The worst Soviet Generals of WWII

Deleted member 1487

No, but being military pioneers that invent concepts like deep battle and operational art when the Nazi generals were still riding around on horses make them better. Being able to formulate a coherent operational design for Barbarossa instead of limbo like the Nazis. That makes them better at meta warfare.
The hell are you talking about? Deep battle was nothing new, nor originally Russian (and the idea predated the Soviets within Russian military theory).
It is also mystifying why you think the Soviets were in the lead in military theory, considering the Soviets were trying to copy the German organization after France and failed at it, quite badly. "Meta-warfare"? This is getting into Soviet-boo territory.
 
The hell are you talking about? Deep battle was nothing new, nor originally Russian (and the idea predated the Soviets within Russian military theory).
It is also mystifying why you think the Soviets were in the lead in military theory, considering the Soviets were trying to copy the German organization after France and failed at it, quite badly. "Meta-warfare"? This is getting into Soviet-boo territory.

Who coined the term again??? Exactly

The Nazis had no concept of operational art. It is why they ultimately lost in military terms. Had they had it they would have done Barbarossa better.
 

Deleted member 1487

Who coined the term again??? Exactly
Someone invented a name for an older concept. So what?

The Nazis had no concept of operational art. It is why they ultimately lost in military terms. Had they had it they would have done Barbarossa better.
Uh-huh.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operational_level_of_war
In the case of World War II analysis, the Wehrmacht did not use the operational level as a formal doctrinal concept during the campaigns of 1939–1945. While personnel within the German forces knew of operational art, awareness and practice was limited principally to general-staff trained officers. Nevertheless, the existential nature of operational art means that examining a campaign or an operation against political aims is valid irrespective of the doctrine or structures of the period. Thus the elements of operational art—time, space, means and purpose—can illuminate thoughts and actions of any era, regardless of the prevailing contemporary doctrine or structure.[3]
They knew about it and used it, they just didn't formalize war into rigid doctrinal concepts like the Soviets did.

Barbarossa was hamstrung by Hitler's constant meddling, logistics issues unrelated to the practice of operational art, and harmed by the parallel war the Axis had with the British and soon the Americans.
 
Eh...not really. He had some success when dipping his hands into operations, but he made massive blunders like invading the USSR, declaring war on the USA.

It's the economic aspects that made those not just the correct decisions, but the only possible decisions. Only with Soviet resources and industry can Germany hope to prevail against US-supported Britain, and only through war with the US can US influence and materiel be excluded from Europe.
 
Eh...not really. He had some success when dipping his hands into operations, but he made massive blunders like invading the USSR, declaring war on the USA, starting the war in the first place, etc.

Yeah, if he was such a genius about the economics of warfare he wouldn't have started a war against the world's largest empire, the world's largest country and the world's largest economy all at the same time .
 
It's the economic aspects that made those not just the correct decisions, but the only possible decisions. Only with Soviet resources and industry can Germany hope to prevail against US-supported Britain, and only through war with the US can US influence and materiel be excluded from Europe.

Trade with the USSR for those resources instead of invading for them. The USSR was perfectly willing to sell to Nazi Germany. Without a war the US is likely to spend only so much.
 
Much as I do not want to step into an intimate flame-war in progress, my two cents: we will never knew which Soviet generals were awful and which were good, because the Soviets covered up the defeats of general they wanted to be seen as good and used defeats of generals Stalin no longer liked to be sacked or worse. Add to this the degree of external political control over their strategic and tactical decisions and you get a very blurry picture as to the "talent" of the men in nominal command.

While an argument could be made that there were many generals in history who through the use of their forgotten hard-working staff were able to achieve victories where they would be defeated without the same level of staff support, the Soviet variant was much more profound and even more opaque. Then to make the matter even more confused, in the immediate aftermath of the War, Stalin - being a petty and jealous sort - went out of his way to denigrate the victorious generals and had his revisionist goon squad find losses where victories took place. Then, in the early Khrushchev years, a complete reversal, with the Red Army being once again called great and their generals celebrated (good and bad, they were all suddenly geniuses). Then, as Khrushchev turned against Zhukov, it once again became a game of finding non-Zhukovs to laud to take the shine off Zhukov. And then, the Brezhnev faction saw the "rehabilitation" of Zhukov as a bridge to the partial rehabilitation of Stalin by reminding folks of the glories of World War 2, so once again the generals' reputations were reshuffled to meet the needs of the political administration. This was then followed by the perestroika reappraisal, where Voroshilov was thrown to the dogs by Soviet press. And then, we had the post-Soviet collapse re-appraisal of revisionists seeking to make a name for themselves by burying Zhukov and finding lesser "forgotten" great generals.

