The Victory of Carthage

The Victory of Carthage

The Premise: In marching across the Alps, Hannibal did NOT lose most of his siege weapons and elephants and, after some even more
resounding victories against the Romans than he really had, attacked Rome. Italy was now divided between Carthaginian Italy and
Roman Italy. Now two powers, Carthage and the Seleucid Empire, [formed by General Seleceus, one of Alexander's most important
generals] would go on to become the new world powers.

All years shall now be counted from 814 BCE, the year of the founding of Carthage. This is year 1. All years shall now be in the by
the Carthaginian calendar created by Hannibal IIII. These are Carthaginian standard years, CSY.

Beginning in 597 CSY, The Carthaginian annexation of Italy began. As Italy broke apart, her old bonds with various allies etc. did so as well.
Carthage and her Celtic allies were now in control of Italy and were moving both North and East.

The Ptolemaic empire chose to ally itself to the Carthaginians, but the prosperous Seleucid Empire of the heartland of the old Persian empire did not.
Here is a rough timeline of events between 596 CSY [218 BCE] is listed here.

May 596 CSY: Hannibal chooses to march across the Alps, but brings sufficient provisions and, moreover,
makes sure that his elephants are kept warm enough to survive the trek. However, not all [but more than three] of his elephants survive
and some of his siege equipment is lost.

December 596 CSY: Resounding victory for Hannibal at the battle of Trebia. NO Roman legions are successful, and the empire
has been taken completely by surprise by Hannibal's moves into Italy. This needs some explaining. At the Battle of Trebia, some legions
actually beat the Carthaginians and managed to retreat. Although this is recorded as an OVERALL victory for Carthage, Hannibal lost some
vital troops here, which in this case he didn't.

June 21, 597 CSY: The battle of Lake Trasimene is another fantastic victory for Hannibal.

November 3, 597 CSY: Hannibal decides to march directly on Rome. Rather than go to Cannae, and/or wait for reinforcements, the Carthaginian army
follows the Tiber and attacks Rome directly. Italy soon falls into civil disarray as the Carthaginian army takes Rome. Hannibal, with his military genius, just
barely manages to pull it off.

599 CSY: The annexation of northern Italy is completed, and Hannibal, now popular beyond comparison within the Carthaginian empire, sets his sights on
Greek politics.

January 16, 600 CSY: Events take a violent turn as Carthage declares war on Macedon. Although the two had originally been considering peace treaties,
peace conferences soon turned to conferences of war when both sides tried to take parts of Greece. One boiling point is Epirus, and the moment that
Macedonian troops march into Epirus, the Carthaginians declare war and the First Macedonian war begins.

March 19, 600 CSY: The people of Epirus divide, one side, the Molossians, who side with Macedon. On the other side are the Chaonians and Thesprotians, who
side with Carthage. However, Carthage is not primarily a military power and overreaches herself. It is 11 years before anything can be done about Greece. On the other
hand, Hannibal is greedy for territory and will do anything to get it.

February 28, 611 CSY: The Carthaginian and Macedonian navies meet at the battle of the Gulf of Oricos. The Macedonian fleet, sailing past, is completely unaware
of the Carthaginian fleet which has chosen to hide in the natural harbour. Taking the Macedonians COMPLETELY by surprise, the Carthaginians win a great victory.
[Battle of Oricos]

August 6, 611 CSY: The Carthaginian invading army in Epirus quickly drives out the Macedonians, the only discrepancy is that it doesn't leave. Leading the army?
Hasdrubal, Hannibal's brother. Hannibal, meanwhile, is managing affairs in Italy.

The Rise of the Carthaginian Empire has begun.

p.s. The timeline may be bad, in fact it may have been done before, it's not an original idea, I'm sure, but it's still fun to do and hopefully better than my first thread.
The map is bad. Deal with it.

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The Second Punic War certainly is a real classic POD (I've been working myself on a scenario), so here's some advice:

1) After the Trasimene Lake, Hannibal simply could not have marched directly on Rome. He didn't have the reinforcements, which is in turn why he consolidated his forces in southern Italy (attempting to win more allies for Carthage) and tried to get reinforcements from North Africa.

2) Even if he had marched on Rome and miraculously won, the Carthaginians could not have "annexed" southern Italy. In fact, the Carthaginians had no intention whatsoever to do that.

3) There would have been no "Carthaginian Empire". Verymuch unlike the Romans, the Carthaginians were no empire builders.
 
There are, however, some subtle differences in the battles.

A] The legions that would have won at the battle of Trebia do not.

