Timeline in a week: A serendipitous detour (Napoleon focused)

longsword14

Banned
@yboxman
If the cadres are not so bad that they would run easily, then Napoleon can handle things. He still has some good base material to use, and when he works well then battles are mostly won before action begins.
 
@yboxman
If the cadres are not so bad that they would run easily, then Napoleon can handle things. He still has some good base material to use, and when he works well then battles are mostly won before action begins.

The Cadres are veterans, more so than OTLs 1806 since more of them survived and remained under the colors the wars of the Second and First Coalition and their combat experience is more recent. But the new recruits have less training and more importantly the units are less well integrated with each other. man for man and unit for unit TTLs army is the superior of that of OTLs 1806- and there are more of them. But taken as a whole it is not as effective.

That said, the question is not whether Napoleon will win the early battles Vs Prussia. The Prussians are so outmatched in leadership, men, material, organization and doctrine that victory of some sort West of the Oder is almost inevietable, even if those still shrouded in the mystique of Fredrick the Great have a hard time realizing it. The questions, to parse them down are:
a. Whether Napoleon will win ITTLs 1779 as decisively, and at so small a cost as he did OTL Vs the Prussians, so as to effectively knock out their army before he even crosses the Oder and the Vistula.
b. Whether the Russians will arrive significantly later than they did OTL (Ie; late enough for Konigsberg to be invested and or captured as Vienna was OTL and for Prussia to be completely knocked out).
c. Whether the quality of Russian generalship is likely to be higher than OTL.
d. Whether in case Napoleon is forced to go toe to toe with the Russians, the correlation of forces and leadership will favor him more or less than it did OTL.
 
Napoleon, being Corse, really felt that he howed his family the best he could. Eventually he will be really tempted to give prominent positions to his brothers in the vassal states and this will likely end as badly as iotl. Still, I like this more radical Napoleon: if things started to go downhill he could try and use nationalism to his advantage.
The Cadres are veterans, more so than OTLs 1806 since more of them survived and remained under the colors the wars of the Second and First Coalition and their combat experience is more recent. But the new recruits have less training and more importantly the units are less well integrated with each other. man for man and unit for unit TTLs army is the superior of that of OTLs 1806- and there are more of them. But taken as a whole it is not as effective.

That said, the question is not whether Napoleon will win the early battles Vs Prussia. The Prussians are so outmatched in leadership, men, material, organization and doctrine that victory of some sort West of the Oder is almost inevietable, even if those still shrouded in the mystique of Fredrick the Great have a hard time realizing it. The questions, to parse them down are:
a. Whether Napoleon will win ITTLs 1779 as decisively, and at so small a cost as he did OTL Vs the Prussians, so as to effectively knock out their army before he even crosses the Oder and the Vistula.
b. Whether the Russians will arrive significantly later than they did OTL (Ie; late enough for Konigsberg to be invested and or captured as Vienna was OTL and for Prussia to be completely knocked out).
c. Whether the quality of Russian generalship is likely to be higher than OTL.
d. Whether in case Napoleon is forced to go toe to toe with the Russians, the correlation of forces and leadership will favor him more or less than it did OTL.

A. Yes: I am confident that Napoleon can completely destroy the Prussian army ITTL, unless maybe they retreat towards Königsberg trying scorched earth tactics? It would likely be impolitic.
B. I don't think so, but I don't have elements to really answer.
C. I don't know, much depends on Suvurov staying in command, which depends on how Paul took the failure to save Wien.
D. This is difficult to answer. I think that the pros and cons relatively to ttl's French army even out, but I am not really an expert so...

I urge more qualified people to take a shot at answering!
 
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longsword14

Banned
The Cadres are veterans, more so than OTLs 1806 since more of them survived and remained under the colors the wars of the Second and First Coalition and their combat experience is more recent. But the new recruits have less training and more importantly the units are less well integrated with each other. man for man and unit for unit TTLs army is the superior of that of OTLs 1806- and there are more of them. But taken as a whole it is not as effective.

