Part 2.
A comment about the historiography: (RTL or ITTL)
It is difficult to describe this battle accurately, for gaps in our information still exist which cannot now ever be filled. Most of the principle vessels engaged on both sides did not survive to leave a detailed report for archivists to catalog for historians to peruse analyze, debate or argue until some semblance of consensus truth can be reached. Our knowledge of the engagement comes largely from the American destroyers, which alone of all the Allied ships engaged escaped afterwards. While their reports are excellent, they did not at times have a complete view of the battle. Being out of communication with Admiral Doorman, US destroyer commanders had no means of knowing upon what information he was acting or what his intentions were. Finally, American destroyers were not present after 2100 and our information for this portion of the battle is derived chiefly from Dutch and Japanese postwar sources; which unfortunately are the clouded memories of survivors who may not have been first party or prime witnesses to certain key events.
(Please understand that while the summary of the battle is more and less true to RTL events, for ITTL purposes some liberties have been taken with historical facts to illustrate the small butterflies at work. The Allies do slightly better and the Japanese a lot worse as they should have, considering it was Shoji Nishimura and Takeo Takagi who lucked out at the end after their miserable opening performance at the first encounters. 1900 heavy caliber shells fired and only 18 hits. 153 Type 93 and year 8 torpedoes launched and only 5 hits. THIS is the Japanese Navy that was the terror of the Pacific?)
The Battle of Java Sea
Contact with the enemy.
Doorman’s squadron stood out of Surabaya on a northwest course riding a sea made choppy by a fifteen knot wind from the east. Visibility remained unlimited until evening. The enemy was on the watch and his planes picked up Doorman’s sortie at once. At 1530 USS Houston opened fire at planes nearly overhead, knocking her second one down and the CSF ships scattered. There was some overcast, so that the planes were not seen until almost too late as they made their runs, but a minute after spotting them several heavy bombs fell 5,000 yards astern. Admiral Doorman immediately requested fighter protection but it could not be spared. The Dutch NEIAAF air force commander of Surabaya required his eight remaining Brewster Buffaloes to escort the four dive bombers which he was shortly to send to make a suicidal attack on the Japanese invasion convoy. The Japanese made no further air attacks and the CSF column reformed on course 320°, speed eighteen knots.
The CSF cruisers were in column formation with De Ruyter in the lead, followed by Exeter, Houston, Perth, and Java in that order. The British destroyer Electra was at the head of the column, with Jupiter to the starboard and Encounter to the port of the De Ruyter. The four American destroyers present were in column astern, with the two Dutch destroyers about 4,000 yards to port of Edwards. The Dutch destroyers were endeavoring to work up to the van of the formation, where they belonged, but boiler trouble limited Kortenaer to about twenty four knots and they were having little success. The American destroyers were laboring under contradictory orders. Their assigned position was on the disengaged bow of the cruisers, but at the same time they were under orders not to pass ahead of the Dutch destroyers. As a matter of fact, the Americans, too, had little speed to spare. With their old machinery, leaky condensers and fouled bottoms they had all they could do to keep up with the cruisers through the ensuing engagement.
At about 1600 the British destroyers sent contact reports back through the line which reached the Edwards, one which mentioned two battleships. At 1611 the American destroyers sighted the enemy ships bearing between 315° and 340°, which put them only a few points on their starboard bow. The DesRon 29 ships went to general quarters and increased speed to 24 knots. Evidently Doorman had blundered into the enemy's covering force, which was known to lie between his squadron and the convoy, which was his actual objective.
The composition of the enemy force was not immediately determined with complete accuracy. The battle opened as the captain of the Edwards reported afterwards; "at extreme range of visibility," and “later smoke obscured the view, but it appears that we had to deal with from four to seven cruisers and two heavier ships described as battleships of either the Kongo or Ise class. Possibly these latter were in fact heavy cruisers. The other cruisers are variously described: there were two or three heavy cruisers of the Nati class, or possibly of the Atago class, which is quite similar. Most accounts agree that there were also present two or three light cruisers of the Sendai class. Lt. Comdr. Lewis E. Coley of the Alden said “Nati class cruisers led the enemy line while some of the Kako class brought up the rear.” He remarks that "the latter must have suffered heavy damage." These were accompanied by thirteen destroyers in two flotillas of either seven and six or eight and five ships respectively. When first sighted these enemy cruisers were to the northwest of our force, while the two heavy ships were considerably farther east. The latter gradually came in and closed the range all through the battle.
