This may seem a wild plan (TL)

Thank you very much. There will actually be several skirmishes and 2-3 major battles for Missouri and both sides will eventually run into their own problems. Even though the feedback is not so numerous I am nonetheless motivated by each like and response, because it was my plan from the beginning to write it more for my own fun and pasttime. So no worrys, it will continue :cool:
 
There will actually be several skirmishes and 2-3 major battles for Missouri and both sides will eventually run into their own problems.
Ooh, this might cause some problems in the East...I don't think the federals would like an confederate campaign in Missouri, especially if the confederates manage to win at least 60% of the conflicts in the region, this is without counting missourian support for the confederates.

I'm actually not saying much because it just doesn't have much to be said, incredible TL and it's being marvelous to read it, always expecting more updates ;)
 
Purely military victories don't provide the Confederates with the much needed propaganda value due to the irrelevance of the theatre in the national media, so Price is forced to capture major towns like Jefferson City or St. Louis. Even though he will be able to concentrate his experienced men more effectively, this means in order to achieve something he has to risk high casualties in frontal assaults. Whether new recruits will be able to compensate for this quantitatively and qualitatively is yet to be seen, especially because Union reinforcement are already on the way.

I'm actually not saying much because it just doesn't have much to be said, incredible TL and it's being marvelous to read it, always expecting more updates ;)
I appreciate that. I am mostly pleased with the fact, that nobody yet called me out for any bullsh*t :biggrin:. Updates will continue although homeoffice is over for now and especially children begin to demand more time (what a surprise).
 
X. Price's Return
X. Price's Return


After having triumphantly paraded through Little Rock and crossing the Arkansas River, Sterling Price and his army were making good progress. Since commencing the campaign, the men had averaged between fifteen and twenty miles per day. Although not being particulary testing for veteran infantry, even greener troops were keeping up, bolstered by their recent success on the field of battle. The terrain in northern Arkansas was certainly rugged and rough, but crossing several high hills and numerous streams did not hold the troops back at all. The army's spirit was optimistic and many a diarist noted the motivation of the officers, NCOs and private soldiers.

Partly responsible for the good morale was the fact that Price had been able to liberate a large wagon train from the Little Rock arsenal. This enabled the army to carry especially sufficient food supplies and necessities to keep the men happy and satisfied. Extensive foraging however would have massively slowed down the march and would therefore have provided the Federals more time to react to the Rebel advance. Nevertheless, mounted foraging parties were sent out in western and eastern directions and many patriotic citizens along the way were willing to donate to men that were not demanding but kindly asking for support. Weapon shortages as well as the need for horses and mules now were an issue of the past due to Steele's rapid retreat from the area and his inability to gather or destroy most of those properties.

Several weeks in advance of the campaign start, Sterling Price already had sent out an illustrous band of recruiters to Missouri. Those were to assemble any willing and able man, especially from the Pro-Confederate regions in Western Missouri. Part of this delegation were Colonels Charles H. Tyler, J. T. Coffee, Caleb Perkins and James T. Searcey as well as Lieutenant Colonels Alonzo Slayback and D. A. Williams.

One man however had no official military rank, but was nonetheless an important puzzle piece in Price's plans. The individual in question was John W. Taylor from the Order of American Knights. This secret organization was formed in 1856 by New Orleans lawyer Phineas C. Wright and remained a paper tiger until its founder moved to St. Louis in 1860. There the OAK was redefined to protect civil rights, promote the movement to end the war and provide protection for Democrats against Unionist and Republican movements. Soon, the movement was organized in several temples and began to hold secret meetings. Although its members were not nearly as numerous as their leaders boasted, several held prestigous functions within local communities that were able to spread pro-southern propaganda. By providing Taylor with cash in gold and several printer presses, Price hoped to sow division within the civil society. The OAK was not able to achieve lasting success, but forced Rosecrans and the Union authorities to send several regiments worth of troops on a wild goose chase for the deviating plotters.

Another factor for the invasion were the roaming bands of bushwhackers in Missouri, that professed some vague loyalty to Price. Although possessing a militant sense of independence, the bushwhackers scented that a major shift in the fortunes of war might be able to occur and doubled down on their activities. It has to be acknowledged that those warbands, in several instances lead by truly psychopaths lusting for simple murder and destruction, took adwantage of the situation to better plunder and intimidate the Pro-Union citizenry, but this nonetheless siphoned away even more men and materials from Rosecrans' department. All in all, the expedition seemed to be well underway.
 
XI. The Battle of West Plains
XI. The Battle of West Plains


Union department commander William S. Rosecrans was being bombarded with reports of supposed rebel columns converging onto Missouri from virtually every direction in early July, 1864. Local fearmongers and sensationalist newspapers were not additionally helpful to filter out those messages that had a factual basis. As a seasoned military man with a sense for strategy, Rosecrans was certain that Price, should he really be advancing, would either turn on St. Louis or the state capital, Jefferson City. Although he had been vaguely promised reinforcements by Grant, he was not willing to gamble on any of both locations and to therefore strip the other one of its defenders.

To solve this issue, the commander decided to reinforce the forts along the path to St.Louis with local militia but at the same time he sent out cavalry from Jefferson City to probe for Price's main force. As soon as the direction of the latter could have been confirmed, Rosecrans would significantly bolster the major city in question to be able to confront the Southerners on comparable terms.

In the first week of July, two Union cavalry brigades, all together 2,400 strong, left Jefferson City. Commanded by Brigadier General John McNeil, the troopers made their way south in the direction of the Missouri-Arkansas border. That landmark soon was crossed by Sterling Price, whose first aim was indeed the state capital. Led by Fagan's cavalry division, the two infantry corps were marching on parallel roads to the north.

Early on July 12, 1864, Fagan's lead brigade, 800 men under the command of Colonel Archibald S. Dobbins, an Arkansas planter born in Tennessee, arrived at the small town of West Plains directly neighboring the border to Arkansas.

The history of West Plains dated back to 1832, when settler Josiah Howell created the first settlement in the region known as Howell Valley. The location of West Plains led to nearly constant conflict due to the proximity to what was then the border between the Union and Confederacy. West Plains was largely burned to the ground, and Howell County as a whole was devastated. No major battles occurred in West Plains or Howell County however until the summer of 1864, but much of the devastation came from constant guerrilla warfare.

The Federal cavalry advanced in a southern direction up until they encountered Peace Valley, reaching the hamlet after dark on July 12. The column was composed of Brigadier General John McNeil’s 1st Brigade, numbering 1,400 troopers; Brigadier General John B. Sandborn’s 2nd Brigade of 1,000 men and the battery of the 5th Missouri Militia Cavalry sporting two 3-inch Ordnance Rifles under Lieutenant Adam Hillerich.

