The Hart Report
Battle of the Java Sea: 27 February 1942
TIME: 1600-2400 hours
WEATHER/VISIBILITY/SEA STATE 2 to 4 Fair/Good to Poor/Small to Moderate Swells.
SURPRISE: none.
MISSION: Allies to intercept and destroy invasion convoy; Japanese to protect convoy
By Sunday the 22nd beginning the last week of February Java remained as the only major Dutch island remaining in ABDA’s possession. To those charged with its defense, there was no doubt the Japanese would invade soon. In fact, Dutch and American submarines had detected two invasion convoys at sea – the so-called Western Invasion Fleet sailed on February 18 from Camranh Bay in Indochina and the Eastern Invasion Fleet on the 19th from Jolo, Philippines. Allied intelligence (Station FRUMEL) warned VADM Conrad Helfrich, the commander of ADBAFLOAT, that the armadas approached. On the 21st he split the maritime defense of his island by creating two surface action task groups, one based at Batavia’s port, Tandjong Priok in the west and the other at Surabaya in the east. On the 25th a Dutch Dornier spotted the Eastern Invasion Fleet. Consequently, Doorman’s Eastern Strike Force at Surabaya was reinforced on February 26th by the Royal Navy contingent based at Tandjong Priok from the Western Force. On this day the first and only conference between the captains and staff of the Eastern Strike Force was convened. It was a brisk one-hour session wherein they agreed to sortie that evening. Sortie they did to spend that night and the following morning fruitlessly sweeping the north coast of eastern Java and Madura and adjacent waters north to Bawean Island, one hundred miles due north of Surabaya. This was the first wasted sortie this force conducted on the basis of late and inaccurate reports concerning enemy movements and positions. Post-action analysis indicates , they searched just a little too far south. Nor did they receive word of an anti-shipping strike carried out by A-20s on the Eastern Invasion Force that day.
What remained of the Western Strike Force also probed its area of responsibility on the 26th, also fruitlessly. It was noticeable that cooperation between land based air under the usually able LTGEN. L.H. van Oyen, his assistant COL E.T Kengen, and the British officer commanding that force had suddenly and inexplicably completely broken down. The British then receiving their orders from New Delhi were informed through their independent command channels upon returning to Batavia on the 27th, that they were to retreat to Ceylon. This they promptly did, leaving the western side of Java wide open to invasion. With the exception of Evertsen (a late addition to the western task force) they successfully accomplished this movement via the Sunda Strait a scant day ahead of the Japanese Western Invasion Force’s arrival. One could comment on the timing here, but let the action speak for itself.
The Eastern Invasion Force, a convoy of forty one transports accompanied by the Second Escort Force with two light cruisers and fourteen destroyers was only about sixty miles north of Surabaya by 1020 on the 27th. Rear-Admiral Takagi, Takeo, the overall commander aboard Haguro, accompanied by Nachi and two more destroyers lagged more than one hundred fifty miles behind. Apparently he did not anticipate much resistance: “The twenty mile long convoy was quite a spectacle. An obvious laxity prevailed in the transports with their ill-trained crews. Many transports emitted huge clouds of black smoke from their funnels . . . Most disturbing, however, was the dreadfully slow pace of the trailing heavy cruisers.” This over confidence was disturbed when Japanese planes sighted the Allied strike force shortly thereafter, heading on an 80 degree course at twelve knots. This sighting was confirmed about two hours later by one of Nachi’s scout planes whereupon Admiral Takagi ordered the convoy to turn north so he could close the gap. At 1340 he received an additional report that the Allies were returning to base and so had the convoy swing back to its southern course. It did not stay on this heading for long.
At 1357, February 27, a Dutch scout plane finally fixed the exact position of the Japanese Eastern Invasion Force only fifty miles north of Surabaya. (And, more importantly, sent the word of its sighting into the right hands for once.) At 1427 Admiral Doorman cleared the channel in the unknown to him minefield outside Surabaya, as he attempted ingress, when he received word of this sighting along with orders from VADM Helfrich to engage. He reversed course almost immediately, and turned back to sea, making the signal: “Am proceeding to intercept enemy, follow me.” The haste and lack of planning with which this action was taken has been criticized by many, but given the fact that the enemy was less than two hours streaming time north, it was the reasonable decision given the facts Doorman had in his possession. With a little good luck Doorman’s haste could result in a great victory. However the luck of the Dutch, so missing that day, (and throughout the war in general so far) was not present. A Japanese cruiser float plane, shot down, survived just long enough to report the Allied turnabout. Takagi, who appears to have been blissfully unaware of the circumstances into which he sailed, seemed to finally wake up to his danger. The two heavy cruisers and the two destroyers screening them finally increased speed while the convoy itself turned north once again.
