The Whale has Wings

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"Away Boarders!"


When the Yamato is nearby.

Too bad cutting-out expeditions went out of style with the steam engine.

In photobucket I found a great negative schematic: http://i4.photobucket.com/albums/y122/Otohiko/stuff/warspite.png

I make that eleven ship's boats!

trekchu

That might be a bit ambitious, even for the RN.:D

Mind you I had a moment of panic when checking on the thread I find the top of the page has perfectgeneral talking about the number of ships boats on Warspite. WTF has Astrodragon done to her!:eek::eek: Then I caught up with the rest of the TL and found his comment was aesthetic rather anything to do with the TL.

Steve
 
Nimitz/USN would want to go for the most direct route to Japan and I that’s the Guam, Saipan Tinian ish route per WPO.

The Solomons are TTL a major backwater - while Singapore and the DEI hold the main LOC route to Aus/NZ is more likely to be across the Atlantic/IO. Also what sort of force will the IJN have available to threaten anyone, a large part of the OTL allied rationale for the Solomons is reactive. Without major IJN/IJA forces in the area (and where would they come from?) security can be managed with local constabulary forces and RAAF Wapiti’s

I seem to recall there are some issues with the USN advance that are not quickly solvable. Apart from the sheer volume of shipping for even the smallest operation there will be a need to construct and deploy major mobile base facilities where there are none at the moment as well as the fleet train. I think that puts a time constraint on when this can begin, as does the availability of assault forces. Nothing that can’t be solved but OTL that was done in late 43. The change TTL is not in US abilities but in UK/CW.

Someone (called Winston probably) is going to point out that the shortest route to Japan runs from Singapore through Manila and then the Ryuku’s as the first two already posses major fleet bases and airfields, as well as enthusiastically friendly populations and oil on tap. and that the UK/CW has or soon will have corps sized deployable forces well acclimatised to the region and accustomed to beating the Japanese. If the US wants to fight anywhere in 42, early 43 it’s at sea or where the forces can be deployed, the same argument that led to Torch/Avalanche. (1st Marines landing at Da Nang anyone?)

The USN may not like this but they will have to persuade FDR that their institutional desires are more important than the national interest. There was some pre war planning for just such a contingency and there may not be a choice. If the UK/CW start a counterattack through Borneo in 42 the advance is likely to move very quickly into range of the Phillipines and I can’t see anyone in the US (cept King) not taking the opportunity.

It would make a good committee game anyway

If the southern Philippines do not surrender the pressure for an early liberation or at least major supply effort will be immense. Also - the surrender was communicated by Radio? TTL would the Allies have intercept and broadcast facilities in range that would let them countermand the order quickly.
 
As I understand it, the reason the Southern PI forces surrendered when they did was that Wainwright was in overall command and therefore had the legal authority to do this. If the command has been split, then he has no authority to order the surrender, even the Japanese will understand that whatever he says will have no direct effect. I doubt that the Japanese would openly say to the US "surrender the southern command or we will kill all the POWs". Not that they would necessarily have a lot of moral scruples, but this would be counter-productive in many ways.

Maybe I've missed something, but ITTL the Japanese have not penetrated as far south as they did OTL - Solomons etc. Especially if, as seems likely, the IJN is going to be way down on carriers ITTL compared with OTL very soon, likewise aviators...and of course beginning to feel the oil pinch, Truk & Rabaul can be neutralized and bypassed, and the threat to Australia & the US-Australia supply lines will be minimal. Unless there is some dramatic almost ASB change in IJN thinking, using bases like Truk & Rabual as depots for an anti-merchant submarine campaign is not happening.
 
As I understand it, the reason the Southern PI forces surrendered when they did was that Wainwright was in overall command and therefore had the legal authority to do this. If the command has been split, then he has no authority to order the surrender, even the Japanese will understand that whatever he says will have no direct effect. I doubt that the Japanese would openly say to the US "surrender the southern command or we will kill all the POWs". Not that they would necessarily have a lot of moral scruples, but this would be counter-productive in many ways.

Maybe I've missed something, but ITTL the Japanese have not penetrated as far south as they did OTL - Solomons etc. Especially if, as seems likely, the IJN is going to be way down on carriers ITTL compared with OTL very soon, likewise aviators...and of course beginning to feel the oil pinch, Truk & Rabaul can be neutralized and bypassed, and the threat to Australia & the US-Australia supply lines will be minimal. Unless there is some dramatic almost ASB change in IJN thinking, using bases like Truk & Rabual as depots for an anti-merchant submarine campaign is not happening.

It was my understanding that Rabaul ITTL was already occupied and the northern part of the Solomons were in the process of being occupied against little to no opposition. I could be wrong.

