Thorough, yes. Rigid, no. Effective operational art, by it’s very nature, cannot be rigid. It must take into account both tactical and strategic factors as well as those on it’s own level and to do that it has to be flexible. The Soviets were rigid in their definitions, but that rigidity begets flexibility as precisely defied terminology prevents confusion that would interfere with flexibility.
And it is very much a correct way to conceptualize war. That’s something which is now universally recognized among militaries the globe over.
Rigidity of the WW2 version of Deep Battle (Soviet doctrine of course evolved and improved post-WW2). Set piece battle doctrine can of course be rigid and successful, see Montgomery's operations in Africa. Inherent in the WW2 version of Soviet Deep Battle was rigidity in forcing breakthroughs where ever demanded (selection of the breakthrough points improved as the war went on of course), which forced tactical rigidity and heavy casualties. Especially when you outnumber your enemy and they've lost strategic and often operational mobility, plus have strategic reserves, highly planned and rigid set piece battles can be quite successful (also see 1918).
And it is very much a correct way to conceptualize war. That’s something which is now universally recognized among militaries the globe over.
Having a definition of the conduct of war between the strategic and tactic level is one thing and quite different from having an operational doctrine that devours the conduct of strategy and tactics.
In 1941-42, there was something of a divorce between Soviet theory and practice for obvious reasons, what with the purges and rapid expansion and not expecting war in mid-1941. Even then, the Soviets did have the material means at the combat end of their elements to at least blunt the hell out of the German advance before the logistical issues undermined their ability to resist... but they lacked the skill to utilize those means appropriately, so in the end the bulk of the forces just collapsed in confusion from the outset.
It was more than skill, than lacked enough radios, logistics of their own, air defense, fully operational tanks, etc.
A substantial function of collapse was the lack of combat means and the physical means to coordinate, which when coupled with leadership failures and lack of experience, not to mention political intrusions into military operations made the entire situation a disaster waiting to happen.
Flatly untrue. The Soviets in 1943 still faced the bulk of German strength and their reserves aswell as a significant fraction of air power that was never rendered inoperational as it was in the West. Additionally, mid-1943 was the peak of the most important striking element of the Heer, the panzer forcres, which was utilized in an attempt in a Blitzkrieg-Esque encirclement and then a mobile defense as in the year’s beforehand... and the Soviets beat it anyways. That gives us a quite good idea of what would have happened if the 1941 Wherhmacht had to face the 1943 Red Army (adjusted for equipment).
Again only if you count the army divisions in combat. Certainly not in the air, nor among the naval forces. The Romanians, Italians, and Hungarians had largely removed what was left of their forces from the East in 1943, while the Germans kept large forces defending conquered Europe and Italy, rotating many of their best divisions off of the Eastern Front to serve in the Mediterranean or Balkans in some capacity. Compared to 1942 a huge proportion of total Axis forces had transferred off the Eastern Front.
Zitadelle was called off due to Operation Husky being launched and the transfer of divisions that were attacking to Italy or other fronts; other units were kept out of the East that would have been useful there, like 1st Panzer division. A lower proportion of mobile units (Panzer/motorized) or elite units (mountain or paratroopers) were in the East in 1943 than in 1942, plus of course the deletion of much of the Axis allies from that front.
Also Zitadelle was not really a 'blitzkrieg-eqsue' attack beyond having a planned pincer move, it was a trench warfare, strength on strength set piece battle.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blitzkrieg
Blitzkrieg operations capitalized on surprise penetrations (e.g., the penetration of the
Ardennes forest region), general enemy unreadiness and their inability to match the pace of the German attack.
Zitadelle was no surprise and understood not to be a surprise when it was conducted after repeated delays and build up, nor did it rely on maneuver, rather brute for artillery smashing a way through (according to Zetterling the Germans used 3:1 as much artillery ammo as the Soviets in the offensive).
A 1941 Wehrmacht would have been vastly proportional stronger, due to having had much more strength in the East than on other fronts. If say the Soviet 1941 forces had 1943 level skill/organization/period levels of TOE they'd have performed better than the OTL 1941 forces did, but having to fight the Germans close to the border would with historical levels of numbers they'd unable to hold up; the Soviets IOTL in 1943 won on sheer numbers relative to their enemy; 1943 disparity in numbers was completely lopsided vs. 1941. Arguably the Axis had numerical superiority at the front in June 1941, during the Zitadelle offensive alone the Germans only had 40% the manpower the Soviets did at the point of battle.
None of which would have permitted the Soviets to win unless they applied exceptional skill. Material and numerical superiority as well as air superiority are potential advantages that mean nothing without the skill to implement it. For the sort of operations the Soviets conducted in 1943-1944 required exceptional operational and, eventually, tactical skill. Otherwise, they’d have been stuck out in Western/Southern Russia borders for the entire war stuck in an endless procession of Rzhev’s. Finally, everyone well understands that the main German reserves in 1943-44 were directed to the East, so that claim is just wrong.
