...Those Marvelous Tin Fish: The Great Torpedo Scandal Avoided

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Strong-back tank extra.
 
That's demanding a small retcon, so that, & add just a trifle more:
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As the new fleet boats begin arriving in numbers, Royce L. Gross (ex-R-9) & John S. McCain, Jr. (ex-O-8, son of the Admiral) are sent to new constriction. Haddock is turned over to Jim Dempsey (ex-S-37) & Tom Wogan is transferred from S-34. As Wogan departs, a sign is seen on her periscope shears, "For sale, as is, where is". (English is not amused; in public, neither is Nimitz.) Wogan is given command of the new Winghead (which adopts Captain America as their symbol); he is sent to surveil Kwajalein at the end of July.
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snip

Really enjoying your work!

As an aside...

My grandfather served on S-34 from 1926-1930. He transferred from the Asiatic Fleet to USS Holland in 1930 (yes, he met Capt Nimitz). He enlisted in 1918 at the age of 14 years (his mother signed a paper claiming he was 17, birth certificates did not exist where he was born in rural Missouri) and retired in 1938 (RM1). He re-enlisted in 1942 and put in for submarine duty, but was denied due to age. Spent the war assigned to the radio station at Point Loma.
 
Really enjoying your work!

As an aside...

My grandfather served on S-34 from 1926-1930. He transferred from the Asiatic Fleet to USS Holland in 1930 (yes, he met Capt Nimitz). He enlisted in 1918 at the age of 14 years (his mother signed a paper claiming he was 17, birth certificates did not exist where he was born in rural Missouri) and retired in 1938 (RM1). He re-enlisted in 1942 and put in for submarine duty, but was denied due to age. Spent the war assigned to the radio station at Point Loma.
Thanks. Glad you're enjoying! It's been kinda fun.

That's a great story, too.:cool: (I'd have loved to meet Nimitz.:cool:)
For the record, I expect to start using this design in Jan-Feb '43, but I still want to "backfill" a bit off Japan & Kwajalein, & let McPherson catch up some, before that.

Let me pose the question I've already raised with him, since I can't make up my mind: do you think the deck guns would be used much in late '44/early '45? Or would the war end before the Sub Force runs out of torpedo-worthy targets? I can imagine it going both ways, but the most gun-inclined skippers (Chuck Triebel, frex) are going to be in Mackerels in SWPA, not in the Yellow Sea.
 
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Awhile ago, off Japan...
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29 April, Mannert Abele's Numbfish (an electric eel) takes station off Nagoya. (She, like a number of her sisters, is bombed by AAF patrol aircraft leaving the U.S. Among Abele's crew is Manning M. Kimmel, the Admiral's son.)

Just after 22.00 on 30 April, with an alert from Hypo, Abele makes contact with a large freighter (about 6000 tons) escorted by a single Minkaze-class destroyer, at a range of 7100yd. Abele closes to 2100yd, plotting the freighter's zigzag pattern, Abele's patrol report expressing surprise at her speed, before firing three bow tubes at 23.03. All three hit, and Abele claims a 5000 ton freighter. The escort charges, and Abele dives to avoid. The Minkaze, oddly, drops no depth charges; when Abele comes to periscope depth to investigate, he finds the destroyer lying to, 1500yd distant, apparently listening with hydrophones. Abele does not miss the opportunity, firing one stern tube; it hits, evidently in the forward magazine, and Yakaze (1345 tons) is blown to bits.

On 6 May, Abele's sonar picks up heavy screws at 14.11, at a range of 4300yd. Running surfaced, Abele closes to 1450yd without being detected, tracking a 6000 ton freighter sailing alone, at about 12 knots, which Abele identifies as a naval auxiliary; at 16.01, he fires three bow torpedoes. All hit. (JANAC is unable to identify or confirm this sinking.)

Numbfish's sonar detects another solitary freighter at 20.48 on 10 May, at 5800yd, running in surfaced to 2500yd to study her zigzagging, before pressing in to 1200yd and firing two stern torpedoes. One is a dud; the other is enough to finish Shonan Maru (5000 tons).

After a two-week drought, at 04.09 on 25 May, after moving to within 5000yd of the beach (& dodging aircraft patrols every morning & night), Abele finds a small, solitary freighter departing Yokosuka at 19.41, at 4900yd. Abele surfaces, keeping close eye out for aircraft, and chases, reaching 1750yd before aircraft threaten, and he fires a single stern torpedo. It hits, and Kitakata Maru (2300 tons) sinks.

Hypo gives notice of a convoy of naval auxiliaries departing Yokosuka 19 May. Numbfish intercepts at 01.24 on 21 May, at 6100yd, Abele counting two large freighters, a large transport, and a tanker, escorted by two destroyers, a Kagero-class and an Asashio-class. He observes the convoy's zigzagging, then gets in close at 03.10, between the Asashio and the merchantmen, firing two bow tubes each at the lead ship (estimated at 6500 tons) and the second (estimated as 6000 tons), then swinging to fire all four stern tubes at the 7000-ton tanker third in line and ringing up flank speed to run astern of the convoy before being detected. Abele's shooting is good: he scores two hits each in the lead ship and the second, and all four in the tanker, which catches fire. The first two, aircraft transport Keiyo Maru (6442 tons) and freighter Meiyo Maru ( 5628-tons), both sink. The fourth ship in line stops to pick up survivors, while the Kagero & Asashio pursue. Abele dives, hoping to shake them off; he ends up pinned down under a two-hour depth charging, which his patrol report describes as "punishing", though counting only twenty-one depth charges in all. Abele manages to shake the destroyers and surface again, 9300yd from where the burning tanker sits, the undamaged transport picking up survivors and fighting fire, the two destroyers running a wagon wheel around them. Abele dives, observing until 06.21, maneuvering for a shot on the freighter, creeping in to 1200yd; at the last moment, he decides to fire two bow torpedoes at the Asashio, two into the freighter, and one into the tanker. As the destroyer comes across his bows, the single torpedo hits abaft her after stack, and Arare (2370 tons) has her back broken. When the Kagero comes tearing around the circle to her aid, Abele unleashes all four stern tubes at her; one hits her at the fo'c's'l break, and Kagero (ironically, the name ship, 2490 tons) is sunk. The freighter absorbs the second torpedo and catches fire, and within 40 minutes, Hokuroku Maru (8359 tons) is also sunk. The tanker, Azuma Maru (6646 tons), lasts only a few minutes longer. As Numbfish clears the area submerged, an unexpected string of explosions from an unnoticed aircraft shake the boat, but do no real damage.