At 1 am on the 13th, the men were roused from their rest and ordered to move out. As the Federals traveled across the countryside, McNeil covered his advance with a heavy screen of pickets and sent small parties ahead to observe the roads and fords to mask his approach to Howell Creek. The head of the Union column reached Spradlin Ford at 8 am.

Despite McNeil's precautions during his move to Peace Valley, the Confederates knew he was coming. By 6 pm the day before Dobbins' scouts had located McNeil's men near that hamlet. However, Dobbins still did not know whether the enemy intended to cross at Spradlin Ford or at Brandsville, several miles farther down the river. Belatedly divining the enemy’s goal, Dobbins moved to reinforce his 20-man picket party at Spradlin Ford with 40 more sharpshooters, but only 11 of the newcomers had reached the ford by daylight. In addition, Dobbins ordered all the regiments of his brigade to send sharpshooters down the road leading from West Plains to Spradlin Ford.

At Spradlin Ford, the Confederates nervously awaited the Yankees. Meanwhile, they constructed an abatis on the south side bank of the ford and manned rifle pits that had been dug along the shore. The defenders also occupied two houses that overlooked the ford, as well as a nearby barn. As McNeil neared, the Southerners had only 30 men defending the ford with another 40 troopers five miles to the west where the creek ended. Captain William L. Anderson of Anderson's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion was in charge of the defense.



Duel at the Ford

At 8 am McNeil's blue column came within sight of Spradlin Ford, Sandborn’s brigade leading the way. In advance of the column were 100 men from the 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry whose task was to dash across the ford and capture the Southern pickets on the other side. Covering this move with small-arms fire would be two dismounted squadrons of the same regiment. The advance guard splashed into the water, which was so high it washed over the backs of their horses, but they were driven back by the fire of the well-protected Confederate sharpshooters on the southern shore. Two more attempts were also repulsed. A member of the 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry reported, “The firing was very sharp and incessant and it seemed as though our men could never cross in the face of that deadly fire.”

A frustrated Sandborn, seeking to break the deadlock at the ford, sent a small body of men downstream a quarter of a mile to flank the defenders, but the deep water and steep riverbanks foiled the attempt. After 30 minutes of failing to get his men across the river, Sandborn opted for a more direct way to break the enemy resistance and get his men across the ford. He ordered his second in command, Colonel John E. Phelps from the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry to force a passage. The Colonel formed the men of the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry into a column of fours and led them across Howell Creek, where they immediately ran afoul of the abatis and were peppered by the well-aimed fire of the Confederates in their rifle pits. Southern bullets felled Phelps' horse and wounded the Colonel in the face. Seeing their leader fall into the water, the men of the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry beat a hasty retreat back to the northern bank of the river.

Wounded and exposed to enemy fire, Phelps nevertheless called for volunteers with axes to wade the river and dismantle the abatis. Twenty troopers came forward and, under cover of friendly carbine fire, went to work to destroy the wooden impediment. With the colonel himself leading the way,the loyalist troopers from Arkansas once more plunged into the water and made for the other side but once again were driven back by heavy Confederate rifle fire.

As more Federals dismounted to add covering fire for the axe men working at the abatis, Phelps gathered men of the 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry and directed their commander, Colonel Joseph J. Gravely to “either cross or not return.” Followed by Phelps, the balance of the 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry and the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry sped toward the ford and into a torrent of renewed enemy gunfire. The hail of bullets caused the Arkansas troopers to break and run at the water’s edge, while Phelps was wounded a second time, this time in the left cheek. His horse was mortally wounded as its rider fell to the earth. Dragged to the north bank by some of the axe-wielding pioneers, a frustrated Phelps turned his gun on the Confederates.

The Arkansas men soon rallied, and with the 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry and the pioneers in tow, galloped into the frigid river. Firing their handguns as they rode, the soldiers made it across Howell Creek and charged at the barn, causing the Confederate defenders to flee. After a few daring attacks on the Rebel rifle pits, combined with the Southerners running out of ammunition, the Federals took some of the vulnerable places. Seeing no hope for a further defense, Anderson escaped.

Soon the remainder of Sandborn's brigade crossed the river and broke the Confederate resistance at the ford, capturing 25 of the defenders as they tried to retreat. Over the next two hours the abatis and the road over Spradlin Ford were cleared of obstacles, allowing McNeils brigades to finally cross the river.



The Federals advance

While giving his men time to water their horses and take a short breather, McNeil rode ahead to scout the terrain beyond Spradlin Ford. He spotted an open plain a quarter of a mile up the road toward West Plains Court House and surmised that it would be there that any future battle with Dobbins would occur. The brigadier formed his regiments and at 10:15 am moved forward, leaving one squadron to guard Spradlin Ford. The blue-clad horsemen rode through the little settlement of West Plains, and followed the road southwest toward. Now McNeil's own brigade led the way with the 13th Illinois Cavalry deployed as skirmishers as well as the 13th Missouri Cavalry and 5th Missouri Militia Cavalry following as their support. The column moved slowly and cautiously with scouts investigating every piece of wood they came to. All in all it was a cautious advance and missed any opportunity to catch Dobbins' regiments isolated and possibly beat them in detail.
As noon approached, Confederate skirmishers in the nearby woods drove back their Union counterparts. In response, the Federals brought up their artillery section and shelled the woods. The shelling drove out the enemy from the timber line, allowing McNeil's command to push through the wood and form a battle line in anticipation of an enemy attack. As the Federals cautiously moved forward, they spied Dobbins' brigade drawn up for battle on the far side of a wide field.



Dobbins' Counterattack

Although the Federals had a large numerical advantage, McNeil did not intend to attack Dobbins' position. Undaunted by the odds against him or the drubbing he had already received from his opponents earlier in the day at the creek, Dobbins elected to take the fight to the enemy. The Confederate commander’s decision was probably reinforced by the fact that if his attack failed McNeil would have been able to push on towards Price's unsuspecting infantry column.

Dobbins sent his own regiment as well as McGhee's and Witt's Arkansas Cavalry at the center of the Union line, while the Lyle's Arkansas Cavalry and Anderson's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion struck McNeil's left. After crossing a small ravine, the Dobbins', McGhee's and Witt's troopers bore down on three squadrons of the 17th Illinois Cavalry posted on either side of a small stand of trees. Seeing the threat, McNeil brought up the 13th Missouri Cavalry and placed it 100 yards to the left of the Illinois troopers. The Union men deployed in a double line, the first line with carbines at the ready, the second rank eager to use their sabers.