Note: Eyewitness accounts quoted here show how disorienting combat can be, even to highly trained participants. The number of Japanese cruisers seen or reported; jumps all over the range from two to seven, the types are misidentified and subsequent interrogation of Japanese survivors confirms that there were no Japanese battleships present at all. Remarkably however, the US destroyer men were accurate about the Japanese destroyers seen as to numbers and types. This is unusual.
The enemy opened fire at 1616. Doorman’s cruisers changed course to about 290° and replied a minute or two later, the Houston or Exeter first, followed shortly by the De Ruyter and Perth. On the Dutch destroyers it was reported by their survivors that the Java too opened fire at this time. As the range was approximately 30,000 yards it seems doubtful that the 5.9 and 6-inch guns of the light cruisers were effective in the early stages of the action. As enemy shells began to come near the CSF ships, Jupiter and Electra, which had come under fire from a Sendai class cruiser, left their exposed position for the disengaged side of Doorman’s cruiser line. The former took a station abeam the main body, or about 800 yards on the port bow of the USS Edwards.
The two cruiser columns moved on roughly parallel courses in a westerly or northwesterly direction with the Japanese vessels somewhat ahead of the CSF/SAG. From time to time Doorman’s cruisers turned either toward or away from the enemy as seen from the Edwards, but it appears that in general the range diminished. Japanese fire was deemed sloppy and poorly directed, though they had the advantage of a seaplane overhead to spot for them. Six- and eight-inch splashes appeared around the allied cruisers. In this early stage the De Ruyter and Houston appeared to be the ones drawing the brunt of the battle. At 1622 the first enemy salvo landed about 1,000 yards over the De Ruyter. At 1629 a salvo missed that ship astern as did a second salvo a minute later. In another minute she appeared to be hit, by a ricochet off the water though not seriously. The splashes that fell short of the Houston appeared to be from 6-inch shells, although the two hits she received during the battle were 8-inch. Shells were soon falling within a few yards of the Exeter. Lt. Comdr. Jacob E. Cooper of the USS Ford remarks; “About every other Japanese salvo aimed at Houston was astern or shot off track. Those clowns never went to gunnery school. The spread of the salvos was very small despite the misses. Our ships escaped serious damage probably because, owing to the great range, the shells came down almost perpendicularly and the Japanese did not appear to have the clocking to adjust for that type of plunging fire.”
Meanwhile the American destroyers had worked up to a position about 3,000 yards on the disengaged quarter of the Java. In order to avoid being pocketed along the Java shore they stayed as close to the cruiser column as they dared. They kept the splashes of the overs fired at the Java and Houston about 1,000 yards on the starboard bow of the Edwards, leading the destroyer column now, but occasional ricochet shells came danger close. Several large splashes were seen on the port bow of the Edwards, "apparently from single gun salvos of a battleship."
Lousy as was the Japanese fire, Doorman’s cruisers were doing little better. ADM Helfrich, who was not even there, so how would he know?; claims that the Houston was firing five or six salvos a minute, while the De Ruyter was also maintaining a high rate of fire. In the early stages of the battle most of the shells were falling around two large Japanese cruisers, but one of the British six-inch cruisers was sending up splashes around an enemy destroyer. Doorman does not appear to have had any plan of fire distribution, but since the enemy ships were somewhat ahead of his and the allied heavy cruisers were near the middle of the CSF column as the Edwards saw them; it seems that they were probably firing on the rear of the Japanese column. "At 1634 enemy gunfire appeared to decrease considerably, and at 1635, plainly visible from Alden's bridge a huge explosion took place aboard the next to last enemy cruiser in line and a column of smoke about three hundred feet high rose into the air. She was seen to stagger out of line on fire shortly thereafter." LTCDR Cooper of the Ford says that "during this time two columns of smoke were observed which appeared to be hits on the enemy by our main body."
