Timeline, Combatants, and Outcome of a Saudi Arabian Civil War


I do appreciate the informative nature of this comment. I did not realize that there were classes to the migrant workers in KSA, so I do appreciate this deeply. However, I can't help but wonder what would happen when the protests would mutate into an armed insurrection. I do know that in construction sites and areas of general development, the third-tier migrants (domestic laborers) would almost immediately turn into this peasant-like movement. Either that, or would join the Saudi protesters, yet this would cause friction within the group

However, I do think that in the Eastern Provinces, there would be a insurrection by the Shias. This religious minority has been treated ill by the current government, stemming from the state's Wahhabist strain of Islam. As evidenced by executions of several Shia clerics (though this was more to due with their anti-government stance). So it might be possible for a "Islamic Republic of East Arabia" to form. Perhaps it ends up like the Syrian opposition, where there are multiple opposition groups, all vying for legitimacy in the world's diplomatic scene.

Another thing I ponder is, what will happen to the general Saudi protests? @John7755 يوحنا might have some insight to this question, as he is an expert on Saudi politics. I do know that Saudi Arabia is vastly different from Syria, so the chances of having a 'Free Saudi Army' occur is unlikely. Yet if that is the case, then what are the alternatives?
 
Pretty much all the Saudis certainly have contempt for the third world lower class laborers, especially those from non-Muslim countries. I very much doubt they woiuld find common cause with them.
 
One issue with an Eastern Arabian revolt, is that without some sort of cap on the US involvement, any rebellion would be snuffed out by the local US military within the area and united Arab support to maintain the oil production in the area. Perhaps it is best to first see a sort of isolationist US policy form regarding these affairs. Then, forms certain anti-Saudi cadres from multiple directions, both internally and externally.

Say with a near ambivalent US and for granted ambivalent major powers in Europe, we may see Russia, Turkey and Iran competing over the Arabian states to some degree and perhaps a cival war can erupt over this if the Saudi monarchy manages the issue very poorly, which the Saudi monarchy has not done generally speaking, in my view. Reforms have occurred at a pace that has acquiesced to more stringent elements of society whilst giving some reform to those of a more progressive outlook. This sort of pragmatism has saved the Saudi kingdom from much discontent at home, whilst more progressive regimes to the north have difficulties. Another point of issue, Saudi Arabian clerics generally have a large following of people who take rulings on major life matters from them; namely this includes rebellion. If one checks 'Alifta . net,' you will find that there are questions from many to the clerics regarding the situations that rebellion is permitted. The Saudi clerics have been known for discouraging rebellion by calling any sort of rebellion as an offense that may send one to hellfire and likewise have associated rebellion with the most radical elements of the Saudi society, that being al-Qaeda. Unless there is more economic discontent in the society, the marriage between the Saudi clerics and monarchy is breached or the Saudi royalty attempt to progress or retroactively move backwards too radically, then civil war in my view is improbable.

Though, if it was to erupt, out of a break down of Saudi legitimacy, especially from a more progressive tone, there is nothing unreasonable regarding the idea of a Libya-type rebellion. Namely, varied Saudi royal house members will take up arms and command sections of support against the ruler, perhaps with different foreign backers. Additionally, there would most certainly be al-Qaeda elements and other such types and tribal-like entities. To be frank, I could see civil war as more likely to develop through a succession crisis of some sorts, or a broken monarch legitimacy which could then lead to a generalized civil war without royal claimants attempting to form an 'Arabian Republic' or other types of changes with support from outside countries. The issue is, as @Falecius stated, some of this was more likely in the 1960s and 1970s when there was great dispute over certain reforms, discontent and the movement in the Middle East was toward pan-Arabism and generally progressive westernized experiments such as Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq, the government in Syria, Egypt and finally the situation in Iran.
 
One issue with an Eastern Arabian revolt, is that without some sort of cap on the US involvement, any rebellion would be snuffed out by the local US military within the area and united Arab support to maintain the oil production in the area. Perhaps it is best to first see a sort of isolationist US policy form regarding these affairs. Then, forms certain anti-Saudi cadres from multiple directions, both internally and externally....

That would be able to help with it. My idea is to have some form of event back in the US, possibly a domestic terror incident to spark controversy in certain ways, thus allowing the then-schizophrenic republicans (they were dived at the time on what to do with Libya) to unite under non-interventionism. Now I don't know how plausible that would be, but it was just an idea. Another thing would be the sanctions imposed by several countries regarding the suppression of protests.