That said, the question is not whether Napoleon will win the early battles Vs Prussia. The Prussians are so outmatched in leadership, men, material, organization and doctrine that victory of some sort West of the Oder is almost inevietable, even if those still shrouded in the mystique of Fredrick the Great have a hard time realizing it. The questions, to parse them down are:
a. Whether Napoleon will win ITTLs 1779 as decisively, and at so small a cost as he did OTL Vs the Prussians, so as to effectively knock out their army before he even crosses the Oder and the Vistula.
b. Whether the Russians will arrive significantly later than they did OTL (Ie; late enough for Konigsberg to be invested and or captured as Vienna was OTL and for Prussia to be completely knocked out).
c. Whether the quality of Russian generalship is likely to be higher than OTL.
d. Whether in case Napoleon is forced to go toe to toe with the Russians, the correlation of forces and leadership will favor him more or less than it did OTL.
Perhaps I am biased a bit, but it is hard to see anybody being able to check Napoleon for long without the lessons learnt in OTL, maybe the campaign is extended as in OTL that would force France to fight on during winter in Poland? Eylau was a mess with the French having awful coordination in low visibility and a hard march behind them.
If you would offset the schedule by two weeks or so, Russia might try more caution in East Prussia, with the capital (as you noted) reduced.
As you have showed till now, Napoleon is following a different route politically speaking; this is what I am more interested in. I expect him not to be fooled into believing that any cooperation would be possible between Russia and France this time. So, I am curious as to what does he does in Germany; any long term success demands some sort of lid or redirection on the nationalist steam that is bound to burst out.
Hopefully he keeps a more hands-off approach to this area of Europe (rather than creating direct zones of influence) which should create a foil to Prussia or Austria becoming the focus for the wave of nationalism that is bound to attract attention.
 
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longsword14

Banned
Napoleon, being Corse, really felt that he howed t


A. Yes: I am confident that Napoleon can completely destroy the Prussiano army ITTL, unless maybe they retreat towards Königsberg trying scorched earth tactics? It would likely be I'm political.
B. I don't think so, but I don't have elements to really answer.
C. I don't know, much depends on Suvurov staying in command, which depends on how Paul took the failure to save Wien.
D. This is difficult to answer. I think that the pros and conservatively to ttl's French army even out, but I am not really an expert so...

I urge more qualified people to take a shot at answering!
Coalition warfare was pretty spotty before 1809, with frequent vacillation and bad coordination. Even in 1813 without the Austrians joining in the coalition was quite cautious even though they worked in a better manner, chipping at the flanks.
I would expect at least some bungling in this coalition too, and with France at its peak expect merciless exploitation. Still, whenever I see Western Europe dominated by a single shade (Blue or Grey), I become nervous and expect political turmoil to follow.
 
Assumptions and trends
Reading the replies made me think that perhaps I should outline my essential assumptions for this TL- would appreciate feedback.

The first is that the French revolution unleashed a revolution in social and millitary organization which came at the right time, technologically speaking. The type of mass mobilization which the French revolution introduced enabled the government to take a seventeen year old boy, shove a bayoneted musket in his hands, shove nationalist revolutionary propaganda in his mind and within a few weeks turn him into a killing machine that was, if not quite the equal, at least of comparable effectiveness in lethality to a professional mercenary with a decade of experience, and often greater motivation (which is also why this is the time mercenaries went out of business- they weren't cost effective). Two centuries earlier, or later, this would have been impossible. The weapons tech required far more training to achieve individual skill, effective arms were too expensive relative to productive capabilities to arm the entire nation, and the form of warfare was not amenable to mass formations marching in blind obedience.

The second is that the revolution enabled the republic to draw on a much wider pool of millitary talent. Napoleon, and most of his marshals, never could have reached the top under the ancien regime. Sure, they had their equivalents among the coalition members- Archduke Charles, Suvorov and Horatio Nelson come to mind (Wellington, with all due respect, is not in their league... but he still stood head and shoulders above the other land commanders of the UK) . But these names stand out as a minority. It took Ancien regimes far, far longer to sift through the chaff to find the grain amongst their pool of millitary talent, than it took their Republican/Imperial equivalents.

The obverse side to that coin is that the revolution also eliminated or exiled most of the officer with the skills and command experience (as opposed to raw talent). In terms of millitary leadership the Republic started low and then skyrocketed. Their learning curve started from a lower point but was steeper, allowing them to reach a qualitative plateau at the war of the Third Coalition. However, that is not to say that the Ancien regimes did not have a learning curve- Austria, in particular, was an example of this. If one compares their performance in the war of the Fifth coalition to that of the Third (or Second. Or First) one is struck by how much they had improved. In effect, post 1808 the Napoleonic regime had spent it's qualitative lead and was operating on a quantitative advantage- which it then squandored in Russia.

The third was that the French revolution also granted whoever was in control in Paris a fifth column of eager sympathizers in the neighboring states who could provide intelligence, sabotage, collaborationist regimes and recruits- and that this made French Rule, so long as it could be seen to serve local progressive ends, and so long as the revolution itself was not discredited, acceptable to important sections of the population in Italy and Germany- and of course Poland. In both France and it's satelites the regime felt it could ask more from it's people in terms of taxes, corvee labor and recruits- because they had more invested in the survival of the regime (in the case of France this was accompanied by agrarian redistribution which was economically ruinous in the long run to France's economic development but which created intense loyalty amongst many peasants in portions of France who feared that monarchial restoration meant they would have to give up their nearly acquired lands and pay massive back taxes).

Here too the Ancien regime adapted. Prussia abolished Serfdom after Jena, Britain changed the manner of it's rule of Ireland and carried out parlimentary reform, and Charles incongruously appealed in nationalist terms to the various nationalites that made up the polygot Austrian Empire.