As the Confederates slogged through the muddy ground, their left was exposed to small-arms fire delivered by the 17th Illinois Cavalry. The Confederate advance was slowed by the muddy terrain, and their close-ordered formations quickly became ragged and fragmented. Colonel James H. McGhee's regiment was hit by enemy artillery fire the minute it started its advance toward the Yankee position. After they had passed through the enemy’s lines, the Federal gunners abandoned their battery. McGhee's men then attempted to capture the enemy guns but were prevented from doing so by a double fence and determined Union sharpshooters. Under heavy fire, the unsupported regiment retreated a quarter of a mile.

As McGhee retired under enemy fire, Dobbins and Witt came within 25 yards of the position held by the 13th Missouri Cavalry. As the Rebel horsemen approached in three assault columns, the Union troopers poured lethal volleys into them. The Southerners retreated in small groups but then turned to charge again. The time was favorable for a Federal counterstroke before the retreating Arkansas units could rally and charge once more. After a short delay, the 13th Missouri Cavalry was ordered to charge, and the Confederates were pushed back to their starting position.

While events took place on the Federal right, Lyle's Arkansas Cavalry and Anderson's Battalion tried to turn the enemy’s left flank. Under intense artillery fire by the two guns under Lieutenant Adam Hillerich and having to knock down a fence that stood in the way, the gray-clad troopers approached the Federal line only to veer to the left and right due to the heavy cannon fire they were receiving. On the Union left the 5h Missouri Militia Cavalry crashed into Lyle's men. The toll of dead and wounded was great, and the Confederates, outnumbered, broke and ran. Sandborn's brigade joined the pursuit of the enemy but halted at the ground from which Dobbins' counterattack had begun.

Concerned about low ammunition, and used-up horses, McNeil ordered a retreat to Spradlin Ford. Sandborn's men covered the reverse movement, which was shadowed by small bodies of Confederates with an occasional rifle shot fired at the withdrawing bluecoats. While the engagement had cost the Yankees less than 80 casualties, they had inflicted almost 130 losses on Dobbins' brigade. More importantly however Dobbins' stubborn resistance in the face of a superior foe indicated to McNeil, that this had been no isolated foraging party but part of the main rebel column. He was almost certain to finally have located Pap Price and his army. On the same evening, riders were sent out to inform Rosecrans about the direction of the rebel advance.
 
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XII. Moving through the Ozarks
XII. Moving through the Ozarks


As soon as Rosecrans was made aware of Price's intentions, he sent a number of orders to his subordinates. Because he now was assured that Schofield and his Army of the Ohio were well underway to join him in St. Louis, the department commander ordered Major General Andrew J. Smith's two divisions as well as the brigades under Colonel Edward F. Winslow, Brigadier General Thomas Ewing and Brigadier General E. C. Pike as well as both batteries of the 2nd Missouri Light Artillery, together about 13,400 men and 8 guns to join Jefferson City's 5,800 defenders, leaving only Senator Benjamin Gratz Brown's 5,000 Home Guards in the second most important city of the state of Missouri.

Meanwhile, McNeil's and Sandborn's cavalry brigades were hard pressed down south in the Ozarks. After being informed about the routing of Dobbins' brigade near West Plains, Major General James F. Fagan, commander of Price's mounted wing, had taken the reverse as a personal slight. As his brigades were following the Federals to the North, clearing the way for Walker's and Parsons' infantry corps, Fagan pondered about how to pay the Yankees back. After having crossed Boone Creek west of Licking on July 17, he sensed an opportunity to trap the uppity northerners. Intentionally Fagan sent out his second smallest brigade (Dobbins' roughly handled regiments were foraging the countryside at that time), William F. Slemons' 1,000 troopers, to engage the Federal rearguard under Sandborn with the explicit orders to retire westwards at the first opportunity, feigning a retreat. Sandborn, after sending word to McNeil, followed on Slemons' heels until the former had recrossed Boone Creek, dismounted and formed his men into line of battle. Sandborn, now authorized by McNeil, who had turned his brigade about to join him, to bring on a general engagment, neared the stream without noticing McCray's Confederate brigade, 1,700 strong, concealed in the woods behind Slemons.

While Sandborn deployed his nearly 1,000 men Fagan sent word to Brigadier General William L. Cabell several miles south about the developing chance. After he gave up the crossing, as he intended to do, and moved west he correctly assumed that he would be followed by McNeil. Cabell moving north from Bucyrus with his 2,700 men would strike the Union column in the flank. If everything worked as planned then Cabell would seize the Boone Creek crossings behind the enemy cavalry trapping them between the two wings of Confederate cavalry. The Federals began the battle acting precisely as Fagan had hoped. After a futile effort to force a crossing at the bridge the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry was sent on a flanking march for a ford. The delay created by the time necessary to complete this flanking manuever allowed Cabell to move into position to execute the plan. After flanking Slemons out of his position on the west bank of Boone Creek, Sandborn forced him back more than a mile from the stream. At this point Brigadier General McNeil arrived with his 1,400 troopers and had Sandborn's men step to the side so that he could take the lead with his brigade. While McNeil advanced westward toward Ellis Prairie Sandborn was to follow. As McNeil was being easily confused by Slemons and McCray, Cabell gained the ground from which the trap could be sprung.

Like all military matters things did not go exactly as planned. The execution of the trap was transformed by an unaccounted circumstance. In violation of his orders Sandborn did not immediately follow McNeil forward. Instead he threw out pickets and ordered his men to prepare dinner. As his command settled down to graze their horses and feed themselves the distance between them and McNeil grew larger. Slemons and McCray moved back west of Ellis Prairie with McNeil's command following. McNeil gradually outdistanced any hope of support from Sandborn and became isolated in front of Slemons' and McCray's brigades. Sandborn, meanwhile, rested somewhat unprepared in Cabell's line of march.

After a several hour delay to complete the feeding process Sandborn awoke his exhausted men with an order to move out. There was no sign of any enemy as they began their move west in a column of fours.The order of march had the main column led by the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry followed by the 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry. The movement had traveled barely 300 yards when a mounted vidette was spotted in the tree line to the south. At first he was mistaken for a returning member of McNeil's command but all questions about his identity were removed when a minie ball struck down the horse of on of the leading riders. The forest was full of Cabell's Confederate cavalry.