FORCES ENGAGED - BATTLE OF JAVA SEA
Fates:
D1: light or superficial damage
D2: moderate damage
D3: heavy damage
D4: disabled
SUNK is self explanatory
ABDAFLOAT Combined Striking Force
TYPE.......NAME................YEAR.....DISP FL....MAIN..............SEC............TT.............SPD...................FATE
CA..........Exeter...............1931.....11,000.....6x8/50............8x4/45........6x21"........32.....................D3
CA..........Houston............1930.....11,420......9x8/55............8x5/25........................32.5..................D1
CL..........De Ruyter..........1935.......7,548.....7x5.9/50..........4x4/45........................32....................SUNK
CL..........Perth.................1936.......9,150.....8x6/50............1x3/45.......8x21".........32.5..................D1
CL..........Java..................1925.......7,205.....10x5.9/50........2x3/45.......6x21".........31....................SUNK
DD.........Witte de With.....1928........1,605.....4x4.7/50..........................6x21".........36....................D1
DD.........Kortanaer..........1927........1,640.....4x4.7/50..........................6x21".........36....................SUNK
DD.........J.D. Edwards......1919........1,308.....4x4/50............1x3/50.....12x21".........35....................D1
DD.........Alden................1919........1,308.....4x4/50............1x3/50.....12x21".........35....................D1
DD.........John D. Ford......1920........1,308.....4x4/50............1x3/50.....12x21".........35....................D1
DD.........Paul Jones.........1920........1,308.....4x4/50............1x3/50.....12X21".........35....................D1
DD.........Electra..............1934........2.205.....4x4.7/45........................10x21".........35....................SUNK
DD.........Jupiter..............1938........2,330.....4x4.7/45..........................8x21".........36....................SUNK
DD.........Encounter..........1934.......2,025.....4x4.7/45.........................10x21".........36....................D1
Total......14.....................1928.....61,225
Japanese Eastern Invasion Fleet
TYPE.......NAME................YEAR.....DISP FL....MAIN..............SEC............TT.............SPD...................FATE
CA………..Haguro…………….1928……14,980……10x8/50…………8x5/40…….8x24”……..33.8………………..
CA………..Nachi……………….1929……14,980……10x8/50…………8x5/40…….8x24”……..33.8………………..SUNK
CL…………Jintsu……………….1925……..7,100……7x5.5/50……….3x3.1/40….8x24”………35.5……………….SUNK
CL…………Naka………………..1925……..7,100……7x5.5/50……….3x3.1/40….8x24”………35.5……………….SUNK
DD………..Amatsukaze…… 1939……..2,490……6x5/50……………………………8x24”……….35………………….
DD………..Asagumo…………1937……..2,370……6x5/50……………………………8x24”……….35………………….SUNK
DD………..Hatsukaze……….1939……..2,490……6x5/50……………………………8x24”……….35………………….D3
DD………..Kawakaze……….1936………1,980…..5x5/50……………………………8x24”………..34…………………D3
DD………..Sazanami…………1931……..2,427…..6x5/50……………………………9x24”……….34………………….D1
DD………..Tokitsukaze…….1939……..2,490……6x5/50……………………………8x24”……….35………………….
DD………..Ushio……………… 1930……..2,427…..6x5/50……………………………9x24”……….34…………………
DD……….Yamakaze…………1936………1,980…..5x5/50……………………………8x24”………..34…………………
DD……….Yukukaze………….1939……..2,490……6x5/50……………………………8x24”……….35………………….
DD……….Harukaze………….1922………1,720…..4x4.7/50………………………..6x21”………..37………………..
DD……….Minegumo……….1937……..2,370……6x5/50……………………………8x24”……….35………………….
