The Whale has Wings

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perfectgeneral

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While recognise the worth of a western med island hopping campaign, this is a Churchill led CW not an AH.com puppet. TTL has to recognise the drivers in place and the desires of those in a position to direct the course of action.

It might be useful to look at plans kept on file at this time should opportunities arise.

http://worldwar2database.com/html/planning.htm

Early in the war Soviet Premier Josef Stalin, faced with grievous losses in the great encirclements of 1941, was agitating for a second front in continental Europe. The war in North Africa was not enough.
Churchill calmly received his scorn when they first met in 1942. The year Britain stood alone still weighed on his mind, and Stalin seemed to take no note of it. Almost immediately upon greeting Churchill Stalin demanded a landing in France before the end of the year. He could point to over 4,000,000 casualties in the last half 1941 alone.
What he got was the Dieppe Raid. Thousands of Canadians were killed, and it was clear that combined operations had a lot of learning to do if a landing was going to work.
Dieppe might not be the most tempting approach now that North Africa has been consolidated and Sicily looks achievable. Island hopping doesn't answer Stalin's call for a second continental front, but Churchill was happy that North Africa was enough to be getting on with IOTL, so why should this one be any different? Freeing up the sea lanes of the Med would be the Empire's top priority (especially with far flung fronts like Malaya to support). This goes beyond taking Sicily. Keeping axis air power out of the Med requires airbases off the coast of the mainland capable of intercepting naval bombers before they can reach allied shipping. The same bases can help patrol for U-boats.

ww2mR071MedTaranto.GIF


Crete and Sicily shield much of the route, but Sardinia still offers a pinch point for axis bombers to exploit. The driver for Corsica is less obvious. That might be a combination of consolidating Sardinia and the French wanting the lowest hanging fruit of European France. Next? Well around the point marked (4) is a weak point of sorts that the Greeks might use to justify taking airbases in the Ionian Islands. That would be more egg on the face of Il Duce and more coastline under immediate threat. Stretching the soft belly before the surprise poke. The axis can see it coming, but where? Italy (north or south), France (north or south) or Greece (east or west)? All the while Norway must be watched. Maybe islands off Norway might make things harder for transiting U-boats and easier for North Atlantic and Arctic convoys?
Map46Aegean.GIF

All the while I wonder how far the Dodecanese Campaign intended to go if it had been more successful? Gen Sir Henry Maitland Wilson seems likely to be in overall charge if Alexander is busy in the Far East.
http://www.iprom.co.uk/archives/caithness/Dodecanese.html

In January 1943 plans were drawn up about the future of the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG). The Middle East Command were not about to let such a specialist unit go to waste, they were looking for an area in which they could operate. This area turned out to be the Aegean Sea. The Aegean is surrounded by Greece to the North and West, which was occupied by the Italians and Germans. To the East was Turkey, which was neutral. To the South lay Crete, which was captured by the Germans. In the middle was the Dodecanese Islands also occupied by the Italians and Germans. The idea was to open another, smaller front, on in the Aegean. This was to capture the Dodecanese Islands and then open the way for a new resupply rout to Russia through the Dardanelles. Also this could be used to infiltrate agents, equipment and Special Forces into Greece
and Yugoslavia for the Partisans. Another worry was with Greece, who were formed into three main Resistance Armies, communist; royalist & independent. All were virtually fighting amongst themselves. Britain was keen to have troops in Greece as soon as possible to replace the King on the throne.
While the Balkans included Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, much like today there was much fighting among the ethnic people. This was going to be a more dangerous warfare than the desert. Hitler had already implied that all Commandos should be shot or handed over to the Gestapo, to be tortured and then shot. In the desert these things were unheaded and generally if a member of the SAS or LRDG were captured or wounded, they could expect to be treated fairly. In the Aegean and Balkans, like today, war crimes were being committed on a daily basis. People were being taken out and shot as examples by the Gestapo and SS. This was defiantly a different kind of warfare, the best they could hope for was to be captured by the Germans or Italians. If caught by the partisans or civilians, could mean being tortured and then mutilated, depending on who caught them.
Some indication that a route through to Russia via the Aegean was targeted.

Just spit-balling here, but might the Empire see finding a route to Russia as a great excuse to annex Persia? With the Med route opened up a lot more could funnel through there than OTL if the local infrastructure could be improved. Which is easier, Persia or Bulgaria?

http://www.patriotfiles.com/archive/navalhistory/WW2RN10-194106.htm
EUROPE - JUNE 1941
Atomic Bomb - The report on nuclear research by the Maud Committee led to the setting up of a development programme by Imperial Chemical Industries. Code named 'Tube Alloys', it oversaw both atomic bomb and reactor work.

