There is Power in A Union: Independent Labor in the United States

So I've finally found a topic I have the knowledge to work with. The Red Britain timeline will be put on hiatus as I do more reading, the period is simply too complex without more knowledge, especially for an American. That said...


Taft-Hartley ended the American Labor movement. It limited it and it forced out anyone left of center and all those who had some strange "foreign" taste for such archaic concepts as free-speech. Most importantly, it lead directly to the collapse of the CIO. However, what if John Lewis had remained? What if the CIO was more entrenched? What if Lewis had decided to accept Coolidge's offer and become Secretary of Labor? And what if this had opened his eyes to the nature of politics, "the struggle," and what must be done? And as a result what if the CPPA had actually succeeded in building a "Labor Party?" What if Taft-Hartley never happened? What if the CIO instead became the dominant union, driving the AFL like the Knights and countless others before them into the history books? What if the labor movement survived?

These are the questions among others I hope to explore in this timeline. As stated above the POD is 1924 and the idea that a young(ish) John L. Lewis had accepted Coolidge's offer and become Secretary of Labor. The events from there on out are meant to paint a realistic portrait of the development of an American labor party. I stress the idea is to be realistic. Utopian timelines are fun, but this is meant to be a psuedo-academic exploration of what could have been. The goal is to create a realistic alternate world.

I'd like to credit Dan McCollum who inspired me with his story of Wisconsin Progressives and whose format I've co-opted as I found it quite readable and effective.

Without further ado, "There is Power in A Union."
 
Chapter 1

1109.1935_John-L-Lewis.jpg


Call Me John
By: John L. Lewis
[Chicago; New Labor Press, 1972]

I always planned to run again for the AFL’s presidency. I should have won in ’21 against the gutless Gompers. The man was something in his early days, but he’d lost, by the 20’s he’d certainly lost it. I still think the dividing point was Wilson. Gompers cooperated with the First World War. Personally I never thought it right to take a position. It risked dividing the mine workers and really I had no say over the matter anyway. My opposition would only have split us. But Gompers, he had to make a choice because he could have stopped it. The AF of L was a powerful thing then and moreover it would have had the sympathy of the working-class, uniting the radicals with the moderates. He chose to support the war though. More importantly he closely cooperated with the government to ensure production. He gave in, gave up our autonomy without concession.

So I should’ve won ’21 but I didn’t. I lost, but I lost fair and square. What killed me was Green. That bastard William Green. He always pretended to be on my side, “our team” he always said. He nominated me in ’21. But I learned it was for him. It was for his selfish purposes. He wanted me out of the way. William Green was a power hungry bastard. And so when we got into the negotiations for the miners’ contracts in ’24 he bolted ‘cause that very spot he said he wanted me in had opened up and he wanted it and he won it. The bastard.

….

But in the end I suppose it all turned out well. I accepted Coolidge’s selfish offer of the Secretary of Labor post in ‘25 [FN1] after he agreed to help us out in contract talks and I so I began my first stint in politics. The whole thing a stunt, the Republicans back then still had their progressive faction, just the election before La Follette had won a tenth of the vote. I’d supported him. Coolidge was worried, twice now in four elections Progressives had broken away and they had almost done it again in 1916 [FN2]. So in an effort to unite the party, I was appointed, briefly. It was a tumultuous time but the lessons I learned were important.

….

The reason they finally gave for sacking me was my support for the strike in England. “How could you,” I remember Coolidge saying, “support such a revolutionary action.”

“Solidarity,” that was my answer. It was really just an excuse though, my support for the strike was almost expected, especially since concerned miners there, and so too it was insignificant. There real reason was my agitation in congress and the drawing up of a Labor Rights act that would have finally truly legalized organizing. Coolidge strongly opposed that but thought if he expelled me for that reason it risked splitting the party. However, most of the reformist, middle-class progressives were either neutral towards or against the general strike in Britain. And so I was kicked out.