DD……….Muresame……….1935………1,980…..5x5/50……………………………8x24”………..34…………………
DD……….Samidare………….1935………1,980…..5x5/50……………………………8x24”………..34…………………
DD……….Yudachi…………….1936………1,980…..5x5/50……………………………8x24”………..34…………………
Total……18………………………1933…….75,334
Torpedoes...........IJN.................ABDAFLOAT
TT.......24"..........138....................0
TT.......21".............6.................100
Totals.................144................100
TABLE 1.5 – COMPARATIVE TORPEDO CAPABILITIES
TABLE 1.5 – COMPARATIVE TORPEDO CAPABILITIES
Nation..............Type.....................Warhead Wgt (TNT equiv lbs eff)...Range (yds).............At knots
Japan...............610 mm 8th yr..........750 (340 kg).........................~20,000(?)................28........^1
Japan...............610 mm (unkn)......1,000 (?) (455 kg)....................~40,000(?)................36(?)....^2
Great Britain.....533 mm Mk IX........1000 (454 kg)............................15,000....................35........^3
Netherlands......533 mm....................350 (159 kg)...........................13,000....................28........^4
USA.................533 mm Mk 8............700 (317 kg)...........................14,000....................27........^5
Notes:
^1 The 8th year torpedo (In Japanese nomenclature also referred to as the Type 90) is apparently based on the post world war developed British Whitehead Mark X torpedo. This Japanese weapon uses the double-action two-cylinder engine copied from the Mark X rather than the four-cylinder radial engine used by first world war-era British torpedoes, which has been the previous Japanese norm. It has a significantly longer run time than we anticipated (14 m/s at 1500 seconds estimated.). It is dimensionally much larger than the British weapon from which it is copied with a length nose detonator to props, from the dud we captured, measured at ~28 ft (855 cm) and a barrel diameter of ~2 ft (61cm). Examination of the warhead reveals it to be a Shimose aluminized composition, not unfamiliar to our ordnance engineers. It's explosive force has been compared to our baseline WE-4 and equals 1.2 TNT equivalency by weight of 750 lbs (340 kg). It is a formidable weapon.
^2 This torpedo of unknown nomenclature is an entirely new weapon revealed to us. Based on observation in action and from measurements taken from recovered broken pieces from premature exploded malfunctioning torpedoes, the following has been ascertained. From barrel curvature, it appears that the weapon is a 2 ft in diameter (61 cm) as akin to the year 8 torpedo. It's length from what remains we have cannot be much longer than 30 feet, (915 cm) as we believe that is the practical handling length for such a monster weapon on the ships we encountered that used it. Based on eyewitness reports of explosions at end of runs and from launch flashes from Japanese warships which fired this weapon and from our own clocking of run times and estimates of speed we conclude that the warhead probably is no greater in TNT equivalent weight yield of ~1000 lbs (454 kg)
^3 The British MARK IX torpedo is comparable to the US Mark XV destroyer torpedo in effective performance though it has a 30% greater run time at its standard speed setting.
^4 The Dutch use the British Mark X (export version) torpedo. It is roughly comparable to the US WW I Mark VIII torpedo in performance before the Alvis Chalmers upgrades.
^5 The US Mark VIII torpedo Mod 8 used in this battle is the current (Alvis Chalmers) rebuild of the US Mark VIII Mod 5 which forms the base war stocks of our reserve destroyers. It uses the Mark V contact pistol. Users reported excessive nose wander right and a high percentage of gyro malfunctions at launch in our Mark VIII weapon that rendered approximately 40-50% of the warshots attempted ineffectual. These problems require urgent remedial action, as most of our destroyer torpedo war-stocks remain the Mark VIII mod 5 and the mod 8.
Further note: It is notable that in this surface battle, all of the combatants sunk on both sides, were, except for Nachi who succumbed to an unknown explosive event, done in by torpedoes. Though artillery gunfire severely damaged and degraded the performance of individual ABDAFLOAT ships, it had markedly little effect on the ability of the fleet as a whole to function. It was the torpedo with its sudden ability to destroy or sink ships that threw the Combined Striking Force into complete disarray and lost the battle for us.
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Material Factors:
These data tables compare the two opposing forces that fought the largest fleet surface engagement to occur since the Battle of Jutland in 1916. The table of forces engaged indicates the Japanese only slightly outmatch ABDAFLOAT in quantitative terms, the two sides being equal in heavy cruisers, ABDAFLOAT with a superior number of light cruisers and the Japanese holding the edge in destroyers. The Allied light cruisers are larger and more heavily armed on paper than their Japanese equivalents. The Japanese destroyers outgun their Allied counterparts, but this advantage is offset by the superior number of torpedo tubes on the Allied light units.
However this does not demonstrate just how great the actual Japanese superiority in weapons really is. They have a 25% advantage in guns of 4” or more (127 to 95) and a 63% more guns of 5” and more (123 to 45). They have a 36% advantage in the sheer number of pounds of ordnance they could fling per minute against ABDAFLOAT based on artillery service cycle. They have a 44% advantage in the number of torpedo tubes and this advantage is in fact far greater because we discovered that their ships could reload torpedoes from magazines while remaining in action. We suspect most of their torpedoes were of the new and unknown 24 inch model supersized long endurance torpedo they revealed in this battle for the first time, while the Year 8 model about which we knew; but previously believed to be a 21 inch model comparable to our own; is now revealed to be a supersized monster in its own right. Our torpedoes had neither the run times endurance seen in the Japanese weapons, nor did many of our weapons pack the punch of the Japanese fish carried. If it is any consolation, the Japanese seemed to have fired dozens of these weapons and missed with most of them. Our forces reported broaches, misses, corkscrewing, what appeared to be premature detonations and many end of run fail to detonates. For all the astonishing performance revealed in the Japanese weapons seen and recovered as duds, their performance was awful, or ABDAFLOAT's CSF should have been utterly destroyed without much trouble. The American torpedoes, despite the marked defects our users reported, comprising over half the Allied total, appeared to function quite well by comparison. This does not excuse our own weapons' shortcomings in run-time endurance, accuracy or guidance reliability, but it is some solace to take from this disaster, that at least when our forces came within effective employment range of the Mark VIII, they did some marked damage.
