I hope they are more knowledgable about other things because they got the aircraft wrong, and the RAF certainly didn't change their opinion about dive bombing. Also, it took an engine stronger that 1000 hp to carry a thousand pound bomb load. That's still a distant dream in 1932.
The Whale has Wings
- Thread starter Astrodragon
- Start date
- Status
I hope they are more knowledgable about other things because they got the aircraft wrong, and the RAF certainly didn't change their opinion about dive bombing. Also, it took an engine stronger that 1000 hp to carry a thousand pound bomb load. That's still a distant dream in 1932.
You have to remember, though, I am basing this on what the US claimed at the time, not what the actual performance of the plane was!
US aircraft manufacturers have a recoord of overclaiming performance.
Of course, the people in the RN who were suspicious of how good it looked on paper are probably also the ones keeping their mouths firmly shut about it
Just to pick a nit -- Did IFF exist in 1939? I thought it didn't appear until at least 1942
and I tought the first Dive bomber was generally considered to be the Curtis SBC. I need to dig a reference or two out but I don't remember a MArtin Dive bomber (I think they had an early Torpedo Bomber)
I am intrigued and look forward to more
I am a little confused about the times set out in the first entry.
The meeting is at midnight or 0000 hours (or 0000h). Then there seems to be a delay of 12 hours and 45 minutes before the first wave is launched at 1245h. The second wave then seems to be sent another 13 hours later or 25 hours and 45 minutes after the meeting.
Also, if the first wave is going at 1245h, then why would they need flares? It's just a little past noon. Is there a solar eclipse?
Don't you mean to have the first wave sent out at 0045h (12:45 am) and second wave at 0145h (1:45 am)? If not, a gap of 13 hours between waves would negate any of the advantages of surprise.
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The Curtiss F8C/O2C is what fits the time frame. The SBC would be 1936/37.
The presence of IFF began in 1940, Germany. It required a radar interrogator to function. OTL. Apparently, a navy which couldn't develop a pilot-operated radio homer had Tesla helping to iron out details.
The dive bomber that the RN was looking at was the Martin Bm-2, which (on paper) could carry a 1,000lb bomb.
I dont think it ever did in the real world, but at the particular point in time the RN is looking at the manufacturers specs for the plane. In fact, certain people in the RN have a definate aim to inflate the performance.
IFF was available in the UK in OTL in late 1939, the IIF Mk 1 fitted to RAF planes. The early versions did have problems. They also had Pip-squeak developed in OTL 1938, which was a precursor to what we now term IFF.
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January 1933
"Please sit down, Admiral"
Chatfield looked at the permament undersecretary. He didnt look happy.
"Chatfield, this public argument has gone on far too long. It has to stop"
Admiral Chatfield looked back, his face stubborn.
"It needs to be resolved - not stopped. Our arguments are valid, and as you know we have growing appreciation of them and support in parliament."
"You mean you are getting all the agitators on your side... Its already being referred to as the RN-RAF war of 1933."
"I mean the Navy is weak, dangerously weak in air power, and getting weaker every year. If we dont do something soon, we are going to be a second-rate power."
"I could order you to stop this campaign"
"You could, of course. However I cant stop members asking questions in the house, and I do have to answer them honestly, you realise. And certainly I cannot stop the newspapers, even if the government can pressure the MP's - which is unlikely, not all of them are on the government benches, and people like Churchill are inherently unsquashable.
However I agree, this needs to stop. So I have prepared some proposals which I think will solve the matter, defuse the issues in public, and let everything settle down."
Chatfield reached into his briefcase, and put some papers on the table.
"The basic issue is that the Royal Navy simply cannot accept the current level of aviation support provided by the RAF. Youve heard all the arguments, probably far more often than you would care to. There is, however, a quite simple solution, which is for the Navy to get back control of the FAA, and fund it ourselves. We realise that there are issues regarding the efficiency of such a plan, and problems with implementing it, but we have had discussions both among ourselves and informally with the RAF and feel we have an adequate solution.
First, the FAA will revert to RN command and control, as it was pre 1918, on 1st April 1933
The FAA will be funded by the navy, and the funds currently spent on it in the RAF will be added to the appropriate navy vote.
The Navy will cooperate with the RAF in funding development of planes and equipment. While we realise the FAA will require carrier planes that have different requirements for those used by the RAF, we realise that many of the expensive development such as engines, armament and controls can be to a very considerable extent common. Where they are, the RN will fund n appropriate proportion of the development costs. Where the requirements are purely for the RN, we will fund them ourselves.
It will take some years for the FAA to build up a satisfactory pilot base. Until that time, the RAF will continue to lend pilots until we can replace them with RN personel. RN and RAF pilot training will be in common, except for the final stage of carrier training, as it would be uneconomical to duplicate the training commands, and this will continue to be under RAF control.