It was perhaps to cover their crippled cruisers and force the CSF line to open the range that the Japanese made a torpedo attack at 1634. Apparently it came from the direction of the enemy cruiser column now about 28,000 yards distant, bearing 325° T. But there is another possibility. While Doorman’s cruisers were engaged in their gun duel, eight Japanese destroyers were observed laying a smoke screen across the horizon bearing about 295°. As Doorman’s ships were then on course 290° this meant that the enemy destroyers were almost ahead of his line some 24,000 yards distant. This destroyer attack was repulsed by gunfire, Perth hitting and possibly sinking an enemy destroyer. The circumstances suggests that the torpedo attack must have come from the vicinity of the enemy cruisers, for Perth, near the rear of our column, could scarcely have hit a destroyer 24,000 yards ahead. Also, it appears that the Japanese purpose was to protect their cruisers by driving Doorman to greater range, and to accomplish this the torpedo attack must have come from the north. And if that is the case, then the Japanese had some incredibly long ranged torpedoes or they were crazy.
Retreat to the South: "Exeter" damaged, "Kortenaer" sunk
Apparently this battle continued for several minutes with the cruisers in parallel columns. At approximately 1645 NEIAAF planes from Java attacked the enemy. The planes themselves could not be seen, but the geysers sent up by their bombs could be distinguished from the splashes of the shells from our cruisers. Sometime between 1645 and 1655 the Java was hit by an eight inch shell, and immediately afterwards Doorman’s cruisers were seen to turn by simultaneous movements to the left/port. This falling away to the southwest may have been to open the range, as one-gun salvos from the "battleships" continued to fall close astern of the Java, but it seems more likely that Doorman’s ships turned to avoid torpedoes launched on their starboard bow.
Situation at 1655
During the next half hour numerous Japanese torpedoes were seen. Some were undoubtedly launched by the enemy cruisers or destroyers, but it seems clear that Doorman believed he had come upon an enemy submarine group, too. At 1650 Jupiter turned sharply to starboard across the bow of Edwards, signaling "torpedo," and a few minutes later a torpedo passed astern of Edwards, between her and Ford. (At this time the American destroyers were still in column on a west-northwest course, while Doorman’s cruisers were coming toward them on a southwesterly course. About 1658 torpedoes were reported on the Edwards' port quarter. Two minutes later a "huge geyser of water resembling a torpedo explosion" shot up in the same vicinity. With it went debris and "two large pieces of metal observed falling end over end." There were no surface ships near the spot, so that it appeared that the enemy torpedo had hit something in the water broken apart and the warhead detonated. If true, that implied not only long ranged Japanese torpedoes, but HUGE ones
After holding a southwesterly course for only a few minutes Doorman’s cruisers again (at 1706) reformed their column on a course of about 290° and renewed the action. Almost at once the USS Houston scored a hit on the stern of the foremost Japanese cruiser. It was perhaps about this time that the Houston received an answering 8-inch hit in the engine room and slowed for a moment. However, the dud shell did not explode and she was soon able to resume speed.
At about 1710 3 additional enemy cruisers and several destroyers were seen over the horizon on the American destroyers’ starboard bow. At about the same time the two enemy destroyer flotillas of the force with which Doorman’s cruisers were already engaged made an attack. While Doorman’s cruisers were maneuvering to avoid more Japanese torpedoes the Exeter was hit in a boiler room by an eight-inch shell. It killed fourteen men and cut out six of her eight boilers, reducing her speed first to about twenty knots, then to about fifteen knots. At about the same time-it is not clear whether it was just before or after the Exeter was hit-Doorman’s cruisers were seen to turn by individual movements to the south. As his ships turned south the De Ruyter lagged behind to close the enemy, whose cruisers had turned behind a smoke screen and were moving toward Doorman’s line behind their attacking destroyers. Doorman’s cruisers opened a concentrated fire and the destroyers were driven back, but not before the De Ruyter had sunk one of them.