B] We are assuming that Italy has plunged into chaos. Although the Carthaginians were not "empire builders," as you put it, they were enemies of the Romans and a chance to get rid of the Roman threat once and for all would have been very tempting.

C] Carthage had moved into Spain, why not Rome?

By all means, any feedback would be welcome. The next part of the timeline is coming up.
 
Indeed it may be a too fast expansion, but however i always want to see a Carthaginian Italy.

I guess Carthage will focus on West Europe (Gallia, Britannia), Altantic and Africa but lefting East Mediterrean to Hellenistic states..
 
There are, however, some subtle differences in the battles.

A] The legions that would have won at the battle of Trebia do not.

Frankly, I don't understand what you're trying to say there.

B] We are assuming that Italy has plunged into chaos. Although the Carthaginians were not "empire builders," as you put it, they were enemies of the Romans and a chance to get rid of the Roman threat once and for all would have been very tempting.

Hannibal Barca never had the intention to annex Italy. He his goal was to rid to Italy of Roman influence, and to do so he wanted to win other Italian polities which were allied with Rome on his side. This is why he went into the south of Italy first.

C] Carthage had moved into Spain, why not Rome?

That's complicated. The Carthaginians mainly expanded in Hispania as a compensation for their losses in the First Punic War, but technically the Carthaginians (or more broadly, Phoenicians) had presence in Hispania for many centuries (at least as colonies like Gadir)

By all means, any feedback would be welcome. The next part of the timeline is coming up.

Well, I'm trying to help where I can, really. I personally enjoy reading ancient history TLs a lot, but I am all too well aware that they require the hell of a lot of research (though, a POD in the Punic Wars is by no means as bad as... say a POD involving the Hittites or Atenism ;) ) and often the butterflies are severe, and this discourages a lot people.
 
At the battle of Trebia, several Roman legions actually won and managed to retreat... Supposedly they would not and thus the Roman army would be weakened...

Hannibal Barca never had the intention to annex Italy. He his goal was to rid to Italy of Roman influence, and to do so he wanted to win other Italian polities which were allied with Rome on his side. This is why he went into the south of Italy first.

This is largely true... But then again, Italy would have been tempting for a general like Hannibal. When I have the time I'll change it to just Rome...

That's complicated. The Carthaginians mainly expanded in Hispania as a compensation for their losses in the First Punic War, but technically the Carthaginians (or more broadly, Phoenicians) had presence in Hispania for many centuries (at least as colonies like Gadir)

This is true...


Well, I'm trying to help where I can, really. I personally enjoy reading ancient history TLs a lot, but I am all too well aware that they require the hell of a lot of research (though, a POD in the Punic Wars is by no means as bad as... say a POD involving the Hittites or Atenism ;) ) and often the butterflies are severe, and this discourages a lot people.[/QUOTE]

The Hittites would be interesting! But you're right, almost too much of the butterfly effect. Human history being that different would probably mean that civilization in general would be completely different...
 
A] The legions that would have won at the battle of Trebia do not.

Trebia is recorded as a Carthaginian victory.

B] We are assuming that Italy has plunged into chaos. Although the Carthaginians were not "empire builders," as you put it, they were enemies of the Romans and a chance to get rid of the Roman threat once and for all would have been very tempting.

The Roman-controlled parts of Italy would have fallen into disunity, because many Italian cities in Etruria, Umbria, Picenum, Lucania, Calabria, Bruttium, Apulia and Samnium still featured a number of autonomous city-states called Socii (allies) or Coloniae (colonies) that were granted Ius Latinitas (Latin Rights), a limited form of citizenship in the Roman Republic. They couldn't vote in Roman elections, but they were obligated to defend the Republic in times of war. With Rome destroyed, its inhabitants killed or enslaved, especially the Nobilitas and Senate, Hannibal may have to assault and lay waste to many of the Latin colonies across Italy, but he had the support of a number of non-Latin cities in the south. With the Roman hegemony gone, the different city-states in Italy would become fully independent, and maybe devise leagues of their own. In regards to Carthage, they may sign trading treaties with them. But outright conquest of Italia was beyond the resources of either Carthage or Hannibal's pay chest.


C] Carthage had moved into Spain, why not Rome?

The Carthaginian expansion in southern Spain took place after the First Punic War, and this was mostly the prerogative of Hamilcar Barca, who had a lot of enemies in the Carthaginian Senate, who found his motives suspect. And while the Hamilcar's territorial gains in Iberia, through both military means and diplomacy with native Iberian tribes, were done in the name of Carthage, all the major military and administrative posts in Punic Iberia were held by members of his family. Hamilcar's brother-in-law, Hasdrubal, succeeded him as governor in Iberia, and then Hannibal after him. The Iberian territories were in practice a Barcid fiefdom.
 
