The US Navy Keeps its Big Guns - the Battleships stay active
- Thread starter TheMann
- Start date
No, the belief is sound. What you need to do is come up with a scenario that allows for the construction of several NEW ships in the 1960s. There are any number of tactical situations where a big gun ship of modern design is very useful.
An example of changes that a modern design could utilize beyond that of nuclear power is a 16" or 18" version of the Mark 16 8"/RF gun deployed on the Des Moines class cruisers. That would, by itself, allow for a significant reduction in crew size, as would nuclear power instead of oil burners. Other pieces of automation would also allow for reduction in the most expensive piece of battleship operation, the pay of the men aboard (do the math sometime, the long term cash obligation to each enlisted sailor is huge, with an even greater cost for the officers).
The overall idea is interesting, it just needs to be rethought.
Perhaps something along the lines of the monitors the RN had using the 15" gun. They weighed in at 9,000 tons had 2x15", 8x4"QF and as many 40mm bofors as they could squeeze on. The were well armoured and could deliver long range fire accurately. Built on modern lines a ship of that nature could provide useful fire support for a fleet.
^ But how would Congress stomach new ships? Vietnam is a possibility for a reason for them, but in OTL they just sent out New Jersey for a tour and forgot about it after that.
I was thinking the 1980s might be a possibility too, with the Kirovs making their appearance and Reagan's 600 ship Navy.
I was thinking the 1980s might be a possibility too, with the Kirovs making their appearance and Reagan's 600 ship Navy.
OK, how about having Long Beach be successful, and as the Des Moines class wear out (which was early-mid 60s), have the USN decide they need new gun cruisers to support troops in Vietnam.
But this problem has a flaw - the 8-inch guns are too weak to hit very far inland. Could the USN develop a 10 or 12 inch gun, or could they simply figure out how to use the Mark 7 on a newer vessel?
But this problem has a flaw - the 8-inch guns are too weak to hit very far inland. Could the USN develop a 10 or 12 inch gun, or could they simply figure out how to use the Mark 7 on a newer vessel?
Agree. Tried to write something somewhat similar here, dunno if I even continue it some day.
https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=93778&highlight=jukra
Personally I think that 8" gun would be the maximum size that new type gun would be developed, similar to OTL Mark 71:
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_8-55_mk71.htm
Why? For longer distances I'd say that solid fuel rockets for fire support role and ASM missiles for anti-ship role have better bang for buck.
As for larger surface ships a doctrine needs to be developed but it's not perhaps not as fanciful as it sounds. What we need is a different take on problems of early 1950's: a naval force which can take part in regional conflicts, act against Soviet fast submarines and take part in strategic nuclear strikes.
The historical solution was refurbishment of old WW II ships to newer roles with FRAM-program for USN destroyers, modernization of old cruisers as missile ships and modernization of Essex-class carriers for ASW and attack roles.
What we need is more forethought on economics of this modernization problem. The WW II ships were hugely expensive in terms of manpower compared to operational value they brought. Additionally, their hulls were often old and had limited service time left. Take for example Gearing-class. It had complement of some 336 men and the ships were modernized during late 1950's. At the same time newer Farragut-class had similar complement but vastly more combat power and room for modernization. Essentially we need a change of thought from quantity to quality.
After this move we can ponder whether the original concept for USS Long Beach could be viable: the cruiser as a single unit capable of offense and defense prowling the seas. Against subs it would have as it's defense both it's tremendous speed and perhaps a load of helicopters, against surface targets a load of missiles, against air targets long-range air defense system which would be networked via NTDS to others ships. To search out targets it would have tremendously effective radar powered by nuclear power.
Then, if it's 1960's, one could contemplate radar-guided Talon-missiles (from ship or by airborne FAC / ground based FO) for this specific task. Would have range of some 200km's. If you want longer range then maybe a ship launched MGM-31 Pershing would be an option. It would have some 740km's range.
Pattern, even with individual gun muzzle velocity radars etc. with 16" guns was about 200 meters. Even with pre-GPS pre-active radar guidance similar accuracy could be reached with ballistic missiles provided they were not fired blind.
Not perhaps alone, but as a part of NTDS networked force. As a concept, how about this one, from front to the back, as a 1960's force:
1.) SSN / SSK patrols for early ASW sweeps and recon. Sporadically linked to NTDS via comms byous with satellite communication.
2.) Battleships/cruisers working as individual strike units and also as forward ASW/AD screen units. Additionally supported by AEW/ASW provided by CVS farther back. These units additionally have about 6 S-61's each for ASW coverage. Ships linked to each other with satellite communication.
3.) CVS providing support for forward deployed forces. Primary support assets would be AEW and ASW aircraft. CVS would also provide close defense for fleet train, from which battleships/cruisers could refurbish in turns.