With three bow torpedoes remaining, at dusk on 28 May, Abele spots a 7500 ton freighter, 7900yd distant, sailing alone. Abele takes more than two hours to sort out her zigzag plan ("Seemed designed by a drunken Marine," opines his patrol report), closing to 1100yd and, at 20.48, firing his three remaining torpedoes. One misses as the ship zigs again, the second is heard to hit but fail to detonate, but the third hits astern, and ammunition ship Naruto Maru (7149-tons) "lights up the sky like a Fourth of July fireworks display", as Abele puts it.

When Abele returns, he is credited with twelve ships totalling an astonishing 66,400 tons; he learns (via Hypo) his first target was actually seaplane carrier Mizuho (10,930 tons). It is the #1 patrol for tonnage of the war; Shinano, claimed by Joe Enright, is only 64,000 tons. (Postwar, Abele's score is reduced to 11 ships and 58,119 tons, & Shinano's displacement is corrected to 72,000 tons.)

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FYI, most of these sinkings are OTL for name, date, location, & JANAC tonnage: credit OTL goes to Bob Rice in Drum or Creed Burlingame's Silversides. (The "unknown maru" was credited to Rice as 4000 tons; Rice believed she was a 6000 ton naval auxiliary.) OTL, Yakaze was converted to a target ship in this period (IMO, this is a more fitting end), Okikaze was on ASW patrol, & the 19 May convoy was unmolested; a big freighter (or naval auxiliary) was fired on, but missed, by Rice, 28 May: I'm attirbuting that as Naruto Maru, which sailed from Yokkaichi for Rabaul 14 May 1942.

The 19 May convoy's composition on this page lists Kagero and Arare. as escorts; this page & this page fail to mention it...

If anybody doesn't recognize him, that's the same Abele KIA on Grunion's first patrol, in the Aleutians, & who got a DD named for him.

Am I wrong racking up such a high tonnage score?

Edit: per below, add postwar correction to Shinano's displacement.
 
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Played around with a B-17 to answer another thread question. Since the work is done now...

For a US bomber to deliver a true torpedo, the bomb bay would have to be a skedge sled type able to handle a bomb body of at least 21-24 inches diameter and a length of not less than 160-180 inches long or about twice the length of the typical 500 lb bomb.

This could be done. Modified bombers that could do this without butchering the air frame too badly are the A-20 Havoc and the B-17 Flying Fortress, but that means rebuilding the center barrel and moving a lot of aft compartment equipment around as well as re-ballasting weight forward. That has consequences.

See this:

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Part of those consequences is a short Lancaster style pannier bomb bay and a V or C shaped carry through of the main wing spar that allows for the pannier. This in turn separates the B-17 into a two compartment bomber with the pilot, co-pilot, top turret gunner and the bombardier separated from the flight engineer, radio-tech, the belly turret gunner and the tail gunner. In addition, the fuselage fuel tank is now moved into the wings outboard the engines, making an already sluggish in climb bomber almost as bad as a Dornier Do-17 in flight characteristics. On the plus side, we add about an hours endurance and now can carry a nominal 2000 lbs of bombs out to a maximum strike radius of 1250 miles instead of the nominal 980 in the B17G. Since we aren't carrying the useless waste of waist gunners (1/2 ton of human beings, machine guns and all that ammunition), that is added fuel.

And for that we can carry two torpedoes or a single 4400 lb retarded fall AP bomb out 800 miles or so.

There is your American Rikko bomber. Meet the PB1B.
 
++Snip++
When Abele returns, he is credited with twelve ships totalling an astonishing 66,400 tons; he learns (via Hypo) his first target was actually seaplane carrier Mizuho (10,930 tons). It is the #1 patrol for tonnage of the war; Shinano, claimed by Joe Enright, is only 64,000 tons. (Postwar, Abele's score is reduced to 11 ships and 58,119 tons.)
++Snip++
I have read the book by Joe Enright and would only edit that I believe Shinano was listed at 72,000t. He was credited with something like 35,000t initally (As the Americans didn't know about Shinano), but post-war he was credited with the fill 72,000t for her sinking. Returned the book to the library so can't confirm that I am 100% correct, perhaps somebody else can?
 
I have read the book by Joe Enright and would only edit that I believe Shinano was listed at 72,000t. He was credited with something like 35,000t initally (As the Americans didn't know about Shinano), but post-war he was credited with the fill 72,000t for her sinking. Returned the book to the library so can't confirm that I am 100% correct, perhaps somebody else can?
Tricky , she is 64800 long ton standard, , but in short tons standard would be 72500. However normally standard displacement was measured in long tons ( or tonnes now )
.
 