This solution covers all the arguments we have been making, and the RAF can now concentrate on its land-based aircraft and heavy bombers. We will of course continue to cooperate fully, and indeed it has been suggested that some comittees, like the ones to research future aircraft and needs, be made common ones.
We consider the proposals sensible, and they will stop this infighting which is, we agree, reaching unacceptable proportions.
"The RAF are not going to be happy at losing control of some of their planes."
"With respect, its the only sensible solution. Noone realised in 1918 that the issue of naval air would end up being so specialised and controversial, this way we cut the Gordian knot of what the RAF has to do to keep us happy.
The undersecretary did not look happy, but this did, as the Admiral said, cut the knot.
"Very well, Chatfield, I feel compelled to agree with you. Unless the RAF can come up with some very compelling reasons why not to, I intend to present this to the Prime Minister as a solution. If I do, I expect the navy to stop this mutual war. Is that clearly understood?
"Of course."
"Please sit down, Admiral"
Chatfield looked at the permament undersecretary. He didnt look happy.
"Chatfield, this public argument has gone on far too long. It has to stop"
Admiral Chatfield looked back, his face stubborn.
"It needs to be resolved - not stopped. Our arguments are valid, and as you know we have growing appreciation of them and support in parliament."
"You mean you are getting all the agitators on your side... Its already being referred to as the RN-RAF war of 1933."
"I mean the Navy is weak, dangerously weak in air power, and getting weaker every year. If we dont do something soon, we are going to be a second-rate power."
"I could order you to stop this campaign"
"You could, of course. However I cant stop members asking questions in the house, and I do have to answer them honestly, you realise. And certainly I cannot stop the newspapers, even if the government can pressure the MP's - which is unlikely, not all of them are on the government benches, and people like Churchill are inherently unsquashable.
However I agree, this needs to stop. So I have prepared some proposals which I think will solve the matter, defuse the issues in public, and let everything settle down."
Chatfield reached into his briefcase, and put some papers on the table.
"The basic issue is that the Royal Navy simply cannot accept the current level of aviation support provided by the RAF. Youve heard all the arguments, probably far more often than you would care to. There is, however, a quite simple solution, which is for the Navy to get back control of the FAA, and fund it ourselves. We realise that there are issues regarding the efficiency of such a plan, and problems with implementing it, but we have had discussions both among ourselves and informally with the RAF and feel we have an adequate solution.
First, the FAA will revert to RN command and control, as it was pre 1918, on 1st April 1933
The FAA will be funded by the navy, and the funds currently spent on it in the RAF will be added to the appropriate navy vote.
The Navy will cooperate with the RAF in funding development of planes and equipment. While we realise the FAA will require carrier planes that have different requirements for those used by the RAF, we realise that many of the expensive development such as engines, armament and controls can be to a very considerable extent common. Where they are, the RN will fund n appropriate proportion of the development costs. Where the requirements are purely for the RN, we will fund them ourselves.
It will take some years for the FAA to build up a satisfactory pilot base. Until that time, the RAF will continue to lend pilots until we can replace them with RN personel. RN and RAF pilot training will be in common, except for the final stage of carrier training, as it would be uneconomical to duplicate the training commands, and this will continue to be under RAF control.
This solution covers all the arguments we have been making, and the RAF can now concentrate on its land-based aircraft and heavy bombers. We will of course continue to cooperate fully, and indeed it has been suggested that some comittees, like the ones to research future aircraft and needs, be made common ones.
We consider the proposals sensible, and they will stop this infighting which is, we agree, reaching unacceptable proportions.
"The RAF are not going to be happy at losing control of some of their planes."
"With respect, its the only sensible solution. Noone realised in 1918 that the issue of naval air would end up being so specialised and controversial, this way we cut the Gordian knot of what the RAF has to do to keep us happy.
The undersecretary did not look happy, but this did, as the Admiral said, cut the knot.
"Very well, Chatfield, I feel compelled to agree with you. Unless the RAF can come up with some very compelling reasons why not to, I intend to present this to the Prime Minister as a solution. If I do, I expect the navy to stop this mutual war. Is that clearly understood?
"Of course."
May 1933
The Defence Requirements Committee report laid out the problems with the FAA and the Carriers in blunt language.
First, the two other powers operating carriers both had 2 large, capable ships modified from WW1 battlecruisers. Of the experimental carriers the Royal Navy operated, only 2, Courageous and Glorious, were considered anything more than experimental (the Furious was considered useful in limited circumstances), and both Japan and the USA had plans to build new, purpose built carriers in their next annual building programs, which would leave the RN even more at a disadvantage. The aims of Germany and Italy were unclear, and in the case of Germany they had of course no sizeable navy, but future threats needed to be considered.