Good points

Some good points, but although the battle of Trebia is RECORDED as a Carthaginian victory, there were multiple fields of conflict and on a few the Romans won. I had to do some research on this bit...
 
The Seleucid Expansion

Whilst Carthage was busy with the Roman wars [596-600 CSY] and the Macedonian wars [600-612],
the Seleucid Empire began to expand it's borders. The ambitious leaders of the Seleucids was Antiochus III,
or the great. Antiochus, unchallenged by the Roman Empire, was able to expand and administrate
his empire to an extent unknown previously.

Here is an approximate timeline of SELEUCID happenings, between 595 CSY and 615 CSY.

595-596 CSY: Antiochus' conquerings take him to to Egypt, where he is confronted by another Diadokhoi,
fat old Ptolemy.

22 June, 597 CSY: Antiochus himself faces Ptolemy the "Great" at the battle of Raphia and inflicts a mortal
and devastating blow on the Ptolemaic Empire.

The Battle of Raphia-

-Antiochus is NOT outflanked by Ptolemy's Echecrates and manages to
defend his flank with a group of Phalangites he had placed on his left. His elephants
do most of the rest of the work, and as his cavalry attacks the enemy phalanxes from behind Ptolemy is forced to flee to Alexandria.

598 CSY: Achaeus takes the war to the Seleucid empire whilst Antiochus attempts to have himself
recognized as the new Pharaoh of Egypt. Antiochus sends his young general, newly promoted from the cavalry, Chipater, with a
limited amount of troops, to fight Achaeus in the north.

January 3, 599 CSY: Chipater, ambitious like Antiochus, defeats Achaeus in a few minor skirmishes before blocking him
from the gates of his city of Sardis. At the Battle of Sardis, Chipater's elephants manage to rampage through the ranks of Achaeus and,
upon capture, Achaeus is slaughtered instantly.

January 4, 599 CSY: The gates of Sardis are thrown open to Chipater, who slaughters and enslaves the entire population of Sardis, and
burns it to the ground.

599-605 CSY: Successful as Antiochus is, he begins to realize the consequences of splitting his power a little as Chipater independently
conquers both Parthia and Armenia over the course of a mere six years. Realizing that something must be done, Antiochus tries to have
Chipater assassinated, but the attempts fails.

605-610 CSY: Using the excuse the it's leader being a "treacherous usurper," Antiochus conquers Bactria without too much trouble.
From here, he allies himself with the Indian king, he also creates an alliance with the new, more powerful Carthaginian empire, which is
now almost directly ruled by Hannibal.










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- Regarding Trebia. Yes, some 10,000 Romans managed to escape the battle, but I do not think that the impact of fewer escaping would be as tremendous as you imagined it.

- Another nitpick: "Turkish penninsula" is a terrible, terrible misnomer. First off, it's called Anatolia, and secondly there won't be any Turks in Anatolia for another 1000 years.
 
You haven't actually explained how Hannibal came to rule Carthage. Did he return in triumph with his Italian spoils in tow? Did he lead his veteran army to besiege Carthage? Or did he seize power in a populist revolt after returning from Italy?

Also, in what way is the Carthaginian Empire "more powerful" at this point? You haven't written about the long and exhaustive campaigns that Hannibal and others would have needed to undertake for the reconquest of western Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and Malta. Plus, Carthage would surely need to restore it's powerful navy, which it was stripped of by the Romans after the First Punic War.

And about the Battle of Trebia, which was fought in 218 BCE, this is six years before the Roman sack of Syracuse in 212 BCE. If you intend for Hannibal to destroy Rome shortly after his victory at Trebia, then Syracuse, the most formidable of the Greek city-states in Sicily, would be in a position to seize control of more of the island's territory, and Hannibal, or Carthage, won't be in a position to challenge King Hieronymus of Syracuse for a few years, in which time, Hieronymus could establish a solid hegemony over the island.
 
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The Victory of Carthage

The Premise: In marching across the Alps, Hannibal did NOT lose most of his siege weapons and elephants and, after some even more
resounding victories against the Romans than he really had, attacked Rome.

I've thought about the common Carthaginian Victory what-if over the years, and here's what I came up with:

More siege weapons and elephants are unlikely to have carried the war for Hannibal, and given how amazing it was for Hannibal to pull off the crossing he managed historically, a POD that makes this improbable feat even more improbable might not be the strongest. What he needed to take Rome were conventional reinforcements, the kind that would have made it possible to firm up his Italian league and complete the prying-away of Rome from its local allies that he came within an ace of achieving through sheer tactical brilliance.

