WWII was obviously a textbook example of a
three-sided conflict. From its prologues in Spain and China, to the immediate aftermath – the stalemate of Allied-Soviet armies facing each other over the Elbe river, and over the heads of hundreds of thousands German POWs in May 1945. There is a little "
but" to it, though.
Global developments in 1930s (resulting from WWI and beyond) put
each and every of these three sides:
- The "Soviets",
- The "Axis",
- The so called "West" (yeah, it included India and China eventually...),
in conflict of interest with the other
two. Not just
one. Then in a need to weaken and destroy/conquer
both of them.
The pawns that cluttered the game board at the beginning of the conflict were predictably sucked-in or swept away. This way, or another.
Well, Switzerland wasn’t bothered - but you don’t bugger with your bank.
As with the "
three body problem" giving a virtually unpredictable number of possible trajectories, in spite of the fact that the underlying physics (not
mathematics though) boils down to simple Newtonian laws,
three-sided conflict outcomes are just as unpredictable,
but (and that’s
this "
but") the underlying basic dynamics is simple again. It boils down to the "
always two-on-one" principle: If you begin to
openly fight
both opponents, being too slow to ally with
any of them – they gang up and
you lose. This rule was instinctively understood from Chinese Three Kingdoms, to any group of three seven-year-old girl school friends (
BFFs).
The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact shaped the alignment of the first phase of the ‘hot’ conflict. But obviously none of its participants intended to live together happily ever after. Just tactics, nothing personal, let’s see what happens next.
There are some not-well-enough understood pivotal moments of WWII, when
bargaining ability (or the
lack thereof) of certain players had
huge consequences:
After a humiliating first phase of the Winter War, in February 1940 the Soviets amassed enough forces to allow them to defeat Finland (in spite of intrinsic inefficiency of the Red Army). But when Stalin took seriously the possibility of Allied military intervention (perhaps
not quite that real), he stopped the war, allowed Finns a truce and - albeit at the cost of huge territorial spoils - he let Finland maintain an independence (for the time being). This unusual ‘
timidity’ allowed him to retain a coalition ability and switch alliances in the future. It also prevented the scenario you were pondering – with all three sides fighting each other
simultaneously.
That’s when he
won, it seems.
A little while later, Stalin’s Finn, Baltic and Bessarabian conquests, plus a
MASSIVE build-up of Soviet forces in bordering Western Military Districts, clearly told Hitler what to expect from his good friend Stalin next. So he willy-nilly
HAD to order Barbarossa planning and preparations, no matter how tied-up he was on other fronts. Exactly in parallel with it, his minion Hess begun his flight planning and preparations. But his epic flight to Scotland was an utter failure. Hitler’s bargaining ability turned out to be non-existent at that moment: Brits were not interested in his offer to switch sides. It might be a matter of an interesting debate whether this rejection was caused in larger part by his ’
black PR’ in Britain, or simply a realization that an imminent outbreak of German-Soviet fighting was inevitable.
And how would you like a stab in the back Mister, when you HAVE TO turn away from us?
That’s when he
lost, it seems.