The Worst American Civil War Alternate History Cliche

[Anaxagoras]

Another cliche. As if the situation would have been the same with Jackson in command. Moreover, the idea that Ewell erred in not assaulting Cemetery or Culps' Hills in the afternoon and evening of day 1. Both were correct decisions.

Not assaulting Cemetery Hill was the correct decision. Any Confederate attack would have been blasted back by the artillery posted there, plus a full brigade of fresh troops with more on the way. Culp's Hill is a different story, though. For a long while, no Union troops occupied the position and Allegheny Johnson's division could have occupied it.

 

[StephenColbert27]

Not assaulting Cemetery Hill was the correct decision. Any Confederate attack would have been blasted back by the artillery posted there, plus a full brigade of fresh troops with more on the way. Culp's Hill is a different story, though. For a long while, no Union troops occupied the position and Allegheny Johnson's division could have occupied it.

It is true that it was unoccupied for some of the day. However, Culp's Hill was occupied beginning at 5 PM, by a division of the I Corps, and then reinforced by an additional brigade that evening. Ewell even dispatched a scouting party to check it out to see verify reports of it being unoccupied, and 2 of them got captured by the 7th Indiana. The survivors gave a predictable report back to Ewell. Based upon the information that he had, not making an attack was the correct decision.
Edit: The timeline is murky, but the retreat to Cemetery Hill by I and XI Corps seems to have been complete by 4 PM. So for an hour(?) it was unoccupied. It seems likely that by the time the unconfirmed report of the hill's vacancy made its way up to Ewell, even if he had ordered an immediate attack, it would have been already occupied by Union forces. It was certainly occupied when his scouting party made their foray. Again, I believe his decision not to attack that evening to be the correct one.

 

[Saphroneth]

No he did not. He had, if anything, numeric superiority until Jackson arrived. Even then he had the numbers to simply hold his position. That he didn't is suggestive of his mode of thinking. He lost his nerve and withdrew, that's it.

What strength measures are you using to define McClellan as having numeric superiority? If you could give the numbers that'd be nice.

In any case, if you have two armies with numeric parity spread across a river, one side with fortifications for army 1 and the other side with a vulnerable supply line for army 2, the first army has the advantage - they can thin out the troops in the defences on one side and then hit whichever side is weaker with a superior force. If McClellan could put his entire force across on the same side of the river they'd have been able to hold and advance by a stellungskrieg, but he couldn't because of the rail supply line.

Stating the size of your opponents army is equal to 2:1 of your numbers when it isn't, is not remotely understandable and speaks to timidness and bad intelligence.

But... uh.. he was moving against Richmond. Either he believed the numbers and was attacking someone who outnumbered him 2:1, or he didn't believe the numbers.

Reinforced with what? Compare the numbers Lee had at the start of the Seven Days to those eventually deployed against Pope and then in Maryland. Lee was at the end of his reinforcements, McClellan had the numbers, but again, chose not to use them.

1. 44th Alabama (arrived during Seven Days)
2. 48th Georgia (arrived during Seven Days, Rafuse or his reference confuses the 48th Ga with the 52nd)
3. 47th Alabama (join between 20th and 23rd)
4. 48th Alabama (ditto)
5. 20th Virginia (incomplete)
6. 59th Virginia (incomplete)
7. 32nd North Carolina
8. 53rd North Carolina
9. 17th North Carolina
10. 44th North Carolina
11. 47th North Carolina
12. 52nd North Carolina
13. 61st Virginia
14. 13th Virginia Cavalry

With en route:

1. 5th Florida
2. 8th Florida
3. 17th South Carolina (Evans)
4. 18th South Carolina (ditto)
5. 22nd South Carolina (ditto)
6. 23rd South Carolina (ditto)
7. Holcombe Legion (ditto)
8. 50th Georgia (Drayton)
9. 51st Georgia (ditto)
10. 15th South Carolina (ditto)
11. 3rd SC Bn (ditto)
12. Phillips Legion (ditto)

Lee started his movements July 26th, with Jackson going north. If he was worried about McClellan attacking preparing to move your own forces north is a strange way to act. McClellan didn't withdraw until the 14th of August. McClellan in that time still had the ability to try and march on Richmond again, he did not.

Lee sent Jackson and Ewell only, specifically to suggest a threat to Washington and prevent McClellan being reinforced - a trick he'd already done twice in June. Lee's main army (about 55K effectives) didn't move until McClellan was being withdrawn.
But again - if the problem is McClellan, then replace McClellan. Don't withdraw the entire army!