...Namely, varied Saudi royal house members will take up arms and command sections of support against the ruler, perhaps with different foreign backers. Additionally, there would most certainly be al-Qaeda elements and other such types and tribal-like entities. To be frank, I could see civil war as more likely to develop through a succession crisis of some sorts, or a broken monarch legitimacy which could then lead to a generalized civil war without royal claimants attempting to form an 'Arabian Republic' or other types of changes with support from outside countries...

Indeed, there would an in-pour of fanatics into the country, given how there are Wahhabist clerics that call for the death of western values and whatnot.

Though, if it was to erupt, out of a break down of Saudi legitimacy, especially from a more progressive tone, there is nothing unreasonable regarding the idea of a Libya-type rebellion. Namely, varied Saudi royal house members will take up arms and command sections of support against the ruler, perhaps with different foreign backers.

That was what I was proposing, with a more progressive rebellion involving several people (mainly in the form of people like Nimr al-Nimr, though I'm unsure if he was an outlier). Though I do ponder the idea of several Saud princes rallying these groups against the core family.

...To be frank, I could see civil war as more likely to develop through a succession crisis of some sorts, or a broken monarch legitimacy which could then lead to a generalized civil war without royal claimants attempting to form an 'Arabian Republic' or other types of changes with support from outside countries...

Could it be possible for an oil crash following a copious amount of sanctions to lead to several members of the royal family to betray the core of the Al-Saud family?
 
I mean, I'm not an expert, but i'm pretty sure oil is central to Saudi Arabia, at least currently. An economy reliant on such a volatile(in a market sense) material can have very harsh side effects. Say the rest of the world becomes MUCH less dependent on Saudi oil; because of the economic downturn, the populace and even members of the family itself would eventually become extremely discontent with the current order of things. This could possibly lead to some sort of changing of the system, which could cause even more unrest. Due to this, a splinter faction could emerge, sparking some separatist movement. IF this ever happened I really don't see it going anywhere, though perhaps there would be a domino effect? I don't know. In any case, all I see is a failing Saudi Arabia, unless they start diversifying the economy and opening themselves up much more to other countries.
 

While I do appreciate the thought from this, and it is true that the Saudi economy is heavily dependent on the oil industry to pay their social programs, this thread is meant to be focusing on the 2011-2012 time-frame, which I proposed in my original post. So while this will help, I would prefer insights into the 2011 time-frame. I do know that oil prices were at a good high, yet with the option to crush the protesters if they were unified under a common leadership, as well as the migrant workers reacting violently if they are brutally suppressed (that is, if they join the protesters).
 
Even when oil prices took a dip, the Saudi government had enough reserves to keep the gravy train going with few reductions. Not enough to cause large numbers to become upset enough to face rifles. The revolutionary theory of rising expectations does posit that if things are getting better and then get worse that situation is more explosive than a constant life of shit. Nothing up until today has put the KSA in that position. The Sunni Muslim Saudis are doing fine riding the gravy train, the shi'a and the low level foreign workers who are not riding this train are either a despised minority or foreigners who deserve no consideration. These two groups joining together is improbable, however if they did it would be difficult under any circumstances for them to form a coalition with the majority Sunni - this means the security services will stomp them as hard as necessary and more.
 
POD an earlier success in Nuclear fusion research, someone gets lucky and makes a viable reactor in the 90's or early 00's. All of a sudden oil prices start to take a nose dive, and the US might start to get a bit more picky about certain political indiscretions by the Saudis...
 
Even when oil prices took a dip, the Saudi government had enough reserves to keep the gravy train going with few reductions. Not enough to cause large numbers to become upset enough to face rifles. The revolutionary theory of rising expectations does posit that if things are getting better and then get worse that situation is more explosive than a constant life of shit. Nothing up until today has put the KSA in that position. The Sunni Muslim Saudis are doing fine riding the gravy train, the shi'a and the low level foreign workers who are not riding this train are either a despised minority or foreigners who deserve no consideration. These two groups joining together is improbable, however if they did it would be difficult under any circumstances for them to form a coalition with the majority Sunni - this means the security services will stomp them as hard as necessary and more.

One thing I have to disagree with is that it doesn't matter whether this 'gravy train' continues once economic sanctions put work at stake. Another thing is that the security forces are a their most uptight is when the foreign workers act and injustices against minorities are most likely to be committed. Even if the factions ally out of a common enemy simply because they want to guarantee themselves and secure the region's oil resources, that's still ample motives to bring the central government down first.
 
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