The fourth is my assumption that class and ideology based identity of the revolutionary Republic had the potential ,much as in the USSR, to transcend regional and national differences- up to a point and provided that the threat of restoration loomed over them. Yet at the same time, the revolutionary regime created all sorts of antagonisms amongst classes and by all the ancien regime governments who feared, correctly, that they would be next on the chopping block.

Napoleon sought to combine the best of all worlds by offering a return to normalancy to the Church, international neighbors and the dispossesed classes of France- but at the same time retain sufficient Republican and meritocratic forms to retain the loyalties and allies of the revolution. to bind this difficult mix together he used a sophisticated propaganda machine, the cult of his personality and the dearly bought loyalty of the army. To that he added greater administrative efficiency and political stability, bringing France to the height of it's relative power between 1801-1807. Unfortunately his ego, grasping nature and misplaced nepotism meant he squandered that window of opportunity. In any event the contradictions in his policy undercut his legitimacy, and forced him to eventually rely on force, and force of personality alone.

The Fifth is that Napoleon was an incredibly talented individual both politically and millitarily. Where he led in person victory was nearly assured for most of his regime. Nor was he, exceptions aside, untalented in identifying, allying with, and delegating to people of similliarly high talents. But he lost his bloom relatively quickly. his health was never good and was made worse by his frequent campaigns. Much like his nephew much of his final failure can be laid on the door of ill health.

The Sixth is that France was already massively overpowered on the continent, under any regime, according to any measure. The revolution had unleashed it's potential but it did not create it. No single power could equal it- but it's geographic location, overseas ambitions, and, under the revolutionary regime, ideology meant that it was always surrounded by enemies. Napoleon's great achievement is that he managed to effectively knock up many of them- up to a point.

That point is that Napoleon never outright eliminated any of his great power rivals (His attempt to take over Spain, a reluctant ally, is the exception). Even when he held Vienna he never tried to break the Austrian Empire up completely. His evisceration of Prussia nontheless left it intact in it's core East German territories. And this came back to bite him on several occasions. But this was not an error, it was simply indicative of the multifront war that France faced. At no point could he afford to tie down his forces in a drawn out war of political extermination against a Great power for fear that his other rivals would turn on him. This was a function not only of the international context but of the technological and political limitations of the period. Armies were small dots on a wide landscape, and a much smaller proportion of the population than was the case in, say, WWI. Power, and changes in boundary had to be negotiated and as the Spanish rebellion and the various Polish insurrections demonstrated, governments did not enjoy a favorable position if an entire population rose against it. Only in the 20th century did govenments acquire a monopoly on advanced weaponary and transportation that made insurgents helpless against an opponent ruthless enough to use them... as few were after WWII.

The Seventh is that the longer France remained at war, all other things being equal, the more it's underlying demographic and economic strength was being sapped in comparision to it's rivals. In spite of Napoleon's success in "exporting" the costs of war to his enemies and satelites, France was still paying and bleeding relatively more than it's rivals, taken as an average over thirty years. The economic warfare between France and Britain harmed the former rather than the latter- and also more than it's continental allies/rivals.

The Eigthis that Napoleon's growing dominance on land up to 1807 were paralleled with growing inferiority on sea. By the time he rose to promiennce, possibly from the moment Britian entered the war, France had no real chance of challenging British supermacy in the Atlantic- if only because the existing British supermacy there prevented his Atlantic fleet from training and operating, which meant that man for man and ship for ship it was increasingly inferior to that of Britain. To have a chance of challenging the royal navy in the Atlantic and the Channel he needed a decade of peace and freedom from continental threats so he could build up a sufficient mass of ships to overcome the British qualitiative advantage. There was no way any British government would give him that. In the Med, OTOH, France's Geographic position and land superiority gave it the chance of achieving dominance- a chance which Napoleon largely threw away in his Egyptian expedition and was never able to recover.

The Ninth is that France was losing it's preminent position before Napoleon and that Napoleon merely accelerated it's decline. The Demographic exception of France could be obsereved, contrary to popular opinion, as early as 1770, and industrial revolution left France lagging behind many of it's neighbors partly, but not solely because the concentration of iron and coal left it shortchaged in comparision to Britain, Germany and Belgium.

The Tenth is that the growth of national feeling in Germany and Italy was a powerful force, that limited the long term viability of any Napoleonic empire but one that could be surmounted, up to a point by an empire offering social reform, economic opportunity political participation ,cultual/linguistic freedom, and, above all, a shared ideal and/or a chance to achieve national unification within that ideal.