Gannt the Chartist

Could it be possible for the US to launch a trans-Pacific invasion of the Marianas without securing the Marshals and Solomons first? And neutralizing the Carolines? That seems to me to be an awful lot of bypassing...
 
It was my understanding that Rabaul ITTL was already occupied and the northern part of the Solomons were in the process of being occupied against little to no opposition. I could be wrong.

You're correct we had an update describing the US raid on Rabaul; all part of their refusal to abandon their schedule regardless of the facts on the ground.
 
You're correct; we had an update describing the US raid on Rabaul; all part of their refusal to abandon their schedule regardless of the facts on the ground.

Garrison

I'm guessing here you mean the Japanese rather than the US in terms of the refusal? It sounds like the US from their mention initially but that doesn't ring true.

Steve
 
Garrison

I'm guessing here you mean the Japanese rather than the US in terms of the refusal? It sounds like the US from their mention initially but that doesn't ring true.

Steve

Sorry, yes the Japanese are the ones refusing to deal with reality.
 
Usertron

This is all coloured by me thinking that both Malaya and the DEI will hold and been seen to be holding in the very near future (say 3 months) and that the Allies will maintain their current carrier superiority as well as building up land based air in the ABDA area.

The USN route would be Gilberts (Tarawa et al) Marshalls, Marianas, Ryukyus. Which starts OTL in late 43 I.e. a nearly 18 months from now TTL. The Allies if combined currently have roughly the carrier position they achieved in late 43 and are likely (even if there is a reverse Midway) to be in a much better position through late 42 and 43 than they were OTL.

My argument is this. The Solomons campaign was not a campaign of choice for the allies. OTL it is a reaction to the major threat to the main LOC to Australia and hey its where the enemy are and we came to fight which added to MacA leads to a diversion of resources there, New Guinea and later on into the western Carolines (Peleliu - why?).

TTL that threat is the DEI/Timor.

For the USN the whole Solomons is a distraction, taking away their assault forces for about a year and by that much postponing the execution of WPO.

With no Japanese landings and airbase construction down the Solomons (maybe even with that as they probably now can't do much anyway) there is no need to commit 1st Marines, 2nd Marines then Americal and 25 inf to Guadalcanal and then up the Solomons. This takes them out of the equation for a year or more and at a time when the USN did not have the Carrier forces to fight outside a lot of land based air cover.

On the other hand those troops can’t sit around doing nothing and I am sure the British or the French (or Mac) would find a use for the best trained and equipped amphib troops in the world at this time, probably in Borneo.

The Gilberts part is I think feasible in 42 with the forces available. What I think is more dubious is accelerating the Marshalls and especially the Marianas. Partly this is a function of distance and having the shipping to support the Fleet in the style of operation the USN used. Partly the need to have the construction troops and floating docks etc available to then support the next move and by the time you are looking at the Ryukyus that’s necessary. Once you have it how long does it take to turn Guam into a useable fleet base?

Truk as such is not a threat it is only a threat if there is a fleet able to operate out of it without being countered AND if they have a deployable ground force. That’s only material for Guam/Saipan - Gilberts are too far away for KB to intercept, Marshalls are/were too lightly defended to pose much of an obstacle and the US land based air build up can be quite fast.

The alternative would be a drive basically retracing the Japanese route through Borneo with or without a second drive through FIC.

Personally I think the Gilberts is a no brainer and that Wake would be retaken, partly because the USN can, partly for moral reasons.

That’s going to lead to a debate later in the year about whether to launch a major offensive into the Marianas, Ryukyus or go Philippines, Ryukyus or both. But the forces to do both are not going to be available until late 43/44

I am not saying it would happen but that there is a need for a debate amongst the allies if for whatever reason the forces in Southern Philippines fight on that’s going to swing it.

I also think that Marshall will be restricting US commitment to the Pacific wherever possible- Germany First.
 
Aboard Warspite and the other allied ships engaging the IJN cruiser force off Java, they will not have our advantage of knowing that the IJN Destroyers have expended all their Long Lance Torepedoes. Therefore any move by IJN warships construed as a torpedo attack should cause a defensive responce from the RN and allied naval ships. I suspect that though the Admiral and everybody else on Warspite right down to the ships cat wants to wipe out the IJN force, the Admiral will be mindful of the value of the big girls pressence in the area and will I think act with discretion if not caution. That said "Cry Havock and let slip the dogs of war". :)
 
