Chapter 1
Call Me John
By: John L. Lewis
[Chicago; New Labor Press, 1972]
I always planned to run again for the AFL’s presidency. I should have won in ’21 against the gutless Gompers. The man was something in his early days, but he’d lost, by the 20’s he’d certainly lost it. I still think the dividing point was Wilson. Gompers cooperated with the First World War. Personally I never thought it right to take a position. It risked dividing the mine workers and really I had no say over the matter anyway. My opposition would only have split us. But Gompers, he had to make a choice because he could have stopped it. The AF of L was a powerful thing then and moreover it would have had the sympathy of the working-class, uniting the radicals with the moderates. He chose to support the war though. More importantly he closely cooperated with the government to ensure production. He gave in, gave up our autonomy without concession.
So I should’ve won ’21 but I didn’t. I lost, but I lost fair and square. What killed me was Green. That bastard William Green. He always pretended to be on my side, “our team” he always said. He nominated me in ’21. But I learned it was for him. It was for his selfish purposes. He wanted me out of the way. William Green was a power hungry bastard. And so when we got into the negotiations for the miners’ contracts in ’24 he bolted ‘cause that very spot he said he wanted me in had opened up and he wanted it and he won it. The bastard.
….
But in the end I suppose it all turned out well. I accepted Coolidge’s selfish offer of the Secretary of Labor post in ‘25 [FN1] after he agreed to help us out in contract talks and I so I began my first stint in politics. The whole thing a stunt, the Republicans back then still had their progressive faction, just the election before La Follette had won a tenth of the vote. I’d supported him. Coolidge was worried, twice now in four elections Progressives had broken away and they had almost done it again in 1916 [FN2]. So in an effort to unite the party, I was appointed, briefly. It was a tumultuous time but the lessons I learned were important.
….
The reason they finally gave for sacking me was my support for the strike in England. “How could you,” I remember Coolidge saying, “support such a revolutionary action.”
“Solidarity,” that was my answer. It was really just an excuse though, my support for the strike was almost expected, especially since concerned miners there, and so too it was insignificant. There real reason was my agitation in congress and the drawing up of a Labor Rights act that would have finally truly legalized organizing. Coolidge strongly opposed that but thought if he expelled me for that reason it risked splitting the party. However, most of the reformist, middle-class progressives were either neutral towards or against the general strike in Britain. And so I was kicked out.
But I’d learned the importance of forging a coalition and when I took back over full time at the UMW I realized we needed the left and they needed us. Just as the Republican Party was failing because it ignored the left-wing of its base, I worried its base would fail if it ignored its own left. Besides, I had firm control of the party by now and so I allowed the leftists to stay, undoing long fermenting plans.
….
1926, ’27, and ‘28 were mainly built around “legalizing labor,” that was the slogan I remember. The 20’s had been a harsh time for the movement and the AFL had lost over a million members. At the same time, though, industrial unions, such as ours, were beginning to get attention. However, we needed to counteract the lies and restrictions oppressing us. I’d made a few friends during my time with the administration but more importantly my “stock” as a public figure had improved. I was much, much better known.
The first step was simple, the Coolidge administration clearly thought they could push us out and we had to show them we’d hit back if they tried. I urged a reassembly of the CPPA (Congress for Progressive Political Action) and they agreed, mainly thanks to the idea of having the miners on their side, thus legitimizing their own organization. They agreed to through their considerable resources behind my plan to run for senate in Iowa under the Progressive Party banner.
….
The northeastern portion of the state was most supportive, being deeply influenced by the neighboring Wisconsin. All in all I never thought I’d win the campaign, that wasn’t the idea at the time. In fact, at the time I’d never dreamt of a real “Independent Labor Party.” The point was to force concessions out of the Republicans, who’d once housed so many progressives including myself. In the end it worked. They lost their senate seat in Iowa to the Democrats and I won a quarter of the vote, nearly overtaking the Republican who won 28%.
….
1927 seemed a year of preparation. We were bartering heavily with the Republican establishment, threatening to run a presidential candidate in ’28 on the progressive ticket again as well as, more importantly, a massive slate of Progressives in the upper Midwest and California for every conceivable office, particular congress. The idea of losing congress was a major threat to the Hoover, who was emerging as the frontrunner in for the Republican nomination. We had to prove we would go through with it however so a convention was planned. In October I formally announced my intent to run for president, although in reality such “intent” was merely meant to scare the Republicans, I doubt I could have done as well as La Follette even at this point, much less become a national threat. Furthermore, I wasn’t he strongest available man. I was put forward because if the Republicans called our bluff, the real politicians didn’t want their careers collapsing.
On the union side, things were getting tense as well. In November occurred the Columbine Massacre [FN3], when police opened fire on a line of our unarmed picketers killing 16. We knew a response must immediately be coordinated; however a long term general strike seemed unfeasible and furthermore would give Coolidge the excuse he was looking for to break the union and the momentum the left was building. Instead, we launched a single day of solidarity strikes. It got the nation’s attention and, with the exception of a small number of clashes, was essentially peaceful. The company caved to our demands
and paid compensation for the deaths within the next two weeks, widely due to public outcry. Our momentum was rapidly building.
….
The Republicans did end up caving. We withdrew most of our slew of candidates but 15 were allowed to run without Republican opposition, of which 12 won. The Progressives now had a foothold in congress. And furthermore, Hoover agreed to reinstate me as Secretary of Labor. We had a plan too. We’d drafted the Labor Bill of Rights, the same thing I’d tried to lobby for in my last stint. Only this time we had the ability to bring it to the floor and bring it to a vote thanks to committee positions and a promise from the Republican establishment. They thought they would then vote it down, little did they know we had a few more tricks up our sleeve. The workers’ were beginning to build an independent force.
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[1] Coolidge actually offered Lewis the post but he turned it down, a decision he later regretted.
[2] Roosevelt was officially nominated again in 1916 but pulled out of the race to support Hughes.
[3] This really occurred, just so you don’t think I’m picking the location of the massacre in bad taste.