The Bottom line, as far as this particular wank is concerned, is that in order to make for a good wank Napoleon needs to:
a. Decisively eliminate his potential continential rivals (Ie; Austria and Prussia) from the playing board at a time when France is at it's qualitative peak
b. Do so without engaging in long see-saw attritional warfare
c. Achieve dominance in the Med so he can build up a fleet capable of challenging Britain, at least as a spolier of it's international commerce.
d. Replace Austrian and Prussian dominance in Geermany and Italy with an administration which is both acceptable to enough of the locals to avoid becoming a drain, and which enables him to draw on the material and manpower of these regions to outmass the qualitatively superior British Economy. That means not placing his brother's behinds on thrones in places where nationalism is at odds with an integrative empire- Germany and Italy no, Poland possibly yes.
e. Offer the nations of his empire some kind of unifying ideal beyond brute force- one which can form the basis for long term economic, cultural and political integration.
f. Not invade the Russian interior (nibbling at the edges is barely doable).
g. Not provoke the entire SPanish nation to rebellion.
h. Make continuation of the war economically and politically impossible for Britain.

Edit: Oh, and I nearly forgot. He needs to do all of the above while still being Napoleon. Overgrasping, nepotistic, suspicious of any power not his own, not particularly fond of technological innovation (though not by any means the technophobe his detractors have made him out to be), etc. So no sudden introduction of railed roads or an inexplicable aversion to meddling in the Spanish succession or invading the Russian Interior, let alone a commitment to the rule of law and democracy for the sake of them. All changes to Napoleon's policy must flow from circumstances created by the original POD and his relatively greater success ITTL must be the result of chance, or at least design given a chance by changed circumstances, not WOG epiphanies.
 
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<snip>
In both France and it's satelites the regime felt it could ask more from it's people in terms of taxes, corvee labor and recruits- because they had more invested in the survival of the regime (in the case of France this was accompanied by agrarian redistribution which was economically ruinous in the long run to France's economic development but which created intense loyalty amongst many peasants in portions of France who feared that monarchial restoration meant they would have to give up their nearly acquired lands and pay massive back taxes).
<snip>

Excellent post. I saved it as soon as I read it. Could you expand on the bolded part I quoted?
 
Excellent post. I saved it as soon as I read it. Could you expand on the bolded part I quoted?

Britanica sums it up well enough:

https://www.britannica.com/topic/land-reform/History-of-land-reform

"
On the eve of the Revolution, French society was polarized, with the nobility and clergy on one side and the rising business class on the other. The middle class was relatively small, especially in the rural areas. The majority of the peasants were hereditary tenants, either censiers, who paid a fixed money rent, or mainmortables, or serfs, who paid rent in the form of labour services, corvée, of about three days a week. The peasants paid various other feudal dues and taxes, from which the nobility and clergy were exempted. The Revolution overthrew the ancien régime and the feudal order and introduced land reform.

The reform repealed feudal tenures, freed all persons from serfdom, abolished feudal courts, and cancelled all payments not based on real property, including tithes. Rents based on real property were redeemable. Once the law had been passed, however, the peasants seized the land and refused to pay any rents or redemption fees; in 1792 all payments were finally cancelled. Land of the clergy and political emigrants was confiscated and sold at auction, together with common land. The terms of sale, however, often favoured the wealthy, which may explain the rise of a new class of large landowners among the supporters of Napoleon.

The social and political objectives of the reformers were fully realized. The censiers and serfs became owners. Feudalism was destroyed, and the new regime won peasant support. The economic effects, however, were limited. Incentives could not be increased substantially since the peasants already had full security of tenure prior to the reform. The scale of operations was not changed; and no facilities for credit, marketing, or capital formation were created. The major achievements were the reinforcement of private, individual ownership and perpetuation of the small family farm as a basis of democracy. The small family farm has characterized French agriculture ever since."

This is basically Russia without any Mir remmenant acting as an organizing organ for redistribution and without any later centrally imposed collectivization.

You can find a more detailed discussion of the issue here:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/650768?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

What it boils down to is that many other schemes were discussed, but what actually happened was more a function of a collapse of of law and order in the countryside and a redistribution of the land by the peseants themselves than a planned redistribution from the top. The government(s), wisely, approved the redistirbution retroactively and spent a generation untangeling the disputes between individual peasant families. As for the economic effects, what it meant was less incentive for the introduction of commercial agriculture and mechanization in the agrarian sector as well as less incentive for peasants to leave the countryside and immigrate to the cities. So lees urban proles driving industrial development. In other countries the effect of such a individual land redistribution would also be significant rural unemployment and the splitting up of family farms into pauper's plots, but the French Demographic exception largely prevented that (The French population less than doubled over a century). You might say that in France's particular circumstances rural social stability and political support of the Republic was purchased at the cost of less economic development- though the latter only began to manifest a generation later.

There is nothing, BTW, Napoleon can do to turn back the clock on this rural redistribution- the only way to pry the land out of the peasants is from their cold dead hands. Napoleon might, however, forbid the splitting up of existing units. That would somewhat ameliorate the negative long term economic consequences of the redistribution.
 