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Aboard Warspite and the other allied ships engaging the IJN cruiser force off Java, they will not have our advantage of knowing that the IJN Destroyers have expended all their Long Lance Torepedoes. Therefore any move by IJN warships construed as a torpedo attack should cause a defensive responce from the RN and allied naval ships. I suspect that though the Admiral and everybody else on Warspite right down to the ships cat wants to wipe out the IJN force, the Admiral will be mindful of the value of the big girls pressence in the area and will I think act with discretion if not caution. That said "Cry Havock and let slip the dogs of war". :)

I wonder if the loss of the KM and RM battle lines will have an effect on the thinking of the Officers in charge of the Warspites Task force, they may well know that they have a lot of battleships to use (5 KGVs, 2 Richelieu’s, 2 Dunkerque class, Hood, Renown and Repulse, the Nelrods and the 3 Modernised QEs with the 2 un-modernised in reserve) so he can afford to be more aggressive when the Destroyers attack, for eample turning into the torpedoes in order to close the range, similar in a way to the OTL 2nd Battle of Narvik, the partial crippling of a Battleship to wipe out the invasion fleet would probably be accepted in the present climate of CV superiority

It would be entirely fitting to see the Warspite charging round in the invasion fleet closing to minimum range in order to make sure there are no survivors, probably while going round in circles because the steering gear has decided to throw a fit again .

She would also make a very nice aircraft magnet to keep any return strikes from the remaining IJN carrier off the advancing Fleet carriers.
 
And don't forget the Revenges, there's another four of them if they got modernised, or five if HMS Royal Oak didn't go down as per OTL (I can't recall and it's too late to search).
 
Just a few comments...

Warspite is pretty certain the Japanese are out of torpedoes, the same units have made two heavy torpedo attacks. In any case, it isn't going to stop her...:)

As to lines of attack.
Assuming the DEI and Malaya hold, the obvious counterattack is Borneo-Celebes-PI; basically the Japanese attack in reverse. Borneo is currently a mess of small units on the coast (the Japanese have been concentrating on the DEI).
This will need more airpower (the allies have dented the Japanese air force, it hasnt been destroyed yet) and troops. Maybe they can persuade the USA to send some men to where the Japanese are rather than where they may go later...:p:eek:

The Pacific campaign as OTL is an issue for the USN, no so much for combat ships as the fleet train needed which wont really be ready for 18 months.
 
I personaly have always been of the opinion that the Revenge Class were a retrograde step from the QE's and that rather than spend huge sums on modernising the QE's it might have made more sense to scrap the Revenges in turn and build new hulls as per Vangaurd using their 15" turrets and as much of the original armered plate as pratical. I know there are a limited number of slips capable of handling KGV size ships in the late 1930's but a program of 1 for 1 rolling substitution from say 1933 might have been possible. Then you could have ended up with 4 or 5 15" armed KGV/Vangaurds pluss the KGV's and the 5 QE's as extant in the early 30's.
Now that would keep the Battle line Admirals quite and give 5 pluss 5 building 28/30 knot BB as carrier companions when war breaks out :D:):D (ok verging on Britwank but:(hey)
 
And don't forget the Revenges, there's another four of them if they got modernised, or five if HMS Royal Oak didn't go down as per OTL (I can't recall and it's too late to search).

Because of certain armor design flaws inherent in the Revenges they literally cannot be modernized, worst luck. It wasn't lack of $$$, time, or shipyard space. It was practicality. It could not be done, period. The problems the Revenges had with their armor, the Lexingtons had with their engines and steering. Some flaws, once built in, cannot be fixed.:(
 
I personaly have always been of the opinion that the Revenge Class were a retrograde step from the QE's and that rather than spend huge sums on modernising the QE's it might have made more sense to scrap the Revenges in turn and build new hulls as per Vangaurd using their 15" turrets and as much of the original armered plate as pratical. I know there are a limited number of slips capable of handling KGV size ships in the late 1930's but a program of 1 for 1 rolling substitution from say 1933 might have been possible. Then you could have ended up with 4 or 5 15" armed KGV/Vangaurds pluss the KGV's and the 5 QE's as extant in the early 30's.
Now that would keep the Battle line Admirals quite and give 5 pluss 5 building 28/30 knot BB as carrier companions when war breaks out :D:):D (ok verging on Britwank but:(hey)

sonofpegasus

A very logical plan, if it wasn't for the naval treaties:mad::mad:. Might have had something along those, although I think the Admiralty would have preferred new ships, if the politicians hadn't agreed in 1930 to continue the battleship holiday.:(:(:mad: The other problem, apart from the desire to bring disarmament by example:eek::eek: - we know how that tends to work, was that with classical economics in vogue and the depression on money was pretty damned short and the military was a low priority. Ignoring the fact this would have been less expensive then the late 30's mad rush rearmament with the added penalty that the long years without construction meant a hell of a lot of capacity and skills had been lost.