From the Ford, now on a southerly course, a Japanese torpedo was seen on the port quarter, overtaking and converging on the destroyer at about a 20° angle. Skillful maneuvering avoided the danger. At about the same time Edwards put her rudder hard left to avoid a torpedo ahead, and several torpedoes surfaced in the vicinity of our destroyers. The Kortenaer, which was about 700 yards to starboard of the Edwards, was caught in the starboard quarter at 1713 by a torpedo which came from behind. There was a "heavy, whitish explosion flinging debris 100 feet in the air. She heeled way over and yawed 90° to the right. She poised momentarily and then turned turtle and folded up like a jackknife so that bow and stern came together. The stern end sank at once and the bow within fifty seconds of the original explosion. Men were blown high in the air and several jumped into the water or scrambled up her side as she heeled over. No survivors could be seen in the water."
The torpedo, which sank the Kortenaer, like the one dodged by Ford, came from the north; that is, from the direction of the enemy battle line. But others, like the one avoided by the Edwards, came from the west. The danger continued for several minutes. At 1721 a submarine was allegedly sighted to port of the Edwards and shortly afterward a torpedo was seen coming from the same direction.
It was apparently after the sinking of the Kortenaer that the Exeter slowed seriously and Doorman’s formation fell into confusion. The enemy closed in from the north to take advantage of the situation. Commander Eccles of the Edwards remarks, "It appeared that the striking force had suffered heavy damage and that the enemy was pushing home an attack to drive us east." A diagram accompanying the Alden report tends to confirm this, but one accompanying the Edwards report shows the enemy cruisers and "battleships" working around to the east of Doorman’s SAG. Since the Japanese convoy lay to the northeast, this would have been a logical maneuver. Moreover, the coast of Java, to which Doorman’s squadron were quite close at this time, runs northwest in this region, so that by driving his ships west the Japanese might have pocketed his force along the shore, exactly the same way that ADM Schley trapped ADM Cervera at the Battle of Santiago de Cuba in 1898.
Doorman’s column reforms.
But Doorman’s confusion did not last long. While the American destroyers laid smoke to cover his cruisers Admiral Doorman reformed his column. At 1726 he signaled for all ships to follow the De Ruyter, and the other cruisers, minus the Exeter, fell in behind him. Perth, followed by Electra and Encounter, delayed only long enough to dash between the Exeter and the advancing enemy line to cover the crippled cruiser with smoke, after which she fell in behind the others. The Exeter started to withdraw slowly to the south. At this point there was another heavy explosion two thousand yards on the Edwards' starboard bow. Several torpedo tracks were seen from Witte de With, and a torpedo exploded to starboard, then another to port, as they finished their runs. The Dutch destroyer dropped several depth charges, indicating that submarines were in the vicinity.
Note: This is the first indication (ITTL) to the USN that the still mysterious and unknown Type 93 torpedo soon to become infamous as the “Long Lance” was every bit as defective as the ITTL Mark XIV and XV had been before the corrective measures taken by the Torpedo Board.
The enemy, however, was pressing his advantage and was sending in his destroyers to finish off the Exeter. Only the British destroyers were in a position to intercept them. About 1730 the De Ruyter signaled "Counterattack." Electra hoisted "TOR I" and entered the smoke to attack. As she swung to starboard she met three enemy destroyers coming toward her through the smoke. All four Japanese destroyers opened fire. Electra scored four hits on one of the Japanese ships, but was herself badly hit in return. One shell entered her boiler room, while another demolished her steering engine. She stopped and lay helpless. The lead destroyer she had hit turned away and broke off the engagement, but the remaining two poured shell after shell into the British destroyer, coming so close that even their machine guns could be used. Many survivors of the Electra were wounded in the water.
