...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided
- Thread starter DaveJ576
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McPherson
Banned
So have I.
I assume that you mean the ATL. Because in the RTL, the British and the Germans had gone through their torpedo crises by 1941 and were either court martialing people or fixing their fish by 7 December 1941. The US may have been aware of these foreign problems or not (accounts conflict) that early, but the British sure as heck were and did not warn the Americans to check their own fish for mechanical and quality control faults. And this should have been the case because the British would have received defective US torpedoes (Mark VIIIs used on the Clemsons and the Wickes) that came with the Lend Leased four stackers in the base swap deal.
I would add, that the technique of the sound generated attack and a discouragement of periscope use, were the direct results of this biased umpiring and inept war-gaming. The submarine accidents and the public outcry over the same did have the salutary effect of forcing the complacent C and R crowd (Buships) to get with the program and "sub safe" the boats to some extent. This made the Gatos and Balaos more effective in war when the proper lessons did percolate through the American submariner community. There was not a built 10% guaranteed fail and loss of mission and boat due to design faults built into the British and German boats. (T-class were horrible, as was the Type VII for unforeseen dive control defects; i.e. main induction valve failures and joint fatigue.)
Overconfident Germans were the victims of the opposite effect. The morale crunch for them comes in 1943.
Once again, the US became instantly aware that something funny was going on with this iteration. This was at Pearl Harbor when Japanese aerial torpedoes were dropped higher and from planes operating at faster speeds than a Devastator and the torpedoes ran shallower than US ones. Somebody noticed but did not either want to find out why or did not follow up. As late as Coral Sea the "crappy" Mark XIII seemed to do its work well (Shoho ate a bunch of them that exploded nicely. All made by Bliss, by the way, who designed the fish.). Even at Midway, where the torprons were slaughtered enough fish hit, that Japanese sailors fished out of the water afterwards reported to their American interrogators that torpedoes did hit carriers (Kaga), but they failed to function. "Our torpedoes work good; but yours don't." I believe one survivor bragged.
I agree with this view.
The dratted Mark 16 is going to enter service:
Don't worry... the "Plywood Wonders" will get their day in the sun too!
Military duty will keep me busy next week so I have to ask for patience as I work that around the planned updates. I really appreciate everyone's enthusiasm for this project. It has been rolling around in my head for a long time.
Sounds good to me. With all the other research we may even wire guided, electric torpedoes by the end of the War.
The comments about the noise flow problem with acoustic torpedoes is interesting. The USN developed FIDO to kill U-boats in one of those WW II "wonder programs" that keeps me scratching my head and wondering why we cannot do that now? Nine months from concept November 1941 to opeval and then 17 months to first U-boat kill (May 1943). FIDO was modified into a submarine swim out weapon (CUTIE) to engage charging Japanese destroyers.
As to whether wire-guidance is possible, that is a good question. Probably not in WW II though the US tried. As to an acoustic seeking heavyweight torpedo, the answer is definitely yes. There was nothing in the G7e/T4 Falke or the G7es Zaunkonig's seekers that was unique or difficult for HUSL or General Electric to master, duplicate or frankly surpass. This will culminate in the Mark 35 torpedo and later the Mark 37. Both of those fish started their lives in the war emergency programs the USN started to rectify the torpedo disaster they had on their hands.
How large was that crisis program? Mods to the Mark 13, 14, and 15 were rolling out almost monthly after January 1943. King was personally involved by then; which meant Leavenworth and careers ended for non-performer people who did not hustle to fix things. Lockwood was at the operational end applying pressure. Even E. W. Bliss, the company, was called in to look at the Navy built Mark 13s after the Midway and Solomon Islands disasters. The Naval Torpedo Station monopoly of Goat Island was forever ended as Westinghouse, General Electric and others got into the torpedo business. At one time, there were a dozen different torpedoes under panic development: five of them acoustic seekers, seven electric, one using a seawater battery, and one with a kind of primitive binary kerosene/oxidizer precursor to Otto fuel.
This activity of the RTL actually makes it hard to ASB the American torpedo effort, because even wire guidance (Mark 39 a failed first effort) comes out of these WW II program.
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marathag
Banned
They came with the WWI era Mk 8 torpedoes, true, but other than running deep, what made them defective?
The Mk 10 were serviceable in WWII. Both were Bliss designs
McPherson
Banned
The Mark VIIIs (destroyers) seemed to have run deep. The Mark Xs (submarines) definitely did run deep.