I have been told, by a very informed sources, since he did his PhD on the treaties, that up until 1930 the government mitigated the damage of the 'holiday' by paying a small subsidy to the companies to maintain some capacity in production of heavy armour and big guns. Unfortunately the government scrapped this after the 1930 treaty. Butterfly that and you have a much rosier picture for Britain when rearmament starts.

Steve
 
Because of certain armor design flaws inherent in the Revenges they literally cannot be modernized, worst luck. It wasn't lack of $$$, time, or shipyard space. It was practicality. It could not be done, period. The problems the Revenges had with their armor, the Lexingtons had with their engines and steering. Some flaws, once built in, cannot be fixed.:(

usertron2020

What I've heard is that they were built with no capacity for expansion, probably as a cost-cutting measure given the naval race on at the time and short expected life span of capital ships.

With all ships in this period, even apart from modernisation of their basic equipment, they suffered serious problems with the demand for extra space and weight for things like radar and other electronic tools, along with greatly improved AA weaponry, along with of course the men needed to operate all this. The Queens had some capacity for this, as well as more general upgrades, but the R class didn't. Even Repulse and Renown, for all their design flaws proved better here because they had the capacity for extensive upgrades and also absorbing the extra demands placed on ships.

Agree that the R's were basically a dead end. They provided fairly cheap escorts for important convoys and some shore bombardment as well as a minimal fleet force when the RN was really stretched. However, without the treaties they would probably have been replaced during the early 30's.

Steve

PS Never heard that about the Lexingtons. Have heard the 1916 S Dakota's would have had the same problem as the R's in terms of lack of stretch but would have thought that with the space of the Lexington's that while it might have been expensive they should have been suitable to upgrade. [Other than the problem of their thin armour making them dubious value but then presumably something could have been done as with Repluse/Renown with extra over the magazines. What was the problem that you know of please?
 
stevep

The Lexingtons did not have quite the maneuverability of the Yorktowns, and had the problem of the generators that went off-line in times of receiving shock damage (like the torpedoes Saratoga kept attracting). This meant long trips back to drydock to tear into the guts of the ship to allow the turbines to be reset.:( One reason why the Saratoga was eventually Lend-Leased entire to the Indian Ocean for British use to keep her out of harm's way. The Lexington, of course, didn't last long enough for that.

For all the criticism against the USN's old WWI battleships (slowness), they proved quite adaptable at modernization. Even the ancient Arkansas.
 
usertron2020

What I've heard is that they were built with no capacity for expansion, probably as a cost-cutting measure given the naval race on at the time and short expected life span of capital ships.

With all ships in this period, even apart from modernisation of their basic equipment, they suffered serious problems with the demand for extra space and weight for things like radar and other electronic tools, along with greatly improved AA weaponry, along with of course the men needed to operate all this. The Queens had some capacity for this, as well as more general upgrades, but the R class didn't. Even Repulse and Renown, for all their design flaws proved better here because they had the capacity for extensive upgrades and also absorbing the extra demands placed on ships.

Agree that the R's were basically a dead end. They provided fairly cheap escorts for important convoys and some shore bombardment as well as a minimal fleet force when the RN was really stretched. However, without the treaties they would probably have been replaced during the early 30's.

Steve

PS Never heard that about the Lexingtons. Have heard the 1916 S Dakota's would have had the same problem as the R's in terms of lack of stretch but would have thought that with the space of the Lexington's that while it might have been expensive they should have been suitable to upgrade. [Other than the problem of their thin armour making them dubious value but then presumably something could have been done as with Repluse/Renown with extra over the magazines. What was the problem that you know of please?


This article explains why the revenges could not be modernised.

http://www.gwpda.org/naval/gmdefn.htm

Basically the low metacentic height means there is no spare stability for extra weight without making the revenges dangerously unstable if they are damaged and start to ship water.

Modernisation usually meant new engines and boilers that cut down on the weight of the original engineering plant, this would have been extremely unwelcome on the Revenges as that would have further reduced stability, I believe all 5 were given large bulges during the early 20s this may have improved things slightly but I would imagine any improvement would have been quickly eaten up buy the extra equipment that all ships seem to gain during there active service life’s (Radios, extra AA, more crew and radar).


The armour was actually pretty good for the time and even in WW2 may have been quite effective, if they had had a higher metacentric height they may well have been able to fit a new Bow (like the Italian rebuilds) to fine up the lines and give them more speed, but the lack of stability precluded any large alterations.


ITTL I thought the Revenges had been put into reserve in order to find the crews for all these shiny new carriers?
 
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