The conclusion was simple; at least one new design carrier, the building of which had been proposed - and put back - since 1925, must be set in motion as soon as possible. The shipbuilding capacity was more than adequate, indeed the construction of such a ship would help alleviate the terrible unemployment in the North of England. A carrier, it was pointed out, was considerably cheaper than a battleship, and not subject to supply bottlenecks like its main guns.
Second, if a new carrier (and ideally more than one carrier) was to be built, it would need suitable planes. It was clear from looking at the ongoing designs for the RAF that a new generation of carrier planes would be needed. Granted, that would be expensive, but their development would take 4 years to maturity, so a specification should be offered to the usual aircraft manufacturers for some suitable designs.
Getting additional funds for aircraft development and carriers would not of course be easy, but it was pointed out that the threat in the Far East was only getting greater with each year, and the aims of Germany were looking worrying in the long term. Also, we had ample tonnage available under the London treaty, so it would hardly be warmongering to build a carrier or two to replace the old and obsolete conversions.
Discussions with the treasury took time, but the Admiralty was quite adamant about their needs (neglecting to mention that they also wanted to get the carriers underway before they needed more money for new battleships). In the end they didn't get all they wanted. One carrier was approved for the 1934 program, and new fighter, dive bomber and TBD models were authorised for development. To reduce costs, engines and all other equipment (where possible) was to be either existing or commonly developed by the RAF. The Admiralty had hoped for two, to at least match the Americans, but one was better than nothing.
There had been considerable argument over exactly what the new carrier would look like, and in the hope of getting approval the Admiralty had, after many, many meetings, decided on a design. It didnt please everyone, but at least no-one hated it enough to resign
Since the displacement under the treaty was 27,000t, the DNC had been told to look at a number of proposals in the 25,000t range, to allow some additions if necessary and to keep the displacement to a level that the government would be pressing for in teh next naval armament talks. The big arguments had been over the armour scheme and the hanger size and arrangements. There had been the idea of copying the Americans with an open hangar, but in the end it was decided that the advantages of a closed hanger, with its ease of protection against gas, easy blackout and warmth in winter conditions outweighed a few more aircraft and a cooler condition in the tropics.
The armour had caused a lot more argument, added to which was the fact that armour production was currently quite limited, and while expansion of the plant was being arranged, there wasnt an infinite amount of armour to play with, It was first of all agreed that deck armour of some sort was necessary; the carrier would certainly be used in the North Sea and Mediteranean, where land based air would be found, and the carrier needed to survive direct attack. This was considered less likely in the Pacific, where the distances involved meant only naval air was likely to be encountered, but it wouldnt hurt to have it. In the end it came down to 3 main choices
A heavily armoured deck to keep out 500lb bombs
An unarmoured deck, with a protected hangar deck
A flight deck thick enough to initiate a bomb, plus a protected hangar deck.
It was pointed out that while on paper the flight deck armour looked good, it would involve a lot of weight high up, and probably limit the hangar height from the 16' currently under consideration for the new planes.
In the end it was decided to compromise and go for the initiating flight deck and a fully armoured hanger deck to protect the magazines and machinery spaces. To reduce the weight, the side armour was reduced to 2" from the 4.5" necessary to defeat heavy shells, as it was felt that the whole point of a carrier was NOT to get close to enemy heavy ships in the first place! However protection sufficient to stop splinter damage and aircraft cannon fire was considered essential. A flight deck just over an inch thick would be laid down - this would also handle the planes currently being designed, as well as future planes which would certainly be heavier, and a 4 1/2" thick hanger deck protecting the machinery and the magazines. Since this effective 'wrote off' the hanger in the case of bombing, it was decided to fit a horizontal armour plate (with opening door to transfer aircraft if necessary) so that a single bomb hit would only take out 1/2 of any aircraft stored below. Since the structure above the hanger deck was (relatively) light, it was expected this would make repairs in case of a successful attack take less time.
DNC reported that on 25,000t with the suggested armour scheme he could provide space for about 45 aircraft in a single hanger, depending on the type. This was looked on unfavourably, particularly compared to foreign carriers current or building, and in fact Courageous already carried 48 (admittedly slightly smaller) planes. DNC offered to carry another 20 aircraft as a deck park, but the feeling was that while a deck park was fine in the Pacific, it made less sense in the North Atlantic in winter, as well as leaving more aircraft out in the open and vulnerable to attack. Again a compromise was reached with what was called the 1 1/2 hanger carrier - a full length upper hanger, 16' high, and a half length lower hanger, again 16' high. This would carry 64 aircraft, comparing much more closely to foreign designs, and the rest of the space at the lower level would allow the necessary crew quarters and to allow some maintenance to be undertaken on long deployments. And if for some reason it became necessary to carry more aircraft, the deck park was still an option.