The 8th Missouri Militia Cavalry reacted rapidly to the new threat. The command was dismounted and took cover behind a nearby fence while a messenger was sent to inform Sandborn of the enemy presence. The head of the column was turned around and Sandborn soon had both of his regiments in line. One of the gamiest fights against odds was on. It was clear to the outnumbered Federals that the fight was to regain the bridge before they were cut off. Cabell was indeed trying to hold the Union line in place with his dismounted troopers while cutting off the route to the bridge. For his part Cabell was somewhat astonished to find this amount of opposition here. He expected that the entire Union column would be to the west and he could take the bridge without any resistance. The following fight was descibed as one of the most obstinate character. Unfortunately for Cabell, Sandborn's quick reaction did not allow him to gain the bridge until the enemy had crossed. After a fierce fight only one battalion of the 2nd Arkansas Cavalry was trapped on the west side of Boone Creek and was captured. Sandborn's insistence on feeding his men had saved them but his retreat left McNeil men to fend for themselves. With Cabell in their rear holding the bridge as well as Slemons and McCray in their front it was a challenging prospect.

At the first indication that Cabell was engaged in the Union rear, Slemons and McCray turned and attacked McNeil's brigade suddenly and vigorously. Fagan did not duplicate Cabell's error of not taking full advantage of his numerical superiority. He immediately ordered a full charge. McCray's brigade, led by the 47th Arkansas Mounted Infantry struck down the pike at the strung out Union column. After a brief period of stubborn resistance the furiosity of the attack created the breakdown of order and discipline in the Federal ranks. As Slemons' brigade began to envelop the Federal flank the melee became an every man for himself race against death or capture.

Fagan later reported to Price that the Yankees broke and the rout was soon complete. The chase, conducted at a full gallop, lasted from outside of Ellis Prairie up until both partys reached Licking. Lost to McNeil were nearly 250 prisoners as well as several wagons and an ambulance. One of the wagons captured contained Sandborn's personal baggage and private correspondence. Both sides additionally lost about 50 men killed or wounded. After his reverse at the Battle of Boone Creek, McNeil never again seriously contested Price's march towards Jefferson City and returned to the state capital to help strengthen the defences. A storm was approaching.
 
Now the time for minor skirmishes is over. The next chapter will feature the first day of the Battle of Jefferson City and it is going to be seriously bloody. Expect roughly 40% casualties for the forces engaged on both sides.
 
XIII. The Battle of Jefferson City (Part I)
XIII. The Battle of Jefferson City (Part I)

When Price's forces were nearing Jefferson City, Federal Major General Andrew J. Smith, acting commander of all Union forces in the state capital, was caught in a pinch grinder. Although having assembled every available man, his 21,300 defenders were still outnumbered by Price's 25,000, who had brought his army's strength back up from the losses near Little Rock by recovered wounded and eager volunteers. At first glance this ratio looked not too bad from the perspective of a defending force, but another important factor had to be counted in. The absolute majority of Jefferson City's population was pro-Confederate. Smith therefore feared sabotage and backstabbing from civilians, should Price settle for a prolonged siege. For this reason, the Federals were obliged to strike the Rebels first. Smith saw his opportunity when Price's army approached the city from the south on July 23. While Fagan's cavalry protected Price's right because the latter expected Union reinforcements from the direction of St. Louis, his left flank, Parsons' infantry corps, was in the air. Therefore Smith detached Moore's division of 4,500 men to leave Jefferson City during the cover of night in a western direction and to circle around Price's open flank. As soon as he would have found the flank on the following day, Moore was ordered to assault it, while Woods' division and the majority of the Missouri State Militia would join the attack from the north. With this attack Smith hoped to be able to defeat one of Price's two corps decisively and to force the Confederate commander back on the defensive.

JeffCity1.png

After marching all night and through the morning, Moore's division arrived late but ready to advance against Price's Army of the West shortly before noon on July 24. Since Moore did not know where the left flank of Mosby Parsons' corps terminated, he had sought to align his three brigades abreast, facing eastward. Just prior to battle, Moore's brigades formed a crescent from left to right: Kinney on the extreme left; Gilbert deployed to Kinney's right; and Wolfe on the far right. However, by the time Moore's division was ready to strike Parsons' corps, the Confederate left wing had changed its configuration so that the Federals would assault a well-protected flank rather than the Southerner's rear.

During the morning of July 24, Confederate Major General Mosby Parsons had moved his reserve forces, Clark's division, into position to protect his left flank. The Confederate position resembled a capital "L," with the lower, horizontal portion well placed to intercept the impending Yankee attack, which otherwise would have struck a weak spot at the end of the Confederate left wing. As Moore's division prepared to break from its cover and begin its delayed assault, Confederate skirmishers were positioned in the field ahead.

Shortly after noon on July 24, 1864, three Union brigades under the command of Colonels T. J. Kinney, James I. Gilbert and Edward H. Wolfe emerged from the heavily wooded, underbrush laden terrain west of Jefferson City after an arduous fifteen-mile march and, moving east and southeast respectively, launched the first attack in the Battle of Jefferson City. These three brigades, more than half of the Union infantry led by Major General Andrew J. Smith, expected to move forward unopposed against the rear of Major General Mosby Parsons' corps. Instead, Kinney, Gilbert and Wolfe encountered Confederate infantry and artillery occupying an advantageous position along slightly elevated ground. Most of the Confederate troops, Simon P. Burns' and Charles S. Mitchell's brigades, had arrived in their positions late in the morning.

When the fighting started, the three Confederate divisions that comprised Parsons' corps were deployed along a front of more than a mile that resembled a capital "L", with the longer vertical portion extending west–east and the shorter horizontal segment extending north–south. Brigadier General Joseph O. Shelby's and Brigadier General John S. Marmaduke's divisions were located near the top of the long part of the "L," facing Jefferson City to the north.

Parsons' line connected on its right with the left of Major General John G. Walker's corps, which was located in the vicinity of Price's temporary headquarters. It's infantry was only lightly engaged on the first day of the Battle of Jefferson City, but its artillery had a role in the late afternoon fighting. Parsons' center division, Shelby's, connected with Clark's division to the left and Marmaduke's to the right.

Burns' and Mitchell's brigades had been in reserve before moving into their battlefield positions on the morning of July 24. Burns' brigade moved first, marching west to a position at the far end of the lower part of the "L". The head of Burns' column, the 10th Missouri Infantry Regiment, was aligned along an north–south road with its sister units. After Burns' column arrived, Mitchell's brigade moved westward from where it had been in reserve, behind Shelby's line. Together, Burns and Mitchell, 2,200 troops, were in line with Harris' Missouri Battery. These guns faced west and south, the directions from which Moore's Union division soon would sweep forward. The attacking Federals did not expect to encounter two brigades with cannons aimed at them from elevated ground. Still, they carried on with their assault march.

