The What-if China/Korea Bonanza Thread

[democracy101]

True. However, I'm thinking that if the Sui didn't fall, the Turks wouldn't be as effective. I can't imagine them approaching Luoyang under the Sui the way they nearly attacked Chang'an during the early Tang. On the other hand, the Eastern Turks collapsed by around 630. I'm thinking that this alt-historical Sui Dynasty, if it outlives the Eastern Turks, could be strong enough for the task of conquering Koguryo, though of course I can't say for certain.

Well, I'm not really sure about the conflicts between the Turks and China, but I think that Chang'an was attacked around 600, and although there was a civil war between the Western and Eastern Turkic factions, they might have been more united if the Sui had thought about launching a campaign against them first.

While it's not impossible, though maybe not likely, for this *Sui Dynasty to send out diplomats to Paekche or Silla, I assume that if these countries are interested in winning, they might take the initiative instead. I'm not sure if it's likely, since it depends on differing relations between the three kingdoms, but what if during this time Koguryo and Silla attack Paekche, prompting Paekche to ask for assistance from Yamato and China? Instead of the historical battle of Baekgang with China and Silla versus Yamato and Paekche, we have China, Paekche, and Yamato versus Koguryo and Silla.

It would have been extremely unlikely for Goguryeo to ally with Silla. As FDW mentioned, Yamato had close ties with both Baekje and Goguryeo, so it would be hard-pressed to choose a side, while if Baekje did manage to retake the Han River Valley, which would probably be unlikely, then it might have been somewhat possible for a Goguryeo-Silla alliance. In OTL, however, the biggest issue was a territorial dispute between Goguryeo and Silla. As I stated before, Kim Chunchu, who would later unify the peninsula south of the Daedong River, went to Goguryeo in 642 in order to propose an alliance due to Baekje's string of successes against Silla. However, Yeon Gaesomun made a counter-proposal in which Silla would hand back part of its northwestern territory that Goguryeo had lost during its wars with the Sui, possibly because Goguryeo wanted to attack Baekje directly instead of going through Silla or solely using naval forces. However, if Silla accepted this proposal, this would have potentially meant that the Han River Valley would be in jeopardy after Baekje was conquered, so it was forced to go to the Tang and negotiate.

This source says the 598 affair was a joint operation between Koguryo and the Mohe/Malgal (haven't decided which one I'm going to call it). I haven't read through it enough to know if it's credible though.

Yes, but the Mohe had been culturally influenced by Goguryeo enough to have been considered as something less than a tributary state, so it doesn't really explain Goguryeo's long-term strategy. Goguryeo also had consistently used both Khitan and Mohe allies during previous battles with states in China and the southern Korean Peninsula.

Okay, it's just that you said "then break through two lines of fortresses to successfully invade Pyongyang," while I would technically argue that China could have taken Pyongyang with a naval landing and then a land assault (wasn't it abandoned? Or am I thinking of another city? Or was that during the war with Tang and not Sui?), though I don't think that's a very Chinese-style of warfare, and I don't think it would lead to a lot of success either. On the other hand, I think Koguryo can't just hope that storms in the Yellow Sea are going to scatter the Chinese fleet every time.

I didn't mention it before, but I read somewhere that the storm during the first naval battle was probably fabricated in order to lessen the magnitude of the Sui's defeat. As a comparison, Taizong was also so upset with his defeats against Goguryeo that he requested to look at the records about him, and possibly rewrote some of them. Regardless, Gang Isik managed to defeat the Sui in the first invasion with a navy of about 50,000, and he probably would have repulsed more if the Sui had attempted to do so. Even if the Sui navy had been successful and captured Pyongyang from a naval assault, Goguryeo forces probably would have simply withdrawn and attempt to hold out from its fortresses in the Liaodong Peninsula. After all, the capital in Guknae Fortress had been sacked twice before, yet Goguryeo managed to come back each time, so it really wouldn't have make sense for Goguryeo to sue for peace when they had plenty of other fortresses remaining.