 
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perfectgeneral

I agree with all your military logic save on a single point: Norway.

As you said regarding Churchill and the drivers present for the British, so to for Hitler. HE is crazy worried about Norway, but the threat of invasion is non-existent (logistics), whatever maps Churchill may find himself studying. There are, after all, real limits to what he can do with the military forces of a democracy.

If any Britons out there are willing to do so, I'd appreciate a little info on how much power a Prime Minister in the UK has over the military in wartime?

In America, the President is the Commander-in-Chief, but generally speaking leaves wartime decisions to his flag officers.

As for American examples:

Abraham Lincoln interfered with his Eastern commanders, but generally left his better Western commanders alone, once he'd learned to trust them. But even there, the Knoxville and Red River Campaigns were forced upon Grant against his specific wishes.

In Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson was micro-managing the war almost every single day. The leader of the Free World in the basement of the White House in the middle of the night, picking individual bombing targets in Hanoi. Doing the job of a major in the USAF.

In World War Two, Roosevelt took a very hands off approach. The only military decisions I can think of off the top of my head were "Europe First", to save MacArthur (and "recommend" to the Australians that they request his appointment as SWPacCom), choosing the Philippines over Formosa as the Pacific's strategic objective after the Battle of the Philippine Sea, and ordering Admiral King to accept Churchill's offer of the British Pacific Fleet in 1945. I'm sure there were many others.

What would be Churchill's options? What kind of power does HE have with his generals, admirals, and air marshals compared to an American President? I am asking for perspective.
 
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What would be Churchill's options? What kind of power does HE have with his generals, admirals, and air marshals compared to an American President? I am asking for perspective.
The big difference is the King, not the President, is commander in chief. The Prime Minister uses powers delegated to him by the king, but will also spend at least an hour a week talking to the king about current events at which the monarch has both the right and duty to make their views known. Once the government has come to a decision, the King has to shut up and support it - but in reality it would be rather a rare occasion when the Prime Minister will tell the King to get lost if he was strongly against something, and for a military operation if it's Churchill .vs. King & Imperial General Staff, Churchill is most likely going to back down.

All in all, I'd say the power is about the same, but to use it Churchill needs more of a consensus in the corridors of power than Roosevelt did.
 

perfectgeneral

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Churchill appointed (and removed) quite a few generals to various theatres throughout the war. Particularly in NA where he was in search of a winning team. He established a brand new spy network in the SOE, commandos and the parachute regiment. He was a lot more 'hands on' than Roosevelt.

H_010688.jpg
08-churchill-met-tommy-gun.jpg

you cannot insert or remove a drum magazine in a Thompson with the bolt closed, which it is.
http://iconicphotos.wordpress.com/2010/04/02/churchill-and-tommy-gun/
It was ironic that the British tried to render their prime minister more threatening. Churchill had more military experience than any British Prime Minister since the Duke of Wellington. Although he had been the Prime Minister for only 50 days when this photo was taken, he had been a military man throughout his life. He was a member of the Harrow Rifle Corps while in public school. After failing the entrance exam twice, he was admitted to Sandhurst, and graduated eighth in his class (and leading in tactics and fortifications). He saw action in India and South Africa and served as the minister in all three branches of the military before eventually being selected for the premiership.
The role of PM is flexible and Churchill exercised his interests. He made himself the defence minister in addition to first lord of the treasury (PM).
Operation Claymore was the first of 12 commando raids directed against Norway during the Second World War,[12] the German response to these raids, was to eventually increase the number of troops they had stationed there. By 1944 the German garrison in Norway had risen to 370,000 men.[13] By comparison a British infantry division in 1944 had an establishment of 18,347 men.[14]

How much less than 500,000 tons a month of shipping are the allies losing in the BotA?
 
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Churchill appointed (and removed) quite a few generals to various theatres throughout the war. Particularly in NA where he was in search of a winning team. He established a brand new spy network in the SOE, commandos and the parachute regiment. He was a lot more 'hands on' than Roosevelt.

The role of PM is flexible and Churchill exercised his interests. He made himself the defence minister in addition to first lord of the treasury (PM).

Well, your inserted quotation certainly answers why Hitler was so nuts about Norway. And of course his understanding of weather, logistics, and terrain was even worse than Churchill's.

Churchill's problems in NA may have been pretty bad, but not nearly so much as Lincoln's. At least Auchinleck, Wavell, Cunningham, and Ritchie didn't see themselves as sitting in Number 10. Monty, OTOH...:D;)

You told me something I didn't know. I knew that one of the first things Winston did as PM was to abolish the "Ministry for the Co-ordination of Defence":confused:, but I had always thought the MoD as such wasn't formed until after the war. I just thought that it was taken for granted that Churchill was "his own MoD", without the official title. Live and learn, I guess. When DID he become Minister of Defense?