After that sort of horror show, I have no idea who were the worst Soviet generals. Because even the fellow we would be quick to condemn for getting his army surrounded because he did nothing could have done nothing because he was given orders to do nothing and to not retreat and 75% of his pals were tortured to death in the late '30s, so he did not want to against the command given. There were cases of Russian generals blowing their brains out in the woods as their armies were surrounded because they knew they could not retreat and also knew they would be blamed for the defeat or being taken captive. But if they killed themselves, then their families would not face sanctions from the government (up to and including being deported to Siberia) for being related to a "traitor" who "cooperated" with the enemy by surrendering.

How can you rank generals in a broken, paralyzed, sociopath society such as that? Some were better at reading Stalin than others and some of them also managed to be good. Others were not quite that lucky for reasons utterly beyond their control. I don't mean the element of luck that most generals need, I mean something even greater than that. Zhukov intimated once that he learned to read Stalin's mood by the way he smoked and that is how he was able to argue with him. Is that a criteria for a good general? Literally decoding smoke signals of a genocidal maniac tyrant?

Many will say Nazi Germany was much the same. And there is a degree of truth to that, but compare the fate of Beck to Tukhachevsky and realize there were thousands of Tukhachevskies.
 
Hard to say. There are a number of contenders for the spot. Kulik, Budyenney, Mekhlis, to name a few. Voroshilov was also bad, although he probably wasn’t the worst.

Pavlov... isn’t really a contender. While it was true that did mishandle the opening stage of Barbarossa, all that really meant was altering the degree of catastrophe. That isn’t to say he really ever showed any signs of potentially being one of the “Greats” either. “Mediocre” would probably fit him best...

They knew about it and used it, they just didn't formalize war into rigid doctrinal concepts like the Soviets did.

Did you actually read what you quoted? Because the very first sentence contradicts your claim.

Yes, the Germans had a understanding of operational art. No, their understanding was not as remotely thorough or coherent as that of their Soviet counterparts. Soviet operational practice didn’t really overtake the Germans until the end of 1942 (I’m not sure where pan’s claims that the Soviets were operating above the Germans “from the very beginning” comes from), but that doesn’t change the fact that their theory was still a whole lot more developed. Soviet operational concepts were also rather the opposite of rigid, you must be confusing them with their tactical practices.

logistics issues unrelated to the practice of operational art

German logistical issues in Barbarossa were very much related to the practice of their operational art. Logistics represents the means, after all, and German Operational Art disregarded the means heavily in favor of tunnel visioning on the ends (what the wiki article refers to as “the purpose”).

It's the economic aspects that made those not just the correct decisions, but the only possible decisions. Only with Soviet resources and industry can Germany hope to prevail against US-supported Britain, and only through war with the US can US influence and materiel be excluded from Europe.

Well, yes and no. Once one accepts Hitler’s foundational belief, that Germany had to wage a war and conquer Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals and smash the twin centers of a Jewish Conspiracy against Germany (the US and USSR) before it destroyed Germany forever, then Hitler’s strategic decision making was actually quite good. However, the obvious fundamental problem from which all the flaws in Hitler’s strategic vision stemmed from was that the aforementioned foundational belief was batshit, not to mention immoral.
 
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Deleted member 1487

Did you actually read what you quoted? Because the very first sentence contradicts your claim.

Yes, the Germans had a understanding of operational art. No, their understanding was not as remotely thorough or coherent as that of their Soviet counterparts. Soviet operational practice didn’t really overtake the Germans until the end of 1942 (I’m not sure where pan’s claims that the Soviets were operating above the Germans “from the very beginning” comes from), but that doesn’t change the fact that their theory was still a whole lot more developed. Soviet operational concepts were also rather the opposite of rigid, you must be confusing them with their tactical practices.
The Soviet conception of it as a distinct level of warfare was thorough and rigid, but that doesn't mean it was necessarily a correct way to conceptualize warfare.
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub939.pdf

Soviet operational practice failed in 1941-42 due to the fault of means; their concept of it was already thoroughly understood, they just were not matching their concepts to means; we don't really know if it would have held up to the German army at it's peak if the Soviet means matched their theory, but by 1943-45 they were facing a fraction of German strength, mostly devoid of air cover (even during Kursk only about 1/3rd of fighter strength was in the east and army strength was moved from the East to the West away from the main German offensive) and strategic reserves. Once again the Soviets didn't win based on some exceptional operational skill, they won on numbers, material aid from their allies, and their main enemy's reserves and air force fighting on other fronts against said allies.