Tricky , she is 64800 long ton standard, , but in short tons standard would be 72500. However normally standard displacement was measured in long tons ( or tonnes now ).
Blair quotes 64000, & that's the number I'm using. If it's revised postwar, so be it.;) Edited to add a postwar correction.
 
The Coral Sea Order of Battle.

IJN 4th Fleet – VADM Admiral Inoue, Shigeyoshi

CL Kashima (Inoue's flagship, anchored at Rabaul during the battle)

Note: these were “training ships” and flagships of various commanders during early Japanese war operations.

Tulagi Invasion Group – RADM Shima, Kiyohide
CM (minelayer) Okinoshima (Shima's flagship) CM Kōei Maru
AP (troop transport) Azumasan Maru
DD (destroyer) Kikuzuki (sunk by submarine), DD Yozuki
AM (minesweepers)Wa #1 (sunk), AM Wa #2 (sunk), AM Hagoromo Maru (sunk), AM Noshiro Maru #2 (sunk), and AM Tama Maru (sunk)
SC (subchaser) Toshi Maru #3 and PG Tama Maru #8

Troops embarked for the Tulagi expedition were 400 troops from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF) plus a construction detachment (rump company of Korean slave labor troops) from the 7th Establishment Squad.

=======================================================

Support Group/Close Cover Force – RADM Matumo, Kuninori

CL (light cruiser) Tenryū (Marumo's flagship), CL Tatsuta

AV (seaplane tender) Kamikawa Maru
-AV Kamikawa Maru air group – 12 aircraft
-AV Kiyokawa Maru air group –12 aircraft (attached)

PG (gunboat) Keijo Maru, PG Seikai Maru, PG Nikkai Maru

Covering Group/Main Body Support Force – Rear Admiral Gotō , Aritomo

CVL (light carrier) Shōhō (sunk)
-Shōhō Air Group – Lieutenant Nōtomi, Kenjirō
-Shōhō Carrier Fighter Unit – 8 Mitsubishi A6M Zero and 4 Mitsubishi A5M fighters
-Shōhō Carrier Attack Unit – 6 Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bombers

Note: The Shōhō embarked air group was supposed to be evenly split between 14 fighters and 16 scout/torpedo planes. It lost over the better half of its complement to make up Nagumo’s losses incurred during the Indian Ocean raid. The Japanese by this period of the war, had suffered so many aircraft losses in their frontline IJN aviation units, that they were stripping second line units of trained pilots and first line aircraft for replacements to areas and units regarded as more critical; which goes directly to the seriousness with which they regarded Operation Mo; does it not? Operation MI, in the planning stages, had first priority, the Darwin air campaign was second, and the Philippine Island campaign was third. Guess who has the scrapings of the IJN Air Service? (^^^^)

CA (heavy cruiser) Aoba (Gotō's flagship), CA Kako, CA Kinugasa, CA Furutaka
DD (destroyer) Sazanami

=================================================================

Port Moresby Invasion Group – RADM Kajioka, Sadamichi

CL (light cruiser) Yūbari (Kajioka's flagship)
DD (destroyer) Oite, DD Asanagi, DD Uzuki, DD Mutsuki, DD Mochizuki, DD Yayoi
PG (patrol gunboat) Ukn 1, PG Ukn 2

Transport Unit – RADM Abe, Kōsō

CM (minelayer) Tsugaru[26]
Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) APA (transport) Mogamigawa Maru, APA Chōwa Maru (sunk), APA Goyō Maru, APA Akiba Maru (sunk), APA Shōka Maru.
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA)- APA Asakasan Maru, APA China Maru, APA Mito Maru, APA Matsue Maru, APA Taifuku Maru, APA Hibi Maru (sunk)
ATF (salvage tugboat) Woshima (sunk)
AO (oilers) Hoyo Maru (sunk), and Irō
MSC (coastal minesweeper) W-20 (Wa #20), MSC Hagoromo Maru, MSC Noshiro Maru #2, MSC Fumi Maru #2, and MSC Seki Maru #3.

Here are the rest of them: approximately 500 troops from the 3rd Kure SNLF plus the remaining construction specialists (Korean slave labor troops; the Japanese are fond of their euphemisms during this era) from the 10th Establishment Squad on the IJN transports.

And we have the South Seas Detachment of approximately 5,000 IJA troops packed on the IJA transports. These are the famous conquerors of Wake Island. These gentlemen were the IJA elite amphibious unit who wanted to take Port Moresby. They were to attack Midway a month after this Operation MO failed. They would be disappointed there, too. On their third attempt, the butchers of Wake Island would get their chance against Port Moresby again, to show how good they were against prepared allied troops in battle. The Australians cut them to bits on the Kokoda Trail.

Carrier Striking Force – VADM Takagi, Takeo

Note: We’ve seen him before. Java Sea was a “famous victory” so the IJN rewarded him with this operation. In the RTL he was lucky to get out of Operation MO alive. Let us see if he makes it this time?