In OTL, Goguryeo fell due to a power struggle between the three sons who succeeded Yeon Gaesomun, which would not have occurred if the monarchy had been retained. The oldest, Yeon Namsaeng, defected to the Tang and aided them in systematically conquering strategic fortresses, which would have been extremely hard for the Tang to carry out alone. Any hopes of holding out were eventually dashed because Silla attacked from the south soon afterward, which caused the state to capitulate after the capital fell.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

Well, I'm not really sure about the conflicts between the Turks and China, but I think that Chang'an was attacked around 600, and although there was a civil war between the Western and Eastern Turkic factions, they might have been more united if the Sui had thought about launching a campaign against them first.

I'll look into this. Either way, the possibility of a fracture into East and West factions is still possible.

It would have been extremely unlikely for Goguryeo to ally with Silla. As FDW mentioned, Yamato had close ties with both Baekje and Goguryeo, so it would be hard-pressed to choose a side, while if Baekje did manage to retake the Han River Valley, which would probably be unlikely, then it might have been somewhat possible for a Goguryeo-Silla alliance. In OTL, however, the biggest issue was a territorial dispute between Goguryeo and Silla. As I stated before, Kim Chunchu, who would later unify the peninsula south of the Daedong River, went to Goguryeo in 642 in order to propose an alliance due to Baekje's string of successes against Silla. However, Yeon Gaesomun made a counter-proposal in which Silla would hand back part of its northwestern territory that Goguryeo had lost during its wars with the Sui, possibly because Goguryeo wanted to attack Baekje directly instead of going through Silla or solely using naval forces. However, if Silla accepted this proposal, this would have potentially meant that the Han River Valley would be in jeopardy after Baekje was conquered, so it was forced to go to the Tang and negotiate.

Well, my point was just that Silla did think about an alliance, so a united front between Silla and Koguryo against Paekche is possible. Of course, the counter-proposal sounds rather inconvenient, but Silla could just turn on Koguryo once the alliance is concluded, the same way it attacked Tang China.

Yes, but the Mohe had been culturally influenced by Goguryeo enough to have been considered as something less than a tributary state, so it doesn't really explain Goguryeo's long-term strategy. Goguryeo also had consistently used both Khitan and Mohe allies during previous battles with states in China and the southern Korean Peninsula.

I didn't mention it before, but I read somewhere that the storm during the first naval battle was probably fabricated in order to lessen the magnitude of the Sui's defeat. As a comparison, Taizong was also so upset with his defeats against Goguryeo that he requested to look at the records about him, and possibly rewrote some of them. Regardless, Gang Isik managed to defeat the Sui in the first invasion with a navy of about 50,000, and he probably would have repulsed more if the Sui had attempted to do so. Even if the Sui navy had been successful and captured Pyongyang from a naval assault, Goguryeo forces probably would have simply withdrawn and attempt to hold out from its fortresses in the Liaodong Peninsula. After all, the capital in Guknae Fortress had been sacked twice before, yet Goguryeo managed to come back each time, so it really wouldn't have make sense for Goguryeo to sue for peace when they had plenty of other fortresses remaining.

In OTL, Goguryeo fell due to a power struggle between the three sons who succeeded Yeon Gaesomun, which would not have occurred if the monarchy had been retained. The oldest, Yeon Namsaeng, defected to the Tang and aided them in systematically conquering strategic fortresses, which would have been extremely hard for the Tang to carry out alone. Any hopes of holding out were eventually dashed because Silla attacked from the south soon afterward, which caused the state to capitulate after the capital fell.

I'm not sure about the Mohe issue. I might look into them if I have time.

I don't think the altering is likely. After all, the Tang historians were more likely to alter events with a bias against the Sui, not in favor of it. Their accounts of the Sui Dynasty are filled with numerous accounts of Sui failure, such as that massive figure of 1,133,000 men in the Sui army. Of course, it's still possible that accounts of storms were added during the Tang Dynasty for the narrative of "even Heaven turned against the Sui," but it's more reasonable to assume that there were storms. After all, the Yellow Sea is also affected by the monsoon.

I don't see why Koguryo would be so resilient. In the 612 Sui invasion, you had two armies at the gates of Pyongyang. I don't remember why they didn't join forces, but if they did meet up and capture Koguryo, I imagine Koguryo would collapse soon: In 612, and I think 613, the Sui navy was largely unimpeded in its landings near Pyongyang, and could provide a critical supply of food which the Sui forces near the Yalu and Liao Rivers lacked. In this scenario (where the Sui survive till 650 to attack), I think it's not likely for the Liao River fortresses to hold out with the capital, and presumably supplies and leadership, cut off.

