Tirpitz sunk in March 1942

While returning from an unsucessful attempt to locate the artic convoys PQ12 and QP8, on the 11th March 1942 the Tirpitz was attacked by aircraft from HMS Victorious. They did no damage.

The question - what if they either sank her, or did a Bismarck and crippled her so she could be sunk by the Home fleet.

What effects would this have on the war at sea and would this see different construction by the british ie no Vangaurd but prehaps 1 or 2 Malta class carriers?

One thing I see is more and better British units in the Indian ocean.
 

CalBear

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While returning from an unsucessful attempt to locate the artic convoys PQ12 and QP8, on the 11th March 1942 the Tirpitz was attacked by aircraft from HMS Victorious. They did no damage.

The question - what if they either sank her, or did a Bismarck and crippled her so she could be sunk by the Home fleet.

What effects would this have on the war at sea and would this see different construction by the british ie no Vangaurd but prehaps 1 or 2 Malta class carriers?

One thing I see is more and better British units in the Indian ocean.


In the long run the reduction in effort spent on the Tirpitz would be beneficial to the ETO, if only in freeing up the recon assets used to monitor the KM ship.

As far as having better units in the Indian Ocean, that needs to be AFTER the Kido Butai raid in early April. If its there before, Cunningham might be tempted to take the IJN on, and that would not end well for the RN. In any case, it would be better to have additional units in the Med.
 

Bearcat

Banned
In the long run the reduction in effort spent on the Tirpitz would be beneficial to the ETO, if only in freeing up the recon assets used to monitor the KM ship.

As far as having better units in the Indian Ocean, that needs to be AFTER the Kido Butai raid in early April. If its there before, Cunningham might be tempted to take the IJN on, and that would not end well for the RN. In any case, it would be better to have additional units in the Med.

I can't imagine Churchill sending much of anything east in this scenario. He fully believes Hitler is the main threat and willa ct accordingly.

The absence of threat from Tirpitz does simplify the Arctic convoys. With attendant butterflies in late 42 and onward. But mostly in that theatre.
 
The Tirpitz did tie up offensive naval assets for covering forces and deliberate attacks. With nothing to defend against these offensive heavy ships can be used elsewhere, perhaps in the Med to reinforce Malta.
 
Some other things, the convoy PQ17 disaster is not going to happen, it was the fact that the Tirpitz was loose that caused it to be scatterd, this together with the fact that following convoys will not be suspended for 3 months, means more supplies for Russia - would this have any effect?

Will Hitler do what he did after OTL Battle of the Barents Sea, and order the scrapping of the surface fleet, this could see Donitz as head of the German navy approx 6 months earlier.

As an example of the small butterflies that can occur, in the RAF musem at Hendon sits a Halifax bomber salvaged from a Norwegian fjord, it was shot down in Aug 42 after a raid on the Tirpitz - it wouldnt be there now. (I went there with my grandad when I was 12 and he would told me how he built that actual aircraft).
 
Bad news for Japan, also

Tirpitz tied down lots of Allied fleet units, including battleships and carriers, that could have been sent to the Pacific.
 
Assuming Hitler doesn't scrap the surface fleet in responce I'd expect there wouldn't actually be all that much of a change. Why? Scharnhorst, two Panzerschiffs, Hipper and Prinz Eugen are still operational and given the date of the PoD serious rebuilding work hadn't started on Gneisenau yet (i.e. there's a serious chance the Germans will shift from the plans of fitting her with new 15" turrets etc. to getting her back into service ASAP as is). There's still enough of a threat from German surface forces that the home fleet is not able to release most of the KGVs and carriers for service elsewhere.
 
One thing I see is more and better British units in the Indian ocean.


rip89,

Why? Were Scharnhorst, Scheer, Lutzow, Hipper, Prinz Eugen, Koln, and Nurnberg all sunk too? All those ships, except Scharnhorst who arrived early in February of '43, were in Norway during 1942. The Home Fleet was guarding the GIUK gap and Murmansk convoys against more than just Tirpitz.

