Air Corp (USAAC) had, as its principal mission, the doctrine of strategic bombing. This incorporated the unerring belief that unescorted bombers could win the war without the advent of ground troops. This doctrine proved to be fundamentally flawed. However, during the entire course of the war the USAAC top brass clung to this doctrine, and hence operated independently of the rest of the Army. Thus it was initially unprepared to provide CAS, and in fact, had to be dragged "kicking and screaming" into the CAS function with the ground troops.
In August 1941, USAAC commander Lt. Gen. Henry ("Hap") Arnold developed a modification of the Wright 27 with dive brakes – the Wright A-27. A good intitial test platform, it was then replaced by a purpose built Boeing-7. Though not quite on a par with the Confederate Mule divebomber, the Boeing-17 was effective as flying artillery and for precision targeting during air raids. By 1943, Boeing-17s were armed with 1.5" antibarrel cannon to penetrate the thinner roof armor of Confederate barrels. The USAAC saw the greatest innovations in 1943 under Gen. Elwood Quesada, commander of IX Tactical Air Command, supporting the First U.S. Army. He developed the "barrel column cover", where on-call fighter-bombers maintained a high-level of availability for important barrel advances, allowing armor units to maintain a high tempo of exploitation even when they outran their artillery assets. XIX TAC, under the command of General Queasada utilized similar tactics to support the rapid armored advance of General Morrell's Army Group West in its drive across Kentucky. As the U.S. aircraft production ramped up it began the carpet-bombing of enemy lines, which was used as breakthrough artillery at the start of many operations. This took the place of the concentrated conventional artillery used in the Great War and in Virginia in 1941. In the invasion of Kentucky 1,500 heavies, 380 medium bombers and 550 fighter-bombers dropped 4,000 tons of high explosives and napalm. At first these operation were not as accurate as the Army wished. In a thousands aircraft carpet bombing attack in the summer of 1942, south of the Rappahannock; 77 Bombers dropped their ordinance early and nearly killed Chief of Staff McNair. From then on the Army began embedding airmen with forward army units like artillery forward observers. It was these such operations that blunted Patton's offensive through the appalachian mountains in the summer of 1943. It again helped break the stalemate in the western virginia area known as the wilderness by burning them to the ground. By 1944 U.S. air dominance and close air support made any large scale Confederate Counter attacks impossible.
