Let's NOT go measuring our personal equipment, shall we?
Just as well they stayed there, based on their performance at Midway they would probably have wandered away never to be seen again...

Be nice. You really don't want to start bringing up OTL American early war naval air performance.
You just might force me to be mean
and start bringing up details of OTL FAA early war naval air performance.
It's true that empty fuel tanks splashed more aircraft than the enemy at Midway, but it wasn't the fault of the pilots
It wasn't pilot navigation that screwed things up at Midway. It was the incompetence of Halsey's (inherited by Spruance) air operations staff in determining
where the aerial strike force should target to hit Nagumo. The PBY search aircraft could give approximate locations (when they weren't dodging Zeroes or being forced to return for refueling), but the staff officers under Spruance were a train wreck in determining where Nagumo would be once the strike force arrived over target.
Fletcher's staff, at least, were mostly spot on in finding Nagumo, but in their case (and Spruance's squadrons as well) coordination of squadron strikes were also a train wreck.

Ironically, it was individual initiative shown by squadron commanders (1) ignoring the estimates of staff officers that led to their being more successful at finding the enemy.
It probably doesn't matter how many carriers are assigned to the Doolittle raid; it's really just going to be a psychological coup on top of what is shaping up to be a series of body blows to Japanese plans.(2)
Exactly. Additional carriers are pointless since they will never be used anyway. Indeed, though I now understand the difficulty that would have been had by going so, having Enterprise at Coral Sea COULD have allowed the loss of the Shokaku outright (and maybe even prevented serious damage to the Yorktown), as opposed to her simply being badly damaged.
But I can't see Nimitz allowing it. After all, if the raid had gone off as planned, Halsey's task force would have come well within range of Japan itself, and the risk of enemy attack would have been far greater. To have NOT sent the Enterprise would have meant telling Doolittle that the raid was a planned suicide run from the beginning.
1) Only the initiative shown by the Hornet's fighter and dive bomber squadrons backfired, as when they found only empty ocean, they turned southeast to Midway to refuel.
2) I am very anxious to see how
Astrodragon balances the hysteria of the Japanese over the Doolittle Raid ITTL compared to OTL.
OTL, the Imperial Army General Staff was fighting against Yamamoto's Combined Fleet plan of Operation MI. Instead, they wanted continued operations against China, completion of operations against Burma, or even a renewed attempt against the USSR

should they start to collapse during the 1942 German offensive.
Meanwhile the Imperial Navy General Staff had its own plans. They supported Yamamoto's plans, but only after their own operations were completed. They were pushing for the completion of the conquest of New Guinea (Port Morseby), and the occupation of the Solomons. This would then be followed by taking the (undefended) New Hebrides, then Fiji, Samoa, and finally New Caledonia. Thereby severing the supply lines and LOCs between America and Australia and New Zealand. Mind, everything on this hit list except Port Moresby and the Solomons were beyond Japanese land-based air range!

The Imperial Japanese could certainly dream big.
Post-Doolittle, senior IJA officers suddenly starting talking like IJN War Planners, and speaking of great strategic sweeps in the Pacific. Beyond New Guinea, even the Naval General Staff had to put everything on the back burner except for the Coral Sea Campaign. The simply political truth was, neither the army nor the navy could face Hirohito without MI.
But how
Astrodragon should choose to balance out these three competing political forces (IJA, IJN, Combined Fleet) in Imperial Japan IDNK.