If Lee lost the initiative for over a month what did McClellan do with it?

He couldn't do anything because he was being promised and then withdrawn reinforcements. Lee had plans to recall Jackson and call in French if McClellan advanced, which combined with McClellan's sick list would have given Lee a considerable advantage (in Effectives, 70K versus 55K)

It only became obvious the problem was McClellan after so many instances where he should have won a battle, yet for a myriad of reasons (including claiming to be outnumbered all the time) he did not. His improper conduct towards the commander in chief, his slowness, ect. Then he was very rightly, sacked.

Can you give an example of the "improper conduct" of which you speak?
I mean, you're saying the reason why McClellan wasn't reinforced on the Peninsula was because everyone "knew" he was wrong about the numbers facing him, and yet if they knew it was McClellan then they should have replaced him. What is the justification for recalling the Army of the Potomac from the James?

Like the whole campaign, he had the opportunity to counter attack. He did not, instead he abandoned the army, the wounded, and numerous supplies.

Attacking who and where? Against Richmond? That's a way of ending up with the army cut off from supplies and having just exhausted all their units.

How? Lee was spent, and had suffered disproportionate casualties. The defensive position was strong, and how was Lee going to crack it, or even threaten Harrison's Landing while the Army of the Potomac was encamped on a superior defensive position and could cut off any feint in that direction? The rains alone would stymie that option, much less the poor state of the army immediately after the fight.

Malvern Hill has nowhere to land supplies safely, and Lee's men could have encircled the hill without much trouble - McClellan's army was pretty much out of artillery ammunition, low on food (in many cases going hungry) and low on ammunition.

It is very well, Lee did it, lost lots of battles, and somehow won the campaign. McClellan had many chances to counter attack. Instead he simply abandoned the army. He wasn't even at Malvern Hill, much less White Oak swamp. He effectively lost control of his whole force until July 1st. It speaks to the competence of his Corps commanders that the Army of the Potomac wasn't defeated.

Oh, come on! The idea McClellan wasn't at Malvern Hill is... actually another one of those fabrications which seem to come up a lot. It was 1864 election propoganda.
Eyewitnesses including Averell and Everett confirm he was on the field.

There's a major difference. Lee was aggressive, which scared McClellan. Grant was aggressive, which Lee fought hard against, and even Lee attempted to counter attack during that campaign. McClellan did none of these things. He was cautious to a fault and failed to act decisively. Lee was aggressive and won, Grant was aggressive and won. If McClellan had been leading the Overland Campaign he would have retreated well before Cold Harbor. His actions on the Peninsula and after Antietam showed it didn't matter how many men he had, he was never going to use them decisively.

Its all well and good to try and portray his as a misunderstood general, but the simple truth is that he was indecisive, and when push came to shove, he would blink before his opponents did.

McClellan consistently held he needed more troops to be safe from attack, because he didn't have enough troops to protect his supply line (which had been fixed by Presidential order somewhere he didn't want it). He was, in short, ordered to do something he had warned was risky and to do so without the troops he had been promised.
By contrast, Grant and Lee were allowed to pull in as many troops as their armed forces could spare, if not a little more, in their respective campaigns (and weren't required to change operational orders based on instructions from their governments while on comparative shoestrings).

 

[Fiver]

Another cliche I have alluded to.

Union negotiators are complete incompetents in Confederate independence timelines. They typically end the blockade, forfiet Union control of the Mississippi River, and give back every bit of Confederate territory in return for getting nothing from the Confederates. They then often offer plebiscites in states that never seceded, in return for getting nothing from the Confederates.

 

[TRH]

Another cliche I have alluded to.

Union negotiators are complete incompetents in Confederate independence timelines. They typically end the blockade, forfiet Union control of the Mississippi River, and give back every bit of Confederate territory in return for getting nothing from the Confederates. They then often offer plebiscites in states that never seceded, in return for getting nothing from the Confederates.

I've yet to see a Confederate independence timeline that covered negotiations in any detail. We just skip to the new map.

 

[Jared]

I've yet to see a Confederate independence timeline that covered negotiations in any detail. We just skip to the new map.

See Guns of the South.

 

[Saphroneth]

I've yet to see a Confederate independence timeline that covered negotiations in any detail. We just skip to the new map.

I did, though not in huge detail. In that one the Confederacy and the British between them kind of had the Union over a barrel, though (DC was being shelled and the Union was running pretty low on gunpowder) so the CSA got most of what they were after, though it took months.