But I’d learned the importance of forging a coalition and when I took back over full time at the UMW I realized we needed the left and they needed us. Just as the Republican Party was failing because it ignored the left-wing of its base, I worried its base would fail if it ignored its own left. Besides, I had firm control of the party by now and so I allowed the leftists to stay, undoing long fermenting plans.

….

1926, ’27, and ‘28 were mainly built around “legalizing labor,” that was the slogan I remember. The 20’s had been a harsh time for the movement and the AFL had lost over a million members. At the same time, though, industrial unions, such as ours, were beginning to get attention. However, we needed to counteract the lies and restrictions oppressing us. I’d made a few friends during my time with the administration but more importantly my “stock” as a public figure had improved. I was much, much better known.

The first step was simple, the Coolidge administration clearly thought they could push us out and we had to show them we’d hit back if they tried. I urged a reassembly of the CPPA (Congress for Progressive Political Action) and they agreed, mainly thanks to the idea of having the miners on their side, thus legitimizing their own organization. They agreed to through their considerable resources behind my plan to run for senate in Iowa under the Progressive Party banner.

….

The northeastern portion of the state was most supportive, being deeply influenced by the neighboring Wisconsin. All in all I never thought I’d win the campaign, that wasn’t the idea at the time. In fact, at the time I’d never dreamt of a real “Independent Labor Party.” The point was to force concessions out of the Republicans, who’d once housed so many progressives including myself. In the end it worked. They lost their senate seat in Iowa to the Democrats and I won a quarter of the vote, nearly overtaking the Republican who won 28%.

0701_010501.gif


….

1927 seemed a year of preparation. We were bartering heavily with the Republican establishment, threatening to run a presidential candidate in ’28 on the progressive ticket again as well as, more importantly, a massive slate of Progressives in the upper Midwest and California for every conceivable office, particular congress. The idea of losing congress was a major threat to the Hoover, who was emerging as the frontrunner in for the Republican nomination. We had to prove we would go through with it however so a convention was planned. In October I formally announced my intent to run for president, although in reality such “intent” was merely meant to scare the Republicans, I doubt I could have done as well as La Follette even at this point, much less become a national threat. Furthermore, I wasn’t he strongest available man. I was put forward because if the Republicans called our bluff, the real politicians didn’t want their careers collapsing.

On the union side, things were getting tense as well. In November occurred the Columbine Massacre [FN3], when police opened fire on a line of our unarmed picketers killing 16. We knew a response must immediately be coordinated; however a long term general strike seemed unfeasible and furthermore would give Coolidge the excuse he was looking for to break the union and the momentum the left was building. Instead, we launched a single day of solidarity strikes. It got the nation’s attention and, with the exception of a small number of clashes, was essentially peaceful. The company caved to our demands and paid compensation for the deaths within the next two weeks, widely due to public outcry. Our momentum was rapidly building.

….

The Republicans did end up caving. We withdrew most of our slew of candidates but 15 were allowed to run without Republican opposition, of which 12 won. The Progressives now had a foothold in congress. And furthermore, Hoover agreed to reinstate me as Secretary of Labor. We had a plan too. We’d drafted the Labor Bill of Rights, the same thing I’d tried to lobby for in my last stint. Only this time we had the ability to bring it to the floor and bring it to a vote thanks to committee positions and a promise from the Republican establishment. They thought they would then vote it down, little did they know we had a few more tricks up our sleeve. The workers’ were beginning to build an independent force.
___________________________________________________________

[1] Coolidge actually offered Lewis the post but he turned it down, a decision he later regretted.
[2] Roosevelt was officially nominated again in 1916 but pulled out of the race to support Hughes.
[3] This really occurred, just so you don’t think I’m picking the location of the massacre in bad taste.
 
one of the ironies in all this being that where unions are active in the US the default mode of operation is 'closed shop' ,rather than the plurality of unions operating in workplaces elsewhere in the world and the recognition of collective bargaining by these groups and loose non aligned groups by employers.
 
Taft-Hartley ended the American Labor movement. It limited it and it forced out anyone left of center and all those who had some strange "foreign" taste for such archaic concepts as free-speech.
I think that's a bit harsh, especially given that the Labor movement kept growing throughout the 1950s, and was incredibly politically powerful in the 1960s.