McPherson
Banned
No hittee, no explody. The fish ran under Japanese transports' keels at Lingayen Gulf and sandsharked. Once someone figured out the hydrostatic control was gated wrong, the depth settings were zeroed and the fish ran true. Then the problems with the contact exploders showed up...
I do know how it worked.
I just find it strange BuOrd, or NTS, or whoever, was willing to accept a fish that wouldn't run at constant depth.
The first, I think is entirely likely. The second, I'd be wary of; as has been pointed out to me, simply truncating the war ignores what else is going on, & what's needed to achieve it: building carriers, tankers, & LCs takes time, & can't be done (much) faster than OTL...so, while the Sub Force can (perhaps) weaken Japan's production & her island defences thereby, actually clearing Japanese forces out may not go enormously faster... Especially not with MacArthur demanding so much attention.
IDK how to measure the impact of increased tonnage sunk any other way, so if you've got one, I'd be happy to use it.
I'm thinking the war must be easier, somewhat, when Japan can't deliver food, supplies, & spares to island garrisons, thanks to shipping losses. Does that mean Guadalcanal falls sooner or easier? Maybe a bit. Saipan? Again, maybe a bit.
For me, the biggie is the domestic impact: how soon does Japan proper stop being able to keep the lights on or feed her people, because subs are slaughtering everything in sight?
As noted, I'm presuming no other changes, & that's based on the improved effectiveness OTL after September '43. Since there will be effects from increased aggressiveness (torpedoes that worked will encourage some to shoot at more dangerous targets, like tincans), as well as from fewer wasted shots, it's likely the OTL rate is too low. Again, IDK how else to measure it.
If you really want to see the war get shortened, start looking at moving all the boats to Hawaii, or giving the Sub Force the "maru code" break at war's start. You can have Japan's economy in ruin in a matter of weeks...
On the Mark X? AFAIK, it had no issues beyond deep-running.
The Mark XIV's magnetic influence feature's problems were masked, to a degree, by the deep-running problem, & only after deactivation did serious problems with its contact pistol surface...
A few more notes.
There was so little actual scientific testing of all USN torpedoes prior to the war that the defects that were found came as a very rude surprise to the U.S. forces. This has been backed up in virtually every reference I have ever read and studied. Whatever experience the Brits and the Germans had was kept to themselves or dismissed by BuOrd and Newport.
The Mk 9 Mod 1B submarine torpedo was the last designed and built by Bliss. The Mk 10 was the last to be designed by Bliss, but it was built by Newport. There were acknowledged problems with depth keeping on the Mk 10 which (surprise, surprise!) was unknown to the submarine force until the war started. The nature of what was wrong is not well known today, but it seems to have been somewhat intermittent, as S-boats (which could not use the Mk 14) used Mk 10's to score several notable successes, in particular the S-44 sank the heavy cruiser Kako with three hits out of four fired.
There was so little actual scientific testing of all USN torpedoes prior to the war that the defects that were found came as a very rude surprise to the U.S. forces. This has been backed up in virtually every reference I have ever read and studied. Whatever experience the Brits and the Germans had was kept to themselves or dismissed by BuOrd and Newport.
The Mk 9 Mod 1B submarine torpedo was the last designed and built by Bliss. The Mk 10 was the last to be designed by Bliss, but it was built by Newport. There were acknowledged problems with depth keeping on the Mk 10 which (surprise, surprise!) was unknown to the submarine force until the war started. The nature of what was wrong is not well known today, but it seems to have been somewhat intermittent, as S-boats (which could not use the Mk 14) used Mk 10's to score several notable successes, in particular the S-44 sank the heavy cruiser Kako with three hits out of four fired.
McPherson
Banned
Best guess? The hydrostatic flow valve that operated as the pressure sensor for depth setting was placed in the wrong position along the torpedo shell body and thus the pressure dropped in the gate unexpectedly due to flow turbulence. If the fish had been tank tested into nets or allowed to sandshark into a known beach shelf slope this problem would have been instantly recognized. War is the wrong time to find this stuff out. As for the Mark III exploder; there seems to have been a defect with the safing mechanism. Anyway, it still worked far better than the firing pin and guide cage on the Mark VI. A case of KISS sure would have helped here.
McPherson
Banned
Can I put one more issue on the list of problems with sub torpedos that needs solving? Namely, the circular runs. DD fish were fitted to prevent it; sub fish weren't.
I really do not know why, unless the 20 foot 6 inch size constriction limit meant that the anti-circular run feature had to go to make way for other "more important" items inside the shell? US submarine torpedoes were the smallest among the great powers. I do not understand this; myself.
