The War of 1938

If Hitler had not been persuaded to solve the Sudeten Crisis in the Conference of Munich he would have been assassinated on September, 28 by a commando led by Captain Heinz and Lieutenant Commander Liedig. In OTL the September Conspiracy failed because they (Beck, Brauchitsch, Dohnanyi, Gisevius, Goerdeler, Halder, Kordt, Oster, Witzleben and others) dismissed their plan after learning that he had agreed to hold a conference to solve the Sudeten Crisis.

So, if Hitler did not have agreed to solve this crisis peacefully he would have been "killed while resisting arrest".
 
I'm not seeing any riots in Austria-Hungary until after the collapse, only low morale, desertions, and general apathy and defeatism.

And, I suppose, you see no link between low morale - collapse - rioting?



If they are too common to mention, we don't know what any of them are. If you're going to make so much of what was meant to be a joke, you might as well cite some actual cases.

You did notice that the red week was one of said cases?

The bloody sunday of 1904 in Czarist Russia is a good example. A mass of unarmed demonstrators gets mowed down by the army; this puts an end to peaceful, reformist movements and paves the way to the revolution of 1905.
The Malabar uprising of 1921 was stoked by an incident in which the police fired on a crowd.
In 1918, the rice riots in Japan were made worse by the police practices, and this ended with the government having to resign.

I could go on and on. While I selected examples from the early 1900s, we should know plenty of modern examples, in countries as diverse as the USA, South Africa, Israel, Pakistan and so on and so forth. There is an initial accident or peaceful demonstration, the police reacts with excessive violence, and this brings about worse things. If you don't know about these mechanics, I'm sorry for you.

Wrong war, jimmie:

I'm not "jimmie". Try to avoid these unpleasantries, if you can.

'the war' to be understood as 'the war nearer the period being discussed'.

You understood it that way. Personally, I think that an uprising during a war
such as the Easter one is a relevant example.

Although that said, the Easter Rising was bitterly unpopular with the Irish people at the time. (And for the sake of completeness, yes, the Irish police were armed, dressed in military-style uniforms, and stationed outside their counties of origin, in these ways being very differnet from their British equivelants).

Let me get this straight: the British needed to use army units, including field artillery, to quell that uprising. It was most definitely not "handled by the constabulary". Don't try to argue in this direction because it would be a falsehood.
 
The Germans get gang tackled by the czechs, poles and french and are crushed in 12 weeks


Poles?

When exactly did they offer any support for Czechoslovakia in 1938? Iirc they presented claims of their own against her.

As for the French, if they move as energetically in 1938 as they were to do in 1939, expect both Armies to die of old age.
 

I think you are right here.

As for the French, if they move as energetically in 1938 as they were to do in 1939, expect both Armies to die of old age.

I think you are wrong here. The French did not launch a massive offensive in 1939 because they needed at least 15 days, or better a month, for that, and in 15 days the Polish situation was desperate. On the contrary, the assumption here seems to be that the Czechoslovakians resist at least a month or two.

Secondly, while the French army of 1938 was less powerful than the French army of 1939, the German army of 1938 was much less powerful than the German army of 1939. It's a hell greater difference.

Going back to the Polish neutrality of 1938, of course the Germans still need to guard against a change of mind. This will tie down the old Landwehr-class divisions, garrisons in East Prussia, border regiments etc., even if the Poles don't raise a finger.
As opposed to this, in 1939 the Germans had just police units and traveling army units in the Protectorate, and they even got three rear-area infantry divisions for security duties in Southern Poland from the Slovakians.
 
I think you are right here.



I think you are wrong here. The French did not launch a massive offensive in 1939 because they needed at least 15 days, or better a month, for that, and in 15 days the Polish situation was desperate. On the contrary, the assumption here seems to be that the Czechoslovakians resist at least a month or two.

Secondly, while the French army of 1938 was less powerful than the French army of 1939, the German army of 1938 was much less powerful than the German army of 1939. It's a hell greater difference.


The disparity had been greater still in 1935, at the time of the Stresa Front. Yet even then, when French and Italian army chiefs met to discuss co-operation, they talked about the defence of Alsace and South Tyrol, rather than about offensive action.

Afaics, the French Army just wasn't thinking offensively in the 1930s - an overreaction from their opposite approach in 1914 - and it's not at all obvious that relative strengths had much to do with it. There's little reason to think that anything different can be expected in 1938.
 
The disparity had been greater still in 1935, at the time of the Stresa Front. Yet even then, when French and Italian army chiefs met to discuss co-operation, they talked about the defence of Alsace and South Tyrol, rather than about offensive action.

Afaics, the French Army just wasn't thinking offensively in the 1930s - an overreaction from their opposite approach in 1914 - and it's not at all obvious that relative strengths had much to do with it. There's little reason to think that anything different can be expected in 1938.

The French did launch a limited offensive operation in september 1939. It did not get far. If they launch as much one year earlier, they will get farther, exactly because of that disparity in strength. Certainly they won't be very offensive-minded, But even a timid, limited, French-minded offensive, in 1938, is going to get much farther than what they actually historically did.

Which doesn't mean a French Blitzkrieg into the Ruhr, of course. But neither a 1938 Sitzkrieg.