As to Pan's claim, I get where he is coming from in that Soviet Deep Battle Theory was already fleshed out (Isserson's work was done by 1940), but the means to actually conduct it were not yet available. Having a developed theory doesn't really mean much if the means aren't there, but beyond that theory could well be flawed or only applicable in specific situations.

As to Soviet rigidity, their operational conception was that war was basically mathematical and you needed to apply x number of men, y number of artillery shells, z number of tanks, etc. and brute force results. See Rzhev for example. Even the conduct of Kursk was rather ham-handed and amounted to little more than frontal spoiling attacks. It mostly worked fine in 1944 when the German army was beyond spent, but in situations where they could mass forces they could still stop the Soviets cold like in Romania in spring:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Jassy–Kishinev_Offensive

German logistical issues in Barbarossa were very much related to the practice of their operational art. Logistics represents the means, after all, and German Operational Art disregarded the means heavily in favor of tunnel visioning on the ends (what the wiki article refers to as “the purpose”).
Operational logistics were issues within the armies and army groups, the German problem was one of strategic logistics, i.e. the rail system not being understood and built up to sustain the sharp end of the stick. So too in that regard Hitler holding back replacement equipment and spare parts to form new panzer divisions and in fact infantry divisions too instead of keeping the Eastern Front supplied; that was all a problem of strategy, not operations. That doesn't mean there weren't operational logistical issues, every military faced that, but the core of the problem was strategic choices and lack of preparation based on faulty assumptions like the Soviet willingness and capacity to resist imploding by August.
 
The Soviet conception of it as a distinct level of warfare was thorough and rigid, but that doesn't mean it was necessarily a correct way to conceptualize warfare.

Thorough, yes. Rigid, no. Effective operational art, by it’s very nature, cannot be rigid. It must take into account both tactical and strategic factors as well as those on it’s own level and to do that it has to be flexible. The Soviets were rigid in their definitions, but that rigidity begets flexibility as precisely defied terminology prevents confusion that would interfere with flexibility.

And it is very much a correct way to conceptualize war. That’s something which is now universally recognized among militaries the globe over.

Soviet operational practice failed in 1941-42 due to the fault of means; their concept of it was already thoroughly understood, they just were not matching their concepts to means;

In 1941-42, there was something of a divorce between Soviet theory and practice for obvious reasons, what with the purges and rapid expansion and not expecting war in mid-1941. Even then, the Soviets did have the material means at the combat end of their elements to at least blunt the hell out of the German advance before the logistical issues undermined their ability to resist... but they lacked the skill to utilize those means appropriately, so in the end the bulk of the forces just collapsed in confusion from the outset.

we don't really know if it would have held up to the German army at it's peak if the Soviet means matched their theory, but by 1943-45 they were facing a fraction of German strength, mostly devoid of air cover (even during Kursk only about 1/3rd of fighter strength was in the east and army strength was moved from the East to the West away from the main German offensive) and strategic reserves.

Flatly untrue. The Soviets in 1943 still faced the bulk of German strength and their reserves aswell as a significant fraction of air power that was never rendered inoperational as it was in the West. Additionally, mid-1943 was the peak of the most important striking element of the Heer, the panzer forcres, which was utilized in an attempt in a Blitzkrieg-Esque encirclement and then a mobile defense as in the year’s beforehand... and the Soviets beat it anyways. That gives us a quite good idea of what would have happened if the 1941 Wherhmacht had to face the 1943 Red Army (adjusted for equipment).

Once again the Soviets didn't win based on some exceptional operational skill, they won on numbers, material aid from their allies, and their main enemy's reserves and air force fighting on other fronts against said allies.

None of which would have permitted the Soviets to win unless they applied exceptional skill. Material and numerical superiority as well as air superiority are potential advantages that mean nothing without the skill to implement it. For the sort of operations the Soviets conducted in 1943-1944 required exceptional operational and, eventually, tactical skill. Otherwise, they’d have been stuck out in Western/Southern Russia borders for the entire war stuck in an endless procession of Rzhev’s. Finally, everyone well understands that the main German reserves in 1943-44 were directed to the East, so that claim is just wrong.

As to Pan's claim, I get where he is coming from in that Soviet Deep Battle Theory was already fleshed out (Isserson's work was done by 1940), but the means to actually conduct it were not yet available. Having a developed theory doesn't really mean much if the means aren't there, but beyond that theory could well be flawed or only applicable in specific situations.