Yes. The Mark XV had the horrible Mark VI exploder/influence assembly and it ran deep. The Mark XIII was a fragile fat fish that either broke up if it hit the water too hard or twisted off bearing as its gyro tumbled on water impact. Somebody forgot to design it like a retarded fall bomb. The quick dirty fix essentially duplicates what modifications the Japanese did to the Type 91 used at Pearl Harbor to make their torpedoes work there. The Americans added a wooden drogue nose ring shock absorber to the Mark XIII to act as a cushion to mitigate impact and to prevent the fish from broaching sideways upon water entry. The tail assembly was essentially the other half of the breakaway kit that pointed the fish for proper nose first entry at water impact, slowed its fall as a volute and guided its water entry into a shallow plunge so it could be used to hit ships in sheltered anchorages. It was successfully demonstrated at Truk. I suspect that this "dirty fix", would be more important than anything else one could do to the Mark XIII pre-war to make it effective. The Mark XIII used a contact version of the Mark VI exploder assembly (Mark V?) without the influence feature and at least in the Mark XIII torpedo made by Bliss it worked. The Goat Island versions, of course, clanged on metal. So... two minor departure points; make the drogue kits immediately after the US conveniently "captures" a Type 91 that sandsharks intact at Pearl Harbor and make sure that Bliss makes all the Mark XIII's. That alone guarantees Kaga is Waldron and or Lindsay killed and allows McClusky to allocate those dive bombers who got her to clobber Hiryu instead.
So much went wrong at Midway...
It's got me beat. I'm thinking, you put a "stop" on the rudder throws, inside the fish, so it can't turn past (say) 60deg off-axis: maybe it'll turn a circle, but it'll be big enough, the firing sub should be able to avoid.
IDK what the DD system looked like; given a choice, I'd adopt that, & only if it wouldn't fit in the tube would I design new. "If it ain't broke, don't f*ck with it."
On the circular run issue...
No where in any of my sources is there any hard data on circular runs, especially with the Mk 14. Most of the stories seem to be unconfirmed and anecdotal, and as yet I have not found a single confirmed instance of a circular run with a Mk 14. For the Mk 15, there is even less data, as the Mk 15, due to tactics on destroyers tended to be a "fire and forget" weapon. Erratic run issues with the Mk 13 are well known and were caused in part by the weapon being damaged as it entered the water. The Mk 18 definitely had known issues with circular runs, just ask Dick O'Kane. I will address this in a later chapter.
This next part is admittedly speculation, but consider this... One of the reasons that there might not have been an anti-circular run device in the Mk 14 was because of how it was intended to be employed. Doctrine as developed in the 30's called for submerged attacks. Periscope depth for a fleet boat was 65 feet (keel depth). Most depth settings for an attack on a surface ship would have the weapon typically running at 10-30 feet. At that depth a circular running weapon would pass over a submerged boat, and unless you were incredibly unlucky and it hit the periscope and mast shears or the periscope itself you were good to go. Circular runs only became a serious problem as tactics evolved once the war started and the boats began to attack from the surface. Both Tang and Tullibee (the only two boats confirmed to have been sunk by circular runs) were on the surface at the time, and both were using Mk 18's. So, perhaps an anti-circular run device not being included in a submarine torpedo is not so ridiculous after all.
Now, erratic runs were more common. This would be a weapon that porpoised or failed to run on the set course, but not necessarily a full circular run.
It is my opinion that the number of actual, confirmed circular runs with Mk 14 and Mk 18 weapons is actually quite low, with the Mk 14 rate being extremely small. This issue, while serious, has been blown out of proportion mostly due to the tragedies of the Tang and Tullibee. I am willing to update my position, but you will have to point me to a solid, reputable reference.
No where in any of my sources is there any hard data on circular runs, especially with the Mk 14. Most of the stories seem to be unconfirmed and anecdotal, and as yet I have not found a single confirmed instance of a circular run with a Mk 14. For the Mk 15, there is even less data, as the Mk 15, due to tactics on destroyers tended to be a "fire and forget" weapon. Erratic run issues with the Mk 13 are well known and were caused in part by the weapon being damaged as it entered the water. The Mk 18 definitely had known issues with circular runs, just ask Dick O'Kane. I will address this in a later chapter.
This next part is admittedly speculation, but consider this... One of the reasons that there might not have been an anti-circular run device in the Mk 14 was because of how it was intended to be employed. Doctrine as developed in the 30's called for submerged attacks. Periscope depth for a fleet boat was 65 feet (keel depth). Most depth settings for an attack on a surface ship would have the weapon typically running at 10-30 feet. At that depth a circular running weapon would pass over a submerged boat, and unless you were incredibly unlucky and it hit the periscope and mast shears or the periscope itself you were good to go. Circular runs only became a serious problem as tactics evolved once the war started and the boats began to attack from the surface. Both Tang and Tullibee (the only two boats confirmed to have been sunk by circular runs) were on the surface at the time, and both were using Mk 18's. So, perhaps an anti-circular run device not being included in a submarine torpedo is not so ridiculous after all.