But, personally, I don't think it will come to sustained, long war operations, anyway. Seeing that the bluff has not worked, that they are taking heavy losses and making little headway in the Sudeten, that the French are advancing, albeit very slowly and not very far from the border, that the British will blockade their overseas shipments (in 1939 they had the promise of Soviet shipments to replace that), that the Soviets are exchanging shots in the Baltic with the Kriegsmarine and pressuring the Romanians for overfly rights so that they can send air units in Eastern Czechoslovakia, and that the said Romanians and the Hungarians aren't going to discount grains and fuels... the German generals put their act together and Hitler has a deadly accident, possibly together with some other high-ranking boss. Peace feelers follow.
 
And, I suppose, you see no link between low morale - collapse - rioting?

Certainly, but nothing is inevitable until it happens, and there is a direct contradiction between rioting and apathy.

You did notice that the red week was one of said cases?

The bloody sunday of 1904 in Czarist Russia is a good example. A mass of unarmed demonstrators gets mowed down by the army; this puts an end to peaceful, reformist movements and paves the way to the revolution of 1905.
The Malabar uprising of 1921 was stoked by an incident in which the police fired on a crowd.
In 1918, the rice riots in Japan were made worse by the police practices, and this ended with the government having to resign.

I could go on and on. While I selected examples from the early 1900s, we should know plenty of modern examples, in countries as diverse as the USA, South Africa, Israel, Pakistan and so on and so forth. There is an initial accident or peaceful demonstration, the police reacts with excessive violence, and this brings about worse things. If you don't know about these mechanics, I'm sorry for you.

I was referring to examples from during the war and wars generally; examples from, you know, Slovakia would also have been nice. There is no need to be patronising, nobody here is a historical ignoramus.

I'm not "jimmie". Try to avoid these unpleasantries, if you can.

It's not an unpleasantry, it's practically an honorific, and being used there to make up the right number of syllables.

People have such narrow definitions of the insulting, don't they? "It's a shame you don't know anything about the subject. Don't dare call me 'wee man'!" Politeness begins in the self.

You understood it that way. Personally, I think that an uprising during a war such as the Easter one is a relevant example.

And I think that using an 'uprising' during a war such as the IRA activity in Ulster is an equally relevant example and, moreover, the example I as talking about.

Let me get this straight: the British needed to use army units, including field artillery, to quell that uprising. It was most definitely not "handled by the constabulary". Don't try to argue in this direction because it would be a falsehood.

I was never arguing that direction because I was arguing about a different incident in a different war and you, having changed the topic, are now apparently accusing me of deceit by talking about the original topic. Not on (jim).
 
I was referring to examples from during the war and wars generally; examples from, you know, Slovakia would also have been nice.


Sorry, but I fail to see how the dynamics mentioned (excessive police force causing a worsening of the existing situation) should be looked for only during a war. it's a dynamics that may happen during peacetime, and during wartime too.

That said, I notice you claim not to be an ignoramus, but you evidently failed to see that the rice upheaval in Japan took place before the end of WWI - a war in which Japan was a combatant.

A nice example would be the Quebec riots of 1917 - directly linked with conscription and thus war, and stoked by a police arrest.

The Los Angeles riots of 1943 pitted civilians against servicemen. I did not know that the LAPD's attitude had some weight on worsening the situation; I learned it now, looking for further examples. I have to thank you for this.

The shooting of anti-war demonstrators in Bari in 1943 led to further demonstrations and strikes, and to other killings, in a cycle of reactions that certainly undermined the short-lived Badoglio government.

The Kent State University shooting by the Ohio National Guard brought about violence at other campuses throughout the country involved. A war was going on. As an example to the contrary, the so-called days of rage in Chicago in 1969 was handled by the police with preventive measures, shows of force, and arrests (as opposed to bullets). There was extensive damage but the riot petered out.


Apart from these further examples, I see you prefer a style of discussion that is unpleasant enough for me. Good bye.
 
If Hitler had not been persuaded to solve the Sudeten Crisis in the Conference of Munich he would have been assassinated on September, 28 by a commando led by Captain Heinz and Lieutenant Commander Liedig. In OTL the September Conspiracy failed because they (Beck, Brauchitsch, Dohnanyi, Gisevius, Goerdeler, Halder, Kordt, Oster, Witzleben and others) dismissed their plan after learning that he had agreed to hold a conference to solve the Sudeten Crisis.

So, if Hitler did not have agreed to solve this crisis peacefully he would have been "killed while resisting arrest".

So they say.

It's funny. After World War Two was over it turned out all the surviving generals hated Hitler and wanted to oppose him. Yet when it FINALLY happened in 1944 after eleven years of Nazi rule, six years of war, and countless atrocities most of the senior generals STILL did not rebel. They may not have loved Hitler but they obviously feared him and his regime.

Would the generals have undertaken a coup in 1938 to avoid a war they had little chance of winning? Maybe. But I only say maybe, given their later actions it was certainly not a sure thing.
 
No, there is proof. The Gestapo found information about the September Conspiracy (they call it Oster Conspiracy in the english wikipedia) during their investigation of the July 20 assassination attempt. But Hitler ordered them NOt to act upon this information. he feared that the population could be unsettled by the information that there were plans to kill him before the war.
 
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