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Human Factors:
The marked Japanese advantage in material factors is only one aspect of their superiority. Two days before the battle Doorman reported to Helflich that fleet moral was critically failing. This was no exaggeration. This officer has observed that ABDAFLOAT specifically and the Allied cause in general has scant success to temper the Japanese advance and this has to affect morale in our armed services at the command levels down to the common soldier, seaman, and airman who has to look at our lack of success and question why? And it is a DAMNED GOOD QUESTION. With the failure of our submarines in the Philippines at Lingayen Gulf, the Far East Asia Army Air Forces caught on the ground and destroyed in the Clark airfield complex disaster when we knew as early as October 7th, that our airfields were being overflown by Japanese aerial reconnaissance, to the bungled "battle on the beach" and the shameful retreat down the central Luzon plain to Bataan, while the Japanese gleefully enjoyed our captured stores that GEN MacArthur foolishly stockpiled in easy to capture caches contrary to our established war-plan to stockpile all the supplies in the Bataan Redoubt.
The captured stores, which should have fed our starving troops on Bataan, saved the Japanese 300,000 tonnes of shipping diverted that they would have needed to supply Homma's troops otherwise. That 300,000 tonnes instead showed up off Java.
I do not in detail recount the disasters the British suffered that contributed to the general collapse of morale, namely the destruction of Forces Y and Z at sea, the complete collapse in Malaysia and the utter route in Burma, nor the pusillanimity that this officer personally observed displayed by their lack of overall leadership, specifically GEN Wavell, which marks their chief contribution to ABDAFLOAT’s sense of a doomed command. However, this officer does note that even if Doorman had won in the east, when the British western striking force pulled out of Priok, Java was doomed to the Japanese Western Invasion Force.
As for the ABDAFLOAT Combined Striking Force, itself, their strength had been whittled away by Japanese air attacks, conducted by Rikko units, to which there was no equivalent allied response. Operational accidents, particularly accidents involving RADM Doorman’s flagship, De Ruyter, in several notable collisions; and general wear and tear; had reduced the number of ships available by several destroyers and one cruiser. Incompetent ship maintenance (Particularly the drydock incident with USS Stewart) had further reduced material resources. The men in the Combined Striking Fleet; either knew of; or had seen these events with their own eyes. Furthermore as an aggravation before the battle, the men of the fleet had had no rest from their wasted abortive sortie the night and morning before; USS Houston’s crew, for example, had stood twelve-hour watches at battle stations for two nights in a row. The men who manned the DESRON 59 were dog-tired, and their ships were tired. The strain of weeks of campaigning without a letup was beginning to tell in haggard features and tight nerves. The common fighting men had the strong suspicion that their leadership was incompetent and their material position was hopeless. Their ships were lacking maintenance and in some cases still not repaired.
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Organizational Factors:
Adding to the human and material strain were obvious organizational problems. The units in the ABDAFLOAT Combined Strike Force came from three navies, (One must consider the Royal Navy and the Royal Australian Navy the same for this purpose) speaking two languages and had not evolved common tactics, much less mutually intelligible codes or signals. The only enemy factor to offset the overwhelming catalog of Japanese advantages was determination. The carelessly confident, almost arrogant and incompetent approach of the Eastern Invasion Force convoy has been described. The Dutch, on the other hand, were down to their last throw of the dice and knew it. No other Admiral in this officer’s recent memory has fought a major sea-battle with the grim determination Doorman displayed in his conduct of this battle. It was do or die for him as he related it at that last battle conference. Bitter prophecy.
Battle:
As the Combined Striking Fleet sortied north Doorman deployed his mixed squadron in three parallel columns, heading west by northwest (course 315 degrees). The three Royal Navy destroyers led, screening the cruiser column De Ruyter, Houston, Exeter, Perth and Java to starboard, while the two Dutch and four American destroyers steamed to the port and a little behind the cruisers. Doorman restricted the speed of the entire force to 26 knots because this was damaged Kortenaer’s best speed; she was still having propulsion problems caused by her grounding prior to the Battle of Badung Strait. “Such an unorthodox deployment of forces suggested Doorman knew nothing about proven naval tactics as understood by the United States Navy. Generally, by our doctrine, destroyers should be positioned to screen the main body and deliver torpedo attacks while the light cruisers should preceed ahead of the heavy cruisers in the column, thus grouping guns by range.