 

[democracy101]

Well, my point was just that Silla did think about an alliance, so a united front between Silla and Koguryo against Paekche is possible. Of course, the counter-proposal sounds rather inconvenient, but Silla could just turn on Koguryo once the alliance is concluded, the same way it attacked Tang China.

Yes, but Silla would first be concerned about retaining the Han River Valley as Goguryeo could potentially invade from both north and south, while attempting to penetrate through the Sobaek mountains as well. Meanwhile, Silla would have to approach China after Baekje had been subdued, which would have been a drawn-out process. In OTL, Silla succeeded in recapturing most of the peninsula because it also had the support of former Baekje and Goguryeo soldiers, who were firmly opposed to Tang control, while the situation in ATL would not have been as clear-cut.

I don't see why Koguryo would be so resilient. In the 612 Sui invasion, you had two armies at the gates of Pyongyang. I don't remember why they didn't join forces, but if they did meet up and capture Koguryo, I imagine Koguryo would collapse soon: In 612, and I think 613, the Sui navy was largely unimpeded in its landings near Pyongyang, and could provide a critical supply of food which the Sui forces near the Yalu and Liao Rivers lacked. In this scenario (where the Sui survive till 650 to attack), I think it's not likely for the Liao River fortresses to hold out with the capital, and presumably supplies and leadership, cut off.

Not really. In 612, only the naval forces reached Pyongyang, and they were decisively defeated because there were two main walls. The Sui managed to breach the first one because it was abandoned, but was then assaulted. When the Goguryeo forces fell back, the Sui were tricked into thinking that they had scored a major victory, and started looting. However, another force arrived and attacked the looters, who were forced to retreat into the sea. Meanwhile, the army was unable to capture Yodong Fortress, so they decided to bypass it and head straight to Pyongyang. However, during its march, Goguryeo forces consistently attacked and retreated multiple times, while the Sui were low on rations and morale. Eventually, when they reached Salsu River and prepared to build a bridge across it, Eulji Mundeok opened a dam that he had prepared, sweeping away the Sui. On the other hand, the invasions in 613 and 614 should be discounted because they failed to breach the fortifications before rebellions occurred in China, causing them to withdraw, so the Sui was not at full potential.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

Not really. In 612, only the naval forces reached Pyongyang, and they were decisively defeated because there were two main walls. The Sui managed to breach the first one because it was abandoned, but was then assaulted. When the Goguryeo forces fell back, the Sui were tricked into thinking that they had scored a major victory, and started looting. However, another force arrived and attacked the looters, who were forced to retreat into the sea. Meanwhile, the army was unable to capture Yodong Fortress, so they decided to bypass it and head straight to Pyongyang. However, during its march, Goguryeo forces consistently attacked and retreated multiple times, while the Sui were low on rations and morale. Eventually, when they reached Salsu River and prepared to build a bridge across it, Eulji Mundeok opened a dam that he had prepared, sweeping away the Sui. On the other hand, the invasions in 613 and 614 should be discounted because they failed to breach the fortifications before rebellions occurred in China, causing them to withdraw, so the Sui was not at full potential.

Yes, but I should point out that in 612 and 614, Sui forces were almost at Pyongyang. The 598 naval force may have been repelled, but Sui forces managed to reach Pyongyang two times in three years less than twenty years later. Now, I don't know if Sui forces could have taken Pyongyang in 612 or if Emperor Yang could have taken Liaodong's fortress in 613, but absent internal dissent in China (the supposed reason for Emperor Yang's withdrawal in 613), but time favors China more than Koguryo. Combine elements of the 613 and 614 invasions, with a focus on capturing Pyongyang and the Liao River area, and Koguryo would be reduced to the Yalu River area, which is unsustainable. Even historically, Koguryo was at its limits: when King Yongyang handed over Yang Xuangan's associate to Lai Huer, it was a sign of weakness, not strength.

