The worst cold war tl cliches

Didn't the Soviets have a functioning biological warfare program in the late eighties-biopreparat? In a late WW3 scenario how much of that would come into play?
 
Well in ancient and medieval times up until maybe I dunno 1700 or something it probably worked-10,000 peasants given a spear will overwhelm a hundred elite soldiers.

But it doesn't work in an era of mass produced bullets. The Russians thought they could send more men into the fray "than the germans had bullets" which cost Russia something like a million men

To be fair, while the Soviet numerical advantage was important, the "Asiatic hordes" trope is grossly exaggerated.

The Germans in WWII were also much more mobilized than NATO would be, and began the war with the initiative, occupying most the Soviet Union's most valuable territories after destroying Red Army 1.0. In a WWIII scenario, much of the most important conventional ally in Central Europe is going to be sitting behind enemy lines in a matter of weeks, if not days; given the memory of WWII and its destructiveness, the Continental allies would be tempted to spare themselves the devastation.

I would heavily question your first sentence. It depends completely on how the war starts. NATO had extremely well-practiced procedures to get mobilized quickly and the Soviets won't be able to completely hide their preparations even in the best case scenario. If the war starts after a period of international tension that puts people on guard, NATO will be mobilized. If intelligence sources NATO had behind the Iron Curtain (Oleg Gordievsky in particular comes to mind as one who would have been very well-placed to alert them and he was only compromised after the balance had swung far more in NATO's favor), they would probably mobilize. I've also noticed that Soviet doctrine seemed to call for some ill-advised things, particularly the "Grey Terror" phase in which Spetsnaz would operate behind the lines in the West before the war, that would have likely alerted NATO something was up and led them to mobilize. I made a thread on that here.

This is actually another Cold War cliche that I'm really not fond of: that Western countries are very casualty averse and will quit and accept Communist domination to spare some lives. Looking at the actual history of democracies in existential struggles, that's very much not how it happened. @CalBear , pardon my random quote of you; not trying to drag you into this thread if you don't want to be here but I just wanted to use this as a reference because it very well encapsulates how committed democracies can be:

In the last 250 years there have been exactly Six wars involving democracies where an existential threat could reasonably be seen. in every case where the situation arose the democracies involved fought to the last.

Two involved Israel, in 1967 and 1973 and ended quickly, long before the question of fighting to the last man could even be considered.

The British were also involved in two, WW I & WW II, in neither case did the British public blink, despite horrific losses and, in the case of WW II, stunning reversals on the battlefield.

The U.S. was, as already noted, involved in the one, the Civil War along with the CSA. Both sides absorbed almost unimaginable losses compared to any previous (or following) conflict and both sides fought to the bitter end.

The sixth was the War of the Pacific involving Chile, Bolivia and Peru. Peru fought on AFTER all of its major cities were occupied and its forces were reduced to small bands of insurgents in the Andes.

It is completely unreasonable to expect a population to accept unending losses when there is no identifiable reason to continue fighting. This is best seen with the American experience in Vietnam (where, to this day, the American people have yet to be given a reason that 50K+ U.S. troops had to die) and the British experience in the American Revolution (where even the then limited democratic representation could not find any reason worth continuing what was becoming an ever widening war). The only time that democracies run into difficulties is when they can not EXPLAIN to the voters why they are fighting. That did not exist in WW II. The Western democracies (and their populations) were very aware of the stakes.

NATO wasn't going to cut and run; if the Soviets charged the Fulda Gap they were ready to fight to the end to stop them.

Personally doubt it; numerical inferiority, more complicated alliance politics, and weak forward positions are serious millstones to have around your neck. Tech is good to have, but better organization and capacity to mobilize are more reliable advantages.

I would question who had more issues with alliance politics. The Soviets literally had to worry about their allies turning their guns on them and their own people revolting.

Training, technology, troop morale, probable to the point of almost certain sea superiority, and the defensive advantage are pretty nice as well.

How far along were NATO smart weapons (PGMs etc) by the 1980s?

That's a ten year period you're talking about there; a lot was different over the course of it. In the first couple years of the decade things were still getting off the ground; the Second Offset Strategy was still being implemented, Paveway II wasn't that common in the arsenals, etc. By 1989 we were close to where we were during Desert Storm.
 
Training, technology, troop morale, probable to the point of almost certain sea superiority, and the defensive advantage are pretty nice as well.

Although as far as NATO is concerned, things such as training, troop morale, and troop quality varied massively over the Cold War period. I'm sure it did with the Warsaw Pact as well, but for obvious reasons, I didn't get to see that so much.