During the war the Home Fleet did contain battleships from both the UK and US, just not as many as people would like to think. As for carriers, more often than not during the war the Home Fleet didn't even have a single flight deck assigned to it. There were other fronts in the Atlantic, there was the Med, there was the need for repairs and refits.

Here's some numbers from Levy's The Royal navy's Home Fleet in WW2 to illustrate my point further. On May 23rd 1941 this was the ship distribution of the Royal Navy:

BB: Home Fleet - 3, Elsewhere - 10
BC: HF - 2, E - 1
CV: HF - 1, E - 4
CVL: HF - 0, E - 2
CA: HF - 2, E - 6
CL: HF - 7, E - 25
CLAA: HF - 0, E - 4
DD: HF - 20, E - 92

As the war went on, the balance of forces between the Home Fleet and other stations didn't change that much. Ships were lost, ships were built, USN ships were briefly loaned, and older ships actually mothballed but the ratio remained basically the same. The only part of the ratio that increased for the Home Fleet involved carriers, by mid '44 the fleet finally had a permanent carrier attached to it.

Sinking Tirptiz earlier isn't going to suddenly release the five or six capital ships routinely assigned to the Home Fleet. There are still KM surface ships in Norway that need to be dealt with, whether they threaten the Atlantic or Murmansk convoys. You might get one or two freed up to steam elsewhere but, seeing as the Home Fleet's capital units were rarely carriers, what real effect will they have? Another battleship or two isn't going to help Cunningham catch the Italians in the Med and, as CalBear wisely points out, the same in the Indian Ocean will only provide the Kido Butai with more targets.


Bill
 
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rip89,

Why? Were Scharnhorst, Scheer, Lutzow, Hipper, Prinz Eugen, Koln, and Nurnberg all sunk too? All those ships, except Scharnhorst who arrived early in February of '43, were in Norway during 1942. The Home Fleet was guarding the GIUK gap and Murmansk convoys against more than just Tirpitz.

During the war the Home Fleet did contain battleships from both the UK and US, just not as many as people would like to think. As for carriers, more often than not during the war the Home Fleet didn't even have a single flight deck assigned to it. There were other fronts in the Atlantic, there was the Med, there was the need for repairs and refits.

Here's some numbers from Levy's The Royal navy's Home Fleet in WW2 to illustrate my point further. On May 23rd 1941 this was the ship distribution of the Royal Navy:

BB: Home Fleet - 3, Elsewhere - 10
BC: HF - 2, E - 1
CV: HF - 1, E - 4
CVL: HF - 0, E - 2
CA: HF - 2, E - 6
CL: HF - 7, E - 25
CLAA: HF - 0, E - 4
DD: HF - 20, E - 92

As the war went on, the balance of forces between the Home Fleet and other stations didn't change that much. Ships were lost, ships were built, USN ships were briefly loaned, and older ships actually mothballed but the ratio remained basically the same. The only part of the ratio that increased for the Home Fleet involved carriers, by mid '44 the fleet finally had a permanent carrier attached to it.

Sinking Tirptiz earlier isn't going to suddenly release the five or six capital ships routinely assigned to the Home Fleet. There are still KM surface ships in Norway that need to be dealt with, whether they threaten the Atlantic or Murmansk convoys. You might get one or two freed up to steam elsewhere but, seeing as the Home Fleet's capital units were rarely carriers, what real effect will they have? Another battleship or two isn't going to help Cunningham catch the Italians in the Med and, as CalBear wisely points out, the same in the Indian Ocean will only provide the Kido Butai with more targets.


Bill

Ok thats disproved one of my ideas about what would have happened:)

What ramifications could have come from this though ie effects on german navy, on the artic convoys any possible changes to british ship construction.
 
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Hyperion

Banned
So sinking the battleship in and of itself would be somewhat helpful, but it wouldn't be the huge gamechanger that some would like.

If the British and US aren't having to worry about her though, might some of the efforts launched against her OTL be redirected against some of the other German warships? Perhaps against another ship an attack that failed in OTL might be more successful?
 
First of all, it seemed highly unlikely the German battleship could have been sunk by just those twelve Albacores alone, since the likelyhood of scoring a single hit with so few bombers was extremely small (even though two hits were indeed scored, but failed to detonate, according to German reports).