To reach the necessary speed of over 30kt, it was felt a 4-shaft ship was necessary, on about 148,000hp.While trunking for 4 shafts was heavier than for 3, the arrangement was actually a bit simpler, as the design displacement and hangar size allowed more flexibility in the disposition of the necessary trunking.
The TDS would have a depth of about 15' given the hull width necessary to carry the weight of the armour, slightly more than had been originally intended, but this also allowed more oil to be carried inside it.
Finally the ship would carry 8x2 4.7" guns for high altitude defence, and 6x8 2 pdr pompoms for close defence. It had originally been hoped that the 5.1" gun would prove suitable, but it had been found that the shell was simply too heavy (in fact the 4.7" gun proposed wasnt developed, and the ship completed with 8 twin 4.5" AA guns) While conversations with the Americans had consolidated the internal opinions that the air group was the most efficient defence, no defences were perfect and defence in depth would give far more security. Hence the heavy AA and the armour, in view of the need to operate in the Med and the eastern parts of the North Sea. While these arrangements in fact reduced the size of the air group, it was felt that overall it gave the best chance of the carrier surviving air attack. There were concerns and discussions about surface attack, but it was pointed out that even in the worst case of surface attack during bad weather, the carrier could run away from anything big enough to damage it (and in the bad weather, even destroyers were unlikely to be able to catch it)
The design displacement was 24,800t (although the complete ship would actually come in at over 25,000t)
The Ark Royal would be laid down on 1st June 1934 for commissioning in July of 1937.
The Defence Requirements Committee report laid out the problems with the FAA and the Carriers in blunt language.
First, the two other powers operating carriers both had 2 large, capable ships modified from WW1 battlecruisers. Of the experimental carriers the Royal Navy operated, only 2, Courageous and Glorious, were considered anything more than experimental (the Furious was considered useful in limited circumstances), and both Japan and the USA had plans to build new, purpose built carriers in their next annual building programs, which would leave the RN even more at a disadvantage. The aims of Germany and Italy were unclear, and in the case of Germany they had of course no sizeable navy, but future threats needed to be considered.
The conclusion was simple; at least one new design carrier, the building of which had been proposed - and put back - since 1925, must be set in motion as soon as possible. The shipbuilding capacity was more than adequate, indeed the construction of such a ship would help alleviate the terrible unemployment in the North of England. A carrier, it was pointed out, was considerably cheaper than a battleship, and not subject to supply bottlenecks like its main guns.
Second, if a new carrier (and ideally more than one carrier) was to be built, it would need suitable planes. It was clear from looking at the ongoing designs for the RAF that a new generation of carrier planes would be needed. Granted, that would be expensive, but their development would take 4 years to maturity, so a specification should be offered to the usual aircraft manufacturers for some suitable designs.
Getting additional funds for aircraft development and carriers would not of course be easy, but it was pointed out that the threat in the Far East was only getting greater with each year, and the aims of Germany were looking worrying in the long term. Also, we had ample tonnage available under the London treaty, so it would hardly be warmongering to build a carrier or two to replace the old and obsolete conversions.
Discussions with the treasury took time, but the Admiralty was quite adamant about their needs (neglecting to mention that they also wanted to get the carriers underway before they needed more money for new battleships). In the end they didn't get all they wanted. One carrier was approved for the 1934 program, and new fighter, dive bomber and TBD models were authorised for development. To reduce costs, engines and all other equipment (where possible) was to be either existing or commonly developed by the RAF. The Admiralty had hoped for two, to at least match the Americans, but one was better than nothing.
There had been considerable argument over exactly what the new carrier would look like, and in the hope of getting approval the Admiralty had, after many, many meetings, decided on a design. It didnt please everyone, but at least no-one hated it enough to resign
Since the displacement under the treaty was 27,000t, the DNC had been told to look at a number of proposals in the 25,000t range, to allow some additions if necessary and to keep the displacement to a level that the government would be pressing for in teh next naval armament talks. The big arguments had been over the armour scheme and the hanger size and arrangements. There had been the idea of copying the Americans with an open hangar, but in the end it was decided that the advantages of a closed hanger, with its ease of protection against gas, easy blackout and warmth in winter conditions outweighed a few more aircraft and a cooler condition in the tropics.