As it happens, the Carthaginians had a golden historical opportunity to permanently swing the Italian war in Hannibal’s favor. It came in 211 BC, when the Barcids Hasdrubal and Mago along with Hasdrubal Gisco decisively defeated the Scipii in Spain. The war at this point teetered on the issue of initiative; if Carthage moved quickly enough to reinforce the Italian front, Rome was done for. If Rome successfully reinforced the Spanish front, OTOH, they could continue hammering at the Iberian possessions that were the key to Carthage’s economy. Historically, the divided command of the Carthaginians led to dithering, and it was the Romans who seized the initiative. When the future Scipio Africanus took Carthago Nova, it was the beginning of the end.

Is it possible to craft a timeline where Hasdrubal Barca manages to unite the Iberian forces under his command and launch an invasion of Italy in support of Hannibal? Such a development would probably spring primarily from tactical exigencies, like the exertion of authority needed in the wake of the battle to keep the 8,000 Roman survivors from escaping (as they did historically). If Hasdrubal managed it, and subsequently persuaded his brother and Gisco that ultimate glory would come from storming to Hannibal’s aid without delay, then this teetering moment of historical initiative falls in Carthage’s favor.

The key here, though, is that the initiative must come from the Iberian commanders and be presented as a fait accompli to the Carthaginian Senate. The one constant of the war was that this Senate never understood the validity of Hannibal’s strategic vision, and was so loath to risk exposing the Iberian possessions that they wound up losing them by over-caution. So, could the Iberian command effectively “revolt” and strike out to join with Hannibal? I think yes, theoretically. The way the Iberian campaigns played out and the very fact of Hannibal’s war in Italy indicates that Carthaginian nobles, much like their Roman counterparts, could and did endeavor to shape their domestic political destinies by acting on their own initiative in the field.

If they failed, of course, Iberia would be lost along with the Italian front and they would face treason charges and crucifixion. It’s probable that the historical caution of Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago stemmed from this... and also potentially from a knowledge of the inner workings of Carthaginian Senatorial politics that’s now lost to us. But ahhh, if they won, if they won... the prospect of unimaginable wealth, immortal glory, and virtual political untouchability might be theirs. I don’t think it’s too outlandish to imagine a great man of this era being tempted by the prospect of having his name written in the book of history alongside others, like Hannibal himself, who were busy carving out their own legends before the eyes of the world.

If they did decide to go, it would mark a concerted effort at reinforcing Hannibal a full two years earlier than happened IRL. These are two extremely crucial years, because the advancement of the timeline means that instead of deploying to Spain, a talented young commander like Publius Cornelius Scipio is required in Italy to fight the concerted assault of the “sons of the Thunderbolt.” His critical seizure of New Carthage therefore doesn’t happen.

Hasdrubal and Mago might decide on a kind of “pincer” invasion, with Hasdrubal going via the Alps as he did historically – the way had been eased by Hannibal – and Mago going by sea from Minorca, as he did historically. Both actions happening at once in 210 presents a major challenge to the Romans. What likely happens is that the 20,000-strong force that reinforced Hispania IRL is sent against Hasdrubal instead – perhaps even under the command of Publius Cornelius Scipio – while the remainder of Roman power is flung into the task not only of continuing to harass Hannibal, but now of keeping a considerable force under Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco from joining up with him. The results of all this are something of a crapshoot. The most favorable plausible scenario for the Carthaginians is that, although, Hasdrubal winds up dead at the hands of Publius Cornelius Scipio – Hasdrubal, while capable, was not Hannibal’s tactical match, but Scipio was – events in the south swing firmly in their favor. Marcus Claudius Marcellus winds up just as dead as he did historically by 209, but now also loses his army in open battle. With more than 15,000 men worth of reinforcements now at his disposal, Hannibal can march on Rome and forces from the north will need to be recalled to face him. What ensues is a bitter epic struggle between Scipio and Hannibal – but now on Italian soil, with Rome’s allies deserting her in a steady stream and Carthaginian reinforcements periodically arriving from Iberia, through southern Gaul and from Numidia. Scipio would be hailed as a third founder of Rome just for being able to check the Carthaginians, kill Hannibal and return affairs to the status quo ante; in that event he’d likely spend a good deal of time re-pacifying Rome’s Italian allies, and further expeditions against Carthage would be out of the question. It’s just as possible, however, that he himself winds up slain before the walls of Rome, which itself is sacked.

