The Western Theater in 1861-62: What could have been done better?

It seems that, of all the Confederates failures and missed opportunities in the Western theater, few entailed so many disasters in rapid succession as those of late 1861 and early 1862 - the invasion of Kentucky, the defeat at Mill Springs and subsequent evacuation of Kentucky, the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson, the fall of Nashville, the defeat at Shiloh, and the loss of Corinth. The question on my mind is: could anything have been done better? I've made a list of possible opportunities, and thought they might generate some discussion. Which scenario do you think works best, or is there another I missed entirely?

1) Better locations for Forts Henry and Donelson: While this scenario does not alter Kentucky's neutrality, I still wonder if better locations could have been found to build these crucial forts.

2) No invasion of Kentucky: Polk and Pillow's impetuous move into Kentucky was undoubtedly one of the war's great blunders. It ruined any hope of Southern sentiment winning out in Kentucky, and extended the alteady massive line the Confederates had to defend. Had Polk waited, Frémont would have sent Grant to Paducah only a few days later, probably causing Unionists in the state to be so cowed as to allow Polk and his rebels to be invited in. Kentucky's men and resources, along with her geographical postion, would have been invaluable to the Confederacy.

3) Finishing the Nashville ironclads earlier: This scenario is probably more potent when combined with #4a/b, but could still be useful at Fort Donelson. Foote may not have been able to advance with such confidence up the Cumberland had he met real oppostion, and two ironclad gunboats would surely have provided that.

4a) Properly reinforcing Donelson: While many condemn Sidney Johnston for the failures of December to May, I hold the one truly great mistake undeniably his own was his indecision regarding Donelson. He should either have gone there personally with his forces to make his stand there, or evacuated to defend Nashville later. What he went with was the worst of both worlds. Had he gone with the former, it seems Grant is forced into a siege, which is probably worse for Johnston than him.
4b) Evacuating Donelson, defending Nashville: Here, Johnston evacuates the fort, and decides to defend Nashville, probably digging in at the bend in the Cumberland below Dover, with his right flank on the river. How this battle would go, I'm not sure.

5) Davis sending Bragg early: In his diary, Josiah Gorgas sharply criticised Davis for not dispatching Bragg and his Gulf troops earlier to Johnston. The presence of 10,000 more troops at Donelson could change Grant's plans significantly.

6) Victory at Shiloh: According to some, Beauregard's plan was over-ambitious, while Johnston's was more feasible. While the green troops will still present an issue, a victory on the level of Second Manassas could easily set the Confederates on the path to more successes.

7) "Lee of the West" Johnston survives Shiloh: this only counts as "better" if you believe Johnston had the potential to become a better commander. You have those who hold he was a hopeless incompetent, and those who suggest he had the makings of a "Lee of the West", hence my specifying "which Johnston" survives the battle. While it seems there was little that could have done more effectively at Corinth, Johnston could have decided to take his army into Kentucky as Bragg did, or follow Hood's path into Tennessee to Nashville.
 
It seems that, of all the Confederates failures and missed opportunities in the Western theater, few entailed so many disasters in rapid succession as those of late 1861 and early 1862 - the invasion of Kentucky, the defeat at Mill Springs and subsequent evacuation of Kentucky, the loss of Forts Henry and Donelson, the fall of Nashville, the defeat at Shiloh, and the loss of Corinth. The question on my mind is: could anything have been done better? I've made a list of possible opportunities, and thought they might generate some discussion. Which scenario do you think works best, or is there another I missed entirely?
There is the lost opportunity at Farmington, Mississippi during the Siege of Corinth. While Halleck was pressing forward, Beauregard saw an opportunity to strike a blow onto Halleck's flank. Beauregard's target was the Left Wing under John Pope as it approached Seven Mile Creek during the first week of May. Knowing that Pope would have to conduct a reconnaissance of the area south of the creek to Bridge Creek he laid out his plan to trap the Federals between the two streams. When the Union foray came Braxton Bragg would confront them with two divisions (Ruggles and Trapier) while Earl Van Dorn with three divisions (Jones, Price, and McCown) marched to an area south of Farmington. When the Federals focused their attention on Bragg their flank would be open and Van Dorn could roll them up with an attack from the south. It was a simple plan but had every chance of being successful if the Union commanders acted as expected. There was no bait necessary, Halleck was coming for Corinth and to get there he had to enter the target area of operations.

Pope had been disenchanted by Halleck's ponderous advance and was spoiling for a fight. Pope decided, although he clearly was aware of the danger, to push two divisions (Stanley and Paine) over Seven Mile Creek toward Farmington. Indeed he was acting just as Beauregard had hoped. His two divisions were now isolated and ripe for the picking. The frontal attack succeeded in pressing Pope across the creek in disarray but Van Dorn’s force had failed to cut off the Federal escape route as expected. In fact they failed to show up on the field at all. When questioned Van Dorn excused his absence from the field stating that swamps and other natural obstacles had prevented him from getting into the proper position on time. Failure to communicate these difficulties allowed Ruggles to start the assault prematurely. It mattered little in the end as he had enough troops available to overpower the weak Federal defense.