Counter Attack by British Destroyers
Jupiter followed Electra into the thick smoke. By the time she reached the spot where her sister ship had last been seen, the Electra had disappeared and Jupiter found only two enemy destroyers, now apparently starting an attack on the Exeter. Jupiter opened fire and the two Japanese ships turned away and disappeared in the smoke and the failing light.
The Exeter, which had had her guns trained to port on the approaching Japanese cruisers, now turned them to starboard and opened fire on the Sendai class cruiser which was supporting the destroyer attack. The Japanese ship promptly turned away and disappeared in the smoke.
Witte de With, which was ordered by Admiral Doorman to escort the Exeter to Surabaja, now saw on her starboard quarter a Japanese destroyer engaging one of the British destroyers and opened fire. The Japanese ship shifted her fire from the British to the Dutch destroyer. In the brief exchange which followed, Witte de With scored two hits before her opponent turned away. Witte de With was not hit, but she suffered extensive damage when one of her own depth charges fell overboard and exploded close astern.
The American destroyers apparently did not participate in this counterattack. At 1728 they had started laying a smoke screen to protect the other cruisers and probably were not in a position to meet this attack which seems to have been aimed at exclusively at the Exeter.
Doorman meanwhile had gathered his cruisers into column on a southeasterly course, then turned north toward the enemy to renew the engagement. Probably his object was to draw the Japanese away from the Exeter. As he was making this turn (about 1745), our cruisers opened fire with their antiaircraft batteries and a stick of bombs fell 1,000 yards to port of the American destroyers. Five minutes later two more sticks fell near the American ships without doing any damage. Furthermore, splashes from enemy 6-inch shells were drawing close and were straddling just astern of the Edwards. Torpedo tracks were seen now and again.
Doorman’s cruisers had emerged from the drifting smoke and were again slinging shells at the enemy at a range of about eighteen thousand yards. The captain of the Edwards noted in his action log; "Their fire was particularly effective, as hits were seen on one of the enemy battleships and two fires were noted on one of the enemy cruisers. These did not appear to have been brought under control as long as we could see them."
The De Ruyter's short-wave radio had been damaged and hand signal lamps were the only means by which Admiral Doorman could communicate with his force. On board the Houston, too, the infrared T. B. S. upon which our destroyers relied for communication, had cut out. As one of our destroyer commanders remarks, “henceforward the crystal ball was our only method of anticipating the intention of Commander Combined Striking Force."
At 1806 a signal came by flashing light from the De Ruyter to commander DesRon 29: "Counterattack." The American destroyers were preparing to carry out this order when Admiral Doorman signaled, "Cancel counterattack." and then "Make smoke." The American destroyers again laid smoke to cover the retirement of the Exeter and to cover Doorman’s cruiser column. While they were thus engaged Admiral Doorman signaled, "Cover my retirement."
The reason for this order, when Doorman’s cruisers were more than holding their own, is not entirely clear, but it appears that Admiral Doorman was anxious to break off the engagement in order to go after his real objective, the enemy transports. It was now growing dark and visibility had decreased to about fifteen nautical miles, so that he might be able to slip into the convoy under cover of darkness.
When they received this order the four American destroyers were between Doorman’s cruiser line and the enemy. To CDR. Binford a torpedo attack seemed the most effective means of covering Doorman’s retirement. Breaking out of the smoke they had just laid, the American destroyer men saw the Japanese battle line some 22,000 yards distant on the starboard bow. They closed the range to 8,000 or 9,000 yards before firing their starboard torpedo broadside at 1822. The enemy cruisers attempted to stop them by gunfire, but their shells were falling about eight hundred yards short. As DesRon 29’s first torpedoes hit the water there was a large explosion on "the right hand" enemy ship, apparently the result of Doorman’s cruisers' gunfire. The American destroyers then turned by a column movement and fired their port torpedoes at 1827. Lt. Comdr. Coley of the Alden remarks that at this time "the rear ship of the enemy column appeared to be on fire aft, and the one ahead of her to have a fire in her high forward turret or superstructure." As for the torpedo attack, it seems that of the sixteen torpedoes DesRon 29 fired, possibly only four hit. Probably the rearmost two Japanese ships were the victims.
