“He then took out his pencil and drew a sketch of the locality, remarking that the position was like a bottle and that Butler's line of intrenchments across the neck represented the cork; that the enemy had built an equally strong line immediately in front of him across the neck; and it was therefore as if Butler was in a bottle. He was perfectly safe against an attack; but, as Barnard expressed it, the enemy had corked the bottle and with a small force could hold the cork in its place.” – Ulysses S. Grant. Personal Memoirs.
The Bermuda Hundred Campaign, of 1864 was a summer sideshow, away from the Clash to Titans occurring around Atlanta and in places called The Wilderness and Spotsylvania. General Benjamin Butler, perhaps the most famous political general of the War, was defeated by General Pierre Gustav Toussaint Beauregard and as Grant famously said was “corked” on a small peninsula of land between the James and Appomattox Rivers. If not for that quote, the small battles and events of the campaign would have been completely forgotten by history.
But the Campaign was a closer run thing, than general histories of the War Between the States give it credit for. Overshadowed, by the campaigns that eventually would secure the Union Victory, there is little thought given to this forgotten campaign that could have, in the right circumstances, have been a decisive Union Victory. This is going to be my view of what could have happened in Southern Virginia, that summer, had things gone just, a little bit differently, and a little more in favor of that oaf, Butler.
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Part One: There Must Be Some Kinda Way Out of Here
From: An Illustrated Guide to the American Civil War 1861-1865. By Rupert Henderson. Scholastic Press. New York. 1997.
“The Spring Offensive of 1864 was a revolutionary event in the history of warfare. The plan Grant and Sherman had devised as the former headed to Washington to receive his Commission as the First Lieutenant General since George Washington was the end result of decades of technological advancement and three years of constant warfare.
For the first time since the South Carolina militia had fired on Fort Sumter, the Union would combine its advanced industrial base, new tactics, and overwhelming advantages in numbers under a new clique of Generals to bring about a co-ordinated campaign against the Confederacy.
As Grant and his staff planned in Washington DC, the complex nature of the campaign began to take shape. At Chattanooga, General Sherman would be in command of the massive Military Division of the Mississippi, consisting of all forces between the said river, and the Appalachian Mountains. Sherman’s orders would be to drive on Atlanta, which when captured would break the South into Thirds, just as the capture of Vicksburg had severed the Confederacy in half. In association with this the forces of General Nathaniel Banks, based in New Orleans were to move East by land and sea towards the port of Mobile, Alabama. Hopefully with the capture of the port there Banks would be in a position to move North across Alabama and Mississippi towards Union occupied Tennessee [1]. In the east there would be a major consolidation of forces, and Grant himself would oversee the operations attached to the Army of the Potomac which would cross the Rappahannock River, and face off against General Lee.
Two smaller Armies would operate in conjunction with Grant, covering in a sense both of his flanks. To the west would be under General Fritz Siegel, the Army of the Valley who’s mission would be to march south down the Shenandoah, denying the crops and the roads of the corridor to Lee’s Army, thus protecting the Army of the Potomac, and Washington DC from an attack on the right. The second Army to Grant was viewed as far more important, this force the Army of the James was to be given the critical assignment of cutting the Richmond and Petersburg Railway, which connected Lee’s Army to the Open Confederate Port at Wilmington, and the entirety of the Eastern Confederacy. It was hoped by Grant that such a severance would turn all of Northern Virginia and Richmond into an indefensible area and cause their abandonment by the Confederacy. At the very least it would make Lee’s supply situation tedious and prevent re-enforcements from reaching it. Thus Grant and his planners targeted the Railroad town of Weldon, North Carolina as the Army of the James’ target… [2]”
From Terrible Swift Sword: A History of the American Civil War. By Joshua G. Banks. Hearst Books. Chicago. 1970.
“In the wake of Grant, two other Union Army officers would find themselves arriving in the East to serve as new officers for the Old Army of the Potomac. Generals Philip Sheridan and William F Smith were to bring new blood and ideas to the Eastern Army. Sheridan though, would not arrive until the following April when he would take command of the Cavalry Corps. On the very train as Grant, momentarily attached to his staff, was the hopeful former Chief Engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, “Baldy” Smith [3]. Smith found himself in high spirits on his train ride east had he certainly had reason.
It was no secret that Grant intended to clean house in the Army of the Potomac, after years of politics between the McClellan and Hooker factions, many good officers had been lost to backwater command, resignations, and many generals who whom would not have cut it in the apolitical army of the West had risen to commands that they were decidedly unsuited for [4]. Grant had been considering these officers ever since Lincoln had written to him asking for his advice on the War in the East. Among them were Generals Benjamin Butler, Franz Sigel, Alfred Pleasanton, George Sykes, and after reviewing his actions following Gettysburg, and the Mine Run Campaign, the commander of the Army of the Potomac himself George Meade. Smith, having become Grants confidant since they had devised the Cracker Line [4], was the man who had been tapped, to take Meade’s post.