 

[StephenColbert27]

See Guns of the South.

Which itself is guilty of many cliches. Notably the "Lee actively opposes slavery" cliche, which there is no historic evidence of whatsoever.

 

[Fiver]

...in the first place, the problem is that Wilkes was actually being praised by the US government and people; in the second case, they wouldn't be going to war "over a rogue officer" but over the apparent assumption of the US that there was no such thing as a ship the US was not allowed to stop and search. The US had been demanding for months that the British withdraw the recognition of the Confederacy as a belligerent (you are only allowed to blockade belligerents) and had been refusing a mutual right of search treaty with the British for decades; what the actions of Wilkes show, unless promptly repudiated, are that the Union does not feel itself bound by international maritime law. (This is why the general reaction of the French, Prussians, Austrians and Russians ranged from full support of the British position to surprise the British had not already declared war - the OTL ultimatum was heavily toned down.)

From what I have been able to find, France said the law was on Britain's side, while Prussia expressed no opinion on the legality of Wilkes' actions. If you have any information showing any of these nations felt Britain would have been justified in declaring war over the incident, please share them.

The letter sent was an ultimatum - and one which clearly stated that any action other than the release of Mason and Sliddell (and their aides) would be cause to consider the ultimatum rejected.

The ultimatum also gave no indication what the consequences of rejecting the ultimatum would be. Only in private instructions was Lyons told that if the Union did not comply Lyons was to "leave Washington with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London. Breaking of diplomatic relations is often a prelude to war, but even then it is not a certainty. In spite of this lack of clarity by the British, Seward and Lincoln were able to determine the odds of Britain declaring war were too high to take the risk. Had they chosen instead to offer mediation, that did not guarantee Britain would declare war. Britain had the option of a second ultimatum, clearly declaring the consequences of failing to comply. Britain might even have accepted the Union's mediation offer - France had already said the law was on Britain's side.

The British going to war with the Union over Trent absolutely does not mean an alliance, any more than the US declaring war on the British in 1812 meant they were allying with Napoleon.

The British going to war over the Trent incident does not require them to formally ally with the Confederacy, but it obviously would help the Confederacy and could lead to a formal alliance. Just like when the US insisted on being an "associated power" instead of a formal ally in the Great War, yet its actions clearly helped Britain and France and hurt Germany.

 

[Fiver]

There's a good point here. Something I think is a tad overlooked in these discussions is that if Britain did intervene, they would almost certainly regret it in the long run. From all the facts on the ground in 1861-62 (heck even into the summer of 1863 when the last serious round of considering recognition was tossed about) slavery did seem to be a neutral factor since neither side was actively courting abolition. However, those in the know were well aware of the South's more rabid support for slavery, but for reasons of realpolitik, if war were declared this would be rather easily brushed under the rug. In the short term at least.

In the long term it is very questionable that the government who enacted such policies could continue, if Palmerston were to survive longer than OTL he most likely could coast his party to another win at the ballot box on the basis of a successful war if the British won (or at least made a really good deal), but once he is gone, and the honest reality of what the CSA is becomes known past the starry-eyed wartime portrayal, the stink of that victory would be inconvenient for some time. Britain would certainly hold its nose and do business with the CSA, but they would certainly find a bad taste in their stomachs about the whole thing. Sort of like how the West began to be a bit iffy about that Stalin fellow post 1945.

Not in the least because they just thoroughly killed the Monroe Doctrine, which considering what France was up to at the same time would come back to bite them in the butt.

Honestly, Britain intervening in the Civil War would probably rank very highly on the list of questionable decisions enacted by London.

Excellent points. The most likely short term winner of a Trent War is the Confederacy, with France being the chief beneficiary in the midterm, and probably Germany in the long term. Central and South America will probably face a lot more attempts at European intervention than in OTL. If a Great War occurs with similar dance partners, it's more likely to end in peace by exhaustion than an Allied win.

 

[TRH]

See Guns of the South.

I'd like one that wasn't openly ASB, of course. That kind of throws realistic political expectations out the window.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

Another cliche I have alluded to.

Union negotiators are complete incompetents in Confederate independence timelines. They typically end the blockade, forfiet Union control of the Mississippi River, and give back every bit of Confederate territory in return for getting nothing from the Confederates. They then often offer plebiscites in states that never seceded, in return for getting nothing from the Confederates.

I've yet to see a Confederate independence timeline that covered negotiations in any detail. We just skip to the new map.