At 1831 there was a signal from the De Ruyter, "Follow me." DesRon 29’s destroyers turned under cover of their own smoke, crossed past the stern of Doorman’s cruiser column and took a position on their disengaged quarter on a course between east and northeast. Comdr. Binford reported to ADM Doorman that all torpedoes aboard his ships had been expended.
Torpedo Attack by United States Destroyers
This torpedo attack had been made at a longer range than doctrine called for with the object of forcing the enemy to turn back. In this it was successful, for "immediately after our torpedo attack the two Japanese heavy cruisers turned by column movement to the north." LTCDR Coley remarks, "It is definitely considered that the Exeter was saved by this attack." It was too much to hope for any sinking hits at the distance at which the Mark VIII torpedoes were fired, and yet about 1830, approximately 10 minutes after our starboard broadside, one large explosion and then another was seen in the Japanese battle line and it seemed very probable that our torpedoes had found their marks.”
Thrust to the north.
“Within a few minutes the opening range and poor visibility forced an end to the cruiser gun action as Doorman moved off on a northeasterly course. DesRon 29’s destroyers trailed as rearguard. Darkness quickly set in and we followed the main body as best we could endeavoring to regain station, and having not the slightest idea as to his [Doorman's McP.] plans and still only a vague idea to what the enemy was doing."
The withdrawal of the enemy was at once reported to Admiral Helfrich by Admiral Doorman, who at the same time asked for further information as to the location of the enemy transports. This request indicates that he had not received the 1805 report. It is possible that it was again sent to him in reply, for he changed course to lead his ships to the northwest toward this last reported position of the convoy. But the men in DesRon 29’s destroyers could only guess his intention. "There were no more signals and no one could tell what the next move would be. Attempts were made to communicate again with Houston and De Ruyter with no results." LTCDR Coley remembers.
If Admiral Doorman hoped to avoid the enemy cruisers in this thrust at the transports he was disappointed. Japanese planes followed his course with flares lighting his way, thus eliminating any chance of a surprise attack, and the CSF/SAG made intermittent contacts with enemy warships during the entire run. At 1902, while Doorman’s force was on a course of 290°, enemy ships, perhaps the ones with which he had just broken off the first engagement, were observed on bearing 240°.66 The allied SAG changed course to the north. At 1912 the Japanese were reported bearing 212° T. from Doorman’s cruiser line and gunfire was seen again.
Doorman’s ships pulled away and again lost contact with the enemy for several minutes, but about 1930 planes dropped eight green parachute flares over his column, apparently to mark its position for their cruisers. Four ships now appeared on the CSF/SAG’s port bow, bearing about 300° T. It seems scarcely possible that this was the same group encountered a few minutes earlier. It may be that Doorman’s previous contacts had been with a covering force while this last was possibly with a screening force close to the convoy. The De Ruyter signaled, "Target to port." Doorman’s cruisers sent over a few star shells and opened fire. The engagement was brisk but lasted only a few minutes. ADM Doorman's objective was the convoy and he was probably not anxious to reengage enemy warships. When flashes in the enemy's direction indicated that the Japanese were firing torpedoes Doorman’s column turned away to the east, and soon afterward a succession of small changes of course brought him again toward the south.
Why Admiral Doorman so easily abandoned this attempt to reach the convoy is not clear. To the men on the American destroyers, struggling at full speed to keep their position, it appeared that he was retiring to Surabaya. Actually his intention, as it subsequently appears now, was either to sweep westward along the north coast of Java to intercept an enemy landing, or to attempt to get around the enemy covering force to the southward.
About the time the CSF/SAG turned back to the south, RADM Pieter Koenraad, Commandant of the Surabaya Naval District, finally received a complete report from a USAAF bomber crew which had attacked the convoy that evening at 1700. At that time there were forty five transports, three cruisers, and twelve destroyers on a westerly course twenty miles west of Bawean. This was approximately the same position in which they had been found at about 1350 that afternoon. The news was forwarded to Admiral Doorman, but presumably he was already well on his way south when he received it.