Now, erratic runs were more common. This would be a weapon that porpoised or failed to run on the set course, but not necessarily a full circular run.
It is my opinion that the number of actual, confirmed circular runs with Mk 14 and Mk 18 weapons is actually quite low, with the Mk 14 rate being extremely small. This issue, while serious, has been blown out of proportion mostly due to the tragedies of the Tang and Tullibee. I am willing to update my position, but you will have to point me to a solid, reputable reference.
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McPherson
Banned
a. The Mark 18 (manual) has a known design fault.
b. Anecdotes about circular runs. That one about USS Grunion is rather startling.
I suppose the best cure for a circular run torpedo is a subordinated 2-d bang/bang guidance logic that kicks in after a clock limited caged mechanical governor unlocks the tail control. This is a relatively "modern" safety feature that became necessary once subs started using CUTIES. It is essentially a steering safety that is a little more complicated than the run arming safeties used in American fish to make sure the fish did not run hot until clear of the tube. Needless to say, both the Americans and the Russians have had hot fish in the tube incidents with catastrophic results (Kursk).
HMAS Canberra may have been a recipient of such a Mark XV the USS Bagley intended for the Chokai.
The only evidence we have that I find convincing is testimony from survivor (Japanese) eyewitnesses about American torpedoes cutting circles in the water as seen from their ships. I have seen nothing in the test and revalidation programs where the USN experimentally verified that circular run was a problem for the Mark XIV, though such gyro compartment flooding and electrical shorts were known to be a Mark XVIII defect when that fish was issued. The Mark XVIII steer control design was based in the main off the Mark XIV. Make of that what you will.
In any event, if we are going to ATL fix this problem, then the USN when it captures a U-boat will have access to FaT T1 or T3 torpedoes to reverse engineer. Trouble is that happens in 1944. So the gyro guidance problem will remain unless the USN goes all acoustic seeker and uses 2-d bang/bang command steer in every fish it uses. And THAT means the circular run problem for the electric motor driven fish remains until the Mark 28 in 1944. Not happy about it for this ATL. The Mark 28 was a roller with a huge nose wander problem as an added issue.
I'm not sure what you want for "confirmed", but Blair's Silent Victory reports half a dozen or so (I haven't counted, & it's been years since I read it last), & credits the sinking of at least three boats (including Tullibee) to them, not counting Tang (which was a Mark XVIII).
In fact, based on Blair, I would've said the Mark XVIII's problem with it is less serious, not more--but that may be on sheer numbers.
As a percentage of rounds fired, it may be small; IMO, one is too many, if it risks being fatal--& it always will be a fatal risk. Why not fix it?
McPherson
Banned
Four boats or possibly five boats sunk by own weapon?
Why in Murphy's name was that torpedo (N0. 24210) not beached, sent to a machine shop and torn apart by ordnance to find out what caused the erratic run? If the fish was erratic in an exercise shot, with the crew who prepped the fish not being responsible for the fish's malfunction (TBD by the ordnance people and USS Tench's officers], and recovered, it is evidence of a mechanical fault that needs investigation. It would be a verified sample of a batch run that would need to be further pulled and inspected.
Note the Mark XIV 3A's and the Mark 23s? Add to it the known troublesome Mark XVIIIs and that leaky inspection and access plate to the gyro compartment becomes a rather damning indictment. (See below.)
If 5 US boats were killed as a result of erratic or "circular runs" of their own weapons, that is a ~ 10% kill factor and 440 trained skilled submariners lost to the imbecility of the people at Goat Island. This is the stuff of court martials and review boards to fix blame. Was it Blandy who ultimately failed here? I would not be surprised.
It should be mentioned that this erratic run problem was only one of about a dozen problems with the torpedoes. Perhaps, spending the US navy's athletics budget of the 1930s on weapon testing might or could have saved a lot of grief, but I still suspect that somehow the same problems or similar ones would have confounded the operational forces. The leadership of the 1930s USN was not all the perfection that the popular histories of WW II make it out to be. There were a host of dud officers in that service. In the end, if the torpedo scandal is to be avoided, there has to be a drastic culture shift in the United States Navy to go with the mechanical fixes we enumerated above.
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