I wonder if that would make a good TL? "What if FDR had played armchair general?" And how far could you take it?

Franklin Roosevelt was the most hands off of political leaders in WWII regarding military affairs this side of Hirohito. (1) He used his civilian military secretaries (SecWar Stimson and SecNav Frank Knox) almost as factotums and emissaries throughout the war while he dealt with his senior military chiefs himself. In fact, for a long time in the war, Knox and SecState Hull begged FDR to be allowed to retire due to age, but he refused. I think Roosevelt liked having Marshall and King essentially being their own "civilian" Secretaries of their respective departments.

1) Yes, I am well aware that the Emperor was many many fold more involved in war decisions than Allied propaganda liked to pretend.
 
Ah, British constitutional questions a subject of much debate in the latter part of the 17th century with sundry beheadings, revoltings, whores (both protestant and catholic) and probably an array of late night food unequalled in all history.

It is also British and constitution i.e. it works why the hell write it down.

The King is not quite commander in chief (he is the King and has due loyalty from subjects, appoints his friends in whom he has confidence as officers etc. etc.) and I don’t think has any command relationship with either the Navy or RAF, and a fairly junior one in the Army, so while the PM does act as the Crown in Parliament its not analogous to the US president who is specified as CinC. The CinC in the British army would be the CIGS who did not have to be a serving soldier.

Churchill is not in a position to give grand strategic orders without a high degree of consensus and while he has the effective power to appoint and sack generals its one that would have to be exercised judiciously and through the chain of command, unlike Hitler/Stalin or theoretically at least FDR. Even as Minister of Defence from 1940 Churchill does not have the service chiefs as subordinates (not till 46). The political heads are the Secretaries for War, Air and 1st Lord of the Admiralty who are cabinet (but not war cabinet) members.

The consensus would come from three sources. First one is the other CW PM’s (and in some circumstances the Viceroy of India) who are also the King's ministers with rights in their sphere. The Chiefs of Staff separately and CoS committee which is a subcommittee of the war cabinet and the war cabinet itself which is itself pretty much a 50/50 tory/labour body and the cabinet in general. For the big questions I suspect the big beasts would be Churchill, Brooke, Eden, Atlee and Bevin in 42 and probably the critical one is Bevin. I say that because he has the Labour ministry and the likely constraint on any British action, military or production is manpower and Atlee would be inclined to support Churchill but restrained by Bevin.

Its going to be a factor that three of them are very anti communist.

As to the immediate future, Sicily is going ahead and after Sicily. Italy. If Italy surrenders then Sardinia falls ( I think if Sicily falls no matter what Sardinia becomes untenable for the Axis) whether anyone likes it or not that means the allies fighting somewhere up the Italian boot, the question is where. Its actually in the UK interest to limit confrontation with the main German field army until the Americans get troops in theatre and a geographically constrained theatre works well for that. It will require a disproportionate commitment of German mobile forces if the UK and/or US (or style) troops are doing the fighting and even OTL the Germans got locked into a bad attritional war.

What the British won’t want to do it take on the main or a very large portion of the German field army with the British army alone so they will wait for that until enough US troops are around; but have a very successful Italian campaign high up the boot and maybe and Anglo French Dragoon in 43 becomes feasible - the constraint on the Rhone Valley works both ways and liberating parts of France will be attractive.
 
To follow up on the issue of "nuisance raids" - ITTL I doubt the Japanese will be pushing at the Aleutians at all, this makes Dutch Harbor and further islands more secure. It should not be too much effort for the USA to build the infrastructure for relatively small scale bases within B-24 range of at least Hokkaido if not the northern bits of Honshu. While the weather in that part of the world is atrocious at best, a limited number of B-24s loaded with incendiaries or mixed HE/incendiary mix can make raids over Japan. Timing the raids to be over Japan at night, but landing back in the Aleutians after daybreak is easy. Since the goal is to dump your load over a city starting fires, issues of "accuracy" like hitting a factory are irrelevant, making the security of darkness a good thing. The Japanese never had much capability in air defense, and even less against night raids.

These sorts of raids, and B-24's from China might do the same, will force the Japanese to divert resources to home defense even though from a strictly military standpoint it's the wrong thing to do. If the high command decides to try and eliminate the threat by going after bases in the Aleutians and China, so much the better - this diversion of resources will hurt areas where they are needed, and result in Japanese losses even in the event of "successes". Acquiring a little more territory in China, or a couple of the Aleutian Islands will be a pyrrhic victory at best. If I were the USA I'd love to see the Japanese send 2-3 carriers and a largish invasion force towards the Aleutians after a build up where there is decent land based air & AA at the bases. This is betting hundred dollar bills to win nickels...
 