The armour had caused a lot more argument, added to which was the fact that armour production was currently quite limited, and while expansion of the plant was being arranged, there wasnt an infinite amount of armour to play with, It was first of all agreed that deck armour of some sort was necessary; the carrier would certainly be used in the North Sea and Mediteranean, where land based air would be found, and the carrier needed to survive direct attack. This was considered less likely in the Pacific, where the distances involved meant only naval air was likely to be encountered, but it wouldnt hurt to have it. In the end it came down to 3 main choices
A heavily armoured deck to keep out 500lb bombs
An unarmoured deck, with a protected hangar deck
A flight deck thick enough to initiate a bomb, plus a protected hangar deck.
It was pointed out that while on paper the flight deck armour looked good, it would involve a lot of weight high up, and probably limit the hangar height from the 16' currently under consideration for the new planes.
In the end it was decided to compromise and go for the initiating flight deck and a fully armoured hanger deck to protect the magazines and machinery spaces. To reduce the weight, the side armour was reduced to 2" from the 4.5" necessary to defeat heavy shells, as it was felt that the whole point of a carrier was NOT to get close to enemy heavy ships in the first place! However protection sufficient to stop splinter damage and aircraft cannon fire was considered essential. A flight deck just over an inch thick would be laid down - this would also handle the planes currently being designed, as well as future planes which would certainly be heavier, and a 4 1/2" thick hanger deck protecting the machinery and the magazines. Since this effective 'wrote off' the hanger in the case of bombing, it was decided to fit a horizontal armour plate (with opening door to transfer aircraft if necessary) so that a single bomb hit would only take out 1/2 of any aircraft stored below. Since the structure above the hanger deck was (relatively) light, it was expected this would make repairs in case of a successful attack take less time.
DNC reported that on 25,000t with the suggested armour scheme he could provide space for about 45 aircraft in a single hanger, depending on the type. This was looked on unfavourably, particularly compared to foreign carriers current or building, and in fact Courageous already carried 48 (admittedly slightly smaller) planes. DNC offered to carry another 20 aircraft as a deck park, but the feeling was that while a deck park was fine in the Pacific, it made less sense in the North Atlantic in winter, as well as leaving more aircraft out in the open and vulnerable to attack. Again a compromise was reached with what was called the 1 1/2 hanger carrier - a full length upper hanger, 16' high, and a half length lower hanger, again 16' high. This would carry 64 aircraft, comparing much more closely to foreign designs, and the rest of the space at the lower level would allow the necessary crew quarters and to allow some maintenance to be undertaken on long deployments. And if for some reason it became necessary to carry more aircraft, the deck park was still an option.
To reach the necessary speed of over 30kt, it was felt a 4-shaft ship was necessary, on about 148,000hp.While trunking for 4 shafts was heavier than for 3, the arrangement was actually a bit simpler, as the design displacement and hangar size allowed more flexibility in the disposition of the necessary trunking.
The TDS would have a depth of about 15' given the hull width necessary to carry the weight of the armour, slightly more than had been originally intended, but this also allowed more oil to be carried inside it.
Finally the ship would carry 8x2 4.7" guns for high altitude defence, and 6x8 2 pdr pompoms for close defence. It had originally been hoped that the 5.1" gun would prove suitable, but it had been found that the shell was simply too heavy (in fact the 4.7" gun proposed wasnt developed, and the ship completed with 8 twin 4.5" AA guns) While conversations with the Americans had consolidated the internal opinions that the air group was the most efficient defence, no defences were perfect and defence in depth would give far more security. Hence the heavy AA and the armour, in view of the need to operate in the Med and the eastern parts of the North Sea. While these arrangements in fact reduced the size of the air group, it was felt that overall it gave the best chance of the carrier surviving air attack. There were concerns and discussions about surface attack, but it was pointed out that even in the worst case of surface attack during bad weather, the carrier could run away from anything big enough to damage it (and in the bad weather, even destroyers were unlikely to be able to catch it)
The design displacement was 24,800t (although the complete ship would actually come in at over 25,000t)
The Ark Royal would be laid down on 1st June 1934 for commissioning in July of 1937.
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I smell a 30s-era Midway Class!
Now why would the RN want a rubbish carrier like that when they can have an Audacious?
Now why would the RN want a rubbish carrier like that when they can have an Audacious?
But of course.
I was merely using the more commonly known example with that armour design.There will be some small changes as a result of the RN getting more and more worried about AA once they have some decent planes of their own to practice against.
However its too late to do anything much about the HA system, and the treasury is still an issue - as youve seen, the RN still only got part of what they wanted, one carrier rather than 2. The treasury will be more generous as war approaches, but we arent there yet, the RN is having to fight tooth and nail for every penny
Good point on the general attitude toward air attacks. Maybe TTL's Tribal analogue are fitted with the 4.5" Dual Purpose guns as a dedicated FADE vessel (the design was intended to be a new type of escort ayway, Tribal Class Frigate has a good ring to it). Maybe toward the end of the war the term Frigate replaced Destroyer?