Carrier Division 5 – RADM Hara, Chūichi, Officer in Tactical Command

CV (attack aircraft carrier) Shōkaku (sunk)
-Shōkaku Air Group – LTCDR Takahashi, Kakuichi[37]
-Shōkaku Carrier Fighter Unit – 21 A6M Zero fighters
-Shōkaku Carrier Bomber Unit – 20 Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bombers
-Shōkaku Carrier Attack Unit – 19 Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bombers

CV Zuikaku (Hara's flagship)
-Zuikaku Air Group – LTCDR Shimazaki, Shigekazu
-Zuikaku Carrier Fighter Unit – 25 Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighters
-Zuikaku Carrier Bomber Unit – 22 Aichi D3A dive bombers
-Zuikaku Carrier Attack Unit – 20 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers

CA (heavy cruiser) Myōkō (Takagi's flagship), CA Haguro
DD (destroyer) DD Ushio, DD Akebono, DD Ariake, DD Yūgure, DD Shiratsuyu, DD Shigure
AO (oiler) Tōhō Maru (sunk)

Submarine Force – CAPT Ishizaki, Noburu
-Patrol/Scouting Group – I-21, I-22, I-24, I-28, and I-29
-Raiding Group – Ro-33 and Ro-35

25th Air Flotilla (also called the 5th Air Attack Force) – RADM Yamada, Sadayoshi
-4th Air Group (based at Rabaul) – 17 Mitsubishi G4M Type 1 land attack bombers
-Tainan Air Group (based at Lae and Rabaul) – 18 Mitsubishi A6M Zero and six Mitsubishi A5M fighters
-Yokohama Air Group (based at Rabaul, Shortland Islands, and Tulagi) – 12 Kawanishi H6K reconnaissance and 9 Nakajima A6M2-N seaplane fighters
-Genzan Air Group (based at Rabaul) – 25 Mitsubishi G3M Type 96 land attack bombers

Note: These are the Rikko units which will give TF 17 (Yorktown RADM Frank Jack Fletcher) a terrible time during the Tulagi raid.

88888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888

Allied forces

Task Force 17 – RADM Frank Jack Fletcher (flagship Yorktown)

Task Group 17.2 (Attack Group) – RADM Thomas C. Kinkaid
CA (heavy cruiser) Minneapolis, CA New Orleans, CA Astoria, CA Chester, CA Portland
DD (destroyer) Phelps, DD Dewey, DD Farragut, DD Aylwin, DD Monaghan

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Task Group 17.3 (Support Group, from Task Force 44) – RADM John Gregory Crace (RN)
CA (heavy cruiser) Australia, CA Chicago, CL (light cruiser) Hobart
DD (destroyer) Perkins, DD Walke

Note: This Walke is the Sims class, not the Paulding class that was scrapped under the terms of the LNT.

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Task Group 17.5 (Carrier Air Group) – RADM Aubrey Fitch, (from Lexington) Officer in Tactical Command (OTC)

CV aircraft carrier Yorktown (badly damaged)
-Yorktown Air Group – LTCDR Oscar Pederson
-Fighting 42 (VF-42) – 17 Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters
-Bombing 5 (VB-5) – 18 Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers
-Scouting 5 (VS-5) – 17 SBD Dauntless dive bombers
-Torpedo 5 (VT-5) – 13 Douglas TBD Devastator torpedo bombers

CV aircraft carrier Lexington (badly damaged)
-Lexington Air Group – CDR William B. Ault
-Fighting 2 (VF-2) – 21 F4F Wildcat fighters
-Bombing 2 (VB-2) – 18 SBD Dauntless dive bombers
-Scouting 2 (VS-2) – 17 SBD Dauntless dive bombers
-Torpedo 2 (VT-2) – 12 TBD torpedo bombers

DD (destroyer) Morris, DD Anderson, DD Hammann, DD Russell

Task Group 17.6 (Fueling Group) – CAPT John S. Phillips

AO (oiler) Neosho (sunk), AO Tippecanoe
DD (destroyer) Sims (sunk) - LTCDR William Arthur Griswold†, Worden(KIA)

Task Group 17.9 (Search Group) – CDR George H. DeBaun

AV (seaplane tender) Tangier. Based at Noumea
-Patrol Squadron 71 (VP-71) – 6 PBY-5 Catalinas
-Patrol Squadron 72 (VP-72) – 6 PBY-5 Catalinas

=========================================================

South West Pacific Ocean Area (SWPOA)– GEN Douglas MacArthur

Allied Naval Forces – VADM Herbert F. Leary

Note: After Hart left ABDA for Washington and exile on the General Board, this gentleman moved up in the pecking order to be MacArthur’s USN guy. He only lasted until 1 September 1942. AFAICT, Leary managed the unique feat of torqueing off MacArthur (not hard to do), Uncle Chuck Lockwood (Who considered him a “cautious man”.) and Nimitz (Who considered him to be something a lot worse than cautious.), so Leary dug his grave three ways to Sunday and had to get out one horse ahead of a review board. For the record, if Leary was not what was wanted in those dark days, his replacement, VADM Arthur S. Carpender, was worse. The Australians hated him with a passion. MacArthur regretted dumping Leary for him and Uncle Chuck would have solved him the Stephen Decatur way, if they still allowed that kind of thing in the United States Navy. Carpender will ruin the submarine operations during the Battle of the Coral Sea ITTL.