To follow up on the issue of "nuisance raids" - ITTL I doubt the Japanese will be pushing at the Aleutians at all, this makes Dutch Harbor and further islands more secure. It should not be too much effort for the USA to build the infrastructure for relatively small scale bases within B-24 range of at least Hokkaido if not the northern bits of Honshu. While the weather in that part of the world is atrocious at best, a limited number of B-24s loaded with incendiaries or mixed HE/incendiary mix can make raids over Japan. Timing the raids to be over Japan at night, but landing back in the Aleutians after daybreak is easy. Since the goal is to dump your load over a city starting fires, issues of "accuracy" like hitting a factory are irrelevant, making the security of darkness a good thing. The Japanese never had much capability in air defense, and even less against night raids.

These sorts of raids, and B-24's from China might do the same, will force the Japanese to divert resources to home defense even though from a strictly military standpoint it's the wrong thing to do. If the high command decides to try and eliminate the threat by going after bases in the Aleutians and China, so much the better - this diversion of resources will hurt areas where they are needed, and result in Japanese losses even in the event of "successes". Acquiring a little more territory in China, or a couple of the Aleutian Islands will be a pyrrhic victory at best. If I were the USA I'd love to see the Japanese send 2-3 carriers and a largish invasion force towards the Aleutians after a build up where there is decent land based air & AA at the bases. This is betting hundred dollar bills to win nickels...

sloreck

I think the main restraint on that was that OTL it was quite late in the day that the USAAF decided fire-bombing was the way to go. They did have a general carpet-bombing approach in Japan but it was the incendiaries that did the real damage. The other factor was that it was quite late and difficult for the US to bomb Japan consistently OTL but, either by a surer base in China or from elsewhere, they might be able to do it markedly earlier TTL.

Steve
 
Usertron2020

Gannt has covered the main details but I think the key factor by the 20thC is the power and security of the PM. He needs to have secure control of Parliament but if so he can do a hell of a lot. Lloyd George for instance in WWI has serious doubts about Haig but was unable to remove him due to the fact that with the Liberal Party split the Tories were dominant in the coalition and they supported Haig and the other generals. [Whether because they wanted to weaken L-G or because they generally believed the generals were correct I've never been quite sure. Probably a bit of both].

Churchill is in a stronger position, hence his success in deposing or shuffling commanders, but he is still in charge of a coalition and can't go too far away from the opinion of Parliament. There were votes of no confidence against the government and although they were fairly heavily defeated some, such as after Singapore fell and then again after Tobruk also fell caused a good degree of concern about how much support they would get.

Steve
 
sloreck

I think the main restraint on that was that OTL it was quite late in the day that the USAAF decided fire-bombing was the way to go. They did have a general carpet-bombing approach in Japan but it was the incendiaries that did the real damage. The other factor was that it was quite late and difficult for the US to bomb Japan consistently OTL but, either by a surer base in China or from elsewhere, they might be able to do it markedly earlier TTL.

Steve

Stevep
sloreck

The US is going to need every B-24 it has for other operations, like ASW, ETO bombing, and most importantly, hitting targets in the SW Pacific. The difference in range and bombload capabilities of a B-24 compared to a B-17 were almost embarrassing.

Also, regarding Hokkaido, it was the ass-end of Japan. Not exactly a huge number of targets compared to the rest of the country.

Another problem is the weather. The word "atrocious" doesn't do justice to the conditions in the Aleutians. It's not just heavy and harsh weather with constant storms. It's weather-bound airfields with heavy FOG all but 25 days a year. This makes a bombing campaign from those islands uneconomical. Also, the North Pacific is essentially a surface naval warfare environment. Not so much for subs and certainly not for carriers. The USN was aware of that from the start but the Japanese seemed to have had to learn that the hard way.

This means that the side with larger surface forces can either invade and take bases in Attu, Kiska, and Adak at will, or be destroyed by a large defensive force. Even destroyers have difficulty operating in these heavy seas. But not heavy cruisers and battleships!:D Which is why the USN released their operational old battleships to operate in the Aleutians long before they did in any other theater of combat. And they did quite well there, thank you very much.