#6 Götterdämmerung
May 10th 1799, Konigsberg, Province of East Prussia, Kingdom of Prussia (1)

Seven years. A generation ago it had taken the combine forces of France, Austria, Russia, Sweden, Spain and Saxony-Poland seven years of warfare to overcome the armies of Fredrick the great and come to the threshold of reducing Prussia to the electorate of Brandenburg. Kalmyk cavalry had, at one point, grazed in the streets of Berlin. And then the coalition fell apart. Fredrick the Great rallied his forces, with the ample aid of British subsidies, and had not only driven his foes from his ancestral lands, but gathered Silesia into his realm as well and nearly annexed Saxony before diplomacy convinced him to act otherwise.

It had taken Napoleon, acting on his own and with no allies, no more than a two weeks to smash every army Fredrick the Great's grandson had thrown at him, capturing over 180,000 prisoners and eliminating the majority of the Prussian army (2) before entering Berlin in truimph. He had expected his numerical superiority and superior genralship to win the day but had been stunned at the chaotic state of the Prussian armed forces. Where the Austrians had learned from the long battles of the War of the First Coalition and their defeats at his hands, and successfully preserved most of their force before withdrawing to Vienna, the Prussians seemed as if they had learned nothing from Valmy. The Prussian court, at least, had not repeated the mistake of Ferdinand and had fled Berlin before he could take them captive, fleeing to the eastern stronghold of konigsberg with as many mobile forces as they could scrape together (3) and waiting for the Russians to slog through the mud of the Rasputitsa, and their own Polish-Lithuanian uprisings, to support their allies.

In the month that followed he had engaged in a rapid march eastward, accepting the capitulation of the shocked Prussian garrisons. Revolution had broken out in Poland even before he had entered Berlin (4), and he had stoped through Warsaw, accepting the adulation of it'speople and proclaiming the ressurection of the commonwealth before converging his forces on Konigsberg (5).

Konigsberg was not Vienna. It had a short circumferance and modern fortifications, for one, and had a narrow approach and was easily resupplied by sea, for another. Capturing it would require a protracted siege and a better artillery train than could be transported so rapidly, or a massive butcher's bill if he were to take it by storm. But that, of course, was never his intention.

"The Russians! Their main body has crossed the Nieman and they are advancing to relieve the siege! (6)"

Napoleon smiled at his aide's excitement. The aid took a step back as a predator out of Corsica's darkest woods bared his teeth at him.

"Good" was all Napoleon said. The trap had worked. He would not have wanted to meet the forces Russia might have been able to assemble given another month of preparation on their part. But whatever forces the Russians had pushed through Lithuania in order to relieve the Prussian court, he was certain he could handle on his own terms.

"Marshal..." The aide said nervously as he handed him the papers.

Napoleon scanned the scouts reports briefly and erupted in outrage.

"What is this nonsense?! these numbers are the greatest fantasy told since Ghenghis Khan invaded Europe! (7)"

For a moment his control slipped, and the predator snarled as he suspected that he might be prey after all. Then his rational mind, ever a stable island in the dark currents of his soul took over. Space. Time. Force. He still had enough of each to make a victory of this. And it would be he who would determine the location and timing of the battlefield.

Briefly, he considered a withdrawal to the Vistula... but no. that would be a signal of weakness to the Prussians in Pomerania and Brandenburg, and to his reluctant recent Saxon ally he could ill afford. Not to mention the Austrians. If given heart they might revolt at his back, cut his supply lines, and enable the Russians to consolidate their forces in East Prussia and meet him on more favorable conditions in Poland or West Prussia. If, on the other hand he defeated the Russians here... but how had they pushed so many men through so quickly?

"Suvorov..." he muttered, a hungry gleam in his eye. It seemed reports of his disgrace had been premature.

Without further ado he began barking out instructions to his aide. Mourat would have to be recalled from Poland with whatever forces he could scrape together and leave the defence of the Bug to the Polish legions. This was where the Main center of Gravity would be. Here was the center of gravity. here would be fought the battle that would determine the future of Europe.