Task Group 42.1 – CAPT Ralph Waldo Christie in submarine tender USS Griffin at Brisbane

-Subdiv 53 – LTCDR Elmer E. Yeomans:

Mackerels (ITTL)
-20......................SS(E)-223.....USS Mudfish..................................(LT(s.g.) O. E. Hagberg)
-22......................SS(M)-225....USS Mudskipper.............................(LTCDR J. R. Craig )
-23......................SS(P)-226.....USS Modok....................................(LTCDR E. J. MacGregor, 3d)
-24......................SS(E)-227.....USS Mooneye.................................(LT(s.g.) J. B. Azer )
-25......................SS(E)-228.....USS Mojar......................................(LTCDR C. B. Stevens, Jr)
-26......................SS(K)-229.....USS Morid......................................(LRCDR R. R. McGregor)

Subdiv 201 – CDR Ralston B. Van Zant:

More Mackerels (ITTL)
-27.....................SS(K)-230...USS Machete...................LT(s.g.) Henry Glass Munson
-28.....................SS(K)-231...USS Mahseer...................LTCDR Edward Shillingford Hutchinson
-29.....................SS(K)-232...USS Mandarinfish.............LT(s.g.) Wereford Goss Chapple
-30.....................SS(K)-233...USS Minoga.....................LTCDR Philip Niekum
-31.....................SS(K)-234...USS Mola.........................LTCDR Gordon Campbell
-32.....................SS(K)-235...USS Morsa.......................LTCDR James William Blanchard

Notes: Reader, you and I have waited for this… The Mackerels are going to war against the IJN.

Task Force 44 – temporarily assigned to Task Force 17, (see Task Group 17.3 above)

Allied Air Forces – LTGEN George Brett (Another AAF general like GEN Brereton. YMMV.)

United States Army Air Forces:

8th Pursuit Group – Archerfield, Brisbane, (I cannot help it, I love reworking birds to work as they should have. See below.)
-35th Fighter Squadron – Port Moresby
---14 Bell Aircraft P-39 Airacobra fighters
-36th Fighter Squadron – Port Moresby
---12 Bell Aircraft P-39 Airacobra fighters
49th Pursuit Group – Darwin,
-7th Fighter Squadron – Darwin
---29 Curtiss P-40 fighters
-8th Fighter Squadron – Darwin
---28 Curtiss P-40 fighters
-9th Fighter Squadron – Darwin
---32 Curtiss P-40 fighters

3rd Bombardment Group
-8th Bombardment Squadron – Port Moresby,
---22 Douglas A-24 Dauntless dive bombers
-13th Bombardment Squadron – Port Moresby
---16 North American B-25 Mitchells
-90th Bombardment Squadron
---11 North American B-25 Mitchells

19th Bombardment Group – Townsville,
-30th Bombardment Squadron
---17 North American B-17B Flying Fortress bombers
40th Reconnaissance Squadron
---6 North American B17R Flying Fortress bombers

22nd Bombardment Group – Townsville and Cairn
-93rd Bombardment Squadron -Townsville
---16 Martin B-28 Dragon bombers
435th Bombardment Squadron - Cairn
---16 Martin B-28 Dragon bombers

Royal Australian Air Force

No. 11 Squadron – Townsville 6 Consolidated PBY Catalina seaplanes
No. 20 Squadron – Cairn 8 Consolidated PBY Catalina seaplane
No. 24 Squadron – Townsville, 3 CAC Wirraway figher/trainers

No. 32 Squadron – Port Moresby, 12 Lockheed Hudson patrol bombers
No. 75 Squadron – Port Moresby, 3 Curtiss P-40 Warhawk fighters

Port Moresby garrison – approximately 5,000 troops under Major General B. M. Morris

30th Infantry Brigade
-39th Infantry Battalion
-49th Infantry Battalion
-53rd Infantry Battalion
-13th Field Regiment
-23rd Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery
-Detachment, 1st Independent Company (scouts)
-30th Infantry Brigade Signal Section
-30th Infantry Brigade HQ Defence Platoon

Moresby Fixed Defences
-Moresby Fixed Defences Fortress Engineers
-Moresby Fixed Defences Anti-Aircraft Artillery (six 3-inch guns)

Other units with 30th Brigade

-1st Army Troops Company
-7th Field Company
-1st Section, 1st Mechanical Equipment Company (combat engineers in American army vernacular)
-8th Military District Survey Section (topology unit mapping the Kokoda Trail which had never been done before.)
-8th Military District Bomb Disposal Section (EOD unit getting a lot of practice. The IJA was dropping a lot of dud ordnance on Port Moresby)
-8th Military District Signals (One of the best combat signals units anywhere at this time. They had better Japanese speakers than the Japanese in the region. And the IJA sure liked to yak on the radio.)
-8th Military District Defence and Employment Company
-New Guinea Volunteer Rifles
-Papuan Infantry Battalion (Valuable scouts and rangers who made the difference on the Kokada Trail. They never get enough credit for the victory.)
-8th Military District Section Intelligence Corps (See the Signals Unit)
-15th Supply Personnel Company (Unsung logistics heroes)
-8th Military District Bulk Issue Petrol and Oil Depot (ditto)
-A Section, 8th Military District Mechanical Transport Company(bears repeating)
-Base Hospital (Yup, again.)
-3rd Field Ambulance (Same.)
-113th Convalescent Depot (Same again.)
-8th Military District Dental Centre
-45th Dental Unit
-253rd Dental Unit
-256th Dental Unit
-274th Dental Unit
-301st Dental Unit
-421st Dental Unit
Note: The Australian army had a thing about teeth?
-15th Optical Unit
Note: Same for eyeglasses.
-8th Military District Depot of Medical Stores
-16th Field Hygiene Section

Note: Medical support in Papua / New Guinea was a thing the SWPA often neglected to the detriment of the fighting troops. Like with combat engineers, it seems the corncob pipe smoker (MacArthur, who should know better.), could not understand why his theater might need more doctors and dentists than the TO and E allotted. SE Asia is not Europe.
There is fungus among us and other nasty bacterii and virii to kill off poor Joe Private. At least the Australian army understood that much about where they are headed. Whatever one might criticize Blamey, he understood that medical care in the wild unknown was a bring your own along affair. But even the Australian army did not provide enough as the Buna and Goa campaigns would demonstrate.