Alternately, the Carthaginian commanders might take the Alpine route together, arriving en masse in Northern Italy. This is possibly a better scenario for the Carthaginians, who with a force this size could realistically fight their way down from the north to join Hannibal in an assault on Rome. OTOH if a Roman army found a way to eke out a victory here – again the X-factor of Publius Cornelius Scipio raises its head – the Italian venture could indeed come to nothing. Hasdrubal and Mago could survive together... or could both wind up dead in a single engagement. Again, the outcome is something of a crapshoot, but a scenario favorable to the Carthaginians is just as likely as a scenario adverse to them.

If either sort of favorable scenario comes about, the Roman capacity for resistance is not infinite. Eventually its ability to raise armies will be crippled and its ties to its allies broken, as in fact began to happen after the Battle of Cannae historically; the early advent of Carthaginian reinforcements merely bolsters the existing trend and, in a victorious scenario, renders it irreversible. What happens when Rome is finally forced to capitulate – one way of rapidly bringing this about would be to pull down the aqueducts – is probably not unlike what happened to Carthage. Likely Rome is sacked, forced to pay a crippling indemnity, and has its further political and military activity subjected to the compulsory scrutiny of the Carthaginian Senate. Many disillusioned Romans probably abandon the city. If there are attempts to revive Roman power as a challenge to Carthaginian injustices toward or abuses of the Italian allies – which injustices are likely to happen just as they happened with the Romans – then Rome probably winds up razed and abandoned, with a Carthaginian colony built on its ruins. It’s possible this happens even if Rome provides no provocation; no doubt Carthage will have its own vindictive Cato the Censors.

At any rate Rome is surely finished as the heart of Italian power. If it continues to exist at all it will be as a diminished, politically irrelevant town haunted by past glories and dreams of what might have been, overshadowed by monuments to the glorious victory of the “sons of the Thunderbolt.” Rome’s poets, dramatists, orators and politicians are largely forgotten except in such patches as are preserved by association with the war of conquest, or except as their achievements are assimilated – with acknowledgment or without – to Punic literature. Geographic exigencies would likely prompt Carthaginian victors to split Italy into two halves: a southern half whose governors have primarily maritime concerns, like conquering and keeping pacified the great breadbasket of Sicily (now Carthage’s breadbasket), combating pirates and maintaining orderly trade routes to the east; and a northern half, possibly governed from somehwere in Etruria, concerned with keeping the land route through the Alps open and maintaining good relations with the Gauls, who remain a major source of manpower. Colonies of Gallic and Iberian soldiers, who eventually become culturally “Italo-Gallic” or “Italo-Iberian,” would potentially become commonplace throughout the peninsula as rewards to the Gallic forces who made the conquest possible.

In Carthage, the war would leave any surviving Barcids as a hugely dominant political force, at least in its immediate aftermath. Historically, after the Carthaginian defeat, Hannibal undertook reforms in Carthage informed by his exposure to the Roman political system during his years in Italy; conquest often leads to some synthesis with the conquered, and in victory it’s quite possible that Hannibal would do the same thing, especially since the Carthaginian oligarchs came close to losing the war for him. All will not be sweetness and light, as this might eventually spark a backlash and lead to some sort of tragic end for Hannibal – who knows but his epitaph might wind up reading, as Scipio Africanus’ did historically, “ungrateful Fatherland, you shall not even have my bones” – but the overall trend in the Mediterranean world was toward synthesis of political and military and religious systems, toward states taking up what worked best from friend and foe alike and unsentimentally putting it to use. So in the long run the Carthaginian system would probably wind up assimilating features, like the manipulation of citizenship to shore up political allegiance, that had once been characteristically Roman; this would be the only way to keep Italian possessions quiescent in the long run. Latin and Hellenistic cult and philosophy would find homes at Carthage, which was already enthusiastically engaged with the latter before the war. With Italy and Spain as possessions, if no doubt periodically restive ones, there is also very little doubt that Carthage goes on to conquer the remainder of the Mediterranean world and probably of Gaul, just as Rome did (although some of the dynamics may be different, since the Gauls are treasured allies of Carthage rather than traditional enemies).

The Carthaginian Empire propagates the Punic (“Canaanite” as they’d see it) language and culture throughout its nearby possessions, leading to a wide variety of Punic dialects in Iberia, north and south Italy, Sicily, Corsica, Gaul, and nearby North Africa. Likely it is no more able than the Roman Empire was to displace Greek as the lingua franca of the East. Also, the influxes of great wealth that come with conquest are just as likely to unbalance the Carthaginian republic as they did the Roman one, so eventually Carthage will evolve counterparts to the Roman Emperors and will face challenges similar to those that they faced, like an eventual volkervanderung from Germany.