(1) So yes, I'm skipping a detailed description of the Jena equivalent. I think there is a consensus that the outcome was pretty much overdetermined even more so ITTL than OTL. Just because this is a Napoleon Wank there is no need for a blow by blow account. The details are different bu the outcome is the same- except that Prussia is screwed even worse and that Bernadote does not have a chance to get on Napoleon's bad side. The real showdown is between Napoleon and the Russians.
(2) I judge that given the growing tensions in the winter of 1798-1799 Napoleon would have better intelligence of the Prussian army's location prior to his invasion, which allows him to avoid some of mistakes in locating it that chracterized the battle of Jena and the prelude to it. He also has more troops to throw at the Prussians, and he has the advantage of surprise (he gives the Prussians two hours notice prior to invading, instead of the two month ultimatum they gave him OTL), so is even more successful it cutting off the retreat of the Crushed Prussian forces and takes even fewer casualties.
(3) OTL it took him three months to get from Berlin to East Prussia. Better weather and more of the Prussian army bagged in the initial battles on the approach to Beerlin, as well as more troops to assign to line of communication and occupation duty means a more rapid advance. Also, the myth of French invicibility is stronger TTL without their initial defeats in the war of the Second Coalition. So garrisons submit more easily.
(4) OTL. Riots broke out when the Prussians introduced conscription to fill their ranks prior to war with Napoleon. This time, with the partitions and the uprisings they sparked Kościuszko_Uprising only four years in the past the Prussians and Russians have had less time to cement their control- and this too is a factor in delaying Russian advance in support of Prussia. OTL, Russian forces contested the French advance on the Vistula. TTL they have to put down riots in their section of the partition and the french advance is faster so they make no such efforts.
(5) Napoleon was much more cagey in regards to Poland OTL. Partly in order to avoid provoking the Austrians into rejoining the war. ITTL the campaign proceeds swiftly enough, and he in any event is more confident regarding the Austrians, viewing them as being essentially contained.
(6) OTL the Russians started seriously contesting the French advance at the Vistula (between East Prussia and the partition) about 11 weeks after Napoleon invaded in response to the Prussian ultimatum. Then they threw back the French entry into East Prussia at Eylau (though they yielded the field), apparantly inflicting equivalent casulties on Soult's forces. TTL, the French advance is faster, Prussian resistance is weaker (they get a delaration of war two hours before Napoleon invades, instead of the two month ultimatum they provided to him OTL) and the Russians need to slog their way through the Mud and Polish- Lithuanian uprisings So the French enter East Prussia and invest Konigsberg within eight weeks. The Russians fail to deploy enough forces to do more than delay them.
(7) No, not a Napoleon quote. But I couldn't help myself.
 
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Battle of the titans discussion: Suvorov Vs Napoleon
This has been discussed in great detail here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/napoleon-vs-suvorov-who-wins.87070/

The difference here in comparison to the scenario described above (Napoleon does not sail to Egypt and meets Suvorov in Italy. each has 60,000 men) Is that each will be commanding about 100,000 troops in the field (Napoleon has other troops investing Konigsberg, besieging the Swedes in Pomerania, occupying Pomerania and the other Prussian provinces, and facing the Russians over the Bug. 100,000 is all Suvorov could scrape together and march over the Nieman) and the battle is being fought relatively close to Russia's borders, albeit at a bad time of the year and in the midst of a Polish-Lithuanian uprising.

Napoleon's are somewhat better rested and have better artillery. They also have more recent combat experience. They contain, however, around 20,000 satellite soldiers.

Suvorov has far more experience (Napoleon's skills seem to have peaked around 1805. Though he has had more experience TTL). Napoleon is younger and has better health, in spite of Suvorov's iron constitution. Napoleon has not yet ironed out his marhsals into perfect insturnments of his will but Suvorov has quite enemies amongst the Russian command given his disgrace following Vienna and prior to it. he's also under considerable pressure to relieve Konigsberg no matter what, which constrains his freedom of operations.

Given the above, does anyone has anything to add to the discussion in the link above? I tend to favor Tande's and RGBs terse analysis BTW (If Suvorov can be forced to give battle at a given spot where Napoleon can deploy his artillery rather than running circles around Napoleon he loses). But I can still make it into a Napoleon wank even if the battle is a stalemate or a borderline French defeat- it will simply be a different, and arguably better kind of wank.
 

longsword14

Banned
This has been discussed in great detail here: https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/napoleon-vs-suvorov-who-wins.87070/

The difference here in comparison to the scenario described above (Napoleon does not sail to Egypt and meets Suvorov in Italy. each has 60,000 men) Is that each will be commanding about 100,000 troops in the field (Napoleon has other troops investing Konigsberg, besieging the Swedes in Pomerania, occupying Pomerania and the other Prussian provinces, and facing the Russians over the Bug. 100,000 is all Suvorov could scrape together and march over the Nieman) and the battle is being fought relatively close to Russia's borders, albeit at a bad time of the year and in the midst of a Polish-Lithuanian uprising.

Napoleon's are somewhat better rested and have better artillery. They also have more recent combat experience. They contain, however, around 20,000 satellite soldiers.

Suvorov has far more experience (Napoleon's skills seem to have peaked around 1805. Though he has had more experience TTL). Napoleon is younger and has better health, in spite of Suvorov's iron constitution. Napoleon has not yet ironed out his marhsals into perfect insturnments of his will but Suvorov has quite enemies amongst the Russian command given his disgrace following Vienna and prior to it. he's also under considerable pressure to relieve Konigsberg no matter what, which constrains his freedom of operations.