The fighting between Burns' and Mitchell's units of Clark's division and Kinney's, Gilbert's and Wolfe's brigades of Moore's division was among the few engagements late in the Civil War in which the opposing forces met in the open field, with no earthen works to protect either side. The Confederate infantry, supported with artillery fire, beat back the Yankees, but a Union column maneuvered into the gap at the angle in the Southerner's line and made threatening progress against Burns' right flank. Illinois and Indiana infantry, under the command of Colonel T. J. Kinney, caught Burns' right slightly exposed and in the same instant opened intense fire against the left flank of Shank's brigade of Shelby's division. At this critical moment in the battle, A. J. Smith ordered his second veteran division, Woods', to strike the Confederate front from the north. Combined, Woods and Moore brought up 7,500 infantry against less than ideally aligned 5,300 men under Clark and Shelby. The Confederates were taking a severe beating and the two division commanders decided to refuse the line in order to lessen the pressure put on them. Four brigades of Rebel infantry streamed to the southeast, but reformed under the watching eyes of corps commander Mosby Parsons on and around local high ground bythe name of Cedar Hill.

The successful Federal assault against Parsons' flank, spearheaded by Moore, and the subsequent Confederate tactical retreat brought an end to the first phase of the day's battle. By reforming Parsons' two left divisions, the Confederate corps commander took the sting out of the Federal surprise attack. Still, the initial Yankee exploitation of a gap in the Rebel line, presaged greater gains, albeit temporary, from the ensuing attacks against Marmaduke's division to the east.



JeffCity2.png

Cedar Hill, later named Shanks' Hill by the Rebels after the struggle for its control on July 24, 1864, became the scene of the most ferocious fighting on the first day of the Battle of Jefferson. Opposing troops fired on each other at murderously close range and at times engaged in hand-to-hand combat, aided by bayonets and clubbed rifles. Shanks' men, the famous Confederate „Iron Brigade“ raised by Joseph Shelby, entrenched on the hill with Jackman's brigade to the right and Burns' brigade to the left, while Mitchell's small outfit was moved to the rear to provide support when needed. The high ground soon became the focus point for parts of four Union brigades that were converging on the landmark in order to tear open the extreme left of Price's army.

Shanks' men fended off continuous Union attacks and suffered immense losses in the process. The northerners however were taking horrific casualties themselves during their nearly continuous wave of attacks on July 24, but they came close to dislodging the Rebels from the strategic high ground before being checked. During two hours of intense fighting, the Yankees captured a short portion of the Confederate line and established themselves in a ravine near the hilltop. However, the Federals failed to dislodge the Iron Brigade that especially honored its name on that occasion.

Hoping to help Moore's and parts of Woods' troops take Cedar Hill Hill, A. J. Smith instructed the two brigades of Missouri State Militia and Winslow's provisional brigade to attack Marmaduke's division, which remained in control of the treeless high ground. Prior to attack, the Missouri State Militia occupied the southern section of Jefferson City's fortifications. The three brigades under Colonel Edward F. Winslow, Brigadier General Egbert B. Brown and Brigadier General Clinton B. Fisk were mobilized from behind the fortifications, and deployed into line of battle with Winslow and Brown at the front and Fisk in reserve.

Winslow's brigade attacked first, moving from behind the fortifications charging southward against Colton Greene's brigade from Marmaduke's division. The other front line brigade on the left, Brown's, followed Winslow into combat. Even though the second prong of the Federal attack was delayed, it achieved partial success when a weak spot was found in the Confederate line between Greene's and Freeman's units. Fisk's 1,800 men charged forward while Brown and Winslow kept the Rebels occupied, broke through, and threatened to overrun Marmaduke's whole division. The gap that had been opened in the Confederate line could have, if further exploited, turned the tide of the battle against Price's Army of the West.

General Price, observing the battlefield action from his headquarters, personally directed cannon fire from three different batteries (Collins', Connor's and Lesueur's Missouri Artillery) against the Yankee front and behind it, thwarting further gains and preventing reinforcements. Colonel Charles S. Mitchell, Parsons' only reserve at that point, was alerted to the dire threat posed by the breakthrough. Mitchell gathered his men and galloped on his white stallion toward the collapsed front of Marmaduke's division. He led his the 8th and 9th Missouri Infantry Regiment as well as Ruffner's Missouri Infantry Battalion, supported by artillery fire, in a counterstrike that hurled back Fisk's brigade and restored Marmaduke's line. The Confederate troops did not pursue their retreating foes, and the fighting came to a close. Combat continued until dark at Cedar Hill.

The day's fierce fighting had cost Parsons' corps significantly. The Confederates had taken 3,500 casualties out of 9,200 men engaged. While Marmaduke's division had suffered comparatively lightly, Shelby's division had lost nearly 55% of its men while Clark reported about 45% casualties. Shanks' Iron Brigade was left with 600 effectives out of 1,400 that had gone into line that same morning.

The Federals however had been hurt even more. Out of 13,300 men engaged, 5,500 were killed or wounded. A. J. Smith's veterans had nearly broken themselves assaulting Cedar Hill and lost 43% of their men. The other brigades committed had to report about 40% losses. During the night, Smith's beaten legions retreated back into the relative safety of Jefferson City's defenses.
 
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XIV. News from the Eastern Theatre
XIV. News from the Eastern Theatre (June 20 - July 24)






Beginning of the Siege of Petersburg

After Ulysses S. Grant had crossed the James River on June 18, 1864, the Overland Campaign had effectively ended and Lee's and Grant's forces were now engaged in the Siege of Petersburg as the city was the last obstacle between the Union army and the Confederate capital, Richmond. As a result of the Federal failure to take Petersburg by assault, the Union supreme commander focussed on securing the three remaining open rail lines connecting Petersburg and Richmond.

Battle of Jerusalem Plank Road

On June 22, Birney's II and Wright's VI Corps advanced against the Weldon Railroad and encountered Confederate divisions under Cadmus Wilcox and William Mahone. While the main Rebel forces were holding both Union corps in place, Mahone sneaked an assault column to the rear of the II Corps via a ravine. The following suprise attack routed two of Birney's divisions that fell back to their own earthworks. A counter attack on the next day proved inneffectual because Mahone's men had already vacated the captured positions. To the south, a heavy skirmish foirce from the VI Corps was driven back by Wilcox' division. The alltogether inconclusive fight cost the Federals nearly 3,000 casualties while the Confederates lost fewer than 600 and remained in possession of the vital rail line.