The CSF was about a half-hour clear of the Surabaya entrance when, at 1530, an air raid forced the ships to scatter. The CSF had only just reformed their force when, twenty minutes later, Jintsu leading Yukikaze, Tokitsukaze, Amatsukaze and Hatsukaze were sighted. The Japanese knew the Allies were coming – spotting reports from their cruiser scout floatplanes, one which was predictably shot down by Houston, whose AA gunners were becoming famous for this stunt, Takagi received it is believed from our radio intercepts at 1500 and 1510, the first of which caused Admiral Takagi, to order his transports to turn back north to avoid contact. That movement, after a heated exchange Takagi had with the Japanese army convoy commander, who wanted to press on, wasn’t fully accomplished until 1530. Jintsu maneuvered to see the transports off to the north. As for the CSF, the Allied cruisers were in column 30,000 yards to the south. Jintsu; after making sure the IJA convoy commander turned his ships north with some friendly IJN artillery encouragement; led her destroyers due south toward the Allied column, although the odds were certainly against her. Then, nine minutes later, Nachi and Haguro screened by Ushio, Sazanami, Yamakaze and Kawakaze hove into the CSF’s view, having caught up to the battle just in time. Additional reinforcements consisting of Naka leading Murasame, Samidare, Harukaze, Yudachi, Asagumo and Minegumo steamed south parallel 13,000 yards west of the heavy cruisers, were also on the way. At 1600 Jintsu turned her group west to parallel the CSF. By 1605 the heavy cruiser group was only 13,000 yards north of the Jintsu.
Electra in the Allied van sighted Jintsu by 1612. Jintsu opened the action four minutes later at 18,000 meters. By 1617 Nachi had joined the action from 28,000 meters distance although her initial salvos fell 2,000 meters short of their target. At 1621 Doorman bent his column 20° to the west to course 295° apparently concerned that the Japanese might cross his T.
By 1627 all the Japanese columns proceeded west, parallel to the Allies. The Houston and Exeter opened fire at about 1620. Houston used red dye to mark the fall of her shells. The immense blood-red columns of water created by her straddles caused intense nervousness on the bridge of the Nachi where Takagi, a submariner by training, and his aide, Nagasawa, experienced their first surface action. Both Houston and Perth obtained hits in this initial long range duel. The first hits by the Japanese were scored when they landed a 8” shell on De Ruyter at 1631 and again at 1653. Both shells significantly were duds. At 1629 Doorman turned further to the west to a heading of 248?, apparently still concerned that the Japanese columns might cross his T with their seven-knot advantage in speed.
Admiral Nishimura commanding Naka and the destroyers of Division 4 judged that his force was not suited for a long-range gunnery duel. He led his column south, southwest across the bows of the other two Japanese columns and by 1630 he was closest to the Allies.. At 1633 Naka launched four torpedoes at a range of 15,000 meters. These torpedoes were of the new type which the Japanese introduced in this battle. The six destroyers of his division followed suit between 1640 and 1645 sending another twenty seven torpedoes toward the CSF from ranges between 15,000 to 13,000 meters. Haguro initiated a torpedo attack of her own at 1652, launching another eight at a range of 22,000 meters. Nachi was unable to add her contribution to this torpedo barrage because a valve left accidentally open had bled all the air pressure from her tubes.^1
^1 These details were copied and recorded from Japanese talk between ships (TBS) radio chatter intercepts aboard the USS Edwards, whose signals division performed outstanding intelligence gathering work during the entire battle.
All the while, the gunnery duel continued. Houston pumped salvos from her main 8” batteries at the rate of eight to ten rounds a minute, a cyclic rate previously thought to be impossible with the Mark 9 gun. De Ruyter, with her impressive forecastle and masts, and Exeter, second ship in line, seemed to be the favorite Japanese targets and were continuously shot at and mostly missed. On the Allied side observers on the Houston, Exeter and Perth all agreed that the Nachi suffered multiple hits, was set afire and sank. The Japanese torpedo barrage – their first mass torpedo attack of the war – was an utter failure: only one torpedo fired by Haguro struck a target, the Dutch destroyer Kortenaer and it was a dud.