Given the above, does anyone has anything to add to the discussion in the link above? I tend to favor Tande's and RGBs terse analysis BTW (If Suvorov can be forced to give battle at a given spot where Napoleon can deploy his artillery rather than running circles around Napoleon he loses). But I can still make it into a Napoleon wank even if the battle is a stalemate or a borderline French defeat- it will simply be a different, and arguably better kind of wank.
Nobody, in the time period we have, ran campaigns of the scale or tempo as Napoleon. Perhaps he does not have the confidence that he did after Austerlitz but he still is quite capable.
I do not know why people believe that he would come off worse in a campaign. He could be very good when it came to tactics, but it was his ability to use parts of his army as corps that allowed him to win despite being outnumbered in the theater.
The battles where he did badly were extensions of his abysmal politics that forced his hand (see trying to chase the Russians far beyond finish line; frontally attacking at Borodino so that they do not slip away; being in Spain while war erupts in Bavaria etc.)
The battle might not be tactically smashing, but I doubt France is going to be outmaneuvered on scales bigger than a battle or two. Worse for Russia (and Prussia and Austria), there are kinks in Russian command, and diplomatic reasons might make Suvorov predictable for Napoleon.

edit : @yboxman Is it 1800 ?
 
Nobody, in the time period we have, ran campaigns of the scale or tempo as Napoleon. Perhaps he does not have the confidence that he did after Austerlitz but he still is quite capable.
I do not know why people believe that he would come off worse in a campaign. He could be very good when it came to tactics, but it was his ability to use parts of his army as corps that allowed him to win despite being outnumbered in the theater.
The battles where he did badly were extensions of his abysmal politics that forced his hand (see trying to chase the Russians far beyond finish line; frontally attacking at Borodino so that they do not slip away; being in Spain while war erupts in Bavaria etc.)
The battle might not be tactically smashing, but I doubt France is going to be outmaneuvered on scales bigger than a battle or two. Worse for Russia (and Prussia and Austria), there are kinks in Russian command, and diplomatic reasons might make Suvorov predictable for Napoleon.

edit : @yboxman Is it 1800 ?

Nope, still 1799. Yes, this is a fastforward Napoleonic wars. TTL's war of the Second Coalition broke out in August 1798, Napoleon marched the Army of Italy over the Swiss passes into the Danube and carried out a Ulm analog> and then a sorta-kinda Austerlitz equivalent (in which the Russians were not engaged since Napoleon captured Vienna and Francis before Suvorov even arrived) in the Autumn of 1798, Resulting in a somewhat harsher Pressburg analog (same territory, more financial compensation).

Following the repulsion of the Anglo-Russian force in Batavia in the Winter of 1798-1799, Napoleon occupied Hannover, and installed republican governments throughout non Prussian West Germany, leading to tensions with Prussia and a Surprise attack by him on Prussia in mid March 1799 before Prussia could mobilize or solidify commitments from Russia and Britain.
 

longsword14

Banned
:eek:
Did Bonaparte even have his 30th birthday?! Three years ago he was nobody, and now - Prussian, British, Austrian armies decisively beaten. What must his army think of him?:hushedface:
edit- Napoleon does not have the corps made, so does he have ad-hoc formations put together?
What happened to Desaix and Kleber ? No Marengo, no Egypt should mean both live.
How is this TL's guard?
 
:eek:
Did Bonaparte even have his 30th birthday?! Three years ago he was nobody, and now - Prussian, British, Austrian armies decisively beaten. What must his army think of him?:hushedface:

Nope, he's still 29. But OTL he carried out the coup which made him first consul only a year after TTL in Novemebr 1789. And he did that after LOSING in Egypt, and BEFORE defeating Austira in Italy, even if he portrayed the matter differently. TTL he carries out the coup after taking Sardinia, Malta and Naples, bagging Nelson in the process and then trouncing Austria even worse than he did OTL in Austerlitz (Albeit against less challenging odds). So I don;lt think his political ascednency ITTL is stretching the bounds of plausability.

What I am concerned about is that the army he is leading against Suvorov is not the nation wrecking Grande Armee killing machine he assembled and trained personally over two years OTL, but a collection of forces he has cobbled together during a series of close linked campaigns following one at the heel of the other.

What does his army think? Alexander the f***g Great. Hell, that's what Napoleon is thinking. But pride doth come before the fall.

TTL's Napoleon has been reaping the rewards of better timing and greater recklessness since he declared war on Austria on his own initiative. His diversion away from Egypt to Italy and his willingness to engage in greater risk taking has allowed him to face Austria with greater forces at his disposal, and a less prepared and unreinforced enemy, and do the same to an even greater extent Vs Prussia. But now he's facing Suvorov, and unlike the Austrians and the Prussians who were caught with their pants down, Suvorov has a force that is equal to Napoleon in Manpower if not in material.
 