Overall this TL is a long shot -- Carthage lost historically because structurally, its empire was more fragile than Rome's, and countering a structural deficiency like that isn't easy -- but it's not outside the realm of possibility.
 
I've thought about the common Carthaginian Victory what-if over the years, and here's what I came up with:

More siege weapons and elephants are unlikely to have carried the war for Hannibal, and given how amazing it was for Hannibal to pull off the crossing he managed historically, a POD that makes this improbable feat even more improbable might not be the strongest. What he needed to take Rome were conventional reinforcements, the kind that would have made it possible to firm up his Italian league and complete the prying-away of Rome from its local allies that he came within an ace of achieving through sheer tactical brilliance.

As it happens, the Carthaginians had a golden historical opportunity to permanently swing the Italian war in Hannibal’s favor. It came in 211 BC, when the Barcids Hasdrubal and Mago along with Hasdrubal Gisco decisively defeated the Scipii in Spain. The war at this point teetered on the issue of initiative; if Carthage moved quickly enough to reinforce the Italian front, Rome was done for. If Rome successfully reinforced the Spanish front, OTOH, they could continue hammering at the Iberian possessions that were the key to Carthage’s economy. Historically, the divided command of the Carthaginians led to dithering, and it was the Romans who seized the initiative. When the future Scipio Africanus took Carthago Nova, it was the beginning of the end.

Is it possible to craft a timeline where Hasdrubal Barca manages to unite the Iberian forces under his command and launch an invasion of Italy in support of Hannibal? Such a development would probably spring primarily from tactical exigencies, like the exertion of authority needed in the wake of the battle to keep the 8,000 Roman survivors from escaping (as they did historically). If Hasdrubal managed it, and subsequently persuaded his brother and Gisco that ultimate glory would come from storming to Hannibal’s aid without delay, then this teetering moment of historical initiative falls in Carthage’s favor.

The key here, though, is that the initiative must come from the Iberian commanders and be presented as a fait accompli to the Carthaginian Senate. The one constant of the war was that this Senate never understood the validity of Hannibal’s strategic vision, and was so loath to risk exposing the Iberian possessions that they wound up losing them by over-caution. So, could the Iberian command effectively “revolt” and strike out to join with Hannibal? I think yes, theoretically. The way the Iberian campaigns played out and the very fact of Hannibal’s war in Italy indicates that Carthaginian nobles, much like their Roman counterparts, could and did endeavor to shape their domestic political destinies by acting on their own initiative in the field.

If they failed, of course, Iberia would be lost along with the Italian front and they would face treason charges and crucifixion. It’s probable that the historical caution of Hasdrubal Gisco and Mago stemmed from this... and also potentially from a knowledge of the inner workings of Carthaginian Senatorial politics that’s now lost to us. But ahhh, if they won, if they won... the prospect of unimaginable wealth, immortal glory, and virtual political untouchability might be theirs. I don’t think it’s too outlandish to imagine a great man of this era being tempted by the prospect of having his name written in the book of history alongside others, like Hannibal himself, who were busy carving out their own legends before the eyes of the world.

If they did decide to go, it would mark a concerted effort at reinforcing Hannibal a full two years earlier than happened IRL. These are two extremely crucial years, because the advancement of the timeline means that instead of deploying to Spain, a talented young commander like Publius Cornelius Scipio is required in Italy to fight the concerted assault of the “sons of the Thunderbolt.” His critical seizure of New Carthage therefore doesn’t happen.