Battle of Saint Mary's Church

On June 24 Philip Sheridan's Union cavalry returned from their failed effort to cut the Virginia Central Railroad and gathered supplies near White House in the vicinity of the James River. At St. Mary's Church Wade Hampton attacked two brigades of cavalry under David McMurtrie Gregg with five of his own brigades. The Rebels outnumbered the Federals by almost two to one and were able to envelop their positions and subsequently drove Gregg and his force from their breastworks. The resulting delaying action however enabled the wagon train to move towards the James River without being bothered. Gregg's losses were about 350 while Hampton took 250 casualties.

First Battle of Ream's Station

On June 29, Federal cavalry divisions under James H. Wilson and August Kautz advanced against the Wilmongton and Weldoin Railroad in southern Virginia. At Ream's Station they encountered Mahones Confederate infantry and cavalry from Rooney Lee's division. Around noon, Mahone struck the Union forces from the front while Rooney Lee outflanked the left end of their line. The attack succeeded in splitting the Federal forces and Wilson as well as Kautz were forced to cut their way back to the Union lines around Petersburg via cross-country races. Union losses were around 400 while the Rebels took about 200 casualties.

Early's Washington Raid

Much less static warfare was going on in the Shenandoah Valley however. After Jubal Early had defeated David Hunter's Union army at Lynchburg, the Confederate Army of the Valley struck in the direction of Maryland and Pennsylvania. Early had been informed, that an invasion was going on in Missouri and he therefore would not be obliged to set everything on one card and risk his force. For this reason he calculated how to inflict the maximum terror and confusion on the Federals while conserving his men in the most efficient way.

Battle of Monocacy River

On July 9, Early attacked an outnumbered Federal force under Lew Wallace at Frederick, Maryland along the Monocacy River. Wallace's Maryland Home brigade had, with support from Rickett's division of the VI Corps, intercepted Early and was determined to slow him down as long as possible. While Rodes' and Ramseur's divisions kept Wallace's forces in place, Gordon's and Breckinridge's divisions with McCausland's cavalry brigade in the van crossed the Monocacy via a ford in the south. It took both divisions the better part of the afternoon to fully deploy, but the Confederates were able to reap the fruits of their endeavor when they finally converged on the Federal left flank held by Rickett's division. The VI Corps men collapsed and nearly 1,200 out of 3,500 were taken prisoner. All along the line, 500 more Federals were killed or wounded while Early took around 500 combined casualties. He decided not to pursue Wallace's remnants in the direction of Baltimore, rested his men and put them on the march towards Washington DC the next morning.

Battle of Fort Stevens

In the morning of July 12, Early reached the outskirts of the Union capital near Fort Stevens. Scouts had informed him that two corps from the Army of the Potomac had joined the capital's defences. Those news did not unhinge the Confederate commander, because he had never expected to take Washington in the first place. He was even eager to have drawn so much attention away from the Petersburg lines and decided, to make a show of his appearance. For several hours he bombarded Fort Stevens and feigned several assaults without ever really committing any formation larger than a brigade. After he had lobbed a series of shells over the walls into the city, Early retreated late in the afternoon. He was sure to have scared the good people of Washington enough for the time being.

Battle of Cool Spring

As expected, the Union VI and XIX Corps under Horatio Wright immdiately pursued Early, who was falling back to Virginia. When Thoburn's Federal division followed Early's men over the Shenandoah River on July 17, Wharton's, Rodes' and Gordon's divisions turned around and suddenly charged the Union men. Driven with the back to the river, Thoburn fended off several savage attacks especially from Rodes' division until darkness put an end to the fighting. During the night the Federals retreated to the northern bank of the river and counted their dead while Early chose to continue heading to the south. 600 Federals and 400 Confederates became casualties that day.

Second Battle of Kernstown

Union commander Horatio Wright had mistaken Early's continued withdrawal for a sign of his army's dissolution and decided to return the majority of his forces to Petersburg, where Grant was not making any headway. As soon as he had departed the Valley however, Early changed his demeanor and went on the offensive again. Only George Crook's Army of West Virginia had been left to deal with the Confederates in the Valley and those nearly 10,000 men were no match for Early. On July 24 his 14,000 strong Army of the Valley assaulted Crook near Kernstown, where Stonewall Jackson had been defeated two years before. A flank attack of Wharton's division rolled up the Union line and sent Crooks men into flight. At the cost of not more than 600 men, Early had inflicted almost 2,000 casualties on the federals, two thirds of them prisoners taken by his pursuing cavalry. As soon as the news reached Grant, he decided to commit a decent force to put an end to Early's presence in the Valley once and for all. The man to lead this operation was to be Philip Sheridan.
 
XV. The Battle of Jefferson City (Part II)
XV. The Battle of Jefferson City (Part II)

JeffCity2.png


July 25, 1864 found Major General Andrew J. Smith in a perilious situation. He had waited for any rebel movements until around 8 AM, but then, finding none, lulled into a false sense of security. The fatigued and decimated men of his own corps and the Missouri State Militia (Fisk's and Brown's brigades) took watch over the right flank while the Enrolled Missouri Militia (Pike's, Philips' and Ewing's brigades) occupied the breastworks in the center, directly in front of the city. To the left, McNeil's and Sandborn's cavalry brigades guarded the army's lifeline, the road towards St. Louis.

The second day of the Battle of Jefferson City began early that morning as James Fagan’s cavalry, leading the Confederate advance, probed McNeil's line. The Union troopers alerted Smith and the EMM troops were ordered to pick up their rifles form their ranks.

Problems began to arise for the Federal infantry almost as soon as the first shots were fired. Chief among their problems was the status of their defensive positions; in a changing world of combat, earthworks had risen to much prominence up until the summer of 1864. And simply stated, the Federal lines in front of Jefferson City were horrible.

A. J. Smith’s men had dug the works hastily, because they did not arrive long before their adversaries and the local militia knew nothing about the erection of defensive positions. After being defeated in their offensive move the day before, the Union forces now had to rely on those lackadaisical positions. One of the men of Wood's veteran division commented that, “The works were too low to protect the troops. They were of very poor quality and reliance.”

The first Confederate troops hit Smith’s corps to the right around noontime. Driving in the Federal skirmishers, the rebels under the direction of John Marmaduke (the only division of Parsons' corps with offensive capabilities left) were soon turned back. Colonel David Moore in temporary command of the corps sent his skirmishers forward again, and an hour later, at 1 PM, Marmaduke's cautious attack was again repulsed under a severe fire of musketry.