 

[democracy101]

Yes, but I should point out that in 612 and 614, Sui forces were almost at Pyongyang. The 598 naval force may have been repelled, but Sui forces managed to reach Pyongyang two times in three years less than twenty years later. Now, I don't know if Sui forces could have taken Pyongyang in 612 or if Emperor Yang could have taken Liaodong's fortress in 613, but absent internal dissent in China (the supposed reason for Emperor Yang's withdrawal in 613), but time favors China more than Koguryo. Combine elements of the 613 and 614 invasions, with a focus on capturing Pyongyang and the Liao River area, and Koguryo would be reduced to the Yalu River area, which is unsustainable. Even historically, Koguryo was at its limits: when King Yongyang handed over Yang Xuangan's associate to Lai Huer, it was a sign of weakness, not strength.

Well, I don't think it's really possible to definitively state which side could have been more successful in the long run. As you said, Goguryeo would have been weakened after the conflicts, so it would have been looking for diplomatic measures to resolve the issues. However, the Sui was also in turmoil as citizens began to voluntarily break their hands and/or legs in order to evade conscription, and I honestly think that revolts would have occurred as long as the emperor was persistent in carrying out exhausting campaigns. In other words, if there had been only one or two campaigns within 5-10 years, Goguryeo would have probably resisted successfully, while if there were three or more, as happened in OTL, the Sui citizens would have become extremely discontented, causing the state to eventually fall apart.

As I said before, Goguryeo technically laid out the path for the Sui in 612, so it's hard to say what would have happened if the defenders had held out within the fortresses. However, assuming that Pyongyang had been captured somehow, Goguryeo still had around 10 major fortresses around the Liao River, and more than 40 fortresses clustered in total around the Liao and Yalu Rivers. Although it took about 16 years from 631-47 to build the Cheolli Jangseong, which functioned as a bulwark against Chinese invasions, another version probably could have been built within 10 years, starting around 615, if the Sui had agreed to a truce earlier. In 645, when Goguryeo had not completely recovered from Yeon Gaesomun's coup, the Tang managed to take only three before withdrawing from Ansi. As a result, it would have been almost impossible for the Sui to successfully take most of the strategic fortresses around the Liao River and successfully take Pyongyang before winter set in.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

Well, I don't think it's really possible to definitively state which side could have been more successful in the long run. As you said, Goguryeo would have been weakened after the conflicts, so it would have been looking for diplomatic measures to resolve the issues. However, the Sui was also in turmoil as citizens began to voluntarily break their hands and/or legs in order to evade conscription, and I honestly think that revolts would have occurred as long as the emperor was persistent in carrying out exhausting campaigns. In other words, if there had been only one or two campaigns within 5-10 years, Goguryeo would have probably resisted successfully, while if there were three or more, as happened in OTL, the Sui citizens would have become extremely discontented, causing the state to eventually fall apart.

Of course, that's true, but depends on other factors too that might not happen historically either. For example, there would definitely be people trying to evade conscription (I'm pretty sure self-mutilation occurred in the good times as well as bad, because conscription is just that bad), but unless there's an important person like Yang Xuangan who revolts in Luoyang, it might not be enough to distract Sui authorities. Likewise, while flooding and famine are frequent in Chinese history, they don't have to take place at inconvenient moments, like when the Yellow River flooded during the later days of the Sui Dynasty.

As I said before, Goguryeo technically laid out the path for the Sui in 612, so it's hard to say what would have happened if the defenders had held out within the fortresses. However, assuming that Pyongyang had been captured somehow, Goguryeo still had around 10 major fortresses around the Liao River, and more than 40 fortresses clustered in total around the Liao and Yalu Rivers. Although it took about 16 years from 631-47 to build the Cheolli Jangseong, which functioned as a bulwark against Chinese invasions, another version probably could have been built within 10 years, starting around 615, if the Sui had agreed to a truce earlier. In 645, when Goguryeo had not completely recovered from Yeon Gaesomun's coup, the Tang managed to take only three before withdrawing from Ansi. As a result, it would have been almost impossible for the Sui to successfully take most of the strategic fortresses around the Liao River and successfully take Pyongyang before winter set in.