Mid 1970s, and NATO troop quality was most kindly described as questionable. In some cases, mid 1970s NATO troops from some places were notorious for their total uselessness and incompetence. Early 1980s, and variable would be fairer description. Late 1980s, and competent applies.
 
Although as far as NATO is concerned, things such as training, troop morale, and troop quality varied massively over the Cold War period. I'm sure it did with the Warsaw Pact as well, but for obvious reasons, I didn't get to see that so much.

Mid 1970s, and NATO troop quality was most kindly described as questionable. In some cases, mid 1970s NATO troops from some places were notorious for their total uselessness and incompetence. Early 1980s, and variable would be fairer description. Late 1980s, and competent applies.

Admittedly that is true. I've kind of been thinking of the 1980s in terms of when a war would probably happen because that was when the Soviet Union got a good enough nuclear arsenal to really be equal, but it could have happened earlier. If it's in the 1970s or 1960s, even the first few years of the 1980s, NATO is pretty screwed.
 
To be fair, while the Soviet numerical advantage was important, the "Asiatic hordes" trope is grossly exaggerated.



I would heavily question your first sentence. It depends completely on how the war starts. NATO had extremely well-practiced procedures to get mobilized quickly and the Soviets won't be able to completely hide their preparations even in the best case scenario. If the war starts after a period of international tension that puts people on guard, NATO will be mobilized. If intelligence sources NATO had behind the Iron Curtain (Oleg Gordievsky in particular comes to mind as one who would have been very well-placed to alert them and he was only compromised after the balance had swung far more in NATO's favor), they would probably mobilize. I've also noticed that Soviet doctrine seemed to call for some ill-advised things, particularly the "Grey Terror" phase in which Spetsnaz would operate behind the lines in the West before the war, that would have likely alerted NATO something was up and led them to mobilize. I made a thread on that here.

This is actually another Cold War cliche that I'm really not fond of: that Western countries are very casualty averse and will quit and accept Communist domination to spare some lives. Looking at the actual history of democracies in existential struggles, that's very much not how it happened. @CalBear , pardon my random quote of you; not trying to drag you into this thread if you don't want to be here but I just wanted to use this as a reference because it very well encapsulates how committed democracies can be:

NATO wasn't going to cut and run; if the Soviets charged the Fulda Gap they were ready to fight to the end to stop them.

I would question who had more issues with alliance politics. The Soviets literally had to worry about their allies turning their guns on them and their own people revolting.

Training, technology, troop morale, probable to the point of almost certain sea superiority, and the defensive advantage are pretty nice as well.
NATO certainly had resources to mobilize, but it's difficult to overstate just how committed Germany was to Soviet annihilation; people claim the Germans weren't really committed until after Stalingrad and the Göbbels speech, but this conceals the fact that Germany started the war with as much debt as the US finished with, and only continued to mobilize more resources, either their own or ruthlessly stolen from conquered territories. If they hadn't spent a decade preparing, taken the offensive, destroyed Red Army 1.0 in untenable forward positions, and occupied the most economically important regions of the country, WWII as we know it would have been utterly unimaginable, and the Soviet numerical advantage insurmountable.

It's important to remember that even the most militarily powerful democracy in the world (and certainly Continental Europe), France in 1940, folded despite all the advantages you list; its situation corresponds much better with the FRG in the 80s than does, for instance, the British. It's one thing to grit your teeth when victory is in sight, and it's simply a question of casualties; it's quite another when your country has been physically overrun and risks being blasted flat in continued fighting. It would depend on what the terms to Soviets offered would be; there's quite a gulf between neutralization in the Cold (well, hot, but whatever) War, unification under a coalition government (in Germany's case), and the imposition of a communist government. This would in turn depend on why the Soviets are intent on breaking NATO at that moment.
 
NATO certainly had resources to mobilize, but it's difficult to overstate just how committed Germany was to Soviet annihilation; people claim the Germans weren't really committed until after Stalingrad and the Göbbels speech, but this conceals the fact that Germany started the war with as much debt as the US finished with, and only continued to mobilize more resources, either their own or ruthlessly stolen from conquered territories. If they hadn't spent a decade preparing, taken the offensive, destroyed Red Army 1.0 in untenable forward positions, and occupied the most economically important regions of the country, WWII as we know it would have been utterly unimaginable, and the Soviet numerical advantage insurmountable.

It's important to remember that even the most militarily powerful democracy in the world (and certainly Continental Europe), France in 1940, folded despite all the advantages you list; its situation corresponds much better with the FRG in the 80s than does, for instance, the British. It's one thing to grit your teeth when victory is in sight, and it's simply a question of casualties; it's quite another when your country has been physically overrun and risks being blasted flat in continued fighting. It would depend on what the terms to Soviets offered would be; there's quite a gulf between neutralization in the Cold (well, hot, but whatever) War, unification under a coalition government (in Germany's case), and the imposition of a communist government. This would in turn depend on why the Soviets are intent on breaking NATO at that moment.