Japanese planes continued to follow Doorman’s movements-as indeed they did the rest of the night. At 2009, while Doorman’s ships were on a southerly course, a single flare was dropped above them. One of Doorman’s cruisers, seemingly again the Houston, fired AAA, but nothing was to be seen. A few minutes later (at 2023) what appeared to be four enemy destroyers were observed on the Edward’s port bow. It was thought that they fired torpedoes and the American ships turned left/port to avoid them. Again at 2043 it was reported that torpedoes were fired, on Edward’s starboard bow this time, and course was altered to 175
Escape of United States Destroyers through Bali Strait: Retirement of American destroyers; loss of "Jupiter"
By 2100 Dooeman’s force was again near the coast of Java, between Surabaja and Tuban. The American destroyers had not had opportunity to take on fuel the preceding afternoon, and their supply was extremely low. After twenty four hours of high-speed steaming they were experiencing increasing difficulty in keeping up with the cruisers. CDR. Binford says, "Realizing that I had no more torpedoes and that further contact with the enemy would be useless, since my speed and gun-power were less than anything I would encounter . . . I retired to Surabaya, which was about 50 miles away."
This retirement of DesRon 29 did not escape the notice of the enemy, for as the American destroyers were entering the channel in the now known mine field a Japanese plane dropped a flare above them. While they were still in the channel orders came from Admiral Doorman to retire to Batavia and to receive orders later for torpedo replacements. CDR. Binford replied that it was impossible to get through to Batavia and that he was entering Surabaya to fuel, after which he would proceed as directed. He never received another message from the commander of the striking force.
Note: CDR Binford’s questionable decisions at Badung Strait and during Java Sea were to land him in front of a Board of Inquiry. He escaped a court martial by the skin of his skivvies since most of the senior officer witnesses to his actions were either PoWs in Japanese prison camps or dead or like Helfrich had good reasons to keep quiet about his sins and theirs. Nevertheless, enough stink clung to him that he was never trusted with another important fighting command.
Pope, which had completed repairs and had been standing outside the mine field waiting for an opportunity to join the other destroyers, was ordered to return to Surabaya with the other DesRon 29 destroyers. The Exeter and Witte de With were already there when the American tincans tied up at Holland Pier and started fueling. They left the pier and returned to the anchorage well before morning brought the daily air raid.
After the departure of the American destroyers the remaining ships of Doorman’s squadron are believed to have turned westward along the north coast of Java. They were reportedly in a single column led by Encounter, followed by De Ruyter, Perth, Houston, Java, and Jupiter. They had been on this westerly course for about twenty minutes when at 2125 there was an underwater explosion on Jupiter's starboard side abreast her engine room and she flashed a signal to the Java, "Jupiter torpedoed."
One British survivor described the situation: "We had not blown up. We had not sunk. We had, in fact, just stopped, and the same oppressive silence of a ship in dock during the night watches descended on us. There was ample time for the launching of boats and rafts, but before the boats could return from the beach for a second load the destroyer heeled over to port and sank at about 0130. A detachment of the Dutch Army on guard along the coast came to the aid of those of us who survived.”
Loss of "De Ruyter" and "Java."
Immediately after the loss of the Jupiter; Doorman’s force turned north. At 2217 it again passed the spot where the Kortenaer had gone down that afternoon, and survivors of the Dutch destroyer saw the CSF/SAG cruisers foam past at high speed. Encounter was ordered to stop and picked up one hundred thirteen men of the Kortenaer's crew of one hundred fifty three complement who survived. It was at first intended to take them to Batavia, but upon learning of a strong Japanese force to the west the captain returned to Surabaya.
The allied cruisers were now left without any destroyer protection whatsoever. This dangerous situation was aggravated by the fact that enemy planes continued to light their course with flares. But ADM Doorman's orders were clear as Helfrich had issued them, "You must continue attacks until the enemy is destroyed," and he pressed on north with a grim determination to reach the enemy convoy.