At 1657 an Allied air strike, three A 20 Havocs, equipped for torpedo attack, escorted by eight Brewster Buffaloes flew over the battle and attacked the Japanese transports. They scored three hits out of six drops and claimed two transports sunk, although it appears only one sank and one was disabled. The Japanese claimed that Zeros from Bali jumped this attack and shot every plane down, but pictures taken by one Allied pilot confirmed the actual attack’s success and refute the Japanese claims. Doorman’s pleas for direct air support at this moment of the battle had gone unheeded, apparently because of British influence that insisted the ABDA-AIR arm be a completely separate force from the ABDAFLOAT naval arm and follow its own completely separate program. Eight fighters, even the rotten and essentially worthless Brewster Buffaloes, could have made a decisive contribution to the CSF’s survival by shooting down the cruiser floatplanes deployed so effectively by the Japanese, but that was not to be.
By 1702 Takagi apparently realized and saw to the north the gunfight in progress and realized that the battle was drifting dangerously close to his transports he was supposed to and not doing a very good job to protect. Hagura was still maintaining a conservative 20,000 meters from the Allied cruiser column and spending tremendous amounts of ammunition without results so he ordered all his ships to close and charge the enemy. At about this same time Doorman came to a similar conclusion and turned his column slightly north toward the Japanese. As the two forces closed range fortune favored the Japanese. First Houston was hit by a dud that caused her to temporarily reduce speed. Then, several minutes later, the battle’s turning point occurred. At 1708 Hagura hit Exeter hard – the shell penetrated to her boiler room taking six of her eight boilers out of line, causing her to lurch out of formation to port, on fire and rapidly lose speed. The three cruisers following Exeter assumed she was turning in accordance to orders, most likely to comb the torpedo wakes that had begun to appear again in the Allied midst, and they turned away as well. De Ruyter continued on for several moments alone.
The Allies, still ignorant of the range of the Japanese torpedoes unleashed against them believed submarines fired the salvos that made the sea seem “alive with torpedoes running from all quarters” and not ships barely visible on the distant horizon. Perth, privy to communication channels with Exeter the other cruisers didn’t share, realized the Royal Navy cruiser was stricken and further disordered the formation by circling around her cousin making smoke. The sea around the milling Allied ships was punctuated by random eruptions caused by the Japanese torpedoes as they sometimes exploded at the end of their runs. Then, at 1713, one torpedo, out of more than fifty fired in this latest series of salvoes, met something more substantial: Kortenaer and for once it functioned as its makers intended. Hit midships by a half ton of explosives, the Dutch destroyer broke in halves and sank almost immediately. The Allies were in complete disarray by this point. De Ruyter finally turned south to find her missing flotilla. Takagi believing, at this point that he had won the battle ordered the transports to turn south. In the first hour of action up to 1720, the Japanese fired by count 1,200+ rounds of 8” shells and scored five hits, only one of which detonated. The Allies had fired approximately half as many shells and they only had the Nachi sunk to show for it. Shooting by both sides was terrible and the results poor.
It took Doorman almost twenty minutes to regain control of his fleet. Exeter, screened by Withe de With and the three British destroyers streamed south, southeast at about five knots. De Ruyter circled around flying her “follow me” flag and repositioned herself at the head of the remaining cruisers and the American destroyers on a heading south by southeast, ahead and to the starboard of Exeter. She turned back northeast around 1725, cutting across the course of Exeter. By this time visibility was poor due to defensive smoke laid by both sides. The Allies had been making the more smoke, the Exeter was burning and twilight was deepening. The Japanese columns were at times invisible to the CSF. The Japanese did not suffer from this condition to the same extent thanks to their spotter planes which remained active and vigilant through out the daylight battle and would continue to do so through the night.
As the Exeter limped away, Jintsu and her eight destroyers, with the Naka and six destroyers south and slightly west of the Jintsu group, gathered to the northwest to finish her off.
At 1745 the Allied cruisers emerged from the smoke on their northerly heading to see the this attack forming up. Moreover, the Japanese force, Hagura leading, bore east and were crossing Doorman’s T. As they did so, they reopened fire from about 19,500 meters.
Doorman ordered the British destroyers to counterattack the Japanese light forces that were coming on hard in four columns. Jintsu’s eight destroyers steamed east-southeast in two columns of four, about 2,000 meters apart and about 6,000 meters southwest of the Hagura. Jintsu herself was on the starboard side of the two columns equally distant from the Naka and her six destroyers also bearing east-southeast.