Wasn't there a "Peace Treaty with the Confederate States thread???" that tried to analyse this....

Edit: ah, here it is. @Anaxagoras made this.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/forum/threads/draft-peace-treaty-between-usa-and-csa.241585/

 

[Fiver]

While it doesn't automatically mean the Confederacy wins, a war with Britain causes the Union so many fundamental problems that I honestly can't see how the Union can bring the war with the South to a successful conclusion unless it quickly contrives to lose the war with Britain. Preferably very soon.

All the OTL advantages of the Union are functionally reversed, from numerical strength to economic power to the blockade.

Of course, the Confederacy never ran out of arms or ammunition in spite of having to import them before the war. They built a navy from scratch. They kept their economy going in spite overworked and inadequate infrastructure and virtually no hard currency. They fought for four years in spite of a 2-to-1 disadvantage in manpower and a 10-to-1 disadvantage in industry. Even fighting both Britain and the Confederacy, the Union would face far better odds than the Confederacy did in OTL.

 

[Darth_Kiryan]

Oh! John C Fremont becomes the greatest American President ever because he was the most successful US civil war general ever.

 

[Fiver]

Let's imagine a situation where the French intervene in 1862 or 1863. They put together a corps-sized intervention force (30,000) the size of their one that went OTL to Calamita Bay, and move it to the Chesapeake after establishing their blockade.

Their objective is Baltimore, and specifically Washington Junction - the one rail link DC has to the outside world - and to get there they need to sail up the Chesapeake Bay and defeat Fort McHenry. This is a star fort dating from 1798, and which has not been modernized - it came close to destruction in 1814, and ship bombardment in 1862 is massively beyond that in 1814.

Once the fort is defeated, then the French can land their troops. Their opposition is one division, roughly (the Baltimore garrison) and they've got three divisions of well-trained long service regulars available, so it's not really much contest. After that Washington is functionally cut off.

This is ignoring all of the natural obstacles and Union defenses between the mouth of the Chesapeake and Ft McHenry. As to Ft McHenry, in 1814 the most powerful British ships had too deep of a draft to get close enough to the fort and I doubt that's changed in the 1860s. After over 24 hours bombardment and over 1500 rounds fired, the British withdrew having done little damage to the fort and killing only 4 Americans. If a French invasion force of 30,000 does make it to Baltimore in 1862, they can probably take the city, but resupply will be problematic and they have very little chance of keeping it. They're also going to need to control the Potomac to completely isolate Washington DC.

The best time for the French to intervene in terms of totally screwing over the Union is probably shortly before the end of the Siege of Yorktown (say the French arrive on May 1). This would functionally result in the loss of the Monitor, the survival of the Virginia, the total loss of the Army of the Potomac (over 100,000 troops with no supply route) and also the cutting-off of Washington.
I have trouble seeing how the Union can come back from that one!

While this probably would result in the loss of the Monitor, it would not be without cost to French naval forces. It should not result in the total loss of the Army of the Potomac, which could fall back overland. It would cut off Washington DC from the sea, but cutting Washington off from the rest of the country is far from certain.

 

[Incognitia]

From what I have been able to find, France said the law was on Britain's side, while Prussia expressed no opinion on the legality of Wilkes' actions. If you have any information showing any of these nations felt Britain would have been justified in declaring war over the incident, please share them.



The ultimatum also gave no indication what the consequences of rejecting the ultimatum would be. Only in private instructions was Lyons told that if the Union did not comply Lyons was to "leave Washington with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London. Breaking of diplomatic relations is often a prelude to war, but even then it is not a certainty. In spite of this lack of clarity by the British, Seward and Lincoln were able to determine the odds of Britain declaring war were too high to take the risk. Had they chosen instead to offer mediation, that did not guarantee Britain would declare war. Britain had the option of a second ultimatum, clearly declaring the consequences of failing to comply. Britain might even have accepted the Union's mediation offer - France had already said the law was on Britain's side.

An ultimatum means do this or the next step is war.
There could only be confusion because the US did not see it's behaviour in the Trent Affair as a cause of war, and if it's leaders thus did not believe that Britain would really declare war over the matter.
I don't think there was any such confusion in Whitehall or Horse Guards.