I do agree it limited it, but I think the Cold War made that inevitable.

Most importantly, it lead directly to the collapse of the CIO. However, what if John Lewis had remained? What if the CIO was more entrenched? What if Lewis had decided to accept Coolidge's offer and become Secretary of Labor? And what if this had opened his eyes to the nature of politics, "the struggle," and what must be done? And as a result what if the CPPA had actually succeeded in building a "Labor Party?" What if Taft-Hartley never happened? What if the CIO instead became the dominant union, driving the AFL like the Knights and countless others before them into the history books? What if the labor movement survived?
Lots of questions here which require answers:
  • Lewis left the CIO leadership much earlier. So you'd need a much earlier PoD.
  • I don't think Lewis becoming Coolidge's Labor Secretary is the PoD you need. Instead, I'd go from WWI; back then, Lewis basically wrote out a vision for how the UMWA would plan the coal industry, which I think is the way in to changing his political opinions. Also, getting him more personally involved in the Harlan County Mine Wars would help.
  • A big thing you'd need to change is the CPUSA under William Z. Foster trying to take over the UMWA in the 20's, which led Lewis to crack down on leftists he saw as outsiders infiltrating his union.
  • There was a perfectly functional American Labor Party that could have done much better had ballot fusion remained legal across the U.S.
 
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I think that's a bit harsh, especially given that the Labor movement kept growing throughout the 1950s, and was incredibly politically powerful in the 1960s.

I do agree it limited it, but I think the Cold War made that inevitable.
I disagree. Although it grew to its height in the 1950's, it did not do so as an independent movement. Since Taft-Hartley and the death of the CIO, the idea of the labor movement refusing broad support for the Democratic Party has been unheard of. While certain issues, such as NAFTA, have forced their hand into protests, they have never really been independent and, moreover, never had that much sway over a party traditionally lead by academics.

Lots of questions here which require answers:
  • Lewis left the CIO leadership much earlier. So you'd need a much earlier PoD.
  • I don't think Lewis becoming Coolidge's Labor Secretary is the PoD you need. Instead, I'd go from WWI; back then, Lewis basically wrote out a vision for how the UMWA would plan the coal industry, which I think is the way in to changing his political opinions. Also, getting him more personally involved in the Harlan County Mine Wars would help.
  • A big thing you'd need to change is the CPUSA under William Z. Foster trying to take over the UMWA in the 20's, which led Lewis to crack down on leftists he saw as outsiders infiltrating his union.
  • There was a perfectly functional American Labor Party that could have done much better had ballot fusion remained legal across the U.S.

  • That's not quite possible as the CIO didn't exist until 1935/8 (depending on which way you look at it) and thus Lewis could not have left the organization a decade before it began. In reality he left it around the start of WWII in the 1940's
  • The idea here isn't to change Lewis' ideological opinions, its to teach him a little about the world of politics. By putting him in political office he becomes frustrated with the Republican Party 10 years earlier, before the Democratic Party offers a real alternative, and thus begins his slide into independence. Furthermore it teaches him the need for "broad tents" in politics, an idea he never reconciled with until well into the CIO years.
  • Lewis didn't expel the leftists until 1928 which has been butterflied away in this timeline. While he maintains his strong central control of a centralized union (in the UMW), he comes to recognize their use in organizing and, again, the need for a "broad tent."
  • I know, which was part of the inspiration for this timeline. However ITTL an independent labor movement is emerging a decade earlier and, quite importantly, is focused in the traditional progressive/labor heartland of the upper Midwest rather then in New York, which has always been dominated by machine politics. Furthermore they are emerging not as a fusion party, i.e. the ALP, but rather in a similar manner to how the Labour Party emerged in the UK, through electoral alliances with a major party allowing them a foothold in Congress.
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Sorry for the long delay between posts. I had a massive paper due in my International Relations course and have been focusing on that. I'm doing a final draft for it tomorrow and then either Wednesday, Thursday, or, at the latest, Friday I'll have a significant update.
 
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