The idea would be that expenditure for larger CVA's would be smaller as CVS level carrier would be enough to support cruiser/battleship forward strike force.
There were a number of notions in the 1960s for a Amphibious Fire Support Ship, or LFS.
It is out of some of that work that the OTL Mk 71 developed.
Earlier thoughts were for a ship with 1-2 new 8" guns, a number of the new rapid fire 5" twin mounts (never entered service), some rocket launchers a la Carronade and various missiles and rockets, including one called Sea Lance.
There was some tentative exploration of a 12" weapon. I'll have to dig out my copy of Friedman's US Amphibious Ships and Craft if anyone is interested on more detail. IIRC, there are was an extensive chapter regarding the LFS development.
However, even that failed due to cost, lack of an immediate need, doctrinal issues and the continued presence of WW2 ships.
In terms of any new battleships, there is unfortunately no chance of any new construction - they simply cost too much, took too many men, didn't bring anything really necessary to the force equation, were extremely vulnerable against missiles, subs and aircraft and were viewed as obsolete in the face of the capabilities aircraft and missiles to do the job they once did.
It would be far better to channel any funds from battleships into develop of a 175mm or 8" gun capable of being deployed on half a dozen LFS type vessels, along with the DX/Spruance class.
8" could go fairly far inland, particularly with new types of ammunition being developed and tested under Project Gunfighter and other goings on at the time.
Now, in the 1950s, given a lot more money, the BBG/BG conversions may go a little further, but still fail. Problem there is Polaris taking a lot of funds and that most of the more useful conversion plans resulted in the ships losing their main gun armament, which is all that sets them aside from a missile cruiser, really.
Even then, economies of scale kick in - one can get a lot more DLGs that can be in a lot more places than one BBG, and they can basically carry all the necessary SAMs.
Further back now, to the 1940s. Have Stalin be a little less indecisive about his Ocean Going Navy plan, and have him actually get down at least 4 Pr.24s, along with a number of Pr.82s (later modified into 82Rs). Add in a few Pr.66s and there might, just might, be a chance for battleships sticking around a bit longer; have him live to 1955/56 to see it's completion.
There is a window of opportunity when the necessary all-weather attack aircraft could not operate off carriers in all locations, so that battleships may still have a role 'way up North'. But it is a very small window.
Balanced against that possibility are a fair few things, though: The Soviets being able to afford the massive expense of a fleet programme, along with all other costs; the most likely Western response is simply to keep a few more carriers about, given their huge superiority there; all of the major research and development was not going into guns, but into aircraft launched weapons capable of sinking any ships - in the USSR, US and Britain.
Another decade back, to the 1930s. Changing how WW2 works out could extend the life of the battleship for a little while, but that involves a lot of fiddling and points of departure. Reduce the impact of aircraft, of carriers, delay development of guided bombs and heavily delay the development of atomic weapons. All of those factors play a part in killing off battleships in the late 40s and 50s.
There is the influence of the 1920s, with the impact of the Washington Treaty and the 'freezing' of development of the ships for quite some time. In some cases, the capabilities for efficient construction, gun pits and armour manufacture took quite a beating.
Having them perform as mooted in the Great War could help them a little, at least in starting butterflies.
Finally, going back to the turn of the century and the Belle Epoque, if we delay the development of aircraft, it can add a few more years onto the capital ship.
But to have a realistic situation where battleships remain in service, we need a combination of almost all of these factors; the battleship was already facing the harbinger of it's destruction in it's seeming heyday of 1900. I haven't been able to figure out an effective post-1900 without adding ASBs with a steampunk fetish; I finally gave up on that POD and started afresh with an entirely new world.
On a few other points, nuclear powerplants are not the best idea. This is a ship going to go into danger, close in to shore. The armoured belt is not in the best place to stop modern missiles (and by modern we mean post 1950, when the first Soviet shaped charge AShMs start to appear, with one of their purposes being killing Western BBs) or modern torpedoes.
The design and organization of the ship isn't optimum compared to more modern ships in terms of shock resistance.
However, the main point here is that putting a nuclear reactor or four in a place where people are going to be shooting at it and bombing it is not the most sensible of options.
Furthermore, cutting up the ship to gut out the powerplant is going to involve a lot of work, expense and damage to the armour scheme.
Reducing the crew carries with it issues of damage control, maintenance of systems and the smooth functioning of the ship. Some reductions may be possible.
Finally, the speeds are a bit optimistic as others have said. Check out this discussion for more on that issue:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-028.htm
It is out of some of that work that the OTL Mk 71 developed.
Earlier thoughts were for a ship with 1-2 new 8" guns, a number of the new rapid fire 5" twin mounts (never entered service), some rocket launchers a la Carronade and various missiles and rockets, including one called Sea Lance.