As to China, bases there face the same problem as OTL. The Japanese can take them with resources (the IJA) that are mostly just sitting there anyway. When this was done at the same time that the US took Saipan, it cost Tojo his job. Not exactly a good thing.:rolleyes::D
 
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steve p

I agree the "problem" with bombing against Japan was the insistence on high altitude "high accuracy" raids against discrete targets such as factories. The high altitude winds over Japan made this even less viable than over Germany (where "pickle barrel" accuracy was a sad joke). ITTL its not totally ASB for somebody in the planning process of making these raids, which will of necessity be at night & not too many bombers/too large a load (weight/range issues), to come up with the idea "since we are not going for specific targets, lets start fires which will be a real pain in the ass for the Japs to deal with - its worth a try". You probably won't get the kind of huge firestorms you got OTL in the post-LeMay firebombings, but they will be ugly and good for US morale, bad for Japanese morale and definitely cause diversion of scarce resources.

This could even happen if there is a supply screw up and instead of HE bombs a bunch of incendiaries are sent to the base in the Aleutians & the guys there figure better to drop them than cancel a couple of raids - when post strike recon photos show the result...it's a happy accident.

The Navy can help here...a few subs, even older boats can be sent to this area, and act as a combination plane guard and nav beacon....at designated times they turn on radio beacons to help the planes find their way in a part of the world where navigation is notoriously difficult. Risk to subs is small, they broadcast for a short time , then displace to a new position. The IJN simply does not have the resources to send ASW units in sufficient numbers to hunt these subs down under these circumstances....and if they do, again they are diverting these units from places they would be better employed.
 
I would agree with user about the horribleness of the aleutians for ops and the demands on the USAAF in other theatres right now you are more likely to be killed in an industrial accident than in combat is you are american so there will be a need to push things into action.

However the RAF is doing high altitude work with accuracy - thats double edged, it may encourage the US to persist, it may encourage them to change method but probably not in a hurry. Until they get experience no reason to believe that their system does not work.
 
While recognise the worth of a western med island hopping campaign, this is a Churchill led CW not an AH.com puppet. TTL has to recognise the drivers in place and the desires of those in a position to direct the course of action.

I quite agree; the failure of that makes for an unrealistic TL.

Dieppe might not be the most tempting approach now that North Africa has been consolidated and Sicily looks achievable. Island hopping doesn't answer Stalin's call for a second continental front, but Churchill was happy that North Africa was enough to be getting on with IOTL, so why should this one be any different? Freeing up the sea lanes of the Med would be the Empire's top priority (especially with far flung fronts like Malaya to support). This goes beyond taking Sicily. Keeping axis air power out of the Med requires airbases off the coast of the mainland capable of intercepting naval bombers before they can reach allied shipping. The same bases can help patrol for U-boats.

Crete and Sicily shield much of the route, but Sardinia still offers a pinch point for axis bombers to exploit. The driver for Corsica is less obvious. That might be a combination of consolidating Sardinia and the French wanting the lowest hanging fruit of European France. Next? Well around the point marked (4) is a weak point of sorts that the Greeks might use to justify taking airbases in the Ionian Islands. That would be more egg on the face of Il Duce and more coastline under immediate threat. Stretching the soft belly before the surprise poke. The axis can see it coming, but where? Italy (north or south), France (north or south) or Greece (east or west)? All the while Norway must be watched. Maybe islands off Norway might make things harder for transiting U-boats and easier for North Atlantic and Arctic convoys?

I'm not debating with your reasoning (that's sound), but what makes sense (then & now) strategically may be a nightmare to carry out tactically.

The purpose of taking Sardinia & Corsica is the same; to open up BOTH the Southern French coast AND the Western Italian coast to amphibious assaults. The drivers for both of these is fulfilling Stalin's call for a second front & opening up American participation (Marshall will go for either target). Ideally, invading Italy would be a distraction to hold attention while preparing to invade Southern France.

perfectgeneral

I agree with all your military logic save on a single point: Norway.

As you said regarding Churchill and the drivers present for the British, so to for Hitler. HE is crazy worried about Norway, but the threat of invasion is non-existent (logistics), whatever maps Churchill may find himself studying. There are, after all, real limits to what he can do with the military forces of a democracy.

I tend to agree with Usertron2020 about Norway; it's a dead end, let the Germans waste their troops there in occupation with only the occasional Commando raid. The terrain & the lack of suitable northern ports makes a campaign there unlikely - unless you want to invade through Bergen, Stravanger or Oslo :(

All the while I wonder how far the Dodecanese Campaign intended to go if it had been more successful? General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson seems likely to be in overall charge if Alexander is busy in the Far East.

Some indication that a route through to Russia via the Aegean was targeted.

Just spit-balling here, but might the Empire see finding a route to Russia as a great excuse to annex Persia? With the Med route opened up a lot more could funnel through there than OTL if the local infrastructure could be improved. Which is easier, Persia or Bulgaria?