-8th Military District Ordnance Depot

And now for the tail enders of 30th Brigade
-19th Ordnance Ammunition Section
-109th Infantry Brigade Group Field Workshop (fixes all the broken vehicles)
-109th Infantry Brigade Group Ordnance Field Park (fixes all the broken weaponry)
-30th Infantry Brigade Provost Platoon (fixes all the legal problems; i.e. lawyers and policemen)
-8th Military District Accounts Office (paymaster)
-8th Military District Postal Unit
-8th Military District Records Office
-8th Military District Stationery Depot
-8th Military District Printing Section
Note the paperwork involved?
-8th Military District Graves Registration and Inquiries Unit
-8th Military District Laundry and Decontamination Unit
-8th Military District Army Field Bakery
-8th Military District Base Depot
-8th Military District Marine Section
-8th Military District Canteen Services
-8th Military District Training Centre
-Australian New Guinea Administrative Unit

Notes: Politicians, lawyers, mechanics, postal clerks, cooks, bottle washers, the supply guys, jailers, the paperwork clown corps and the USO show. What army travels without these tail-enders?

Still working on the battle itself. MAN did a lot of inexplicable things happen RTL, that to this day no-one has a good explanation for how or why it happened. It is worse than Midway!

Sources: A combination of Lundstrom (First Team), Hyperwar (invaluable), some Wiki and US submarines (fleetorganization.com) were sources I used to cobble this ITTL order of battle together. Any errors are exclusively mine. I will have a P-39 ITTL up soon. I just can't help that, I want to PoD every boloed aircraft in the US OOB.

====================================================

P_39_aircobra_ITTL.png


General characteristics P-39 Airacobra (ITTL)
Crew: One
Length: 30 ft 2 in (9.2 m)
Wingspan: 34 ft 0 in (10.4 m)
Height: 12 ft 5 in (3.8 m)
Wing area: 213 sq ft (19.8 m²)
Empty weight: 6,516 lb (2,955 kg)
Loaded weight: 7,570 lb (3,433 kg)
Max. takeoff weight: 8,400 lb (3,800 kg)
Powerplant: 1 × Allison V-1710-88 liquid-cooled V-12, 1,400 hp (1045 kW) at 9,842 ft (3,000 m)
Never exceed speed: 525 mph (845 km/h)
Maximum speed: 389 mph (626 km/h) at 9,842 ft (3,000 m)
Stall speed: 95 mph (152 km/h) Power off Flaps & undercarriage down
Range: 525 miles on internal fuel (840 km)
Service ceiling: 35,000 ft (10,700 m)
Rate of climb: 3,937 ft/min (20 m/s) at 9,842 ft (3,000 m)
Wing loading: 34.6 lb/sq ft (169 kg/m²)
Power/mass: 0.18 hp/lb (0.30 kW/kg)
Time to climb: 15,000 ft (4,572 m) in 4.5 min at 160 mph (260 km/h).

Armament

Guns:1 × 20 mm M1 cannon in nose (firing through the propeller hub) with 120 rounds of HE-T ammunition.
........2 × .50 cal (12.7 mm) synchronized Browning M2 machine guns, nose-mounted; 200 rounds per gun
........2 × .50 cal (12.7 mm) Browning M2 machine guns (one each wing), 300 rounds per gun
Bombs: Up to 500 lb (230 kg) of bombs under wings and belly or one 60 gallon (227 l) drop tank

P.S. Damage reports USN to 7 December 1942.
 
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Retconned. I would like someone try to keep this cast of characters straight... (How did Leary ever get a command?) I did not even know Ralph Christie was in Brisbane, yet; or Carpender was out from SubLANT, raising Hell with SWPO subs, as MO was kicking off. *I'm usually rather good on that stuff.

P.S. My sources showed Ro-34 (RTL), but Ro-35 it is ITTL. Ro 35 gonna die anyway. Just not at Coral Sea.
 
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I would like someone try to keep this cast of characters straight... (How did Leary ever get a command?) I did not even know Ralph Christie was in Brisbane, yet; or Carpender was out from SubLANT, raising Hell with SWPO subs, as MO was kicking off and I*'m usually rather good on that stuff.
Well... Blair has Christie taking 6 Atlantic Fleet S-boats to Brisbane, departing 5 March '42. Christie had planned to take 3 divisions, but at Panama decided to leave the "20" boats behind (unfit to make the voyage) & King cut the "30" boats.

TTL, with the S-boats already pulled back to Hawaii, maybe more end up there...but with the accelerated building of fleet boats, & the Mackerels, IDK where he might end up. My guess is, with Lockwood's TF51 in Suva.

Leary was replaced by Carpender around the same time the S-boats were pulled out of SWPA, which looks like mid-Sept '42 OTL. OTL, the S-boats were replaced by Fife's Squadron Two (& Holland); TTL, the Mackerels might be supported by the (OTL) S-boat tender, Griffin, which was pulled back.
 
And now, the Hunt for Orange October...:openedeyewink:
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12 April, the damaged Kaga sorties from Truk, bound for the navy yard at Kure, escorted by DesDiv 17. After slipping past Chappell's Sculpin and McKinney's Salmon at Truk, Hypo alerts several submarines along her route, including Martin P. "Spike" Hottel's Cuttlefish and Ray Moore's Stingray off Saipan; Don McGregor's Gar, Gene McKinney's Salmon, Stan Moseley's Pollack, Frank Fenno's Trout, & Lew Wallace's Tarpon off Japan; Dave Hurt's Perch and Roland Pryce's Spearfish, bound for Formosa; and Bob Rice's Drum and Creed Burlingame's Silversides, en route to Empire Waters.