It is doubtful if he ever knew how close he did come to reaching it in this last magnificent attempt. The convoy had in fact remained in the area west or southwest of Bawean. At 1850 a PBY from Patrol Wing TEN had taken off to shadow it in the bright moonlight. At 1955 this plane saw star shells above three cruisers and eight destroyers on a northerly course about thirty miles southwest of Bawean. As these appeared to be Doorman’s squadron no hostile contact report was made. At 2235 the USNAS PBY found the convoy southwest of Bawean. Twenty-eight ships were counted in two groups, escorted by a cruiser and a destroyer. At this moment Admiral Doorman was headed toward this very spot, but it is doubtful if he ever received the PBY’s report. It reached the Commander of the Naval Forces at Surabaya at 2352, after which it was sent on to Doorman; but by that time both the De Ruyter and Java were already beneath the waters of the Java Sea. At 2315 the De Ruyter signaled, "Target at port four points." In that direction were seen two cruisers which opened fire from a distance of about 9,000 yards. Perth replied with two or three salvos which landed on one of the enemy cruisers for several hits. The Japanese thereupon fired star shells which exploded between their ships and ours so that Doorman’s cruisers could no longer see them.
Shortly afterward the Doorman’s flagship, De Ruyter, received a hit aft and turned to starboard away from the enemy, followed by his other cruisers. As the Java, which had not been under enemy fire, turned to follow there was a tremendous explosion aft, evidently caused by a torpedo coming from port. Within a few seconds the whole after part of the ship was enveloped in flames.
The De Ruyter had continued her turn onto a southeasterly course when, very closely after the Java, she too was caught by a torpedo. United States Signalman Sholar, who was on board and was subsequently rescued, reported having seen a torpedo track on relative bearing 135°. There was an extraordinarily heavy explosion followed by fire. Perth, behind the flagship, swung sharply to the left to avoid a collision, while the Houston turned out of column to starboard. The crew of the De Ruyter assembled forward, as the after part of the ship up to the catapult was in flames. In a moment the 40-mm. ammunition began to explode, causing many casualties and the ship had to be abandoned. She sank within a few minutes. For some time her foremast structure remained above the water, until a heavy explosion took the ship completely out of sight.
The torpedoes which sank the two Dutch cruisers apparently came from the direction of the enemy cruisers and were probably fired by them. Both Sendai and Nati class cruisers are equipped with eight torpedo tubes.
Of the CSF/SAG Doorman had started this grim day with, only the Houston and Perth now remained. They had expended most of their ammunition and were still followed by enemy aircraft. There seemed no possibility of reaching the enemy convoy, and about 0100 (February 28th) the two cruisers set course for Tandjong Priok in accordance with the original plan for retirement after the battle. On the way Perth informed Admiral Koenraad at Surabaya of their destination and reported that the De Ruyter and Java had been disabled by heavy explosions at latitude 06°00' S., longitude 112°00' E.71 The hospital ship Op ten Noort was immediately dispatched toward the scene of their loss, but it is doubtful if she ever reached it. Sometime later Admiral Helfrich lost radio contact with the ship, and a plane reported seeing her in the custody of two Japanese destroyers.
The Japanese convoy remained west of Bawean. About 0130 the USNAS PBY saw a column led by a cruiser, followed by four destroyers with a second cruiser bringing up the rear. This was about twenty five miles from the convoy and moving toward it. For a while the PBY pilot believed that it was Doorman’s striking force about to attain its objective, but a little later it became apparent that this was merely the enemy screening force-possibly the same ships which had just sunk the De Ruyter and Java. When the PBY left shortly after 0200 a Dutch Catalina plane took up shadowing the convoy, which remained in approximately the same position until dawn.
During the forenoon of the 28th as the Perth and Houston approached Priok, they were followed by Japanese reconnaissance planes. Fighters came out from Batavia to protect them, but there was no attack and the two cruisers reached port safely at 1330.
Part 3 Post mortems and recriminations to follow.
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