On the other hand, how valuable are all of these fortresses? Wikipedia shows one of the Liao fortresses as far north as Changchun. If that's not the most desolate part of Koguryo territory at this time, I don't know what is. I mean, they can't all be as forbidding as the Ansi or Liaodong Fortresses. Besides, how much resistance did the fortresses offer in the latter invasions? I'm pretty sure that during Gaozong's invasions, the Liao River fortresses were breached, and I don't remember the Yalu River ones offering too much resistance. Historically, Koguryo largely collapsed after Pyongyang was taken. If the remaining leaders of Koguryo could have holed up in their fortresses (like that one deep in Puyo territory, or at least the Yalu River ones), why didn't they? In my view, without Pyongyang, it becomes much harder, almost impossible, to sustain a defense of Koguryo.

 

[democracy101]

Of course, that's true, but depends on other factors too that might not happen historically either. For example, there would definitely be people trying to evade conscription (I'm pretty sure self-mutilation occurred in the good times as well as bad, because conscription is just that bad), but unless there's an important person like Yang Xuangan who revolts in Luoyang, it might not be enough to distract Sui authorities. Likewise, while flooding and famine are frequent in Chinese history, they don't have to take place at inconvenient moments, like when the Yellow River flooded during the later days of the Sui Dynasty.

Well, I'm assuming that the major revolts occurred when they had a better chance of succeeding, considering that the emperor still had control of many hundreds of thousands of troops. This was probably why his prime minister's son rebelled against him in 613, and revolts began simultaneously breaking out a few years later as natural disasters began to set in. Although it's possible that they could have been avoided, see my next response.

Although this is in response to your previous post, Goguryeo handing a defector over to the Sui was probably a sign of weakness. However, considering that in the second campaign, Eulji Mundeok pretended to surrender in order to analyze the situation among the Sui troops, and intentionally drew the invaders further into Goguryeo, the tactic was probably carried out with a similar intent to distract the Sui.

On the other hand, how valuable are all of these fortresses? Wikipedia shows one of the Liao fortresses as far north as Changchun. If that's not the most desolate part of Koguryo territory at this time, I don't know what is. I mean, they can't all be as forbidding as the Ansi or Liaodong Fortresses. Besides, how much resistance did the fortresses offer in the latter invasions? I'm pretty sure that during Gaozong's invasions, the Liao River fortresses were breached, and I don't remember the Yalu River ones offering too much resistance. Historically, Koguryo largely collapsed after Pyongyang was taken. If the remaining leaders of Koguryo could have holed up in their fortresses (like that one deep in Puyo territory, or at least the Yalu River ones), why didn't they? In my view, without Pyongyang, it becomes much harder, almost impossible, to sustain a defense of Koguryo.

Once again, not really. If, according to your logic, most of the fortresses were unimportant, then why did Yeon Namsaeng aid the Tang in systematically conquering more than 40 fortresses, and march to the Sea of Japan, taking remote fortresses like the one you mentioned? If he felt that Goguryeo had been greatly weakened due to the power struggle, he could have just breached the most strategic ones and head straight to Pyongyang, but this was not the case. When Taizong invaded, he attacked seven fortresses but only took three before withdrawing from Ansi. In Gaozong's first invasion, he decided to bypass the Cheolli Jangseong entirely and use most of his forces to attack Pyongyang by sea, although a stout defense led to his failure. His second attempt did succeed, but as I stated earlier, almost all of Goguryeo's northern fortresses were systematically destroyed before heading to Pyongyang to meet up with Silla forces.

In other words, there isn't enough evidence to determine whether China would have succeeded if it managed to breach the fortifications around the Liao River while invading Pyongyang from another direction, but given what we have, it's probably more likely that Goguryeo would have managed to hold out.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

Well, I'm assuming that the major revolts occurred when they had a better chance of succeeding, considering that the emperor still had control of many hundreds of thousands of troops. This was probably why his prime minister's son rebelled against him in 613, and revolts began simultaneously breaking out a few years later as natural disasters began to set in. Although it's possible that they could have been avoided, see my next response.

Although this is in response to your previous post, Goguryeo handing a defector over to the Sui was probably a sign of weakness. However, considering that in the second campaign, Eulji Mundeok pretended to surrender in order to analyze the situation among the Sui troops, and intentionally drew the invaders further into Goguryeo, the tactic was probably carried out with a similar intent to distract the Sui.