Of them all, because English or Hypo underestimaed Kaga's speed (or overestimated the damage), only Stingray and Tarpon even came in sight of the carrier. Wallace sights her at 03.20, at a range of 9500yd, making 16 knots, covered (still) by DesDiv 17. Wallace rings up flank speed, pushing his main diesels to the maximum, but proves unable to get closer than 6500yd; at 05.41, he fires all six bow tubes. All miss, and Kaga reaches port safely.

When Wallace returns to Pearl Harbor, English's endorsement is mildly critical of him firing from such long range, but concurs that the value of the target justifies it in this instance.
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This one is pretty short, but the Sub Force really didn't do much in the "hunt" for Shokaku OTL.
 
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ITTL document to the General Board, (Author proposed: VADM Thomas Hart)

We are preparing to fight a desperate action in defense of the Midway Islands, a location where every scrap of intelligence we now possess; indicates that the next major attack Orange plans is against us, with their clear aim of drawing us into a decisive naval battle; a battle Orange calculates we lack the means to win. They know we will have to fight them there, for three reasons.

1) We cannot permit an enemy outpost located within their easy air and submarine striking reconnaissance or striking range of Pearl Harbor.
2) We cannot afford the further erosion of national morale or political will by simply allowing the Japanese to seize such a territory without a contest, though present military necessity and logic dictates that we not engage in this contest at a time of enemy choice and preference. Not with the now known odds against us.
3) We cannot afford the extra time and resources it would take to take back what the Japanese hope to conquer or win by default at this current stage of the war. We know that it would take two years at our current program levels to amass the forces and means, and who knows what havoc Orange can raise in those two years that we must remain supine as we martial those resources?

So, we are fated to meet Orange on his terms? Perhaps we may not.

That same intelligence, we have obtained about the Midway Islands, indicates an opportunity for Blue to disrupt Orange’s timetables and intents. The possibility exists to pick off a chunk of Orange’s resources, and lessen the odds against Blue, by fighting him in another theater. This theater is along the axis Papua / New Guinea and the Solomon Islands as we can fairly predict with high confidence that Orange will attempt to separate Blue’s lines of communication with Scarlet by advancing along that axis.

For once geography and infrastructure favors Blue as Orange has no easy pickings of developed ports and air bases to enable an amphibious campaign supported by land based air forces. Orange must bring naval air power to the operation to achieve his projected aims. The argument instantly arises, that if Orange does so, how can Blue oppose in this region, what Blue has dared not do elsewhere? For Orange can still bring more airpower in the form of six to eight aircraft carriers against Blue’s three or four. And as of present, within the theater, Blue only has tanker support and other logistics for two task forces that Blue can base at Noumea at present.

This would be a prohibitive problem if Orange had not a similar situation at its forward bases at Truk and Rabaul. Both Orange and Blue with their mutual fixations on the planned operation in Hawaiian waters in the near future have massed tanker support and other logistics for that operation. Therefore Orange is as constrained by a tanker shortage in the New Guinea / Solomon Islands region as Blue. There are other factors at work which have come to light recently.

Blue has become aware through Red’s reports of Orange’s raid into the Indian Ocean that Orange’s 1st Air Fleet was absent one major carrier, since identified as the Kaga. Attempts by Blue’s submarines to track and attack this aircraft carrier once its location was discovered at Truk proved unfortunately fruitless, but their contact reports indicate that Kaga was sent to Orange’s homeland to repair major damage of an unknown nature, possibly a successful torpedo attack such as recently suffered by Saratoga. That definitely removes for a time a major unit from Orange’s primary strategic weapon.

This is heartening news. Further, it appears that the recent IJN raid against Darwin and adjacent ports, in Scarlet’s Northern Territory did not involve more than three aircraft carriers of the 1st Air Fleet. Post action analysis indicates that Orange withheld two aircraft carriers, from the 1st Air Fleet for a reason. It has to be for the projected operation planned for the Papua / New Guinea and Solomon Islands offensive. There is even reliable intelligence in Blue’s possession that indicates a rift in Orange’s high command about this operation and its timing with heated debates among Orange’s naval and army leadership about whether or not to postpone the Midway Island operation to insure the Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands operation has adequate support. It appears that Orange, in his arrogance, thinks he is strong enough to mount both operations as scheduled and that he expects Blue to passively wait to be attacked in either case.

Opportunity involves risks. Blue has this opportunity to surprise Orange if Orange offers himself up for piecemeal slaughter as it appears he has. Let Blue meet Orange in the Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands area in full force. Fortune favors boldness, but mathematics also favors such an ambush. Four versus two. Blue has long known that the character of aircraft carrier warfare is that first strike is first kill. Orange may not know this. If he does not, so much the better for us, as Blue’s mission is simple. Destroy Orange’s two attack aircraft carriers, offered up for slaughter, with our four. That will leave Orange with just three plus whatever light carriers he has in his order of battle. His 1st Air Fleet will be diminished by half. That will be a force that Blue can meet on equal terms in the Midway Islands operation.

===================================================

Can you imagine the fury of PacFLT when they found out about the Doolittle Raid? Timing is everything. Coral Sea was a golden opportunity missed RTL (See above.) because of a publicity stunt.^1 It sure would have helped allied morale a lot more, if the IJNs 1st Air Fleet CarDiv 5 was at the bottom of the Coral Sea than some Hollywood air raid that yielded nothing but a movie and some unwarranted feel-goods. Yamamoto, Isoruku had offered Nimitz a first chance to cut his throat there at Coral Sea, and he would do so again. Some people do not learn.^2

But this is an ITTL. Let's see how things work out in spite of the Doolittle raid?