Of course, both the new carrier and the existing ones would need aircraft. Under the RAF's control, supply of aircraft had been kept to a minimum, indeed there was a serious shortage of aircraft. While the international scene was darkening, it was not felt there was a serious chance of a major war within 5 years, so the decision was taken to go with a larger purchase of new aircraft rather than more of already obsolete types. This was a calculated risk, but one it was felt worth taking to get better aircraft.
The RN had for many years been proud of the quality of its ships and weapons - not always deservedly so. It was felt that the 'armament' of a carrier should be equally capable, bearing in mind the Royal Navy's unique commitment to arriving anywhere in the world at any time on short notice.
Admiral Henderson chaired a committee that reviewed both the likely existing opposition (particularly with carrier based planes in mind), with an aim to specifying development and purchasing of planes, and also looking at the requirements for the next generation to follow them. It was decided that while it was useful to minimise the number of type of planes to be supported with a carriers limited maintenance facilities, 3 different types of planes would be needed. These would be a fighter, and dive bomber (which would also have a reconiasance role), and a torpedo bomber that would also be able to level bomb. This plane also would be used for reconnaisance.
The fighter would have a single pilot, the dive bomber a crew of 2 and the TBR plane a crew of 3. It was reluctantly decided that a common engine wasn't practical at present, although it was seen as a very useful development for the future. It was expected that a radio suitable for single-person operation to allow the fighter to find its carrier would be bought or more likely licensed from America.
The TBR requirement it was pointed out could be filled by the private venture Swordfish, which would be available in service from 1935. Concerns were raised over its rather old-fashioned design, but its performance was similar to other planes in service with other navies, and it was expected that an improved version of the engine would give some improvements in performance. The conclusion was to go for an initial production order, while looking at a better plane as a replacement in a few years time. While the Swordfish would have a less powerful engine than that intended for use in the other 2 aircraft, it was felt that such an aircraft was the most likely one to find use outside of the highest threat areas, and so a later TBR aircraft could replace the Swordfish and allow it to be deployed to lower threat areas.
Finally the difficult choices were over the type of fighter. Previously the RAF had argued that 2 men were needed to operate any homing beacon and navigate the plane at sea. The USN, on the other hand, seemed to have no big problems doing this with one man (although they did have a superior radio system), and it was obvious that a one man fighter would have a better performance that a 2 man plane. There was considerable argument that the 'best' performance wasn't necessary, in that land based planes wouldn't have fighter protection, but in the end this lost out to the fact that if they did indeed have modern land based fighters in attendance then things would go poorly for the RN planes, and just because the RAF couldn't do something that didn't mean the RN couldn't. Especially since the USN demonstratably could. Suggestions that the choice was made partially to put one in the eye of the RAF were studiously denied...
Since this would be the first specialised fighter for the FAA, the aircraft under development for foreign navies were investigated to allow a specification to be written to exceed them. Aircraft from Japan, Germany, Italy and the USA were considered; while the USA was not considered to be an enemy, the fact that they were one of the only 3 navies to run carriers did make them useful for comparison. The committee was quite surprised, when the reports came back , that the initial response of the British aircraft industry was that they could do considerably better, even without any development of new systems and engines.
It was pointed out that the planes due in service with the USN and IJN in the timeframe were the Grumman F3F, a biplane fighter with a reasonable performance by biplane standards, but weak armament and protection, and the IJN planes would be the Mitsubishi A5M, a monoplane fighter with a higher speed (although still only around 235kt) and again a weak armament. It was therefore suggested that they requirement should try and meet the one currently being looked at for the RAF, which was a monoplane of at least 300kt speed with a heavy armament of 8 .303 guns or an equivalent. A number of British manufacturers claimed they could come close to this even with the current radial engines, and if a higher powered engine could be developed then they could exceed this.
Consideration was given to pressing for development of a more powerful engine, and as a result some discussions were held with the Bristol company, the main supplier of rotary engines in the country. There was some surprise at the Admiralty that the company didn't see any need for more powerful engines than those in their current inventory, since the FAA could clearly see advantages in an engine in the 1200-1500hp range for a fighter and for a better dive bomber and TBR aircraft. Informal discussions with Roy Fedden at Bristol led to the interesting possibility of developing what he was calling the Hercules engine with a version available for test flights in 1935. This would allow it to be used for a fighter developed for acceptance in late 1936, which was the FAA's preferred timescale. Such an engine could also be used to drive a dive bomber capable of delivering a 1,000lb bomb (or a 500lb bomb at longer ranges). This was a weight of bomb that would allow the FAA to sink or seriously damage any ship short of a battleship, and indeed only modern battleships would be safe against it. Fedden also pointed out (without wanting to be quoted, of course), that considerable pressure might have to be applied to the Bristol board to persuade them to develop the engine. The Admiralty, fresh from its victory over the RAF, so no reason why they couldn't persuade an engine company to do as requested - especially if they were funding the engine. As a result a contract to get the Hercules available for flight testing in mid-1935 was placed with Bristol, and the proposed performance made available to the aircraft companies.