Well, the Emperor might have been away on his campaign with hundreds of thousands of troops, but Sui troops were able to defeat Yang Xuangan (not sure if his father was the Prime Minister; either way, the guy was dead already) with relative speed in 613. Asides from Yang and associates, most of the Sui officials didn't start defecting until 616, after the fourth war with Koguryo, which is why I'd say at least Yang's revolt occurred at a time when it was unlikely for him to succeed. As for the defector, yes, I could see it as a clever ploy as well. My point, however, was just that cracks were starting to appear in the Koguryo defense.

Once again, not really. If, according to your logic, most of the fortresses were unimportant, then why did Yeon Namsaeng aid the Tang in systematically conquering more than 40 fortresses, and march to the Sea of Japan, taking remote fortresses like the one you mentioned? If he felt that Goguryeo had been greatly weakened due to the power struggle, he could have just breached the most strategic ones and head straight to Pyongyang, but this was not the case. When Taizong invaded, he attacked seven fortresses but only took three before withdrawing from Ansi. In Gaozong's first invasion, he decided to bypass the Cheolli Jangseong entirely and use most of his forces to attack Pyongyang by sea, although a stout defense led to his failure. His second attempt did succeed, but as I stated earlier, almost all of Goguryeo's northern fortresses were systematically destroyed before heading to Pyongyang to meet up with Silla forces.

In other words, there isn't enough evidence to determine whether China would have succeeded if it managed to breach the fortifications around the Liao River while invading Pyongyang from another direction, but given what we have, it's probably more likely that Goguryeo would have managed to hold out.

If China took that route, Koguryo's territory would be indefensible, a sliver of territory along the Yalu River. It might be just me, but I can't see Koguryo lasting as a rump holdout in such a situation, especially once the winter abides and Chinese forces can return. I certainly can't imagine the vast wilderness of Southeastern and Central Manchuria support Koguryo, especially when the nomads in the area are going to switch alliances when the balance of power shifts. Besides, defectors or no defectors, I don't see the argument why China's not strong enough to take these forts. China was assisted by defectors from Koguryo, but how much assistance was provided? I'm still pretty sure the bulk of the forces involved were from China. As for Gaozong, I'm also pretty sure that Pyongyang was taken by just his forces invading from the south.

 

[democracy101]

Well, the Emperor might have been away on his campaign with hundreds of thousands of troops, but Sui troops were able to defeat Yang Xuangan (not sure if his father was the Prime Minister; either way, the guy was dead already) with relative speed in 613. Asides from Yang and associates, most of the Sui officials didn't start defecting until 616, after the fourth war with Koguryo, which is why I'd say at least Yang's revolt occurred at a time when it was unlikely for him to succeed. As for the defector, yes, I could see it as a clever ploy as well. My point, however, was just that cracks were starting to appear in the Koguryo defense.

I see what you mean. However, as both sides were exhausted, I think that it would be hard to determine which side would be more successful in the long run. That's all.

If China took that route, Koguryo's territory would be indefensible, a sliver of territory along the Yalu River. It might be just me, but I can't see Koguryo lasting as a rump holdout in such a situation, especially once the winter abides and Chinese forces can return. I certainly can't imagine the vast wilderness of Southeastern and Central Manchuria support Koguryo, especially when the nomads in the area are going to switch alliances when the balance of power shifts. Besides, defectors or no defectors, I don't see the argument why China's not strong enough to take these forts. China was assisted by defectors from Koguryo, but how much assistance was provided? I'm still pretty sure the bulk of the forces involved were from China. As for Gaozong, I'm also pretty sure that Pyongyang was taken by just his forces invading from the south.