The sort of operations conducted in 1943 relied on bludgeoning mass attacks that were insanely costly and succeeded due to the increasingly anemic Axis forces in the East, as their strength was bled away to other fronts, especially their air power; in 1943 the Soviets for the first time had real numerical superiority, but even then at places where the Luftwaffe could assemble even limited strength, like Kursk, they could fight the Soviets to a standstill in the air. Exceptional skill was not the watchword of that year. Even Glantz's Journal of Slavic Military Studies has published articles about the multiple failures of Soviet commanders at Kursk:
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13518046.2016.1232563
1944 saw the maturing of Soviet skill, but even then the 'ultimate' Deep Operation of Bagration still saw the Soviets with a slightly better than 1:2 combat casualty ratio despite the Axis forces lacking air support and being grossly outnumbered and lacking any substantials strategic reserves. The German reserves and best divisions had been siphoned off to fight in Normandy or Italy. When some came back from Italy in August they trounces Soviet advanced spearheads:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Radzymin_(1944)
Which is nice and all, but still manages to miss the entire point. Deep Battle was an expression of Operational Art which was understood by the Soviets. And as their understanding was the most thorough on the planet, so too then was Deep Battle. And obviously Deep Battle isn’t applicable in all situations. Not even the Soviets made that claim. Military doctrine is created to fit circurmstances. Had the US Army been faced with the Eastern Front it would have developed different weapons and a different way of fighting. Not necessarily identical to what the Soviets chose, since the Americans had access to consistently better junior leadership to use just one example, but certainly different from what it used for the rather different circumstances in the Western and Pacific Fronts. Similarly, the Soviets never had doctrine for the kind of large-scale all-arms amphibious assault the Western Allies conducted at Normandy, so they would have had to build it up to suit their needs.
The Soviet concept of operational art and operations as distinct from other levels of warfare was the most elaborate, but that doesn't mean it was the best conceptual understanding of warfare.
Of course different types of warfare require different application of idea, but the idea that the Allies lacked the same sort of idea is silly given things like the 1919 battle plan in WW1:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plan_1919
One would be very hard press to argue that they lacked operational planning with their conduct of the battle of France in 1944, which was cleared in about the same time that it took to clear Belarus with fewer losses to the Wallies vs. what the Soviets took in Bagration and greater losses to the Germans.
The difference between the Wallies and Soviets was the major dearth of combat experience among the Wallied forces used in Normandy.
A lovely misrepresentation of norms, which constitutes but one aspect of Soviet tactical practices. And Soviet “brute force results” were only as brute force as everyone else. Overwhelming force at the point of contact is Just How Things Are Done. It’s only a result of exceptional operational maeneuvering if the Germans do it.
The difference was generally choosing the weakest point to attack for more 'mobility' based doctrines, while the Soviets were plenty happy to try and force breakthroughs where doctrine demanded, rather than where it was going to be less costly (with exceptions like Operation Uranus). Rzhev 1942-43, Smolensk 1943, Bagration 1944, Orel 1943, Belgorod-Kharkov 1943, Leningrad 1942-44, the Narwa Bridgehead 1944, Romania in Spring 1944, Seelowe heights 1945...
Certainly that doesn't mean the other nations didn't do the same and screw up, like Zitadelle 1943 or the British around Caen in 1944, or arguably even Patton in Lorraine in 1944.
Which good operational art would account for and plan around. The Germans didn’t and didn’t. German ignorance of railroad conditions within the USSR was a deliberate one, based on a arrogant and unfounded assumption that Soviet Forces would simply collapse with the opening blows. When said collapse failed to materialize, they continued to ignore the implications of the rail situation and act as if they could operate exactly the same as they always did... with predictable results. That’s poor Operational Art.
The railroad problems weren't deliberate as much as based on wishful thinking, misunderstandings, and miscalculations. Remember the Soviet Union was a closed society so getting accurate intel wasn't exactly easy as the other intel failures of just about everyone vs. the USSR demonstrated.
Hitler certainly did not want to deal with the reality of the situation once it proved itself, he of course held back replacement vehicles and spare parts, as well as replacements to build entire new divisions for future campaigns in the Middle East rather than admit that his war plan was falling apart.
That's a faulty strategy and messed up strategic leadership, not faulty operational art. In 1941 operations were progressing well repeatedly until mid-late October, pockets were increasing in size, Soviet losses were beyond the comprehension of everyone, and the fighting was going right to the gates of Moscow; the problem was the strategic realization that the pre-invasion plan was not working out and that secondary objectives like Leningrad were a disastrous diversion of resources.
And said faulty assumptions are a direct result of flawed Operational Art which did not make any effort to prevent such assumptions being made and failed to adjust accordingly when said assumptions were proven wrong.
How? The strategy was what was faulty, you seem to be falling into the trap outlined in the paper I posted about 'operational art' devouring strategy...
The choice of objectives, the resources made available for campaigns, and the allocation of resources/replacements among theaters is all part of the strategic level of warfare. Operations are about carrying out those objectives with the resources allocated.
https://www.thefreedictionary.com/strategic+level+of+war
strategic level of war
The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives.Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans.
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. US Department of Defense 2005.