Which is nice and all, but still manages to miss the entire point. Deep Battle was an expression of Operational Art which was understood by the Soviets. And as their understanding was the most thorough on the planet, so too then was Deep Battle. And obviously Deep Battle isn’t applicable in all situations. Not even the Soviets made that claim. Military doctrine is created to fit circurmstances. Had the US Army been faced with the Eastern Front it would have developed different weapons and a different way of fighting. Not necessarily identical to what the Soviets chose, since the Americans had access to consistently better junior leadership to use just one example, but certainly different from what it used for the rather different circumstances in the Western and Pacific Fronts. Similarly, the Soviets never had doctrine for the kind of large-scale all-arms amphibious assault the Western Allies conducted at Normandy, so they would have had to build it up to suit their needs.

As to Soviet rigidity, their operational conception was that war was basically mathematical and you needed to apply x number of men, y number of artillery shells, z number of tanks, etc. and brute force results.

A lovely misrepresentation of norms, which constitutes but one aspect of Soviet tactical practices. And Soviet “brute force results” were only as brute force as everyone else. Overwhelming force at the point of contact is Just How Things Are Done. It’s only a result of exceptional operational maeneuvering if the Germans do it.

German problem was one of strategic logistics, i.e. the rail system not being understood and built up to sustain the sharp end of the stick.

Which good operational art would account for and plan around. The Germans didn’t and didn’t. German ignorance of railroad conditions within the USSR was a deliberate one, based on a arrogant and unfounded assumption that Soviet Forces would simply collapse with the opening blows. When said collapse failed to materialize, they continued to ignore the implications of the rail situation and act as if they could operate exactly the same as they always did... with predictable results. That’s poor Operational Art.

So too in that regard Hitler holding back replacement equipment and spare parts to form new panzer divisions and in fact infantry divisions too instead of keeping the Eastern Front supplied; that was all a problem of strategy, not operations. That doesn't mean there weren't operational logistical issues, every military faced that, but the core of the problem was strategic choices and lack of preparation based on faulty assumptions like the Soviet willingness and capacity to resist imploding by August.

And said faulty assumptions are a direct result of flawed Operational Art which did not make any effort to prevent such assumptions being made and failed to adjust accordingly when said assumptions were proven wrong.
 

Deleted member 1487

Thorough, yes. Rigid, no. Effective operational art, by it’s very nature, cannot be rigid. It must take into account both tactical and strategic factors as well as those on it’s own level and to do that it has to be flexible. The Soviets were rigid in their definitions, but that rigidity begets flexibility as precisely defied terminology prevents confusion that would interfere with flexibility.

And it is very much a correct way to conceptualize war. That’s something which is now universally recognized among militaries the globe over.
Rigidity of the WW2 version of Deep Battle (Soviet doctrine of course evolved and improved post-WW2). Set piece battle doctrine can of course be rigid and successful, see Montgomery's operations in Africa. Inherent in the WW2 version of Soviet Deep Battle was rigidity in forcing breakthroughs where ever demanded (selection of the breakthrough points improved as the war went on of course), which forced tactical rigidity and heavy casualties. Especially when you outnumber your enemy and they've lost strategic and often operational mobility, plus have strategic reserves, highly planned and rigid set piece battles can be quite successful (also see 1918).

And it is very much a correct way to conceptualize war. That’s something which is now universally recognized among militaries the globe over.
Having a definition of the conduct of war between the strategic and tactic level is one thing and quite different from having an operational doctrine that devours the conduct of strategy and tactics.

In 1941-42, there was something of a divorce between Soviet theory and practice for obvious reasons, what with the purges and rapid expansion and not expecting war in mid-1941. Even then, the Soviets did have the material means at the combat end of their elements to at least blunt the hell out of the German advance before the logistical issues undermined their ability to resist... but they lacked the skill to utilize those means appropriately, so in the end the bulk of the forces just collapsed in confusion from the outset.
It was more than skill, than lacked enough radios, logistics of their own, air defense, fully operational tanks, etc.
A substantial function of collapse was the lack of combat means and the physical means to coordinate, which when coupled with leadership failures and lack of experience, not to mention political intrusions into military operations made the entire situation a disaster waiting to happen.