Hasdrubal and Mago might decide on a kind of “pincer” invasion, with Hasdrubal going via the Alps as he did historically – the way had been eased by Hannibal – and Mago going by sea from Minorca, as he did historically. Both actions happening at once in 210 presents a major challenge to the Romans. What likely happens is that the 20,000-strong force that reinforced Hispania IRL is sent against Hasdrubal instead – perhaps even under the command of Publius Cornelius Scipio – while the remainder of Roman power is flung into the task not only of continuing to harass Hannibal, but now of keeping a considerable force under Mago and Hasdrubal Gisco from joining up with him. The results of all this are something of a crapshoot. The most favorable plausible scenario for the Carthaginians is that, although, Hasdrubal winds up dead at the hands of Publius Cornelius Scipio – Hasdrubal, while capable, was not Hannibal’s tactical match, but Scipio was – events in the south swing firmly in their favor. Marcus Claudius Marcellus winds up just as dead as he did historically by 209, but now also loses his army in open battle. With more than 15,000 men worth of reinforcements now at his disposal, Hannibal can march on Rome and forces from the north will need to be recalled to face him. What ensues is a bitter epic struggle between Scipio and Hannibal – but now on Italian soil, with Rome’s allies deserting her in a steady stream and Carthaginian reinforcements periodically arriving from Iberia, through southern Gaul and from Numidia. Scipio would be hailed as a third founder of Rome just for being able to check the Carthaginians, kill Hannibal and return affairs to the status quo ante; in that event he’d likely spend a good deal of time re-pacifying Rome’s Italian allies, and further expeditions against Carthage would be out of the question. It’s just as possible, however, that he himself winds up slain before the walls of Rome, which itself is sacked.

Alternately, the Carthaginian commanders might take the Alpine route together, arriving en masse in Northern Italy. This is possibly a better scenario for the Carthaginians, who with a force this size could realistically fight their way down from the north to join Hannibal in an assault on Rome. OTOH if a Roman army found a way to eke out a victory here – again the X-factor of Publius Cornelius Scipio raises its head – the Italian venture could indeed come to nothing. Hasdrubal and Mago could survive together... or could both wind up dead in a single engagement. Again, the outcome is something of a crapshoot, but a scenario favorable to the Carthaginians is just as likely as a scenario adverse to them.

If either sort of favorable scenario comes about, the Roman capacity for resistance is not infinite. Eventually its ability to raise armies will be crippled and its ties to its allies broken, as in fact began to happen after the Battle of Cannae historically; the early advent of Carthaginian reinforcements merely bolsters the existing trend and, in a victorious scenario, renders it irreversible. What happens when Rome is finally forced to capitulate – one way of rapidly bringing this about would be to pull down the aqueducts – is probably not unlike what happened to Carthage. Likely Rome is sacked, forced to pay a crippling indemnity, and has its further political and military activity subjected to the compulsory scrutiny of the Carthaginian Senate. Many disillusioned Romans probably abandon the city. If there are attempts to revive Roman power as a challenge to Carthaginian injustices toward or abuses of the Italian allies – which injustices are likely to happen just as they happened with the Romans – then Rome probably winds up razed and abandoned, with a Carthaginian colony built on its ruins. It’s possible this happens even if Rome provides no provocation; no doubt Carthage will have its own vindictive Cato the Censors.

At any rate Rome is surely finished as the heart of Italian power. If it continues to exist at all it will be as a diminished, politically irrelevant town haunted by past glories and dreams of what might have been, overshadowed by monuments to the glorious victory of the “sons of the Thunderbolt.” Rome’s poets, dramatists, orators and politicians are largely forgotten except in such patches as are preserved by association with the war of conquest, or except as their achievements are assimilated – with acknowledgment or without – to Punic literature. Geographic exigencies would likely prompt Carthaginian victors to split Italy into two halves: a southern half whose governors have primarily maritime concerns, like conquering and keeping pacified the great breadbasket of Sicily (now Carthage’s breadbasket), combating pirates and maintaining orderly trade routes to the east; and a northern half, possibly governed from somehwere in Etruria, concerned with keeping the land route through the Alps open and maintaining good relations with the Gauls, who remain a major source of manpower. Colonies of Gallic and Iberian soldiers, who eventually become culturally “Italo-Gallic” or “Italo-Iberian,” would potentially become commonplace throughout the peninsula as rewards to the Gallic forces who made the conquest possible.

In Carthage, the war would leave any surviving Barcids as a hugely dominant political force, at least in its immediate aftermath. Historically, after the Carthaginian defeat, Hannibal undertook reforms in Carthage informed by his exposure to the Roman political system during his years in Italy; conquest often leads to some synthesis with the conquered, and in victory it’s quite possible that Hannibal would do the same thing, especially since the Carthaginian oligarchs came close to losing the war for him. All will not be sweetness and light, as this might eventually spark a backlash and lead to some sort of tragic end for Hannibal – who knows but his epitaph might wind up reading, as Scipio Africanus’ did historically, “ungrateful Fatherland, you shall not even have my bones” – but the overall trend in the Mediterranean world was toward synthesis of political and military and religious systems, toward states taking up what worked best from friend and foe alike and unsentimentally putting it to use. So in the long run the Carthaginian system would probably wind up assimilating features, like the manipulation of citizenship to shore up political allegiance, that had once been characteristically Roman; this would be the only way to keep Italian possessions quiescent in the long run. Latin and Hellenistic cult and philosophy would find homes at Carthage, which was already enthusiastically engaged with the latter before the war. With Italy and Spain as possessions, if no doubt periodically restive ones, there is also very little doubt that Carthage goes on to conquer the remainder of the Mediterranean world and probably of Gaul, just as Rome did (although some of the dynamics may be different, since the Gauls are treasured allies of Carthage rather than traditional enemies).