By 3:30 PM, Marmaduke’s men had attacked and been repulsed twice. Moore’s front was holding, and the Missouri State Militia as well as the Enrolled Missouri Militia were providing support on his left. For the time being, the firing slackened.

While the Federal soldiers waited in their lines, the Confederates were planning their next move. Major General Sterling Price took control of the situation as he brought up his main striking force, John G. Walker's corps, as well as all his seven batteries of artillery. The artillerists soon began positioning 42 guns in order to open fire.

As Price brought up the majority of his fresh infantry, and placed his guns, Smith’s own forces were having new problems. With their three artillery batteries exposed, Union gunners and horses soon began falling prey to Confederate sharpshooters. With nowhere to take shelter behind the low works, the Federals continued sustaining casualties. In the face of the sharpshooting, several militia companies had to take up the places of fallen gunners.

Finally, around 5 PM, having taken close to two hours to prepare, Price was ready to strike. The guns opened fire, shelling the Federal lines for close to forty minutes. The fire proved especially destructive because of the faulty design of the earthworks.

Around 5:40, Price ordered Walker to unleash his infantry assault. The day’s fighting and the strenuous artillery barrage had softened the Federal infantry’s resolve. Striking the Union lines, Walker’s men acted like a nutcracker; the Federal line split open at the seams. Confederate soldiers vaulted over the works, sent the Union infantry reeling and took hundreds of prisoners while, on the Confederate right, James Fagan unleashed an assault of his own.

As the Union troops were fleeing through the city, Price ordered his men to halt their advance. He feared carnage among his state capital's civilian population if he decided to take the city now by force of arms. Instead of sending his jubilant infantry after the Yankees, he ordered Fagan to put more pressure on McNeil and Sandborn to cut Smith's line of retreat. The Federal troopers however were in a good defensive position and their repeaters and carbines blunted several mounted and dismounted assaults against their firm line.

No matter what he tried, Fagan and his men were turned back again and again. After taking a round to his right shoulder, Fagan had to retire from the field and ordered his exhausted men to cease their assault. While covering themselves with glory and expeding almost their last rounds, Brigadier Generals John McNeil and John Sandborn enabled major parts of Andrew Smith's forces to reach the road to the east. While the Confederates had taken another 800 casualties, mainly from Fagan's division and Walker's corps, Smith lost 600 killed and wounded as well as 2,100 unwounded prisoners. All in all, the struggle for Jefferson City had cost the Confederate Army of the West 4,300 men; Andrew Smith had taken 8,200 losses.

With the nearing dusk, Price's victorious troops entered the capital of Missouri as liberators. Leading the army were Shelby's and Clark's divisions, who had bled the most during the struggle for the city. Then Marmaduke and Churchill followed with Polignac bringing up the rear. Cheering Missourians lauded their countrymen and several families celebrated impromptu reunions when the column entered the city. At the head of the troops rode Sterling Price and governor-in-exile Thomas Caute Reynolds.
 
always wondered if this guy was related to the corrupt sheriff Johnny Behan in Tombstone AZ during the Earp/Cowboy conflict...
I can honestly say that I did not expect this take. If the sheriff was as delusional as our captain, we might have a family pattern here^^
 
I can honestly say that I did not expect this take. If the sheriff was as delusional as our captain, we might have a family pattern here^^
Sheriff Behan wasn't really delusional, just corrupt... although the sheriff of whatever county Tombstone was in, he did zilch to curb the crimes of the Cowboys, and even enlisted the worst of them in posses a few times when he was chasing down the Earps…
 
Wow, that's going really well for the Confederates. Without somenof his troops, Grant might not be able to stretch Lee's army to his limits and make him abandon Petesburg. I wonder what will happen in the East
 
Wow, that's going really well for the Confederates. Without somenof his troops, Grant might not be able to stretch Lee's army to his limits and make him abandon Petesburg. I wonder what will happen in the East
All in all it is not as spectacular as one might think. Up to now, Price only faced one second-rate army (Steele in Arkansas) and a force 50% or more of which were militia together with less than 8,000 veterans commanded by junior officers. As soon as Schofield's Army of the Ohio arrives on the scene (about 13,000 men), the situation is going to change and the Rebels will no longer outnumber their opponents. The militia will also have learned some lessons from their experiences. We might as well get some interference from Kansas and additional detachments from Sherman or Grant. As long as the Federals hold St. Louis, they are the only ones getting troops from the other side of the Mississippi River as reinforcements.
 
XVI. A Quartermaster's Dream New
XVI. A Quartermaster's Dream


The next morning, both Confederate corps prepared for a proper military parade in the fields before the city. Price and his commanders knew the state capital was filled with numerous old friends and a couple thousand people sympathetic to the cause and their expectations were not disappointed. As various units rolled through the open landscape, the citizenry took to the streets to cheer and cry for their heroes. By 11 AM, Sterling Price arrived at the city center to greet the cheering crowds and what had been a spontaneous celebration now turned into near bedlam. The civilians flocked to see him and for the rest of the day the scene baffled description. With no great exaggeration, Price recalled that „old and young, men, women, and children, vied in their salutations and in ministering to the wants and comforts of my wearied and war-torn soldiers“. That evening, Confederate Jefferson City continued the celebration with an exuberant and alcohol-drenched party at the governor's mansion.

Early on July 27 after a light breakfast, Pap Price and an entourage that included Governor Reynolds, moved to the steps of the city hall where both continued to receive and greet guests. Below them, several of the army officers worked through the process of questioning and paroling the prisoners captured during the two-days-battle.

In Jefferson City, Price finally got the reception he had come to expect. There were too many friends to meet and too much applause to receive for him to leave quickly. But more importantly, Price's personal reception was part of a larger outpouring of Confederate sympathies that netted the army thousands of recruits.

Counting in the return of the slightly wounded, the fight for the city had brought Price's army down to little over 22.000 able-bodied men. The following two weeks of the stay in and around the Missouri state capital witnessed the arrival of nearly 7,000 volunteers from central and north western Missouri. Thousands of Southern sympathizers who had long waited for Price to liberate their state now willingly left farms and families to be a part of the grand expedition. Other, less enthusiastic, Southerners, when faced with the prospect of being conscripted by Union militia, chose finally to join the cause of the South. Still, such men needed to be encouraged, oraganized and brought to the army. This task was being fulfilled by the numerous host of recruiting officers sent into the state before the invasion with explicit instructions to raise whole units and then report back to the army when it had reached Jefferson City.