Well, I didn't really say if Goguryeo troops aided the Tang. I was making the point that because Yeon Namsaeng had served under his father and had been the Prime Minister, he had more knowledge of the terrain and the fortifications to have potentially found a shortcut, but he decided to take almost all of the fortresses, including minor ones. I agree that if a Chinese dynasty had managed to take all of the major fortresses around the Liao River, and simultaneously invade Pyongyang successfully, then Goguryeo would be in danger of collapse. However, as this situation never occurred in OTL until a power struggle weakened Goguryeo, a defector essentially revealed all of the potential strategies that Goguryeo would have used, and Silla attacked simultaneously from the south, I would have to say that conquering the Liao River fortresses and Pyongyang would be extremely difficult.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

Well, I didn't really say if Goguryeo troops aided the Tang. I was making the point that because Yeon Namsaeng had served under his father and had been the Prime Minister, he had more knowledge of the terrain and the fortifications to have potentially found a shortcut, but he decided to take almost all of the fortresses, including minor ones. I agree that if a Chinese dynasty had managed to take all of the major fortresses around the Liao River, and simultaneously invade Pyongyang successfully, then Goguryeo would be in danger of collapse. However, as this situation never occurred in OTL until a power struggle weakened Goguryeo, a defector essentially revealed all of the potential strategies that Goguryeo would have used, and Silla attacked simultaneously from the south, I would have to say that conquering the Liao River fortresses and Pyongyang would be extremely difficult.

But how much assistance could Yon Namsaeng have provided? I mean, let's be honest, after sixty years of invading the same areas, I'm pretty sure Chinese forces know the terrain of at least the Liaodong Fort, and probably some others. And I don't think it's possible or reasonable to assume that all those forts fell because of his secret knowledge, unless those forts were under his control and he surrendered them to China, which might have been the case, since I don't recall reading about him too much (I had to get his name from Wikipedia because all of the sources in Google Books just describe him as "son of Yon Kaesomun"). One site, of unknown trustworthiness to me, tells me Yon Namsaeng surrendered to the Tang forces in Kungnae, which suggests that China had either taken or bypassed those forts. It seems much more likely to me that even if he provided strategy and details, he was more helpful and less indispensable. Even if Yon Kaesomun didn't die, I don't see him resisting China for too much longer. Troops from China and Silla are still approaching and still outnumbering him from two directions.

If Yon Namsaeng had surrendered most or all of those fortresses, that suggests disloyalty on the part of his subordinates too, so it seems like the division wasn't limited to just the higher ranks.

EDIT: Said source also says that Liaodong Fortress was taken in 645 and demolished, but I don't remember whether it was rebuilt. It might be a mistake on the source's part.

 

[democracy101]

But how much assistance could Yon Namsaeng have provided? I mean, let's be honest, after sixty years of invading the same areas, I'm pretty sure Chinese forces know the terrain of at least the Liaodong Fort, and probably some others. And I don't think it's possible or reasonable to assume that all those forts fell because of his secret knowledge, unless those forts were under his control and he surrendered them to China, which might have been the case, since I don't recall reading about him too much (I had to get his name from Wikipedia because all of the sources in Google Books just describe him as "son of Yon Kaesomun"). One site, of unknown trustworthiness to me, tells me Yon Namsaeng surrendered to the Tang forces in Kungnae, which suggests that China had either taken or bypassed those forts. It seems much more likely to me that even if he provided strategy and details, he was more helpful and less indispensable. Even if Yon Kaesomun didn't die, I don't see him resisting China for too much longer. Troops from China and Silla are still approaching and still outnumbering him from two directions.

If Yon Namsaeng had surrendered most or all of those fortresses, that suggests disloyalty on the part of his subordinates too, so it seems like the division wasn't limited to just the higher ranks.

EDIT: Said source also says that Liaodong Fortress was taken in 645 and demolished, but I don't remember whether it was rebuilt. It might be a mistake on the source's part.

Well, at this point, you're not really addressing the original question, which was how the Sui could have lasted longer, and not how Goguryeo could have done so. My initial response was that because it would have been likely for the Sui to collapse due to uprisings as long as it consistently attempted to conquer Goguryeo, it could have at least tacitly acknowledged Goguryeo's dominance east of the Liao River. However, you said that if the Sui had managed to hold out until the chaos had died down, then it could have been more successful against Goguryeo. This brings me to my next point, which is that the following events might not have occurred at all with a divergence around 613-5.