^1 Might want to rethink that idea about Yamamoto being a great admiral?
^2 Especially when he makes the same mistakes over and over.
 
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ITTL document to the General Board, (Author proposed: VADM Thomas Hart)
Well said on all counts.

I confess, I'm unfamiliar with the use of "Orange" & "Blue". It works, but leaves me with an odd feeling...
want to rethink that idea about Yamamoto being a great admiral .
Not after looking at his dispositions at Midway.:rolleyes: I'll leave it to you to show how bad they were--& what happens when you screw it up so much.;) (TBH, tho, anybody familiar with OTL has a pretty good idea already.;))

On Doolittle, missing the crushing blow at Coral Sea ain't the half of it. It cost 250,000 Chinese killed in reprisal.:eek::eek::mad: For 16 tons of bombs on Tokyo.:mad:
 
On the Hart report; Thomas Hart "Terrible Tommy" would have saidUnited States, Japan, and British. His language would have ben even more precise and forceful. Hart would have had more detailed concents for actions. Otherwise excellent presitentation of Thomas Hart.
 
===================================================

Can you imagine the fury of PacFLT when they found out about the Doolittle Raid? Timing is everything. Coral Sea was a golden opportunity missed RTL (See above.) because of a publicity stunt.^1 It sure would have helped allied morale a lot more, if the IJNs 1st Air Fleet CarDiv 5 was at the bottom of the Coral Sea than some Hollywood air raid that yielded nothing but a movie and some unwarranted feel-goods. Yamamoto, Isoruku had offered Nimitz a first chance to cut his throat there at Coral Sea, and he would do so again. Some people do not learn.^2

But this is an ITTL. Let's see how things work out in spite of the Doolittle raid?

^1 Might want to rethink that idea about Yamamoto being a great admiral?
^2 Especially when he makes the same mistakes over and over.

Check wikipedia for Coral sea. The allies had intel of a possible Japanese thrust to the South west in March, but it was not until late April after Doolitle had flown that they had enough intel to know just what the Japanese were up to. Also, Coral sea was what made Yamamoto to plan for Midway.
 
On the Hart report; Thomas Hart "Terrible Tommy" would have said United States, Japan, and British. His language would have ben even more precise and forceful. Hart would have had more detailed concepts for actions. Otherwise excellent presentation of Thomas Hart.

I thought about it, but Hart is speaking to navy types and certain civilians as well. He would use the color names; Red for Britain, Orange for Japan, Scarlet for Australia, Blue for the USN members because the people involved are Plan Orange and Plan Red trained to think in those terms. In this general strategic document, he would stick to preferred military policy for the specific issue at hand, pruning it to the basic principles involved, as this is an advisory board of senior military "wise old men" for the secretaries and the president (i.e. civilians). He argues for an extremely risky operation. Broad stroking it on military principles is his way in the most plain manner to emphasize the primary underlying principles to concentrate extremely limited military force in the limited time available to exploit an advantage against an Orange enemy's error of dispersion of effort. "Terrible Tommy" also applies the KISS^1 principle, here, because he does not have a high opinion of his peers or his superiors.

^1 Keep it simplified for the simple-minded.^2

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Check wikipedia for Coral sea. The allies had intel of a possible Japanese thrust to the South west in March, but it was not until late April after Doolitle had flown that they had enough intel to know just what the Japanese were up to. Also, Coral sea was what made Yamamoto to plan for Midway.

First, that would be SOUTHEAST. MacArthur was not wrong about New Caledonia, but he was thinking too far ahead. The Japanese were trying to immediately end run New Guinea and the Solomon Islands as far as San Cristobal Point and the Venatu Islands to mask northeast Australia in the first half of their moves to cut Australia's SLOCs.

Second; check Hyperwar. Your vision and understanding of what happens is way off. The Americans can do more than "read a map, count cattle and latrine pits"^2. They know (can predict); where the Japanese are headed, why, with how much and approximately how soon without HYPO; because they have OpFor teams thinking of how Orange might behave under the circumstances. (It is called the Naval War College gaming team.). The Midway op-intel from JN-25 was order of battle, deployment timetable (details) meaning the exact timing of arrival of who, when and where, not the Orange intent or (faulty) concept of operations. Those details (See above Hart example of this [op-analysis of intent.] ^^^^) was more a matter of crystal ball gazing on the part of PACFlt staff under Nimitz's guidance.

McPherson

^2 Grant's sarcastic way of explaining why McClellan never could use military intelligence properly. In Hart's case, apply it to MACARTHUR (See above the previous footnote.).

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For info:




Australian viewpoint:

 
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Well said on all counts.

I confess, I'm unfamiliar with the use of "Orange" & "Blue". It works, but leaves me with an odd feeling...

See above.

Not after looking at his dispositions at Midway.:rolleyes: I'll leave it to you to show how bad they were--& what happens when you screw it up so much.;) (TBH, tho, anybody familiar with OTL has a pretty good idea already.;))

I allude to Japanese military politics which caused this dispersion of effort.

On Doolittle, missing the crushing blow at Coral Sea ain't the half of it. It cost 250,000 Chinese killed in reprisal.:eek::eek::mad: For 16 tons of bombs on Tokyo.:mad:

Yeah. When Spruance was asked about it, he said; "It is an interesting way of making war." Spruance could be sarcastic, too.
 
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