The second mass torpedo attack began at 1748 and lasted until 1807. The Hagura was first to launch at Exeter from long range. The light cruiser leaders fired next at 1750 from 18,500 yards (Naka) and 1754 (Jintsu) before turning away. The Jintsu's destroyers launched one after the other as they reached 15,000 meters and reversed course. The Naka’s destroyers closed to 10,000 yards except for the Asagumo and Minegumo which continued independently to 6,500 meters before launching. The British destroyers Encounter and Electra swung first south, then east and finally northeast to meet this threat, breaking through the smoke to take on the two light cruisers and fourteen destroyers. The Minegumo and Encounter exchanged fire between 1800 and 1810 on a parallel course at ranges down to 3,000 meters without inflicting much damage or hitting anything. Electra, however, scored a direct hit on the Asagumo’s engine room from 5,000 meters, which caused her to go dead in the water. Electra also landed one shell on Jintsu which did some damage, killing one and wounding four. As Asagumo slowed to a stop, she got her revenge and then some with two serious shell hits on Electra shortly after 1800. Then a torpedo hit her. The British destroyer, heavily on fire, sank at 1816; the American submarine S38 rescued 54 of her crew the next morning. Tokitsukaze was also hard hit by shellfire in this action. The Japanese fired ninety-two torpedoes in this attack, scoring but a single hit.
The De Ruyter column made a full circle and by 1750 resumed a southeast heading parallel to the Exeter and her two escorts. Doorman instructed the American destroyers to cover his withdrawal at 1808, an order the American destroyer men interpreted offensively. From 1810 the four American destroyers charged almost due north to within 8,000 meters of the Japanese cruisers. They fired their starboard torpedoes at 1822 and then turned and discharged their port torpedoes as well, launching twenty four to thirty torpedoes in all (Accounts are unclear as to the exact numbers DESRON 59 had embarked in available torpedo loads at this time.). Chased by Japanese salvos, they then hurried back to the south. It was this barrage which claimed variously Jintsu, Naka, and the luckless Asagumo in a shocking riposte in which these vessels spectacularly exploded and sank, showing off the power of the new American composition 4F torpedo explosives. This attack definitely encouraged Takagi to turn his force north. At about the same time Perth scored a hit on Haguro igniting a large fire on her catapult, but otherwise doing no other damage.
At 1820 as the sun set, it appeared the battle was over. The Japanese were on a disorderly northerly course while the CSF were heading south, licking their own wounds. Takagi, with his destroyers low on fuel and conscious of his primary task, to see the convoy (only 30 miles northwest of his position) through to Java, ordered the transports south and west once again.
Doorman, after the American destroyer attack, must have become overconfident as he saw the Japanese retire in disarray. He sent Exeter back to Surabaya escorted by Witte de With while he gathered up his scattered force to resume the attack. The CSF main force continued southeast, as he did this, for several minutes until all Japanese ships had disappeared in the dark. At 1831 he signaled “Follow Me” and swung back initially to the northeast, and then northwest, hoping to surprise the transports in the darkness.
The Japanese were ignorant of the Allied turn, but acted instinctively under the assumption the CSF might make another attempt against the transports. Moreover, that had two spotter planes in the air. At 1920 the Japanese were proved correct when the Jintsu column, now minus Jintsu, and with Yukikaze leading it, with eight destroyers in trail, sighted the De Ruyter column with Houston, Perth, Java and the Jupiter screening to port and the four American destroyers to starboard rear. The two forces were on a parallel course heading north with the Japanese 17,500 meters to port. The Haguro was also to the port, slightly north of the Allies at a range of 16,000 meters stopped and recovering two seaplanes. Perth and Houston opened fire at 1933 and Yukikaze replied with four torpedoes. Observing this launch, the Allied ships turned individually to starboard at 1936. The Japanese increased speed, made smoke and withdrew northeast. Apparently the Allies never sighted the heavy cruiser recovering her seaplanes although Hagura briefly opened fire at 1937. The short engagement was quickly over with neither side suffered any damage.
Doorman, knowing there would be no future opportunities to defend Java, attempted to circle around the Japanese by taking his force inshore along the Java coast. At 2100 the four American destroyers, out of torpedoes and low on fuel, continued in their practice of interpreting Doorman’s instructions independently returned to Surabaya.^2
^2 Up to now CAPT Binford of DESRON 59 had demonstrated excellent combat acumen and fulfilled his duties as a subordinate in an efficient and sometimes superlative manner. His torpedo attack had been a textbook example of the evolution and there was little to fault him for his performance. However; it was at this juncture, that he took it upon himself to decide to quit the battle. His reasons; that his destroyers were low on fuel and that his force had expended all of the torpedoes allotted to it, might under other circumstances have been good ones for requesting permission to withdraw, and even receiving it: but he did not do that. He abandoned his duty in the middle of the battle. There is no other word for it.
At 2125, just as Doorman was turning his force back to the north, Jupiter struck a Dutch mine, exploded and sank almost immediately. At 2200 the force came upon survivors from Kortenaer. Encounter was detached and rescued one hundred and thirteen of her crew.