The Reich's mobilization, however, is countered to a great degree by the farcical inefficiency with which their economy and military programs were run.

The important thing to realize is that France was *conquered* as opposed to its popular and political will collapsing. Even though the cabinet voted for armistice it was a reaction to the fact that the Nazis had taken Paris a week earlier and were rolling up everything else. The Third Republic didn't collapse because it decided to accept Nazi dominion in exchange for a few less casualties, it happened because the Nazis pulled it inside out on the battlefield. Even after that, a very large part of it fought on.
 
The important thing to realize is that France was *conquered* as opposed to its popular and political will collapsing. Even though the cabinet voted for armistice it was a reaction to the fact that the Nazis had taken Paris a week earlier and were rolling up everything else. The Third Republic didn't collapse because it decided to accept Nazi dominion in exchange for a few less casualties, it happened because the Nazis pulled it inside out on the battlefield. Even after that, a very large part of it fought on.

France capitulated in 1940 just like it did in 1815 or 1871. Everyone tought that the Germans would make peace with Great Britain, a peace treaty would be signed and the whole thing would end in 1941 at the latest. That's why there wasn't much resistance at the outset of the occupation, because people believed normality would return soon (that's what the great majority of French wanted in 1940 - nobody was enthusiastic about the war).

But they were wrong. It wasn't a classical war, but a total one. Britain wasn't going to sue for peace - Churchill, for whatever reasons, wanted to contine a fight he had lost. And Germany had no interest in leaving France. They fought a war of extermination against other "races" and they would exploit France, its population and ressources to win the war.

It was the scarcity of goods and the hunger that mainly fueled the Résistance.
 

Archibald

Banned
Another irritating cliché is that a beloved-but-cancelled aircraft or spacecraft could win the Cold War by itself.
The Avro arrow of course (as much as I'm a die hard fan of it !), but also Dyna Soar space plane, the MOL manned spy space station, France Mirage 4000, Great Britain TSR-2, the F-108 or F-12 Mach 3 interceptors, and many others.
The Polyus Soviet laser battle station is another example.
What the soviet failed to orbit in 1987 was barely a mockup of a prototype with little functionning systems inside.
 

Archibald

Banned
How far along were NATO smart weapons (PGMs etc) by the 1980s?

Laser guided bombs were first used in Vietnam in May 1972 to destroy that goddam Paul Doumer bridge that had cost America dozens of aircrafts and crews since 1966. Iron bombs just couldn't do the job. AFAIK the earliest aircrafts able to drop LGBs in the 70's were Phantoms and F-111s (with the Pave Tack system). The Navy was probably not too far behind (A-6 Intruder).
 

Archibald

Banned
Most definitely... I was very worried all through 1983, particularly when the former head of the KGB became the leader of the Soviet Union, the same guy who was behind an attempt to kill the Pope, while it wasn't long since it looked like the Soviets were really going to invade Poland and meanwhile the US President literally joked about launching a nuclear strike.

Worried enough to develop a provisional escape plan from the Houston Texas area in the event of war as oil refineries are a primary target.

Sometimes history is no substitute for living through the time period.

That by the way was BEFORE we learned about how Able Archer almost triggered a nuclear war

Wow. Born in 1982 but I have been learning about the fall of 1983. And surely it was gloomy. KAL-007, Andropov, Able Archer - Plus Threads and The day after sickening gritty doomsday movies. Even Reagan was depressed by The day after (he was lucky not to watch Threads, he would have had a nervous breakdown...)
 
Wow. Born in 1982 but I have been learning about the fall of 1983. And surely it was gloomy. KAL-007, Andropov, Able Archer - Plus Threads and The day after sickening gritty doomsday movies. Even Reagan was depressed by The day after (he was lucky not to watch Threads, he would have had a nervous breakdown...)

That year I took a college course called "Nuclear War and Society", as part of it we watched "The Wargame" and "The Day After". (I saw "Threads" a bit later on PBS). The final exam included an essay question where you had to explain what the most likely strike plan would be for Houston (Texas), and the likely damage and casualties. I still have some of the materials from that course. It stuck with me a bit.

(of the three movies above, "The Wargame" is probably the most horrifying even though it is in black and white)
 
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If the Soviets started a conventional WWIII I think that would pretty thoroughly discredit Communism. Even today it isn't a widely loved ideology. Throw some more millions of deaths on the pile in an unprovoked offensive (NATO wasn't going to start anything so that's pretty much the only way it could happen) and I think it would be a hated to an only slightly milder degree than fascism.