As no dive bomber was available, a specification was put out to tender. The two selections for development were the Blackburn Skua and a navalised version of the Hawker Henly being designed for the RAF. The Admiralty were a bit concerned by the non-rotary engine of the Henly, but at present there wasn't a rotary equivalent. This lack was noted for further action, and hawker were asked to look at the possibility of replacing the Merlin with a radial engine if this could be done with minimal performance loss.
The Henley was expected to fly in late 1936, and be available to the FAA in 1937. The Skua was also expected to fly in 1936, with delivery in early 1937. The FAA would have preferred earlier development and delivery times, but Hawker in particular were busy with RAF orders.
A pair of fighter designs were chosen for development; the Gloster G.38 and the Bristol type 153. Both were specified to fly in early 1936 so as to be in production at the beginning of 1937 in time for operational use before the new carrier completed. The armament posed problems, as there was still ongoing argument both in the RN and the RAF as to the best choice of weapon. It was found that the RAF was going for 8 .303 machine guns. While this was considered a good armament, there were issues as to the size of bullet against bombers. In the end it was decided to develop 2 prototype aircraft with different wings, one carrying 8 .303 as the RAF designs, and one with 4 .5 inch as an alternative. A final decision could then be made later when the expected opposition could be better evaluated. The chosen aircraft was expected to show a performance of well over 300kt, and allow a heavy armament as well as the long range required by a naval aircraft.
The future after these planes was considered to be a longer term issue, especially as it was known that land-based air was currently in the throes of defining a new generation of higher-performance aircraft. It was complicated by the fact that the preferred engine type for naval planes was the radial engine, whereas the RAF seemed to be looking to a new generation of high performance inline engines produced by Rolls-Royce, although this hadn't been definately decided yet. It was decided to form a committee to look into the future needs of the FAA in terms of equipment and planes, which would liase with its equivalent in the RAF. While the relationship between the FAA and the RAF was rather strained at a high level, the lower ranking members actually doing most of the work got along much better, as long as everything could be kept off the record. Something the British officers were quite skilled at, fortunately.
The RN had for many years been proud of the quality of its ships and weapons - not always deservedly so. It was felt that the 'armament' of a carrier should be equally capable, bearing in mind the Royal Navy's unique commitment to arriving anywhere in the world at any time on short notice.
Admiral Henderson chaired a committee that reviewed both the likely existing opposition (particularly with carrier based planes in mind), with an aim to specifying development and purchasing of planes, and also looking at the requirements for the next generation to follow them. It was decided that while it was useful to minimise the number of type of planes to be supported with a carriers limited maintenance facilities, 3 different types of planes would be needed. These would be a fighter, and dive bomber (which would also have a reconiasance role), and a torpedo bomber that would also be able to level bomb. This plane also would be used for reconnaisance.
The fighter would have a single pilot, the dive bomber a crew of 2 and the TBR plane a crew of 3. It was reluctantly decided that a common engine wasn't practical at present, although it was seen as a very useful development for the future. It was expected that a radio suitable for single-person operation to allow the fighter to find its carrier would be bought or more likely licensed from America.
The TBR requirement it was pointed out could be filled by the private venture Swordfish, which would be available in service from 1935. Concerns were raised over its rather old-fashioned design, but its performance was similar to other planes in service with other navies, and it was expected that an improved version of the engine would give some improvements in performance. The conclusion was to go for an initial production order, while looking at a better plane as a replacement in a few years time. While the Swordfish would have a less powerful engine than that intended for use in the other 2 aircraft, it was felt that such an aircraft was the most likely one to find use outside of the highest threat areas, and so a later TBR aircraft could replace the Swordfish and allow it to be deployed to lower threat areas.
Finally the difficult choices were over the type of fighter. Previously the RAF had argued that 2 men were needed to operate any homing beacon and navigate the plane at sea. The USN, on the other hand, seemed to have no big problems doing this with one man (although they did have a superior radio system), and it was obvious that a one man fighter would have a better performance that a 2 man plane. There was considerable argument that the 'best' performance wasn't necessary, in that land based planes wouldn't have fighter protection, but in the end this lost out to the fact that if they did indeed have modern land based fighters in attendance then things would go poorly for the RN planes, and just because the RAF couldn't do something that didn't mean the RN couldn't. Especially since the USN demonstratably could. Suggestions that the choice was made partially to put one in the eye of the RAF were studiously denied...
