II. Payback Time
From Bloom, L., et al., The Lamps Gone Out: A History of the Great War (New York: Stepford House, 1992).
The Treaty of Trenton
After General Stuart’s request for a ceasefire was accepted by the Union, a delegation of a dozen diplomats was dispatched northwards by train, through the hellscape of Maryland and into Pennsylvania, reaching Trenton in eighteen hours – a feat, it must have been recalled by the twelve men as they crossed the Delaware, that the Confederate States Army had failed to accomplish in eighteen months. Upon arrival in New Jersey (Teddy Roosevelt having declared that “once in my lifetime is more than often enough for the Rebs to enter Philadelphia” and refused to countenance negotiations in the de facto capital of the United States), the delegation was given a little time to rest prepare to enter negotiations.
As things stood for the Confederates, a little time was all that was needed; the situation was, as of September 10th, grim. The Union occupied:
- most of Virginia north of the Rappahannock and a non-negligible salient in the Appalachians
- 85 percent of Kentucky
- most of northern Tennessee, and the salient Pershing’s final offensive had seized around and beyond Murfreesboro
- northeastern Arkansas across a line from Mammoth Spring-Jonesboro-Lepanto-and due east to the Mississippi River
- two further salients encompassing Fayetteville and Fort Smith
- practically all of the important parts of Sequoyah (the CS barely retaining most of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations and little else)
- a vast swathe of West Texas along the line Vernon-Abilene-Grandfalls-Toyahvale-Banderas
- and a salient or three in Sonora down the valleys, the largest of which extended as far as Caborca, Benjamin Hill, and Moctezuma.
The Confederates, on the other hand, no longer occupied a single square foot of US territory, with the last foothold of resistance in Maryland, a detachment of Marines at St. Mary’s City, surrendering on September 9th just after the armistice.
The military situation is similarly depressing when we look at it: while on paper the C.S. Army has two million men fighting on land across four field armies (Northern Virginia, Kentucky, the Mississippi, and Texas), the savaging of the Confederate Army at the hands of the Union and the breakdown of many units in Virginia and Tennessee has seen most reduced to between one-half and two-thirds effective fighting strength – that is, about one to one-and-a-half million effectives at the front. Many regiments are also being withdrawn by their home states to combat Negro insurgencies, further diminishing the manpower available and adding to organisational woes. One-and-a-half million have been killed (600,000), wounded (700,000), or captured (200,000): this is five percent of the Confederacy’s 1914 population.
In comparison, the US Army has six million soldiers across eleven field armies stretching from the Gulf of California to the Atlantic Ocean, and while there is some fatigue at the front most are at three-quarters combat efficiency. The overall numerical advantage enjoyed by the Union is about 4:1, and growing as the Canadian occupation enters its second winter and conscription maintains its pace. If the US really wants to destroy the Confederacy, both on the field of battle and as a nation-state altogether, it is more than capable of doing so. General Lejeune sums up the views of the Confederate General Staff rather neatly, even before negotiations commence: “The damnyankees have our asses over a barrel; all we get to decide is which end they get to screw us from first.”
The damnyankees, as it happens, decide to begin in Virginia: the Army of Northern Virginia is, as a precondition, to complete its retreat across the Rappahannock in the next fortnight, and are to leave all artillery pieces in place. They then move onto matters at sea: the Confederate States Navy is to halt all attacks on Central Powers shipping and sail for their home ports. Submarines are to be surrendered entirely. Further conditions include the surrender of twelve thousand machine guns (this is revised to ten thousand when the Confederates inform them, falsely, that they do not possess twelve thousand), all Confederate armoured cars and arks (in the case of arks, this amounts to three – two captured from the U.S. and one Confederate), and the immediate release of all Union prisoners of war.
The Confederates agree to these terms on September 11.
In addition, U.S. legations are to be established in Paso del Norte, Fort Smith, Memphis, New Orleans, Charleston, and Portsmouth once a peace treaty is signed and arrangements can be put into place. The garrisons are not to exceed one regiment per city, and are authorised to conduct searches of nearby military facilities to ensure compliance with the terms of the armistice.
The Confederates agree to these terms on September 15, as a large U.S. Navy task force anchors off the coast of South Carolina.
The treaty itself is negotiated over the fall and winter of 1916, with a final peace being signed on December 15. The final terms are as follows:
· U.S. possession and admission of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the newly-constituted Territories of Houston and Sequoyah, effective January 1, 1917.
· Confederate cession of Virginia north of a line from Woodstock due southeast to the source of the North Fork Rappahannock, and thence to the sea; of a slice of Arkansas roughly from Mammoth Springs to Lepanto; and of a slice of Sonora heading southwards from Douglas, Arizona along the San Antonio Mountains as far as Cumpas, before turning northwest to meet the US border at Sonoyta.
· Confederate recognition of above state and territorial borders, with boundaries to be fixed according to a bilateral Boundary Commission no later than June 1, 1917.
· A complete prohibition on Confederate development or importation of arks, submarines, or bomber aircraft. One squadron of fighters will be successfully argued for in revisions in 1917 in light of the Red Revolts, and observation aircraft are permitted both for said counterinsurgency and for use by the C.S. Meteorological Bureau (an ostensibly civilian organisation which tracks hurricanes over the Caribbean).
· Confederate States Army to be restricted to 100,000 men and officers.
· Armaments are to be restricted to 100,000 rifles and the equivalent of 400 rounds of ammunition per weapon, 1,500 machine guns (heavy and light) and 6,000 rounds per weapon, two hundred trench mortars, and three hundred pieces of field artillery (200x 75mm, 100x 105mm) with one thousand rounds apiece.
· Confederate States Navy to be restricted to 25,000 men and officers; surface fleet to be restricted to four cruisers, twelve destroyers, twenty-four sloops (modern escorts [1]) and torpedo boats. All other ships are to be placed in reserve, used for commercial purposes, or else surrendered or sold to other nations. Tonnage to be restricted to 100,000 tons.
· National Guard units of the Confederate States to be restricted to 250,000 men in total, with no more than 25,000 men in any individual State’s own National Guard.
· Reparations of US$25 billion, to be adjusted according to inflation since 1914 to prevent the Confederates devaluating their currency to get around it. The 1921 revision of the Schedule of Payments, coming after the election of the Sinclair Administration, divided these into A, B, and C bonds; in this manner two-thirds of remaining reparations payments were effectively erased to reduce the burden on the CSA. By 1923 the Confederacy was declared to have settled its debt with the U.S., having paid only about $6.9 billion. This was still enough to place a crushing indemnity on the C.S. economy; the total paid was equivalent to the entire 1913 GDP of the CSA.
While the Union terms seemed – and were – harsh, there was a widespread feeling in the Union that so much sacrifice had been made that the U.S. had best get something out of its war. One-and-a-half million dead, and twice as many wounded, make for an awfully compelling argument.
Revisionist historiography has looked unkindly upon these terms, and it must be admitted that they undeniably contributed to the rising political extremism and instability in the Confederacy throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. However, the Remembrance ideology had been the guiding ideal of the Union for thirty-five years; now that the Confederates were at the Union’s mercy, a strong example was to be made of them. It was unfortunate short-sightedness in pursuing this goal which led the U.S. to do so, unwittingly instigating the rise of an ideology every bit as virulent and violent as Remembrance…
[1] TTLspeak for frigates, at least in the US.