Flatly untrue. The Soviets in 1943 still faced the bulk of German strength and their reserves aswell as a significant fraction of air power that was never rendered inoperational as it was in the West. Additionally, mid-1943 was the peak of the most important striking element of the Heer, the panzer forcres, which was utilized in an attempt in a Blitzkrieg-Esque encirclement and then a mobile defense as in the year’s beforehand... and the Soviets beat it anyways. That gives us a quite good idea of what would have happened if the 1941 Wherhmacht had to face the 1943 Red Army (adjusted for equipment).
Again only if you count the army divisions in combat. Certainly not in the air, nor among the naval forces. The Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians had largely removed what was left of their forces from the East in 1943, while the Germans kept large forces defending conquered Europe and Italy, rotating many of their best divisions off of the Eastern Front to serve in the Mediterranean or Balkans in some capacity. Compared to 1942 a huge proportion of total Axis forces had transferred off the Eastern Front.
Zitadelle was called off due to Operation Husky being launched and the transfer of divisions that were attacking to Italy or other fronts; other units were kept out of the East that would have been useful there, like 1st Panzer division. A lower proportion of mobile units (Panzer/motorized) or elite units (mountain or paratroopers) were in the East in 1943 than in 1942, plus of course the deletion of much of the Axis allies from that front.
Also Zitadelle was not really a 'blitzkrieg-eqsue' attack beyond having a planned pincer move, it was a trench warfare, strength on strength set piece battle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg operations capitalized on surprise penetrations (e.g., the penetration of the Ardennes forest region), general enemy unreadiness and their inability to match the pace of the German attack.
Zitadelle was no surprise and understood not to be a surprise when it was conducted after repeated delays and build up, nor did it rely on maneuver, rather brute for artillery smashing a way through (according to Zetterling the Germans used 3:1 as much artillery ammo as the Soviets in the offensive).

A 1941 Wehrmacht would have been vastly proportional stronger, due to having had much more strength in the East than on other fronts. If say the Soviet 1941 forces had 1943 level skill/organization/period levels of TOE they'd have performed better than the OTL 1941 forces did, but having to fight the Germans close to the border would with historical levels of numbers they'd unable to hold up; the Soviets IOTL in 1943 won on sheer numbers relative to their enemy; 1943 disparity in numbers was completely lopsided vs. 1941. Arguably the Axis had numerical superiority at the front in June 1941, during the Zitadelle offensive alone the Germans only had 40% the manpower the Soviets did at the point of battle.

None of which would have permitted the Soviets to win unless they applied exceptional skill. Material and numerical superiority as well as air superiority are potential advantages that mean nothing without the skill to implement it. For the sort of operations the Soviets conducted in 1943-1944 required exceptional operational and, eventually, tactical skill. Otherwise, they’d have been stuck out in Western/Southern Russia borders for the entire war stuck in an endless procession of Rzhev’s. Finally, everyone well understands that the main German reserves in 1943-44 were directed to the East, so that claim is just wrong.
The sort of operations conducted in 1943 relied on bludgeoning mass attacks that were insanely costly and succeeded due to the increasingly anemic Axis forces in the East, as their strength was bled away to other fronts, especially their air power; in 1943 the Soviets for the first time had real numerical superiority, but even then at places where the Luftwaffe could assemble even limited strength, like Kursk, they could fight the Soviets to a standstill in the air. Exceptional skill was not the watchword of that year. Even Glantz's Journal of Slavic Military Studies has published articles about the multiple failures of Soviet commanders at Kursk:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2016.1232563

1944 saw the maturing of Soviet skill, but even then the 'ultimate' Deep Operation of Bagration still saw the Soviets with a slightly better than 1:2 combat casualty ratio despite the Axis forces lacking air support and being grossly outnumbered and lacking any substantials strategic reserves. The German reserves and best divisions had been siphoned off to fight in Normandy or Italy. When some came back from Italy in August they trounces Soviet advanced spearheads:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Radzymin_(1944)

Which is nice and all, but still manages to miss the entire point. Deep Battle was an expression of Operational Art which was understood by the Soviets. And as their understanding was the most thorough on the planet, so too then was Deep Battle. And obviously Deep Battle isn’t applicable in all situations. Not even the Soviets made that claim. Military doctrine is created to fit circurmstances. Had the US Army been faced with the Eastern Front it would have developed different weapons and a different way of fighting. Not necessarily identical to what the Soviets chose, since the Americans had access to consistently better junior leadership to use just one example, but certainly different from what it used for the rather different circumstances in the Western and Pacific Fronts. Similarly, the Soviets never had doctrine for the kind of large-scale all-arms amphibious assault the Western Allies conducted at Normandy, so they would have had to build it up to suit their needs.
The Soviet concept of operational art and operations as distinct from other levels of warfare was the most elaborate, but that doesn't mean it was the best conceptual understanding of warfare.
Of course different types of warfare require different application of idea, but the idea that the Allies lacked the same sort of idea is silly given things like the 1919 battle plan in WW1:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_1919
One would be very hard press to argue that they lacked operational planning with their conduct of the battle of France in 1944, which was cleared in about the same time that it took to clear Belarus with fewer losses to the Wallies vs. what the Soviets took in Bagration and greater losses to the Germans.