Smith had already served in the Army of the Potomac, from First Bull Run to Fredericksburg he had risen from a staff officer to a Corps commander. In Army politics he had failed miserably, after the disaster at Fredericksburg he had been one of several officers whom Burnside listed as necessary to be removed in the rebuilding of the Army. The Presidents removal of Burnside gave Smith only a short reprieve. Shortly thereafter due to his lobbying against his commanders in favor of General McClellan, Smith proved to Lincoln that perhaps, in this case Burnside had been right. Sent first north to Pennsylvania, then to West Virginia, Smith found himself by the fall of 1863 in the Army of the Cumberland as its chief engineer officer. While he showed himself clearly capable of preforming the duty, and proved himself a hero for the Union with the opening of the Cracker Line, Smith held onto a closely guarded bitterness and thirst for revenge that would only reappear upon his return to Washington…”
From The War Between the States: An American Epic: Part III New Market to Shreveport . By R.S. Cooper. Midtown Publishing. New York. 1962.
“Conferring with his old Commander, Henry Halleck [5], Grant began to weed out the commanders in the East that were not deemed fit for coming operations, the most obvious of these in the Army of the Potomac was the removal of George Sykes from V Corps, replaced by the hero of Gettysburg, Gouverneur K Warren [6]. Sykes was removed due to a chronic lack of action on his part in his new post.
Skyes commanders felt having commanded the US Army Regulars in the Army of the Potomac so well, Sykes had grown too used to being a strategic reserve. It was felt by Grant and Halleck that he lacked this lack of daring would cause serious problems in the upcoming overland campaign. Alfred Pleasanton would be the second corps commander replaced. Grant would bring in the Infantry Officer Philip Sheridan to command the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac; Sheridan was given the post so as to bring to the troopers a leader capable of independent action, as opposed to the standard scouting and courier duties the mounted arm had traditionally been used for [7]…
…Grant soon had to scratch off one of the names on his list due to political concerns. General Franz Siegel had not shown any true ability to command troops in combat, time and time again. Unfortunately for Grant and Lincoln Siegel had a card unique to the rest of the “Political Generals” of the Union Army. While men like John Fremont and John McClernand had been protected by Radical Republicans and War Democrats, Sigel was considered untouchable because of the ability he had to raise recruits. Siegel was a former hero of the Revolution of 1848, and immensely popular with the German immigrants who had been arriving in the United States since then, to relieve him of command would dampen the recruitment of new Germans into the Union Army [8]. Siegel was worth several divisions of the Union forces it was thought. With the option of his removal from command, Grant had to content himself with putting Sigel in command of the Army of the Valley, which would operate close to his own headquarters and hopefully thus be kept from disaster.
… Grant was of the initial opinion that Meade should be replaced, Halleck for all his previous reservations about Meade’s conduct in July of 1863, disagreed especially when the name of William F Smith began to be suggested as his replacement. Meade was still the first man to truly beat Lee, and would be more then able to keep command of the Army, especially if Grant remained in the East. As the Lieutenant General began to know Meade better his mood began to shift, beginning the first major Army-Politics Drama since Grant and Sherman had forced the removal of McClernand.
“Baldy” Smith, had a long history of disagreement with his superiors which Grant had, since the Chattanooga Campaign disregarded as slander, the reports were so different then the relationship he shared with his prized engineer [9]. This changed when, after a series of meetings with Halleck, Meade, and their respective staffs Smith and Grant met at the War Office in Washington. Upon being informed he was being passed up for Command of the Army of the Potomac, Smith became furious. Not even Grant’s announcement that he has submitted Smith’s name to the senate for a promotion to Major General could calm Baldy down [10]. In the end, Grant ordered Smith to leave their meeting, and that he would speak to him the following day.
Smith departed, and went back to his rented room. There, Smith would repeat the same mistake he had made almost a year before. He wrote to Lincoln. Smith explained in his letter how Grant was making a terrible mistake, that Meade had shown time and again that he was in no position to command the Army of the Potomac in the coming campaign. He of course suggested himself as a possible replacement, he suggested that Grant should be kept in Washington for the coming campaign, and explained how he would bring the Army down to the Yorktown Peninsula, a sound strategy that would avoid the same mistakes that McClellan had made in the Spring of 1862 [11].