What is it about the Balkans area? Churchill thought it was a good idea too, although Alan Brooke will argue against it - the British Army's institutional memory of Gallipoli will tend to influence them against ANY campaign in the area lest they incur huge troop losses to no real purpose; the terrain is mountainous, so it'd be mostly infantry ops with reduced warning time for air-raids. The biggest headache is that Marshall won't go for it - so no American involvement whatsoever.
If you're really optimistic, then securing access to the Adriatic opens up another possibility; a simultaneous landing on both North-Western & North-Eastern Italian coasts... I'd say it was a dramatic over-reach with the available military strength even waiting until 1943!

Passing supplies to the Soviets? You'd need to liberate Southern Greece, occupy Bulgaria (probably proceeding to invade Romania to occupy the oil fields) and then the Russians would have to supply shipping to take supplies onward. Opening the Black Sea to direct shipping depends on Turkish co-operation which WON'T come; I wouldn't want to try invading to seize the Dardanelles & the Bosphorous (including Istanbul) :(
Supplying the Soviets through Persia is an equally big headache; it's a long distance overland (over 1000 miles) & it's mostly mountainous country similar to the southern Balkans. Plus the shipping route takes it through the Med, around Arabia & up the Persian Gulf.
Overall it's simpler to ship around the North Cape & to Murmansk/Arkhangelsk.
Once you've eliminated shipping routes into the Black Sea & the routes for air attack are covered, the Aegean becomes more or less irrelevant except as actual war practice for amphibious landing against limited opposition.

<cut>
As to the immediate future, Sicily is going ahead and after Sicily. Italy. If Italy surrenders then Sardinia falls ( I think if Sicily falls no matter what Sardinia becomes untenable for the Axis) whether anyone likes it or not that means the allies fighting somewhere up the Italian boot, the question is where. Its actually in the UK interest to limit confrontation with the main German field army until the Americans get troops in theatre and a geographically constrained theatre works well for that. It will require a disproportionate commitment of German mobile forces if the UK and/or US (or style) troops are doing the fighting and even OTL the Germans got locked into a bad attritional war.

What the British won’t want to do it take on the main or a very large portion of the German field army with the British army alone so they will wait for that until enough US troops are around; but have a very successful Italian campaign high up the boot and maybe and Anglo French Dragoon in 43 becomes feasible - the constraint on the Rhone Valley works both ways and liberating parts of France will be attractive.

I thoroughly agree - preferably in Northern Italy or with a series of smaller amphibious landings for leapfrogs. If the Americans can get a full division involved, it gives them valuable experience for later.
As you said, with greater manpower & a bigger say in the objectives, the Free French will want to liberate France ASAP. Even if the British don't necessarily agree, it will draw Axis troops towards Southern France, making a future landing in Northern France easier. The Americans will also support it - if it's a 1943 landing, they should have enough troops in theatre.

Med 1.JPG
 
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Pretty much. Standard operating procedure now seems to be Astro posts an update, you'll get a few pages of discussion, debate, and speculation on future events, and then a short while later when people start waiting for the next update it all takes a wild digression into silliness. :)
Geez, I only posted the update on Wednesday!!
Unfortunately you've created a monster with a voracious hunger, both for pork scratchings/food that's bad for you and thread updates apparently. ;)
 
I would agree with usertron2020 about the horribleness of the aleutians for operations and the demands on the USAAF in other theatres right now you are more likely to be killed in an industrial accident than in combat if you are american so there will be a need to push things into action.

Periods are your friends.:p I trust your reference to Americans being killed in industrial accidents being better than in combat refers to operating in the Aleutians? I agree. Add on the losses in the Philippines though...:(

Gannt the Yorkist said:
However the RAF is doing high altitude work with accuracy (1) - that's double edged, it may encourage the US to persist, it may encourage them to change method but probably not in a hurry. (2) Until they get experience no reason to believe that their system does not work.

The trick is while the Japanese have done extensive scientific research into the nature of the Jet Stream by the start of WWII, the West has not.:( So when the B-29s started their raids from Saipan, they were doing so fully loaded and fueled at 30,000 feet, right into the teeth of said Jet Stream. The B-29s coming from Japan were flying WITH the stream, and only flying into it with "bombs gone" and with a lower fuel load remaining. The same holds true for RAF Bomber Command over Germany. So the lessons really aren't there to be learned. The British bombers might notice an awful lot of turbulence on their return runs, but I don't know how much more they would pick up from that in terms of experience to be transferred to the USAAC.

1) In addition, the Germans have a lot more "big industry" concentrated in the Ruhr, making for easier targeting and better bombing results than you would get over Japan (though damage in Japan tends to be pretty much permanent).