Beauregard tried to strike Pope's isolated and vulnerable wing again. Despite his failure, Van Dorn, supported by Hardee, was to lead the Confederate flank move again and he would begin the assault. Once his flank attack was engaged a powerful main body would strike with corps in echelon in an effort to roll up the entire left wing of the Union line. This time it would not be a small scale affair. Beauregard, in a complicated series of movements, shifted the majority of his army to his right flank and waited. Beauregard decided to strike on May 21. Van Dorn argued that the flank march could not be conducted in the time allotted and requested that the attack be postponed for one day. Beauregard gave in with a stern warning that Van Dorn be on time. Every moment that the other portions of the line remained empty was a chance for the Federals to attack. About 2 A.M. on the 22nd Van Dorn departed with the flank marchers while the main body waited for the sound of his guns. The appointed time came and nothing was heard from Van Dorn. At 8 A.M. Van Dorn reported to Beauregard of delays caused by “bad management and stupidity of officers.” He also noted that the heavy overnight rains had created unexpected natural obstacles. Beauregard and the main body continued to wait. Hours passed and still nothing. Around noon Van Dorn finally told Beauregard that he “Cannot attack and am returning.”

Unable to get in position by noon Van Dorn determined that it was too late to attack and counter marched his troops towards the entrenchments. This failure could not be saved with a positive result by the other forces. Beauregard scrambled to get his army back into their trenches before the Federal commanders saw the weakness. But the damage was done and could not be repaired. On May 30th Corinth was abandoned. Halleck’s slow advance proved a successful strategy for winning the objective. It was a relatively bloodless triumph thanks to Van Dorn’s failure.
 
4b) Evacuating Donelson, defending Nashville: Here, Johnston evacuates the fort, and decides to defend Nashville, probably digging in at the bend in the Cumberland below Dover, with his right flank on the river. How this battle would go, I'm not sure.
This wouldn't make much sense in the face of the reality that Fort Henry and thus the Tennessee River was in Federal hands. As Phelps' Raid between February 6-10 demonstrated that Federal gunboats (and transports) could move up the Tennessee River without fear of obstruction. Phelps' gunboats made it all the way to Florence, Alabama and could have destroyed the Bear Creek Bridge on a major Confederate trunk line that Leroy Pope Walker described as the “vertebrae of the Confederacy.”

The loss of the Tennessee River simply meant that Johnston's defense line had been severed and could be bypassed, separating the Bowling Green force and Columbus force. Stopping at Nashville would be suicide. If Fort Donelson was abandoned, the Federals could steam up the Cumberland River with impunity and attack Nashville in the rear or cut off communications in Columbus. They couldn't do that if the naval batteries were manned to repel any such crossings. Which brings me to my second point...
4a) Properly reinforcing Donelson: While many condemn Sidney Johnston for the failures of December to May, I hold the one truly great mistake undeniably his own was his indecision regarding Donelson. He should either have gone there personally with his forces to make his stand there, or evacuated to defend Nashville later. What he went with was the worst of both worlds. Had he gone with the former, it seems Grant is forced into a siege, which is probably worse for Johnston than him.
I have always thought that this argument relied on far too much hindsight. From Johnston's and his staff officers' admissions, there was not enough transports to put the entire Bowling Green force at Fort Donelson. I'm not sure how much of these admissions are CYA, but it should be remembered that delaying Grant to allow the Bowling Green force to safely withdraw across the Tennessee River was the key of the battle, which could be achieved if the Confederates made a stand west of Fort Donelson, where the terrain was suitable for defensive operations.
 
This wouldn't make much sense in the face of the reality that Fort Henry and thus the Tennessee River was in Federal hands. As Phelps' Raid between February 6-10 demonstrated that Federal gunboats (and transports) could move up the Tennessee River without fear of obstruction. Phelps' gunboats made it all the way to Florence, Alabama and could have destroyed the Bear Creek Bridge on a major Confederate trunk line that Leroy Pope Walker described as the “vertebrae of the Confederacy.”

The loss of the Tennessee River simply meant that Johnston's defense line had been severed and could be bypassed, separating the Bowling Green force and Columbus force. Stopping at Nashville would be suicide. If Fort Donelson was abandoned, the Federals could steam up the Cumberland River with impunity and attack Nashville in the rear or cut off communications in Columbus. They couldn't do that if the naval batteries were manned to repel any such crossings. Which brings me to my second point...

I have always thought that this argument relied on far too much hindsight. From Johnston's and his staff officers' admissions, there was not enough transports to put the entire Bowling Green force at Fort Donelson. I'm not sure how much of these admissions are CYA, but it should be remembered that delaying Grant to allow the Bowling Green force to safely withdraw across the Tennessee River was the key of the battle, which could be achieved if the Confederates made a stand west of Fort Donelson, where the terrain was suitable for defensive operations.
It seems one of the best options for the Confederates at Donelson was to strike at Grant as he trudged along the road from Fort Henry to Dover. The terrain here lent itself to setting up an ambush, and the two sides had roughly equal numbers.

On February 14, a panicky Grant wanted to withdraw - could be very interesting to see how that would turn out. The Confederates would probably take the chance to escape, and Grant could find his career in jeopardy at allowing ~17,000 rebels to slip away without a fight.
 
Interesting... If the entire Ft. Donelson garrison managed to escape to Nashville (Forrest remains a footnote in history) I can see A.S. Johnston still retreat and regroup his army at Corinth, where he would receive more reinforcement (Van Dorn's men from Arkansas). Considering events still play out as OTL, the Army of Mississippi, which significantly outnumbers Grant, can now execute the counterattack at Shiloh, destroying the Federals at Owl Creek. What now?
 
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