Goguryeo had relatively been at peace for almost 30 years before Yeon Gaesomun, receiving rumors that the monarch was planning to assassinate him, did the same to the ruler in a coup in 642. This occurred because after the Prime Minister had directed the creation of the Cheolli Jangseong, the officials wanted to extend the peace, while the generals believed that the Tang was preparing for another invasion. Although Goguryeo initially sent diplomats to China in 643, it eventually attacked Silla soon after so that it would not face a two-front war. These events caused Taizong to eventually attack Goguryeo because he thought that the state had become corrupt and insubordinate, so he attacked it in 645. However, Goguryeo continued to remain independent until 668, and Yeon Gaesomun even persuaded the Turks to revolt about 15-20 years after they had been conquered in 630, in order to distract the Tang. Eventually, after the Prime Minister died in 666, his sons began fighting each other in order to become the de facto ruler, causing a civil war. After the oldest was ousted from power, he was forced to reside in Guknae Fortress, the former capital, where he gathered those loyal to him and sent a message to the Tang, which does not imply that the fortress itself was under Tang control. He then aided his former enemy in conquering 40 fortresses in Buyeo and 60 in Liaodong, and then headed to Pyongyang to meet up with Silla forces.

In other words, if the Sui had somehow managed to agree to a truce with Goguryeo before riots became widespread, there is no reason to assume that a coup would have occurred, and that a succession dispute would have occurred due to a puppet monarch. For example, the long wall could have been built around 615-25, and as the Sui remained strong, the government could have still agreed to thoroughly prepare for a final confrontation. This could also have led to different policies regarding Silla and Baekje, as the former could have been unable to seize more Goguryeo territory during its conflict with the Sui, while Baekje could have seized more Silla fortresses. No succession dispute also would mean that Goguryeo would not be torn apart by civil war, causing more resistance against invasions in the long run.

As a result, just as you stated that the Sui did not necessarily have to collapse after multiple campaigns, Goguryeo could have also held out for a longer period of time.

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

True, I got distracted. I'll leave it at that then.

 

[Grouchio]

What should we talk about next? A more progressive Ming Dynasty that discovers steam power?

 

[FDW]

What should we talk about next? A more progressive Ming Dynasty that discovers steam power?

I don't really consider that likely, for a number of reasons…

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

Alright, here's an idea: in 1127, if Prince Kang is captured by the Jurchens, whether when he's in the capital at Kaifeng or when he's fleeing to the south, he would be unable to take the throne to become Emperor Gaozong of Song. This might remove the Southern Song entirely: Gaozong was the best claimant for the Song throne, and if he's removed, the remaining officials and generals of the Southern Song will be divided trying to find a suitable claimant for the throne.

 

[FDW]

Alright, here's an idea: in 1127, if Prince Kang is captured by the Jurchens, whether when he's in the capital at Kaifeng or when he's fleeing to the south, he would be unable to take the throne to become Emperor Gaozong of Song. This might remove the Southern Song entirely: Gaozong was the best claimant for the Song throne, and if he's removed, the remaining officials and generals of the Southern Song will be divided trying to find a suitable claimant for the throne.

Yeah, that would definitely be an interesting TL to read…

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

As for another Song possibility, in 1129, Emperor Gaozong was either deposed temporarily (according to Wikipedia) or almost deposed by a military coup (most Google Books sources). If he had been overthrown by his generals, I imagine that this might start a trend for the Southern Song of a rule by military dictators possibly similar to the shogunates in Japan.

 

[FDW]

As for another Song possibility, in 1129, Emperor Gaozong was either deposed temporarily (according to Wikipedia) or almost deposed by a military coup (most Google Books sources). If he had been overthrown by his generals, I imagine that this might start a trend for the Southern Song of a rule by military dictators possibly similar to the shogunates in Japan.

That could be interesting, though who says it might just end up devolving into a full-blown dynastic change?

 

[WhatIsAUserName]

That could be interesting, though who says it might just end up devolving into a full-blown dynastic change?

Short-term, probably not. The Northern Song collapsed because of invasion. Its legitimacy was still in place, which can be seen in how the Jurchen puppet states had little popular support. Long-term, it's a possibility, and there's the chance that future dynasties would fall into the same pattern.

 

[FDW]

Short-term, probably not. The Northern Song collapsed because of invasion. Its legitimacy was still in place, which can be seen in how the Jurchen puppet states had little popular support. Long-term, it's a possibility, and there's the chance that future dynasties would fall into the same pattern.

There's also the fact that Song generally had a vigorous "civil society" (If you could call it that) that might not stand for something like that, especially the confucian scholars.