These two foolish actions and Binford's unauthorized retirement cost Doorman his entire destroyer force. Without a screen the four Allied cruisers proceeded north until they were sighted by a lookout on the Haguro at 2302 at a range of 16,000 meters. At this time the Haguro was headed south southwest. The Haguro swung to the port toward the Allies and assumed a parallel course heading due north. The Allies opened fire at 2310 on the Japanese heavy cruiser. The Japanese didn’t return fire until 2321. At 2322 Haguro launched eight torpedoes, followed a few minutes later with another salvo of four, showing how fast the Japanese could reload in the middle of a battle. The range was approximately 14,000 meters. In contrast to the hundreds of torpedoes launched previously and uselessly, these two salvoes told. The De Ruyter was hit aft at 2332 by one of Haguro’s first eight, exploding her ammunition and killing Doorman along with three hundred forty-four of his crew. She sank very quickly. Two minutes later one of Haguro's second spread struck Java. She took an hour and a half to sink. Doorman’s last known orders to the Houston and Perth were to retire to Batavia and ignore survivors.
The Battle of the Java Sea lasted seven hours, and was a defeat, due to the determination of Admiral Doorman. His handling of his fleet indicated that he felt any risk was justified regardless of the odds or the unlikely probability of success; he demanded a decisive result and he got one. The long range shooting on both sides was generally ineffective, despite the spotting aircraft the Japanese were able to employ. Collectively the Japanese heavy cruisers fired 1,600 heavy shells, about two thirds their total supply and obtained only five hits, four of which were duds. The light cruisers fired an additional 221 5.5” shells to this bombardment with no hits (save perhaps on Electra). The Allied cruisers may have scored at least twenty hits, and they obtained many straddles. The Japanese torpedo attacks were also ineffective until the final Japanese salvoes from Haguro. Despite the Japanese reputation for excellence in torpedo tactics and the superior qualities of their weapons, they only obtained five hits out of one hundred fifty two torpedoes fired, a two percent hit rate. By contrast, the one Allied torpedo attack by DESRON 59 had used perhaps thirty torpedoes and scored enough strikes in the two salvoes to sink Naka, Jintsu and Asagumo; two light cruisers and a destroyer. The Allies lost two light cruisers and one destroyer to torpedoes, all launched by the Haguro, one destroyer was destroyed accidentally by mining, and one destroyer to a combination of gunfire and a stray torpedo. One heavy cruiser was heavily damaged by gunfire. The Japanese convoy continued and began landing troops at Kragan forty miles west of Surabaya the next day.
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Tactical Factors:
1. Japanese air reconnaissance was decisive. Doorman's CSF often lost track of Takagi and Nishimura during the critical moments of maneuver between gun and torpedo engagements because of the offensive and defensive smoke screens each side employed. Japanese scout planes, even at night, kept Takagi and Nishimura mostly informed about where the CSF was in relation to their forces and in what direction Doorman moved because they had an overhead view and had well trained in day and night spotting. Japanese use of night flares was especially critical in the final Haguro torpedo attacks.
2. Though both sides acted as if they were headless chickens at key moments, the Japanese tended to stay together and in formation. They remained in coherent tactical units. Except for DESRON 59, the CSF at times operated as if it was three independent formations, with the cruisers doing one thing, the British doing another, and the Dutch off by themselves out front not coordinating, though Doorman was supposed to be the officer in tactical command. In contrast after Jintsu and Naka went down and Nishimura had to swim for it, one does not see a breakdown in Japanese discipline. He took up his command in hand again in Yukikaze and resumed the battle with dispatch. Takagi, in Haguro, took six hours to straighten himself out, but at the end it was his flagship that coup de mained Doorman and sent the CSF fleeing in defeat.
3. Finally, one has to question the whole exercise. Doorman may have misused his gun-line, and frittered away his destroyers (or have them desert), but the question must be raised, why did he fight at all, once it became known that the British western striking force had departed and left Java uncovered to the Japanese Western Invasion Force? One must conclude that Dutch pride and Helfrich may have influenced Doorman. On more than one occasion, this commanding officer has seen VADM Conrad Helfrich, play the personal honor and cowardice cards against his allies and his own subordinates to the overall detriment of ABDAFLOAT and the interests of the Allies in this war. One's personal opinion should stay out of an objective report, but it is an observation that politics, especially at this stage of the war, when the allies need a success somewhere, anywhere, should not be a determinant in dictating prudent military action to conserve and preserve resources for a future use-hopefully when the chances of success are more certain than in this irredeemably doomed exercise in futility.
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Well, there it is. Hope you like it.