2) I doubt that the USAAC will learn its lessons over Japan any way but the hard way.:( After all, how long did they keep sending unescorted B-24s and B-17s into the heart of Germany only to be slaughtered?:(
 

perfectgeneral

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If Churchill and his general staff had been put off fighting in Greece why reinforce the Greek mainland? Gallipoli wasn't the only campaign of WW1 in the area. Salonika was also attempted with a bit more success.

http://www.1914-1918.net/salonika.htm

I must re-emphasise that the wisdom of this approach only has to win over the CW high command, not us in hindsight. Like the amphibious landings in south eastern Bulgaria in support from the Caucuses. Russia has shed loads of marines and would request air support over the Black Sea.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Black_Sea_campaigns_%281941%E2%80%931944%29#Soviet_naval_strength

Ship Type Number Note/class
Battleship 1 Parizhskaya Kommuna
Cruisers 5 Molotov, Voroshilov, Chervona Ukraina, Krasnyi Krym and Krasny Kavkaz
Destroyer Leaders 3 Leningrad-class destroyer and Tashkent-class destroyer
Destroyers (Modern) 11 6 Type 7, 5 Type 7U,
Destroyers (old) 4 Novik type
Submarines 44
Escort Vessels/Gunboats 2
Mine warfare vessels 18
Motor Torpedo Boats 84

In December (1941), there was an amphibious operation against Kerch which resulted in the recapture of the Kerch Peninsula.
Air bases and a land bridge into the Black sea are very much in Russian interests and they will support in any way they can. Sevastopol is under siege at this point.

Anyone got data on the Bulgarian navy? Is there one at all?

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Like barbed wire, the German zones of occupation mark out the vulnerable points. The Dodecanese (marked here in Italian green) are already in allied hands. How dynamic do they expect the German and Italian forces to their north to be? Who holds Samos and Ikaria in TTL, the Italians still?
The Bulgarian government was forced by Germany to declare a token war on the United Kingdom and the United States on 13 December 1941, an act which resulted in the bombing of Sofia and other Bulgarian cities by Allied aircraft.

The German invasion of the Soviet Union caused a significant wave of protests, which led to the activation of a mass guerrilla movement headed by the underground Bulgarian Communist Party. A resistance movement called Fatherland Front was set up in August 1942 by the Communist Party, the Zveno movement and a number of other parties to oppose the then pro-Nazi government, after a number of Allied victories indicated that the Axis might lose the War. Partisan detachments were particularly active in the mountain areas of western and southern Bulgaria.
Fair game. Allied occupation in the south would endanger fewer Bulgars than the bombing. Soviet landings south of Burgas suffer from the lack of a war between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union. Soon remedied I suppose. It would be nice if the SOE got going with an underground movement before (instead of) the communists. Isolate the German occupation zone on the Turkish border, then invade. Britain had at least three parachute brigades to support this by 1943. Perhaps one, dropping as three battalions, in 1942? Battalion size drops can be quite well co-ordinated and successful. Given all the cross roads and bridges to cover, company size forces is more likely (if any of this is).
41.744933,26.170607
41.585661,26.218085
41.437064,26.222119
41.313822,26.108572
41.274202,26.1198
41.233413,26.090634
41.233679,26.072411

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The Germans here are geared up to defend against Turkish aggression (and to offer some of their own), so a landing on the coast and to their north west should effectively flank or even encircle them. Any similarity to Market Garden is purely for satire.
 
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Tech state

Is there a way to have a post of Tech state for Air/Ground/Sea. A list of what is in use now and what is in developement. I have a fair idea of where the UK is with its tech but where the other folks are is where its clouded to me.

Thank you and will be eating a share of pork rinds for you folks.
 
I wonder did Portugal made DoW on Japan because of attack on Portuguese Timor?

Yeah, I asked this earlier but received no reply.

I've been wondering about it too, I might not have posed it as a direct question but I'd like to rectify that and third your motion.

No. But it DID help make their decision in 1943 (?) to allow Allied use of the Azores as a base to hunt down and sink U-Boats a helluva lot easier.

You're clearly talking about OTL.

OTL, Portugal's behavior was really odd; as a neutral they gave an outrageous level of license to the Allies. Why didn't they ever just throw in with the UN openly? They were well shielded from any retaliation Hitler could throw at them and the Japanese had already done their worst, more than enough to justify a DOW against them.

I think. I assume that when the Japanese took Hong Kong they took Macao too, if so then they'd invaded not one but two Portugese Far Eastern possessions. I can barely conceive the possibility that they invested Hong Kong but left Macao alone, holding it hostage by the implied threat they'd invade and flatten the place if the Portuguese made a wrong move. That would explain their diplomatic restraint.

