That does sound more interesting. The problem is a Fourth Pacific War is pretty difficult to avoid. After all the big take way TL-191 US got from the Second Great War is don't ever let your enemies get strong enough that they can threaten you. Atomic weapons will make Japan a huge threat (potentially far more dangerous than Featherston ever war), so if Japan does start developing atomic weapon capability, the US will almost certainly launch a preemptive strike. (And most likely with its own atomic weapons.)
Those are all good points. The problem is I think the Fourth Pacific War needs to happen soon, before the generation that grew up after the war and grew up with images of Charleston/Newport News/London/Hamburg/Paris/Philadelphia* bombings. The late 1950s/early 1960s will also likely be the time when the Canadian and Confederate occupations are starting to grate, especially among younger people who are expected to die. Once they grew up, a pre-emptive strike against Japan will rapidly become politically impossible. A 1950s Fourth Pacific War may work, although it will be politically divisive and economically costly. A FPW in the 1960s wouldn't make Vietnam look tame. Even pre-1960, the costs of the Confederate and Canadian occupations will make a war against Japan unappetizing.
I also don't think a German-Japanese alliance isn't entirely impossible. Or not a full alliance but an understanding Philadelphia and Berlin that a pre-emptive nuclear strike on Japan will mean trouble. Not because Germany views Japan as an ally, but because it will tie the massive economic might of the United States and prevent them meddling in Russia and Africa.
Thus the only real ways I can see to avoid a Fourth Pacific War are either Japan voluntarily foregoing atomic weapons (which is unlikely since the Japanese know they are basically defenseless against the US and Germany without such weapons) or Germany allying with Japan and making clear that any US attack on Japan will be regarded as an attack on Germany. (Which also seems unlikely since why would the Germans want to forego their alliance with the US to ally with a country who betrayed its allies during the Second Great War?)
Again, it depends whether the Japanese develop bombs soon after the Second Great War, and whether the United States intelligence services catch them early enough. A Japan which already has nuclear bombs is a very different kettle of fish to one that could potentially get them in a couple of years.
This all seems plausible except possibly the last point. Can Germany really afford to annex the British (and French) African colonies? The Germans are already going to have their hands full with rebuilding Germany (remember Entente forces advanced all the way to Hamburg, so northwest Germany was probably pretty damaged even before the atomic strike), occupying France, propping up the Austro-Hungarians, and maintaining control in Eastern Europe. It also already presumably has a rather big empire in Africa (assuming it grabbed the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa after the First Great War.) Trying to annex Algeria or Egypt or South Africa on top of everything else the German Empire is already having to do, might just be the straw that breaks the camel's back.
I agree that Germany would overstretching itself. The problem is that from the perspective of the German government, they have to take something. There isn't really that much more that can be taken in Europe. And in any case, I don't think Germany will annex South Africa, Egypt or Algeria. South Africa (along with Australia and New Zealand) is an independent state with informal ties to Britain. Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia are German puppet states. Coastal Algeria remains with France, with Germany annexing the interior of the colony along with the remaining fragments of France's colonial empire. Sierra Leone, British Kenya, Nigeria, British Somalia, and British Gold Coast (assuming they haven't already been taken over) are all annexed to Germany. The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan becomes the German-Egyptian Sudan. Ceylon and the British Indian Ocean territories are taken over by local warlords/strongman who align with South Africa and Australia, with the smaller, more strategic islands being taken by Germany. This absolutely massive empire is a house of cards and isn't helped by the USA's not entirely subtle, indirect, support for the African independence movements.
Interesting. How big a troop commitment do you see the US making by 1952? If Dewey gets the US involved in New Guinea in a big way, that could give the Socialists their opening for the 1952 elections. (Arguing that Dewey is neglecting the pacification of the Confederate States and Canada by diverting so many troops to a pointless conflict in far off Asia.)
I see the East Irian War being a mix of the OTL Vietnam and Korea conflicts. Politically, the conflict is nowhere near as draining as the Second Indochina War and US troop numbers never approach the numbers of Vietnam, let alone Korea. This is partially because the US bombers are based in Australia and therefore less vulnerable to attack than the American bases in South Vietnam. Despite this, there is considerable pressure on Dewey to end the war in time for the 1952 elections.
The final outcome of the war is one that as with the Third Pacific War, leaves everyone unhappy. The Australians are forced to ease off on New Guinea, with the big highland tribes being given autonomy similar to the princely states of the old Raj. Meanwhile, Japan has failed to install a client in the south-east of the island but the really hard line militarists have been killed off and partially discredited. For the United States, the war has contained the Japanese but there are at least half-credible rumors that German officials in the north were not particularly vigilant in stopping the rebels trafficking arms through German territory.
*I'm going to suggest that the latter four are going to have an even bigger impact than Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the west simply because they feel so much more immediate, particularly Paris...
---
Preparedness Begets Paranoia
by William Cross, printed in
The Philadelphia Inquirer, May 20th 1947
Or such is the conclusion must draw from Chancellor Goerdeler's recent speech to Reichstag. Only two months in office, Chancellor Goerdeler has already proven himself to be a more entertaining presence than either Mr. Bruning or Mr. Papen, although hardly a positive influence on the peace of the world.
Rising in front of a Reichstag packed with his lackies in the DVP and coalition partners in the Right-Centre Party, Chancellor Goerdeler warned of the threat of "renewed, economic, encirclement of Germany by certain powers". As part of this nefarious conspiracy, the Chancellor cited recent efforts by unnamed powers to "mislead the peoples of Britain, France, and Russia, into supporting political movements not in their national interest." The speech went on to list the dire consequences that awaited anyone who tried to restore the Entente's encirclement of Germany.
Perhaps the Chancellor views the great American public as feeble minded but this reporter feels as though he greatly underestimates us. It is clear that the new German government would rather keep the peoples of Europe in a state of bare survival while it wastes time and money propping up its out-dated colonial empire. In contrast, the American people have chosen to send aid to the devastated lands of Europe, even as we attempt to reconstruct our own nation and contain the Japanese dragon in the Far East. If Germany is unwilling to take steps to establish new societies in its defeated enemies, then perhaps it deserves encirclement.
----
teg