The Nazis did the same way OTL and in the Losing the Peace TL, the discrediting of fascism got undermined by the Morgenthau plan, which is absolutely bonkers for as far as I'm concerned. As a result the memory of the Holocaust gets constantly countered with the whole screwing up the German people thing (and sometimes denied), a kind of "whataboutism" is abundant; and that the Jim Crow system and anti-Semitism are still around in the West by the 1980's. Who's to say that some counterpart to the idiotic Morgenthau plan would be formed in a WWIII to punish the Soviet people's because reasons?

Though I would add that communism IOTL isn't as hated as fascism and Nazism are, but that's another subject for another time.
 

CalBear

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Or you could just fuck off and have a normal discussion instead of trying to run people off the board.
Well, the good news (for you) is that you managed to hold off until you aren't trolling straight out of the gate, so you avoided one of the Eight Ways to Crash Land.

That pretty much concludes the good news.

You DO NOT, in any way, shape, or form, get to insult other members or play Moderator. If you see someone who is, in your opinion, violating the rules, you hit the "report post" button. Period. DOT.

See ya' in 7. Best trim your sails upon return.
 
You know what Cold War cliche I hate?

Ideological arguments in every single thread.

As beautifully represented by two volunteers above.

A general observation about cold war TLs - is it possible that we have an age problem here ? My impression is that many here were born after the end of the cold war and see the whole thing filtered through thriller novels of doubtful accuracy (like Clancy et al.)

Also, more specifically, the cosmic destiny of John McCain is to suffer. I've seen him mentioned by name a few times in various TLs, and it's always in the context of additional suffering.[/QUOTE]

I hope this isn't TLDR, my apologies if it is.

The problem is Cold War History and Historiography is by its very nature ideological. Most of the historiography is either drawn down from U.S viewpoints of Orthodox and Revisionist, in this case, the Orthodox being anti-Soviet and pro-U.S, the Revisionists are a difficult bunch to characterize which can range from anti-U.S to at times semi-apologetic or outright apologetic. The only respite in this New International theory which is basically the Cold War in a non-U.S context. In a historiographic context, Orthodox is usually the dominate view and Revisionist the counter view to it, granted that depends on how the topic is defined by historians.

What makes the problem worse a lot of what is passed off as "facts" from certain interpretations have entered the popular imagination of what the Cold War is about or how some wars should be viewed. For example, the Sino-Soviet split is seen in one fashion or another as being Mao's fault, either because of ideological reasons as if Mao is some kind of Stalinist, or he got too ambitious as if Mao somehow overstepped his bounds.

I wouldn't give novels too much credit for how the Cold War is filtered, they take their views from the historiography that tends to be Orthodox ie: Vietnam was a lost cause, or it was because we couldn't invade the North or Korea was a forgotten war. Granted Vietnam is an oddity because the historiography is largely reversed from the rest of the Cold War, the Orthodox position on Vietnam is the usually anti-U.S Revisionist viewpoint. So why is Vietnam commonly seen as a "lost" war or even the erroneous story of a highly advanced army being beaten by an inferior one, it's how most popular viewpoint presents the history,

Bad shit always happens to the People's Republic of China in what seems like every Cold War TL. Whether it's a Sino-Soviet War (and the Sino-Soviet split is also always destined to happen) leading to nuclear destruction, Mao collapsing the country during the Great Famine or Cultural Revolution, a coup by Lin Biao or Zhou Enlai starting a civil war, or the whole state generally turning into a giant North Korea, the PRC always seems to get boned. Bonus points if there's a new warlord era or KMT reconquista.

This boils down to the fact not too many people are really educated on the Sino-Soviet Split, Communist China of the period and on top of that Mao is tended to be seen as an irrational actor, both by the lay person, and it's as an unfortunate undertone of what passes for the Sino-Soviet Split historiography. Most if not of all of it is written and discussed in terms of Political Science. As for the Split being destined to happen, I would argue that Khruschev and Mao would have to work a decent relationship and fast which is unlikely. Only because I want to suspect Mao was fed up with Stalin and his attitude of being unreliable as a source of aid and always wanting his regardless of the consequences, I also want to believe that Mao may have had a personal resentment towards Stalin when Sheng Shicai who Stalin supported in Xinjiang killed Mao's last surviving sibling, but only went along with the Soviets because he felt they were the only option.
 
One cliche that I've seen a few times is the idea that Yugoslavia will always fall into line with the Soviets in the case of WW3, or indeed in the case of any escalation of hostilities - sometimes even with Tito still in charge, despite his personal feelings.
 
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