As much as I like a Napoleonic wank I would not be averse to Suvurov giving Napoleon a bloody nose (pyrrhic victory or indecisive battle). Otherwise he really risks to become too reckless for his own good, given his previous success. On the other hand the way you wrote it seems a best case scenario for Napoleon, with Suvurov forced to engage on a terrain of Bonaparte choosing and into well prepared artillery batteries.
 
I concur- a bloody nose for an arrogant Napoleon is the likely outcome. Though I actually think the idea that Suvurov would be favored by a longer campaign and Napoleon by a decisive battle perhaps gets it the wrong way around.

One thing is that Napoleon's speed and daring were both the qualities that allowed him great victories but were also potential weaknesses- if at Ulm he'd fought a commander with any decisiveness whatsoever instead of Mack, you can picture a fairly thumping Austrian victory.
I think that he'll be more cautious- by Napoleon's standards- up against Suvurov, but I still think he'll underestimate him.

Once.

Afterwards, Suvurov is the one trying to hold together an army of a hundred thousand, poorly supplied and fairly inexperienced conscripts, but Napoleon will have the most skilled veterans in Europe.
 
As much as I like a Napoleonic wank I would not be averse to Suvurov giving Napoleon a bloody nose (pyrrhic victory or indecisive battle). Otherwise he really risks to become too reckless for his own good, given his previous success. On the other hand the way you wrote it seems a best case scenario for Napoleon, with Suvurov forced to engage on a terrain of Bonaparte choosing and into well prepared artillery batteries.

Pretty much my thoughts- If I had gone for a total Napoleon wank Suvorov would have been sent to Georgia and Napoleon would have massacred the palty Russian relief and then did his ATG thing and marched on Moscow, only with 150,000 men instead of 600,000. That would not have ended well.

I concur- a bloody nose for an arrogant Napoleon is the likely outcome. Though I actually think the idea that Suvurov would be favored by a longer campaign and Napoleon by a decisive battle perhaps gets it the wrong way around.

One thing is that Napoleon's speed and daring were both the qualities that allowed him great victories but were also potential weaknesses- if at Ulm he'd fought a commander with any decisiveness whatsoever instead of Mack, you can picture a fairly thumping Austrian victory.
I think that he'll be more cautious- by Napoleon's standards- up against Suvurov, but I still think he'll underestimate him.

Once.

Afterwards, Suvurov is the one trying to hold together an army of a hundred thousand, poorly supplied and fairly inexperienced conscripts, but Napoleon will have the most skilled veterans in Europe.

This sounds most plausible. Now I need to wargame this out. I can see a few ways Suvorov might try to outfox a Napoleon who underestimates him and a few ways Napoleon might be able to extract himself from his Suvorov's manuvers and turn the tables on him again.

Question is how, and how quickly, Napoleon will react to surprise at this point in his career and how long it takes him to recover. The other question is how Austria and Prussian Partisans react to a setback. OTL, he spent four months recovering after Eylau, with the French and Russo-Prussian armies facing each other over the Alle and Preyel and the Austrians did nothing, nor was there any great upshot in Prussian resistance. TTL archduke Charles is dead and the Austrian army is even less recovered and underfunded (given the greater indemmity) but Charles, until the Fifth coalition, actually held Francis back since he wanted the army to complete it's reorganization. Likewise, potential Prussian rebels are in POW stockades or enroute to France to be used as forced labor, but TTLs Napoleon seems to be even more of a threat to the Prussian socio-economic system, particularly to the class from which their officers derive. And then there is the way in which TTLs Napoleon encourages Polish nationalism- whose reprecussions cannot be limited to the boundaries he has in mind for the Duchy of Warsaw.

Finally, one needs to bear in mind that both Suvorov and Tsar Paul are on a clock. The former has a year to live, possibly less if he is engaged at hard campaigning throughout, and the latter, unless he is VERY successful against Napoleon has a date with an assasin in about 22 months. Again, probably earlier if Suvorov and whoever succeed him are either defeated or engage in a long and costly but indecisive campaign.
 

longsword14

Banned
Pretty much my thoughts- If I had gone for a total Napoleon wank Suvorov would have been sent to Georgia and Napoleon would have massacred the palty Russian relief and then did his ATG thing and marched on Moscow, only with 150,000 men instead of 600,000. That would not have ended well.
I doubt this TL's Napoleon who has carved the Baltics and Poland would do the whole '' chase an army to destruction''. It is Russia who would have to come and fight against a time table determined by the weather (Napoleon should know that the Russians would be incapable of any follow up operations past a date, so all the troops capable of being brought are already there); he can just keep chipping parts off Russia if hostilities continue.
150,000 troops also means that he does not mean to finish a monstrous operation that is too off the walls, and is capable of supplying himself,which makes a march deep into Russia itself meaningless. Such an army is useful to contest possessions closer to Warsaw than Moscow.
 
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