First of all, it seemed highly unlikely the German battleship could have been sunk by just those twelve Albacores alone, since the likelyhood of scoring a single hit with so few bombers was extremely small (even though two hits were indeed scored, but failed to detonate, according to German reports).
Secondly, the Homefleet was quite far away at over 120 miles, due to the range of Norway based Luftwaffe bombers and likely would not dare to enter closer to the shore, even when the German ship was somehow crippled. Tirpitz was still sailing within aircoverrange of the Luftwaffe, by the time of the Albacore attack, although bad weather prevented the Germans to launch aircraft. The British still did fly an attackforce though, seemingly because the British were more experienced in such weatherconditions.
Thirdly, Tirpitz still operated close to the Norwegian cost and could easily have be reenforced by other ships, to support the ship in case of damage and guide her back to a fjord or so, before the British fleet could turn up theoretically. (If the Homefleet could accept a sort of suicide mission Japanese style, it still would have taken half a day to reach the possition of the stricken German ship.)
Even with Tirpitz out of the way, not much would have been different in the UK shipbuildingplans as historically. HMS Vanguard would still be constructed, as she was never intended with Germany in mind in the first place, but to create a fast carrierescort for the Eastern/Pacific Fleet, dealing with Japan only. All five King George V class ships were already more or less completed by 1942, as were the Illustrious Class Carriers. Only the newer Malta and Gibraltar Class ships would possibly have been affected at best, although even with Tirpitz around in real history, these were eventually canceled. (except for two, becomming HMS Eagle and Ark Royal)
Priority wouyld have still been the ASW warfare, so the majority of labor in shipbuilding would still have been as historical in construction of specialized ASW vessels mainly. This was the UK's first and only real priority, as the Nations survival was at stake. More exotic warplans were always secondary to this.
In the fleetdistribution, the most likely consequense of the removal of Tirpitz would be a smaller Homefleet with possibly just two battleships and one or two aircraft carriers remaining there, capable of hunting down any possible German surfaceraider. (like Scharnhorst) For this only the King George V class was acceptable, because of their higher speed and longer ranged gunnery. Only two were left by then, as HMS Prince of Wales would have been lost already in 1942. Normally one or two would be refitting at any time, so not much left to spare for exotic deployement.
At best the Eastern Fleet could be reenforced by the old and more or less useless Royal Sovereign Class battleships, as the Queen Elizabeth class was already needed in the Med., as were the Nelsons. (While two were already out of action for a long time, due to the Italian attack in Alexandra Harbor.) Aircraft Carriers were needed badly in the Med as well, wjile one was already hit hard and in need for a very long repairtime. At best only one, or two or so could be spared at best for the East. Problem was still the same with the inverior quality of the FAA aircraft of the period.
Conclusion would be that the Tirpitz alone did pose a serious threath, causing the British to allocate serious forces in the Homefleet, backed up by USN supporting units in 1942. With Tirpitz removed, the already starved Royal Navy simply lacked the needed ships to reenforce seriously other fleets in the world. The most likely direct result of Tirpitz´ removal would have been the withdrawing of the USN from the Arctic waters to the Pacific, leaving the Atlantic to the Roayl Navy only.