Secondly, the Homefleet was quite far away at over 120 miles, due to the range of Norway based Luftwaffe bombers and likely would not dare to enter closer to the shore, even when the German ship was somehow crippled. Tirpitz was still sailing within aircoverrange of the Luftwaffe, by the time of the Albacore attack, although bad weather prevented the Germans to launch aircraft. The British still did fly an attackforce though, seemingly because the British were more experienced in such weatherconditions.

Thirdly, Tirpitz still operated close to the Norwegian cost and could easily have be reenforced by other ships, to support the ship in case of damage and guide her back to a fjord or so, before the British fleet could turn up theoretically. (If the Homefleet could accept a sort of suicide mission Japanese style, it still would have taken half a day to reach the possition of the stricken German ship.)


Even with Tirpitz out of the way, not much would have been different in the UK shipbuildingplans as historically. HMS Vanguard would still be constructed, as she was never intended with Germany in mind in the first place, but to create a fast carrierescort for the Eastern/Pacific Fleet, dealing with Japan only. All five King George V class ships were already more or less completed by 1942, as were the Illustrious Class Carriers. Only the newer Malta and Gibraltar Class ships would possibly have been affected at best, although even with Tirpitz around in real history, these were eventually canceled. (except for two, becomming HMS Eagle and Ark Royal)

Priority wouyld have still been the ASW warfare, so the majority of labor in shipbuilding would still have been as historical in construction of specialized ASW vessels mainly. This was the UK's first and only real priority, as the Nations survival was at stake. More exotic warplans were always secondary to this.

In the fleetdistribution, the most likely consequense of the removal of Tirpitz would be a smaller Homefleet with possibly just two battleships and one or two aircraft carriers remaining there, capable of hunting down any possible German surfaceraider. (like Scharnhorst) For this only the King George V class was acceptable, because of their higher speed and longer ranged gunnery. Only two were left by then, as HMS Prince of Wales would have been lost already in 1942. Normally one or two would be refitting at any time, so not much left to spare for exotic deployement.

At best the Eastern Fleet could be reenforced by the old and more or less useless Royal Sovereign Class battleships, as the Queen Elizabeth class was already needed in the Med., as were the Nelsons. (While two were already out of action for a long time, due to the Italian attack in Alexandra Harbor.) Aircraft Carriers were needed badly in the Med as well, wjile one was already hit hard and in need for a very long repairtime. At best only one, or two or so could be spared at best for the East. Problem was still the same with the inverior quality of the FAA aircraft of the period.

Conclusion would be that the Tirpitz alone did pose a serious threath, causing the British to allocate serious forces in the Homefleet, backed up by USN supporting units in 1942. With Tirpitz removed, the already starved Royal Navy simply lacked the needed ships to reenforce seriously other fleets in the world. The most likely direct result of Tirpitz´ removal would have been the withdrawing of the USN from the Arctic waters to the Pacific, leaving the Atlantic to the Roayl Navy only.
 
"First of all, it seemed highly unlikely the German battleship could have been sunk by just those twelve Albacores alone, since the likelyhood of scoring a single hit with so few bombers was extremely small (even though two hits were indeed scored, but failed to detonate, according to German reports)."

Maybe if those two hits did detonate? The number of Swordfish that crippled the Bismarck was about the same, though that did take a lucky hit to the Rudders. If the first attack does the same to Tirpitz, what are the chances of a second strike?

I came up with this idea, while reading (the abbreviated), official history of British Intellingce in the Second World War, the enigma decrypts were read with some delay during this period, if they were read quicker, say by 12 hrs (there was a 48hr delay), then maybe Tirpitz would have been caught closer to the Home Fleet.

If the rest of the German fleet sailed to protect her could there be a chance of a fleet battle?

By the way the book is a treasure trove of possible PODs, expect more questions in the future:)
 
"First of all, it seemed highly unlikely the German battleship could have been sunk by just those twelve Albacores alone, since the likelyhood of scoring a single hit with so few bombers was extremely small (even though two hits were indeed scored, but failed to detonate, according to German reports)."

