Honestly I think Fletcher gets a lot of unneeded flak for the loss of Lexington and Yorktown which in both cases should have survived but were instead lost due to factors completely outside his control; albeit one mistake he definitely made at Coral Sea was not withdrawing Neosho say a day or so earlier which caused her loss.
a. No American had ever fought an aircraft carrier centric battle before with an opposing enemy fleet. The floor-exs at the NWC and the fleet problems had not really revealed to the Americans in reality how difficult reconnaissance and weather factors would be in locating the enemy Nobody Japanese or American anticipated how much like it would be like two blind folded men running around a futball or soccer pitch separated by hedge maze while throwing grenades at each other, IN A DENSE FOG with only the sounds they make as the means to locate each other.
b. If you can visualize that futbol pitch hedged and fog patched situation into aircraft carrier warfare and translate that into Pacific weather fronts, scattered islands and scared terrified men trying to fly blind man's bluff in that mess at the Coral Sea or at Midway Island seeking to find the other side first and then attack first since first strike is first kill, then one has a vague idea of what Takagi, Nagumo, Fletcher, Fitch, Spruance, et al were up against and why plot tracks and battlespace management and reconnaissance battles were so important.
c. In that context, Neosho was not the mistake at Coral Sea. The raid on Tulagi was. Fletcher flashbulbed himself and showed Takagi EXACTLY where he was, while Fletcher had no idea where the Japanese were (Any of them, except Shipwreck Shima trying to put the seaplane place together at Tulagi anchorage.). That was when King Kong Hara and Braindead got into their "discussion" over tactics and Hara was benched and Takagi went ahead after and screwed up the battle and revealed himself in turn with his foolhardy dusk attack that showed Fletcher where HE was.
USS Neosho gets lost in the ruffle shuffles and the Japanese blunder into her entirely by accident.
As for the early Solomons campaign and his decision not to cover the landings past a certain time period he knew he had to prepare for a carrier battle that would almost certainly result from the Guadalcanal campaign plus it's not he could have reasonably predicted the outcome of Savo Island.
d. US destroyers need fuel every two days when they run at 15 m/s. (29 knots.) Know why FJF was always caught refueling in mid battle? He was fighting at flank or on the speed run avoiding IJN subs or launching searches or strikes. Try explaining that one to the Marines or to John Tower or KING. And Eastern Solomons was the crowning moment of his great career; Fletcher saved those ungrateful Marines.
e. Santiago de Cuba was the other time a US fleet (surface action group) was caught with its admirals at loggerheads and with an emergency shore conference in progress (violent arguments between admirals and land forces commanders with TURNER being the asshole screwing it all up instead of Sampson.) when the enemy shows up to make noise. Savo Island added a feature RARELY seen. though: a gutless COWARD, (Capt. Bode) showing a streak of yellow a kilometer wide and taking the designated substitute command ship, USS Chicago, out of the fight.
f. Oh for a Schley that day (er night.). Inept as he was in 1898, he would have turned and RAMMED USS Chicago into HIJMS Chokai.
As for Waso not being at Eastern Solomons to be frank with the oiler shortage PACFLEET had in the time period unless he had been given specific dates when the IJN was going to show up like a Midway or Coral Sea there was no way in heaven he could have kept all three of his carriers and their escorts available near Guadalcanal for extended periods of time....actually thinking about said oiler shortage I have an interesting idea for a timeline or at least a thread what if the first group of what became the Cimmaron class Oilers/ the Sagamon class escort carriers had had say three dozen ships built instead of the 12 that were built in otl. Even assuming the Sagamons had eight members instead of the otl 4 an extra 20 fast Oilers would have made the USNs life in 1942 and 1943 vastly easier
g. I presume one means USS Wasp? Nimitz was down to 5 fleet oilers having lost 2 to Japanese action. That was enough for two CBGs. with the 3 he deployed to WATCHTOWER. 2 were on the San Francisco shuttle run.
h. Sangamons with the oiler capacity and fuel at sea feature would have been EXTREMELY useful as versions of the HMS Unicorn type function. So...
assuming the Sagamons had eight members instead of the otl 4 an extra 20 fast Oilers would have made the USNs life in 1942 and 1943 vastly easier...
Force Z.
9 Nells with 1100 pound bombs, all missed a DD
8 Nells,with 550 pound bombs, one got the hit on Repulse
17 Nells with Torpedoes. one Golden BB hit on PoW, and Repulse stuck around
26 Bettys. Three more hits on PoW, four on Repulse, sunk
Level bomber attacks on PoW, one hit. Sunk.
8 torpedo hits from 49 attempts on one BB, one BC and four destroyers.
A USN Sortie from Pearl would be much larger than that, and the IJN pilots would not be able to concentrate attacks as with Force Z
a. This was the same stupid goddamned no good rotten son of a bitch idiot who championed the Singapore Bastion Defense. Instead of facing reality, and the professional career consequences of his gross stupidity, he took his command out and did a naval George Armstrong Custer. Even when the incompetent and equally stupid Brook Pophan told Phillips there would be no RAF cover because the air bases were gone, that imbecile pressed northward into the Gulf of Thailand (Siam?) and into the IJN airpower circle where he KNEW he would be sunk. Goddamn him.
b. The Genzan and Kanoya formations were specially and intensively trained land-based RIKKO units, two of only three such units Japan possessed, (about 50 aircraft or 25 planes per (Kokugui Kogi) (bomber group) ) Yamamoto sent a third, the Mihoru formation and a reconnaisance element to bring the attackers up to a gerusa (bombardment group) strength and the rest is Chief Crazy Horse on his Sitting Bull history.
Risking the battle line at sea against Kido Butai.
c. There was an enormous difference between the criminal stupidity that was Force Z. and a possible PACFLT sortie, but given Genda's Pearl Harbor plan and the superb quality of the IJNAS aircraft carrier borne naval aviation on that day, I would not want to see the Battle Force at sea under the wings of Akagi's or Hiryu's dive bombers without Enterprise's and Yorktown's CAP there to protect them.
Nor would I be too happy to see Standards trying to dodge hammer and anvil torpedo attacks from Kaga's and Soryu's Kates, knowing now what I know. Better for the Standards to be sunk and recovered at the moorings.
McP.