The difference between the Wallies and Soviets was the major dearth of combat experience among the Wallied forces used in Normandy.

A lovely misrepresentation of norms, which constitutes but one aspect of Soviet tactical practices. And Soviet “brute force results” were only as brute force as everyone else. Overwhelming force at the point of contact is Just How Things Are Done. It’s only a result of exceptional operational maeneuvering if the Germans do it.
The difference was generally choosing the weakest point to attack for more 'mobility' based doctrines, while the Soviets were plenty happy to try and force breakthroughs where doctrine demanded, rather than where it was going to be less costly (with exceptions like Operation Uranus). Rzhev 1942-43, Smolensk 1943, Bagration 1944, Orel 1943, Belgorod-Kharkov 1943, Leningrad 1942-44, the Narwa Bridgehead 1944, Romania in Spring 1944, Seelowe heights 1945...
Certainly that doesn't mean the other nations didn't do the same and screw up, like Zitadelle 1943 or the British around Caen in 1944, or arguably even Patton in Lorraine in 1944.

Which good operational art would account for and plan around. The Germans didn’t and didn’t. German ignorance of railroad conditions within the USSR was a deliberate one, based on a arrogant and unfounded assumption that Soviet Forces would simply collapse with the opening blows. When said collapse failed to materialize, they continued to ignore the implications of the rail situation and act as if they could operate exactly the same as they always did... with predictable results. That’s poor Operational Art.
The railroad problems weren't deliberate as much as based on wishful thinking, misunderstandings, and miscalculations. Remember the Soviet Union was a closed society so getting accurate intel wasn't exactly easy as the other intel failures of just about everyone vs. the USSR demonstrated.
Hitler certainly did not want to deal with the reality of the situation once it proved itself, he of course held back replacement vehicles and spare parts, as well as replacements to build entire new divisions for future campaigns in the Middle East rather than admit that his war plan was falling apart.
That's a faulty strategy and messed up strategic leadership, not faulty operational art. In 1941 operations were progressing well repeatedly until mid-late October, pockets were increasing in size, Soviet losses were beyond the comprehension of everyone, and the fighting was going right to the gates of Moscow; the problem was the strategic realization that the pre-invasion plan was not working out and that secondary objectives like Leningrad were a disastrous diversion of resources.

And said faulty assumptions are a direct result of flawed Operational Art which did not make any effort to prevent such assumptions being made and failed to adjust accordingly when said assumptions were proven wrong.
How? The strategy was what was faulty, you seem to be falling into the trap outlined in the paper I posted about 'operational art' devouring strategy...
The choice of objectives, the resources made available for campaigns, and the allocation of resources/replacements among theaters is all part of the strategic level of warfare. Operations are about carrying out those objectives with the resources allocated.
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/strategic+level+of+war
strategic level of war
The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.
 
Rigidity of the WW2 version of Deep Battle (Soviet doctrine of course evolved and improved post-WW2).

Rigidity at what level? Tactically, sure. Operationally however, it became extremely unrigid. Indeed, this is in part because of it's rigidity at the tactical level. One of the downsides in overemphasizing at the tactical level is that it can strip the operational commander of the flexibility to make many key command decisions easily. Which the Soviets found absolutely demented.

Having a definition of the conduct of war between the strategic and tactic level is one thing and quite different from having an operational doctrine that devours the conduct of strategy and tactics.

Soviet operational doctrine did not remotely devour the conduct of strategy. Indeed, it's refined form in the late-war was based on a extremely refined understanding of strategy. It did devour tactics, but then that was part of the point. The Soviet argument was that success on the tactical level should ultimately be about aiding the accomplishment of operational-strategic aims and objectives, not being tactically adept for the sake of tactics. Thus, the Soviets subordinated tactics to operations by default.

It was more than skill, than lacked enough radios, logistics of their own, air defense, fully operational tanks, etc.

No, it was heavily skill. Your right that they lacked logistics, but that would have only undermined them after the first few days (although even then they would have been able to retreat in a more coherent matter then historically). They did have enough radios and operational tanks to make a go of it in that time... what they lacked were the crews skilled enough to operate them. The lack of air defense was also a function more of skill more then one of equipment and relatively unimportant to those initial ground battles, especially given that the Luftwaffe's attention in those first few days of Barbarossa was focused heavily on demolishing the VVS at the expense of actually lending ground support to the troops.