 

[Saphroneth]

The ultimatum also gave no indication what the consequences of rejecting the ultimatum would be. Only in private instructions was Lyons told that if the Union did not comply Lyons was to "leave Washington with all the members of your legation, bringing with you the archives of the legation, and to repair immediately to London. Breaking of diplomatic relations is often a prelude to war, but even then it is not a certainty. In spite of this lack of clarity by the British, Seward and Lincoln were able to determine the odds of Britain declaring war were too high to take the risk. Had they chosen instead to offer mediation, that did not guarantee Britain would declare war. Britain had the option of a second ultimatum, clearly declaring the consequences of failing to comply.

Definitionally an ultimatum is a final demand. You're suggesting the British would have responded to their final demand (for which the options were compliance or rejection) being rejected with another final demand - in fact, this would be the British showing themselves to have been bluffing, and would impede all their future diplomacy.

From what I have been able to find, France said the law was on Britain's side, while Prussia expressed no opinion on the legality of Wilkes' actions. If you have any information showing any of these nations felt Britain would have been justified in declaring war over the incident, please share them.

"although at present it is England only which is immediately concerned in the matter, yet, on the other hand, it is one of the most important and universally recognised rights of the neutral flag which is called into question... [if Wilkes acted under orders] we should find ourselves constrained to see in it not an isolated fact, but a public menace offered to the existing rights of all neutrals." (Bernstorff to Gerolt, Berlin, 25 December 1861)

"according to the notions of international law adopted by all the Powers, and which the American government itself has often taken as the rule of its conduct, England could not by any means refrain in the present case from making a representation against the attack made on its flag, and from demanding a just reparation for it." (Rechberg to Hulsemann, Vienna, 18 December 1861)

"Baron Brunnow wrote at once from London to his colleague at Washington, condemning in strong terms the conduct of the Commander of the 'San Jacinto', and advising due reparation to Her Majesty's Government by the President of the United States. Prince Gortchakoff wrote also to Washington and to London private letters entirely approving the step taken by Baron Brunnow." (Earl Russell to Lord Napier, 10 January 1862)

This is ignoring all of the natural obstacles and Union defenses between the mouth of the Chesapeake and Ft McHenry.

There aren't any.

This 1840s chart shows feet in the dotted area and fathoms (6 feet each) otherwise, and shows low water.

Annapolis is totally undefended. Fort Severn has been made into the US Naval Academy and is run down and unarmed. The Severn River is at least 20 ft deep until almost Indian Landing, and a landing force can land within 5 miles of the railway (and there is a branch line to the main railway, which connects at Annapolis Junction).

As for Baltimore, the depth chart shows floating batteries (Aetna class) and gunboats can roll right up to Fort McHenry at neap tide (the depth on the chart), as can sloops, corvettes and even a few frigates.


OTL Fort McHenry was bombarded by mortars at extreme range (they didn't get closer because of the guns of the fort) and was badly damaged, including a shell penetrating into the magazine. The fort was adequate - just - to stand off ships in 1814, but hasn't been upgraded at all.

While this probably would result in the loss of the Monitor, it would not be without cost to French naval forces. It should not result in the total loss of the Army of the Potomac, which could fall back overland.

I said shortly before the end of the Siege of Yorktown... there is no overland route for the Army of the Potomac to fall back down. It only has communications via water.
As for cost to French naval forces, probably - but I'd bet on Gloire over Monitor any day, Gloire has a lot more guns and is about as able to hurt Monitor as the reverse. Gloire and two sail battleships is incredibly one sided.

 

[samcster94]

Which itself is guilty of many cliches. Notably the "Lee actively opposes slavery" cliche, which there is no historic evidence of whatsoever.

True. He was more like Rommel(who was no friend of the Jews), as his motive did not directly connect to slavery(his primary goal was state loyalty, and he did cruelly torture slaves).

 

[Anaxagoras]

Which itself is guilty of many cliches. Notably the "Lee actively opposes slavery" cliche, which there is no historic evidence of whatsoever.

Attempts by hagiographic biographers to turn him into a closet abolitionist are not supported by any real evidence. But it's quite clear that he was no Fire-Eater of the Robert Rhett variety.

 

[galveston bay]

As for cost to French naval forces, probably - but I'd bet on Gloire over Monitor any day, Gloire has a lot more guns and is about as able to hurt Monitor as the reverse. Gloire and two sail battleships is incredibly one sided.

a major cliche is the frequent appearance of military scenarios, particularly intervention scenarios, without any detailed analysis or background of why they occur

just a bad is the cliche that one side will always make the wrong choices and the other side will always make the right choices.

and finally, only in fiction do you have wars and campaigns without the friction of war making the simple difficult, and the difficult a fantasy.