A very sharp analysis on the second punic war, BobDobolina, and welcome aboard. :D I've come to similar conclusions myself (I'm also working on a Punic War TL, and I've been doing research on that issue), especially in regard for how crucial the Hispanic theatre of war was for the outcome. I only have one tiny nitpick...

The Carthaginian Empire propagates the Punic (“Canaanite” as they’d see it) language and culture throughout its nearby possessions, leading to a wide variety of Punic dialects in Iberia, north and south Italy, Sicily, Corsica, Gaul, and nearby North Africa. Likely it is no more able than the Roman Empire was to displace Greek as the lingua franca of the East. Also, the influxes of great wealth that come with conquest are just as likely to unbalance the Carthaginian republic as they did the Roman one, so eventually Carthage will evolve counterparts to the Roman Emperors and will face challenges similar to those that they faced, like an eventual volkervanderung from Germany.

Overall this TL is a long shot -- Carthage lost historically because structurally, its empire was more fragile than Rome's, and countering a structural deficiency like that isn't easy -- but it's not outside the realm of possibility.

First off, "Germany" didn't exist yet (I admit that this is a linguistic problem in English because people on this board regularly mess up German and Germanic ;) ), so it's more appropriate to talk of "Germania Magna" (which is the Roman term for the area, even though it would obviously not be used in a TL where the Carthaginians emerged victorious).

Secondly, I would argue that the Migration Period (at least in a recognizable form) would be butterflied away in the absence of Rome, since many of the factors that promoted it were indeed caused by Rome itself. I also don't think that the Carthaginians would strive to distribute the Punic language in the same manner as the Romans pressed Latin upon defeated people. Bear in mind that in many respects of their attitudes, Carthaginians and Romans were diametrically opposed.

EDIT: Oh yes, and it's spelled "Völkerwanderung" (or "Voelkerwanderung" in absence of umlauts on your keyboard ;) )
 
A very sharp analysis on the second punic war, BobDobolina, and welcome aboard.

Cheers, and thanks for your comments.

Secondly, I would argue that the Migration Period (at least in a recognizable form) would be butterflied away in the absence of Rome, since many of the factors that promoted it were indeed caused by Rome itself.
If true, this would be interesting indeed. I'm not really up on scholarship about the "barbarian invasions" aspects of the late Empire, I'll confess. Which factors do you have in mind, and why do you think they'd play out differently for Carthage?

(Sorry for the butchering of Germania-related terminology, BTW!)

I also don't think that the Carthaginians would strive to distribute the Punic language in the same manner as the Romans pressed Latin upon defeated people.
Fair point, and I don't see the Carthaginians going about it in the same way, either. The vectors of dissemination might be different; it might prove to be a more organic process resulting simply from the natural advantages of a prestige-language at the apex of the political order, and in which most trade and international relations would be conducted. An analogue might be the later spread of Islam and Arabic in North Africa and Spain, in which the Arab conquerors didn't force anyone to take on their language or religion, but (to simplify a bit) took over the highest spot on the pyramid and made their way the most convenient one. [EDIT: Note, however, that according to some scholars the Romans didn't have a language "policy" so much as just a basic attitude that the only truly functional languages were Latin and Greek. Cf. Bela Adamik's Language Policy in the Roman Empire.]

As I theorize about Carthage picking up a trick or two from Rome, I'm sort of condensing what would be a long and complicated and conflict-fraught process whose ultimate extent and details I will readily admit to being unclear on. I do think in the long run the thing that Carthage would cling to most would be the exclusivity of full citizenship (assuming it remained tax-exempt and provided an industrial and naval workforce). However, inasmuch as Carthaginian hegemony historically featured a grab-bag of political techniques that ranged from heavy exaction of tribute and close centralized control, to loose treaty deals and client-state relationships, to Roman Republic-style alliance-and-tribute systems, I do think it's likely that a Carthage in control of Italy will pick up and probably generalize some Roman-style techniques. My postulated Hannibalid reforms wouldn't be the totality of that process, just the beginning of it, the seed that lends the idea credibility and prestige by association with the great man.
 
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