Again only if you count the army divisions in combat. Certainly not in the air, nor among the naval forces.

Given that the land war was what consumed the preponderance of German attention and resource, it represented the bulk of German combat power to begin with.

The Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians had largely removed what was left of their forces from the East in 1943, while the Germans kept large forces defending conquered Europe and Italy, rotating many of their best divisions off of the Eastern Front to serve in the Mediterranean or Balkans in some capacity. Compared to 1942 a huge proportion of total Axis forces had transferred off the Eastern Front.

Only the Italians transferred off the Eastern Front and even they weren’t completely gone until August. The Romanians and Hungarians remained until their countries surrender in 1944 and ‘45 (respectively), never fighting in the West. The gross bulk of both German divisions and their best divisions continued to serve in the East. No Eastern Front formations were sent to the Balkans and only a small proportion to Italy. The proportion of total Axis forces from the Eastern Front may have declined, but it was not remotely a "huge" decline. It still represented the overwhelming bulk of the Germans forces, both in terms of their best and in terms of overall.

Zitadelle was called off due to Operation Husky being launched and the transfer of divisions that were attacking to Italy or other fronts;

Which ironically helped the Germans from suffering a even more devastating defeat.

other units were kept out of the East that would have been useful there, like 1st Panzer division. A lower proportion of mobile units (Panzer/motorized) or elite units (mountain or paratroopers) were in the East in 1943 than in 1942, plus of course the deletion of much of the Axis allies from that front.

Total forces employed against the WAllies in 1943 were not enough to even cover for the losses suffered on the Eastern Front, much less represent a significant addition of strength.

Also Zitadelle was not really a 'blitzkrieg-eqsue' attack beyond having a planned pincer move, it was a trench warfare, strength on strength set piece battle.

Your confusing what happened with what the Germans intended to happen when they were planning the operation. Citadel was very much supposed to be a Blitzkrieg-esque attack. That it turned into a attritional slugfest was not something that the Germans planned for and was a consequence of it's misfire. It’s hardly surprising: A battle of attrition is what happens when an attempt to wage a battle of maneuver fails, after all.

A 1941 Wehrmacht would have been vastly proportional stronger, due to having had much more strength in the East than on other fronts. If say the Soviet 1941 forces had 1943 level skill/organization/period levels of TOE they'd have performed better than the OTL 1941 forces did, but having to fight the Germans close to the border would with historical levels of numbers they'd unable to hold up; the Soviets IOTL in 1943 won on sheer numbers relative to their enemy; 1943 disparity in numbers was completely lopsided vs. 1941. Arguably the Axis had numerical superiority at the front in June 1941, during the Zitadelle offensive alone the Germans only had 40% the manpower the Soviets did at the point of battle.

The Germans also had more strength in the East than on other fronts in 1943 as they did in 1941. They would have very much been able to hold up as the Germans would have encountered a competent anti-tank defence coupled with continuous and coordinated strikes at their flanks by armored forces that would sap their forward momentum, giving the Soviets the time to move up the rest of their forces and achieve a similar disparity as occurred IOTL, instead of a disorganized mess that just collapses in on itself in confusion.

The sort of operations conducted in 1943 relied on bludgeoning mass attacks that were insanely costly and succeeded due to the increasingly anemic Axis forces in the East, as their strength was bled away to other fronts, especially their air power; in 1943 the Soviets for the first time had real numerical superiority, but even then at places where the Luftwaffe could assemble even limited strength, like Kursk, they could fight the Soviets to a standstill in the air. Exceptional skill was not the watchword of that year. Even Glantz's Journal of Slavic Military Studies has published articles about the multiple failures of Soviet commanders at Kursk:

Yes, the Soviets made mistakes in 1943. That is hardly unusual: everyone makes mistake. Even in 1941 and 1944-45 the Germans and Soviets (respectively) were making mistakes. And it's hardly surprising that the Soviets screwed up more in 1943 then they did in 1944-45, as they were still learning a lot in that time. But that they succeeded at all required a exceptional level of skill to match their growing material and numerical superiority.

And yes, the Luftwaffe could fight the Soviets to a standstill where they concentrated their strength. But that was a huge drop over the year before when they could beat the VVS and proved irrelevant to the larger ground battle, which still consistently went in the Soviets favor.