Since this would be the first specialised fighter for the FAA, the aircraft under development for foreign navies were investigated to allow a specification to be written to exceed them. Aircraft from Japan, Germany, Italy and the USA were considered; while the USA was not considered to be an enemy, the fact that they were one of the only 3 navies to run carriers did make them useful for comparison. The committee was quite surprised, when the reports came back , that the initial response of the British aircraft industry was that they could do considerably better, even without any development of new systems and engines.
It was pointed out that the planes due in service with the USN and IJN in the timeframe were the Grumman F3F, a biplane fighter with a reasonable performance by biplane standards, but weak armament and protection, and the IJN planes would be the Mitsubishi A5M, a monoplane fighter with a higher speed (although still only around 235kt) and again a weak armament. It was therefore suggested that they requirement should try and meet the one currently being looked at for the RAF, which was a monoplane of at least 300kt speed with a heavy armament of 8 .303 guns or an equivalent. A number of British manufacturers claimed they could come close to this even with the current radial engines, and if a higher powered engine could be developed then they could exceed this.
Consideration was given to pressing for development of a more powerful engine, and as a result some discussions were held with the Bristol company, the main supplier of rotary engines in the country. There was some surprise at the Admiralty that the company didn't see any need for more powerful engines than those in their current inventory, since the FAA could clearly see advantages in an engine in the 1200-1500hp range for a fighter and for a better dive bomber and TBR aircraft. Informal discussions with Roy Fedden at Bristol led to the interesting possibility of developing what he was calling the Hercules engine with a version available for test flights in 1935. This would allow it to be used for a fighter developed for acceptance in late 1936, which was the FAA's preferred timescale. Such an engine could also be used to drive a dive bomber capable of delivering a 1,000lb bomb (or a 500lb bomb at longer ranges). This was a weight of bomb that would allow the FAA to sink or seriously damage any ship short of a battleship, and indeed only modern battleships would be safe against it. Fedden also pointed out (without wanting to be quoted, of course), that considerable pressure might have to be applied to the Bristol board to persuade them to develop the engine. The Admiralty, fresh from its victory over the RAF, so no reason why they couldn't persuade an engine company to do as requested - especially if they were funding the engine. As a result a contract to get the Hercules available for flight testing in mid-1935 was placed with Bristol, and the proposed performance made available to the aircraft companies.
As no dive bomber was available, a specification was put out to tender. The two selections for development were the Blackburn Skua and a navalised version of the Hawker Henly being designed for the RAF. The Admiralty were a bit concerned by the non-rotary engine of the Henly, but at present there wasn't a rotary equivalent. This lack was noted for further action, and hawker were asked to look at the possibility of replacing the Merlin with a radial engine if this could be done with minimal performance loss.
The Henley was expected to fly in late 1936, and be available to the FAA in 1937. The Skua was also expected to fly in 1936, with delivery in early 1937. The FAA would have preferred earlier development and delivery times, but Hawker in particular were busy with RAF orders.
A pair of fighter designs were chosen for development; the Gloster G.38 and the Bristol type 153. Both were specified to fly in early 1936 so as to be in production at the beginning of 1937 in time for operational use before the new carrier completed. The armament posed problems, as there was still ongoing argument both in the RN and the RAF as to the best choice of weapon. It was found that the RAF was going for 8 .303 machine guns. While this was considered a good armament, there were issues as to the size of bullet against bombers. In the end it was decided to develop 2 prototype aircraft with different wings, one carrying 8 .303 as the RAF designs, and one with 4 .5 inch as an alternative. A final decision could then be made later when the expected opposition could be better evaluated. The chosen aircraft was expected to show a performance of well over 300kt, and allow a heavy armament as well as the long range required by a naval aircraft.
The future after these planes was considered to be a longer term issue, especially as it was known that land-based air was currently in the throes of defining a new generation of higher-performance aircraft. It was complicated by the fact that the preferred engine type for naval planes was the radial engine, whereas the RAF seemed to be looking to a new generation of high performance inline engines produced by Rolls-Royce, although this hadn't been definately decided yet. It was decided to form a committee to look into the future needs of the FAA in terms of equipment and planes, which would liase with its equivalent in the RAF. While the relationship between the FAA and the RAF was rather strained at a high level, the lower ranking members actually doing most of the work got along much better, as long as everything could be kept off the record. Something the British officers were quite skilled at, fortunately.
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What 0.5" gun will be used, British Vickers, US Colt-Browning or Belgian FN-Browning and what ammunition 12.7 x 81 Vickers, 12.7 x 99 Browning or 13.2 x 96 FN.
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they will be evaluating these over the next year or two, and probably seeing what the US does.
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