Maybe if those two hits did detonate? The number of Swordfish that crippled the Bismarck was about the same, though that did take a lucky hit to the Rudders. If the first attack does the same to Tirpitz, what are the chances of a second strike?

I came up with this idea, while reading (the abbreviated), official history of British Intellingce in the Second World War, the enigma decrypts were read with some delay during this period, if they were read quicker, say by 12 hrs (there was a 48hr delay), then maybe Tirpitz would have been caught closer to the Home Fleet.

If the rest of the German fleet sailed to protect her could there be a chance of a fleet battle?

By the way the book is a treasure trove of possible PODs, expect more questions in the future:)



There still are a bit too many "iff's" then, as the Germans certainly would mobilize the Luftwaffe units stationed nearby, even though they were to fly in bad weather. The Tirpitz was too important to loose and she was certainly within range of the aircover, which could be given in strength. It would not surprise me to see Tirpitz survive, being towed back to savety and the HMS Victorious, King George V and USS Washington at the bottom of the Barentzsea, if they decided to press on, into enemy controlled restricted waters.

The Germans did have quite a concentration of both air and naval forces in the North, by the time of PQ-12, mainly torpedoplanes and patroll aircraft, besides the long ranged Ju-88 divebomber. for the first and a dozen U-Boote for the second. HMS Victorious was the only carrier in the region and she had a small airgroup of just about 30 planes at best in all (most likely even less). Against such odds, the Homefleet would be suicidal to press on against a criplled Tirpitz, which could not have been sunk by just twelve Albacores, as their offensive power was too little to harm her that seriously. (although she could be crippled.)

Tirpitz was just some less than 100 miles of the Norwegian coast and about 150 miles from friendly airbases, when attacked by the Albacores. This would have given the Luftwaffe some 30 minutes or so to get the first CAP fighters over her, as the range was so close, if some Bf-109's were ready for a scramble mission, by that time. Otherwise, it would take some more time, but not that much. Against a Bf-109, the Albacore made no change at all. (Tirpitz also had shot down two herself during the historical attack, according to German reports.)

With no CAP of any significance for the Homefleet, appart from a few addapted Hurricanes, or so, besides some Fulmars, the Homefleet could be facing a "Prince of Wales & Repulse" scenario in the Barentzsea, against several dozens of German bombers, protecting Tirpitz and holding Allied forces at bay.
 
First of all (big snip)


First of all, rip89's question had to do with Tirpitz being sunk earlier. In posing that question, he suggested one scenario in which that sinking may have plausibly occurred. Whether the scenario works or not is moot because the question is about the effects of Tirpitz' earlier loss and not how that loss occurred.

Second...

In the fleetdistribution, the most likely consequense of the removal of Tirpitz would be a smaller Homefleet with possibly just two battleships and one or two aircraft carriers remaining there...

... as I've already explained, the Home Fleet generally had three or fewer battleships and, until mid-44, operated more often without any carrier than with one or two. Also with plenty of other German surface, air, and submarine forces still in Norway and convoys still crossing the Atlantic and heading for Murmansk, the Home Fleet still requires a certain number of ships in order to do it's job.

Whether Tirpitz is afloat or not, there are no significant assets in Scapa waiting to be moved to other forces.

Conclusion would be that the Tirpitz alone did pose a serious threath, causing the British to allocate serious forces in the Homefleet, backed up by USN supporting units in 1942.

That "conclusion" is sadly unsupported by the actual numbers.

With Tirpitz removed, the already starved Royal Navy simply lacked the needed ships to reenforce seriously other fleets in the world.

That is somewhat true. The late war RN had few ships when compared to the USN but, as I've explained twice now, there really weren't that many ships assigned to the Home Fleet anyway.

The most likely direct result of Tirpitz´ removal would have been the withdrawing of the USN from the Arctic waters to the Pacific, leaving the Atlantic to the Roayl Navy only.

That is nonsense. Convoys to Murmansk mean escorts and that means the US would still be involved. Furthermore, in the OTL USN heavy units, battleships, cruisers, and a lone small carrier, operated in the Arctic very briefly and did so for reasons which, while they included Tirpitz, were not limited to Tirpitz.


Bill
 
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