Among the most successful of these was Colonel James T. Searcy who, in short order, raised a brigade worth of men in the Boonslick counties and presented it to Price only three days after the fall of the capital. Captain George S. Rathbun was another successful recruiter although being a native Ohioan. The one-time state legislator from Lafayette County went to his hometown and final destination, Lexington. The local Union militia fled, leaving the city as easy pickings for the anxious Rathbun. Over the next days, Rathbun conscripted no less than eight hundred men between the ages of seventeen and fifty. Former guerilla chieftain and commissioned Confederate Colonel Caleb Perkins dutifully brought nearly a thousand men from Audrain, Calloway and Boone counties while Lieutenant Colonel D. A. Williams, formerly with Jackman's brigade, had combed Livingston and Carrol counties and came up with twelve hundred men, at least one hundred of whom had ridden with Bloody Bill Anderson in the past. Those efforts did not mark the end of Price's endeavor to aquire men in the region. Throughout their stay, the commanders granted liberal furloughs to their soldiers. While Price was especially sympathetic to letting his soldiers see long-missed family and friends, the primary focus was to recruit among those. As a result, in early August Price was able to field an army of about 29,000 men. Their spirits were high and enough supplies were in stock. The Rebels were now able to contemplate their next moves [1].

Due to the influx of new Missouri volunteers and confronted with the fact, that replenishments for Arkansas and Texas units were not in sight for the foreseeable future because of the distances, the Confederate army had to be reorganized in order to retain its combat efficiency. The volunteers that had not been used to bolster existing units were forming a new division commanded by Brigadier General M. Jeff Thompson, who had only days before rejoined the army after an exchange of prisoners of war. The order of battle was changed in the following way:


Army of the West, Major-General Sterling Price, 29.000 men

I. Corps, Major-General Mosby Parsons, 11.400 men

Churchill's Division, Brigadier-General Thomas J. Churchill, 4.500 men

Tappan's Brigade, Brigadier-General James C. Tappan, 1.500 men
24th, 27th, 33rd, 38th, Hardy's Arkansas Infantry

Gause's Brigade, Colonel Lucien C. Gause, 900 men
26th, 32nd, 36th Arkansas Infantry

Hawthorn's Brigade, Brigadier-General Alexander T. Hawthorn, 1.200 men
34th, 35th, 37th, Cocke's Arkansas Infantry

Dockerty's Brigade, Brigadier-General Thomas P. Dockerty, 900 men
18th, 19th, 20th Arkansas Infantry, 12th Arkansas Infantry Battalion

Clark's Division, Brigadier-General John B. Clark jr., 2.600 men

Mitchell's Brigade, Colonel Charles S. Mitchell, 900 men
8th, 9th Missouri Infantry, Ruffner's Missouri Infantry Battalion

Burns' Brigade, Colonel Simon P. Burns, 1.700 men
10th, 11th, 12th, 16th Missouri Infantry, 9th Missouri Infantry Battalion

Thompson's Division, Brigadier-General M. Jeff Thompson, 4.300 men

Tyler's Brigade, Colonel Charles H. Tyler, 800 men
14th, 15th Missouri Infantry

Coffee's Brigade, Colonel J. T. Coffee, 1.200 men
17th, 18th, 19th Missouri Infantry

Perkins' Brigade, Colonel Caleb Perkins, 1.200 men
20th, 21st, 22nd Missouri Infantry

Searcey's Brigade, Colonel James T. Searcey, 1.100 men
23th, 24th, 25th Missouri Infantry

Artillery-Battalion

Harris' Missouri Battery
Collins' Missouri Battery
Hughey's Arkansas Battery
Blocher's Arkansas Battery


II. Corps, Major-General John G. Walker, 11.800 men

Polignac's Division, Major-General Camille A. J. M. Prince de Polignac, 5.200 men

Waul's Brigade, Brigadier-General Thomas N. Waul, 1.200 men
8th, 18th, 22nd Texas Infantry, 13th Texas Cavalry (dismounted)

Luckett's Brigade, Colonel Philip N. Luckett, 1.500 men
3rd, 16th, 17th, 19th Texas Infantry, 16th Texas Cavalry (dismounted)

Roberts' Brigade, Colonel Oran M. Roberts, 1.000 men
11th, 14th Texas Infantry, 28th Texas Cavalry (dismounted), Gould's Texas Infantry Battalion

Looscan's Brigade, Colonel Michael Looscan, 1.500 men
15th, 17th, 22nd, 31st, 34th Texas Cavalry (dismounted)

Shelby's Division (dismounted), Brigadier-General Joseph Shelby, 2.900 men

Iron Brigade, Colonel David Shanks, 1.300 men
5th, 11th, 12th Missouri Cavalry, Elliott's Missouri Cavalry, Crisp's Missouri Cavalry Battalion

Jackman's Brigade, Colonel Sidney D. Jackman, 1.600 men
Hunter's, Jackman's Missouri Cavalry, Schnable's, Williams' Missouri Cavalry Battalion, 46th Arkansas Infantry

Marmaduke's Division (dismounted), Brigadier-General John S. Marmaduke, 3.700 men

Greene's Brigade, Colonel Colton Greene, 1.100 men
3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 10th Missouri Cavalry, 14th Missouri Cavalry Battalion

Freeman's Brigade, Colonel Thomas R. Freeman, 2.600 men
Freeman's, Fristoe's Missouri Cavalry, Ford's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion

Artillery-Battalion

Hynson's Texas Battery
Connor's Missouri Battery
Lesueur's Missouri Battery


Cavalry Division, Major-General James F. Fagan, 5.800 men

Cabell's Brigade, Brigadier-General William L. Cabell, 2.600 men
Gordon's, Monroe's, Morgan's Arkansas Cavalry, Gunter's, Harrell's, Hill's Witherspoon's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion

Dobbins' Brig, Colonel Archibald S. Dobbins, 700 men
Dobbins', McGhee's, Witt's, Lyle's Arkansas Cavalry, Anderson's Arkansas Cavalry Battalion

Slemons' Brigade, Colonel William F. Slemons, 900 men
2nd, Calton's, Crawford's, Rogan's, Wright's Arkansas Cavalry

McCray's Brigade, Colonel Thomas H. McCray, 1.600 men
15th Missouri Cavalry, 45th, 47th Arkansas Mounted Infantry


[1] This chapter was heavily influenced by excerpts from Kyle Sinisi's "The Last Hurrah". The actual numbers of recruits were maybe a quarter lower, but even in OTL many volunteers joined Price's force.
 
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