But I don't see the Japanese armies in China being that Machiavellian. I could look it up but my browser is being all wonky.

So, assuming the Japanese did invade Macao too, why wouldn't Portugal have DOWed just Japan, on the grounds that they did violate Portuguese territory, and having already done their worst against the Portuguese in their power, were in no position to do any further harm to them farther west and so Portugal would have nothing to lose.

Except of course the possibility Hitler would take offense and retaliate with his own DOW against them, which could hurt them--certainly by including Portuguese flagged shipping in the U-boat war, and conceivably if he ever managed to flip Franco over to active Axis membership, a crushing German/Spanish invasion might have been in the cards. But getting Franco onside like that would not be easy or likely; if nothing else Franco was well aware how dependent Spain was on seaborne trade that the British could cut off any time.

So I am mystified why, OTL, Portugal's Salazar didn't simply cite his country's long-time good relations with Britain and the offense Japan had committed against them to DOW Japan and see if Hitler were then stupid enough to use that, or Salazar's many one-sided deals with the Allies, as an excuse to retaliate in kind--which would put Portuguese assets at some greater risk but also bring them in as subsidized full partners in the winning Allied war effort. By 1943 or '44 at the latest it should have been clear the Anglo-Americans were going to win, or at any rate Iberia would be safe and the Germans would surely be swept from even under the seas, so he should have tipped over westward by then.

So who can explain why Portugal was not simply and openly an Ally in the OTL war, at least in its last years? Salazar's willingness to assist the west in the form of providing bases indicates to me either he was not deeply ideologically opposed--or he greatly feared that if he refused the RN and later USN permission, they'd just take the Azores and any other assets they wanted by force, he could squack and join the Axis and be damned with them if he did object (and Portugal would lose Timor, Macao, Angola and Mozambique forever) so he may have been an Axis sympathizer who felt strong-armed into submitting.

So which of those was it, or some third thing? It's very puzzling.

And for Astrodragon--are things any different with Portugal in this timeline? It looks to me like all the factors that would have pulled or pushed Salazar into openly joining the Allies are stronger here and any factors leading him to hesitate or even work for Axis victory are weaker. A German invasion or coup in Spain would be even stupider and less tenable or conceivable; the RN is stronger in general and particularly at hunting U-boats, Timor--I've lost track of whether the Japanese invasion there has been repelled or not, but if not yet its days are surely numbered, and the people driving the Japanese out would be W-Allies--Aussies, other Commonwealth, DEI, maybe by then some Americans, and for East Timor to remain a Portuguese possession it would behoove Salazar to have good relations with London. Berlin can't do him either harm or favors. But with Ally membership he gets protection of all the colonies Portugal now holds, including an East Timor actually back in Portuguese possession, plus a firm claim on getting Macao back. And probably lots of money in the form of military aid and donated weapons and training.

Maybe he still figures, as apparently OTL, he gets most of that and avoids having to commit any Portuguese soldiers or sailors to do their share of dying in Allied operations, if he's just an outrageously friendly neutral? That even a DOW on Japan, richly merited as that is, would entangle his weak country into shared burdens it shouldn't have to bear?

Is that pretty much his reasoning OTL and will it still hold here despite all the shifting of the odds in the Allies' favor?
 
(snip)
Anyone got data on the Bulgarian navy? Is there one at all?

IIRC, the Bulgarians had a small navy, a handful of pre-WW1 torpedo boats. Romania had a somewhat larger navy- 4 destroyers (2 WW1 Italian ships in poor condition & 2 of the British A-I destroyer leader knockoffs that were so popular in the interwar era), a couple WW1 vintage ex-French sloops (equivalent to the various 'Flower' types built by the RN at the same time) a handful of patrol boats &, 1 old submarine in poor condition, & a couple more that were commissioned too late to be of much use.
 
As i understand it Timor was occupied first by Dutch Aussie forces and Macao was sort of respected as neutral, more in name than fact by the Japanese with the odd visit from the US Navy (aka getting shot up).

I get the impression that Portugal felt being a pro allied doormat was the best policy and noone objected to that a long as they got to use the colonial bits they wanted to when they wanted to. On balance thats probably the most help they could have given the allies without being a drain on resources and allowed Salazar to avoid any complications with Spain or Germany, or his own people that open alliance would have caused.

On the Balkans while a Salonika might be sort of feasible and might be attractive to Churchill and Atlee and is certainly a threat that the Germans can't ignore (as is a Bulgarian defection if Italy goes) I can't see it except as an endrun in the event of German collapse. It brings the British up against the the main German armies and neither the US or France would support it. Or Brooke and the CoS.
 
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