1944 saw the maturing of Soviet skill, but even then the 'ultimate' Deep Operation of Bagration still saw the Soviets with a slightly better than 1:2 combat casualty ratio despite the Axis forces lacking air support and being grossly outnumbered and lacking any substantials strategic reserves. The German reserves and best divisions had been siphoned off to fight in Normandy or Italy. When some came back from Italy in August they trounces Soviet advanced spearheads:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Radzymin_(1944)

Working off of memory on the specifics, but I recall that only one of the divisions described came from Italy. The others were all already in the East. The preponderance of the Germans reserves and best divisions in mid-1944 were in fact still on the Eastern Front, there were twice as many German mechanized formations on the Eastern Front as there were in the west, just on the wrong part of it. And yeah, the Germans could deliver reverses to the Soviet offensives in 1944 once the Soviets had stretched themselves out quite a bit, but those counter-offensives never achieved more then halting the Soviets. Similar attempts at counterblows in mid-'44 when a Soviet attack was much younger tended to result in the counter-attacking Germans being obliterated and the Soviet attackers pressing on.

One would be very hard press to argue that they lacked operational planning with their conduct of the battle of France in 1944,

"Eliminating the common factor of heavy bombing, the major British, Canadian, and US Offensives [at Normandy] were uncoordinated, poorly supported [each other], and too individual in nature to suggest the guiding hand of a great captain. Some, like Totalize and Tractable, were from an armored, and certainly from a Soviet point of view, inane. The fact that Spring and Totalize were loose parts of a strategic effort that only succeeded because of Cobra, should not obscure the fact that there was no actual strategic offensive, but rather a series of reactions to Goodwood's failure."
-Roman Jarymowycz, Tank Tactics Normandy, Chapter 14: STAVKA in Normandy, Pg 305.

Lacked operational planning? No. Lacked operational planning as good as the Soviets for the sort of large-scale ground warfare that was the staple of the Eastern Front? Yes, quite.

which was cleared in about the same time that it took to clear Belarus with fewer losses to the Wallies vs. what the Soviets took in Bagration and greater losses to the Germans.

Cleared in the same time? The clearing of France took four months, of which half the time was spent achieving the breakthrough. Bagration itself only covered Belarus and parts of Eastern Poland and covered it all in a little over two months, with the creation of the breakthrough only taking a few days. The clearing of Western Ukraine, the rest of Eastern Poland, and the Baltics in their turn took around one to two months. The clearing of Romania, Bulgaria, and Southern Yugoslavia all took place within two months. All happened in the same time span it took the WAllies to clear France alone. Greater losses to the Germans? The summer of 1944 saw the Germans suffer around twice as many irrecoverable losses in the east in both armored vehicles and men as in the west between the months of June and September. The Germans saw multiple panzer divisions annihilated in the East while in the west only infantry divisions were ever completely destroyed, with all of their panzer formations managing to escape... badly mauled but still intact.

The difference was generally choosing the weakest point to attack for more 'mobility' based doctrines,

Which the Soviets tried to do.

while the Soviets were plenty happy to try and force breakthroughs where doctrine demanded, rather than where it was going to be less costly (with exceptions like Operation Uranus).

Uranus was an exception in 1942-43. In 1944-45, it was the rule.

Rzhev 1942-43, Smolensk 1943, Bagration 1944, Orel 1943, Belgorod-Kharkov 1943, Leningrad 1942-44, the Narwa Bridgehead 1944, Romania in Spring 1944, Seelowe heights 1945...

I like how you include Bagration 1944 despite it very much being an example of the Soviets choosing to strike the weakest point of the line.

The railroad problems weren't deliberate as much as based on wishful thinking, misunderstandings, and miscalculations.

The railroad problems were quite deliberate. As the Germans had waged an extended campaign there in 1914-1918, so there were legions of reports left over from that war detailing the railroad situation. Additionally, their observers in the USSR (who were frequently being given extensive tours of the USSR's industrial infrastructure as it was as part of the deterrence end of Stalin's strategy) were allowed relatively free reign and would have had more then enough ample opportunity to study the railway network beyond the immediate frontier. And indeed logisticians of the German army collected their data and delivered their verdict: the railroad situation would start to inhibit the campaign logistically after the first 300 kilometers, force a pause at 500 kilometers, and become insurmountable beyond 800 kilometers (predictions which all proved to be dead on). The operational planners ignored them. All the subsequent misunderstandings, miscalculations, and wishful thinking were all the direct product of that deliberate ignorance.


By selecting operational objectives beyond the capacity of the allocated resources. Rational planning would have recognized the limitations of resources imposed upon operations and adjusted accordingly. This the Germans never did.

The strategy was what was faulty, you seem to be falling into the trap outlined in the paper I posted about 'operational art' devouring strategy...

And so was the operational art. An operational art which makes no account of strategic realities is one which is devouring strategy far more assuredly then one that does take it into account.
 
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