When Lincoln received the letter, he discussed it with his Secretary of War, Stanton, and then sent a messenger to get Grant. A consensus was quickly reached, and Smith’s name was quietly removed from the list of promotions that had been sent to the Senate. Smith was then informed that he was being dispatched to the Department of the Pacific, to command the Army Corps of Engineers in California. Smith instead chose to resign his commission. Grant would write to Sherman of his disappointment, as he had hoped Smith would have been able to put aside his personal feelings for the country. He did note though that ‘It is better we find such faults in character now, then in the midst of the coming campaign.’ The Lieutenant General found there would soon be much more to concern him then the loss of one unmanageable engineer [12]. ”
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Notes
[1] This was actually the initial plan for Nathaniel Banks forces following the opening of the Mississippi (Where this army had taken the Confederate Position at Port Hudson, Vicksburgs less famous twin). Grant and Banks had proposed a campaign towards Mobile and Alabama as early as July of 1863, it had been constantly delayed by the crisis at Chattanooga and by Lincoln’s need to dispatch necessary troops to Texas, as a show of force against the French Occupation of Mexico. Grants initial 1864 plan for these troops would also never occur, as they instead would depart on a disastrous campaign up the Red River into Louisiana, Texas, and Defeat.
[2] Again this is an initial plan. Grant wanted the Richmond to Wilmington Railroad cut. (Wilmington was the last Confederate Port open on the Atlantic Coast and a haven for blockade runners) Weldon, North Carolina seemed to be the perfect point to do this. This plan would eventually be scraped IRL after a series of discussions with Grant and officers in the region about the problems of crossing Seven rivers.
[3] William Franklin Smith, was commonly known to his troops and the press as “Baldy”. Not because of any lack of hair on his part, but because the Union Army had quite a few General Smiths. There is no record about how he felt about that.
[4] Calling the Western Armies “apolitical” is a common and annoying trait by American Historians. John C Fremont, John Pope, and John McClernand were all up to their respective necks in Army Politics, and so in fact were Grant and Sherman. It just happens that either these generals went down in flames quickly or were thoroughly checked by officers far better at the Army politics game.
[5] Henry Halleck had been Grant’s commander out West for a good part of 1862, and had been the General-in-Chief of the US Army form the removal of General McClellan from the post, to Grants Promotion to Lieutenant General. By all accounts, despite their troubled past Halleck and Grant worked well together in preparation for the 1864 Campaign.
[6] Warren, the Army of the Potomac’s Chief Engineer had made his reputation as a national Hero on Day Two at Gettysburg when he’d discovered Little Round Top was undefended. His quick dispatches to get Infantry troops there, was credited with preventing a flank attack by James Longstreet’s forces. Warren would IOTL go on to hold command of the Corps until the last days of the war when he was relieved by Phil Sheridan.
[7] Philip Sheridan had fought in the Army of the Ohio (Later Army of the Cumberland) for the entire war. He had made a reputation for hating southerners, and for skill in commanding his units up too an infantry corps. While Chattanooga had been besieged by Confederate Forces, he had developed a relationship with Grant and Sherman that would allow him to become the Union’s most favorite Cavalrymen, and one of its most famous Indian Fighters post war.
[8] Franz Sigel, formerly a Colonel in Baden’s Revolutionary Army, Baden’s Secretary of War, and the fellow who got Baden’s Army to Switzerland when the Revolutions of 1848 collapsed, held Incredible popularity with German troops in the Union Army. This in spite of the fact that he was a universal failure in command. Even after his relief in the summer of 1864, German troops in the German Army would proudly state “Im Mit Sigel” until the end of the war.
[9] Historians Generally agree, Baldy Smith had no skill in dealing with his superiors, his relationship with Grant seems to have been based off initially on the fact that he needed Grant to open the supply line to the besieged Union Army at Chattanooga, and after that because well, he saw his way to the top.
[10] Smith had already been promoted to Major General when he had been in the Army of the Potomac, the promotion had been rejected by the Senate, but Grants Influence in 1864 would get him the promotion had Baldy not lost his temper. This is the POD, IOTL Smith had allowed himself to believe for a time that he would at least command the Army of the James. When he only received a corps in it, he began his rapid decline.
[11] This was actually a plan that Grant had considered in late 1863 for the Army of the Potomac, Smith was a key and stubborn supporter for it, even after Grant dropped it. Just like IOTL he would be a loud and stubborn supporter for the original Army of the James plan, the overland march to Weldon, North Carolina. Such stubbornness didn’t help him then, and it won’t here.
[12] Grant would eventually regret bringing Smith with him to the East, though he declined to ever state exact reasoning. And in 1864 there are plenty of Union Generals that are spares.