There was some tentative exploration of a 12" weapon. I'll have to dig out my copy of Friedman's US Amphibious Ships and Craft if anyone is interested on more detail. IIRC, there are was an extensive chapter regarding the LFS development.
However, even that failed due to cost, lack of an immediate need, doctrinal issues and the continued presence of WW2 ships.
In terms of any new battleships, there is unfortunately no chance of any new construction - they simply cost too much, took too many men, didn't bring anything really necessary to the force equation, were extremely vulnerable against missiles, subs and aircraft and were viewed as obsolete in the face of the capabilities aircraft and missiles to do the job they once did.
It would be far better to channel any funds from battleships into develop of a 175mm or 8" gun capable of being deployed on half a dozen LFS type vessels, along with the DX/Spruance class.
8" could go fairly far inland, particularly with new types of ammunition being developed and tested under Project Gunfighter and other goings on at the time.
Now, in the 1950s, given a lot more money, the BBG/BG conversions may go a little further, but still fail. Problem there is Polaris taking a lot of funds and that most of the more useful conversion plans resulted in the ships losing their main gun armament, which is all that sets them aside from a missile cruiser, really.
Even then, economies of scale kick in - one can get a lot more DLGs that can be in a lot more places than one BBG, and they can basically carry all the necessary SAMs.
Further back now, to the 1940s. Have Stalin be a little less indecisive about his Ocean Going Navy plan, and have him actually get down at least 4 Pr.24s, along with a number of Pr.82s (later modified into 82Rs). Add in a few Pr.66s and there might, just might, be a chance for battleships sticking around a bit longer; have him live to 1955/56 to see it's completion.
There is a window of opportunity when the necessary all-weather attack aircraft could not operate off carriers in all locations, so that battleships may still have a role 'way up North'. But it is a very small window.
Balanced against that possibility are a fair few things, though: The Soviets being able to afford the massive expense of a fleet programme, along with all other costs; the most likely Western response is simply to keep a few more carriers about, given their huge superiority there; all of the major research and development was not going into guns, but into aircraft launched weapons capable of sinking any ships - in the USSR, US and Britain.
Another decade back, to the 1930s. Changing how WW2 works out could extend the life of the battleship for a little while, but that involves a lot of fiddling and points of departure. Reduce the impact of aircraft, of carriers, delay development of guided bombs and heavily delay the development of atomic weapons. All of those factors play a part in killing off battleships in the late 40s and 50s.
There is the influence of the 1920s, with the impact of the Washington Treaty and the 'freezing' of development of the ships for quite some time. In some cases, the capabilities for efficient construction, gun pits and armour manufacture took quite a beating.
Having them perform as mooted in the Great War could help them a little, at least in starting butterflies.
Finally, going back to the turn of the century and the Belle Epoque, if we delay the development of aircraft, it can add a few more years onto the capital ship.
But to have a realistic situation where battleships remain in service, we need a combination of almost all of these factors; the battleship was already facing the harbinger of it's destruction in it's seeming heyday of 1900. I haven't been able to figure out an effective post-1900 without adding ASBs with a steampunk fetish; I finally gave up on that POD and started afresh with an entirely new world.
On a few other points, nuclear powerplants are not the best idea. This is a ship going to go into danger, close in to shore. The armoured belt is not in the best place to stop modern missiles (and by modern we mean post 1950, when the first Soviet shaped charge AShMs start to appear, with one of their purposes being killing Western BBs) or modern torpedoes.
The design and organization of the ship isn't optimum compared to more modern ships in terms of shock resistance.
However, the main point here is that putting a nuclear reactor or four in a place where people are going to be shooting at it and bombing it is not the most sensible of options.
Furthermore, cutting up the ship to gut out the powerplant is going to involve a lot of work, expense and damage to the armour scheme.
Reducing the crew carries with it issues of damage control, maintenance of systems and the smooth functioning of the ship. Some reductions may be possible.
Finally, the speeds are a bit optimistic as others have said. Check out this discussion for more on that issue:
http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-028.htm
Friedman's book chapter "Fire Support Revisited" from U.S. Amphibious Ships and Crafts seems to be available via books.google.com, so check it out! It also discusses 12" gun program etc.
I dug the volume out of my rather disorganized shelves, and have it with me now. Makes for interesting reading and some good pictures.
burmafrd
Banned
I think you are off Cal on your accuracy figures for the 16".
I do believe the real number is about half.
The ability to take out hardened bunkers really only came about in the last 20 years-missiles did not have the punch and even the bombs we tried were not accurate enough or have the penetration power. It was only in the years just before desert storm that we got the ability. So through the 70's gunfire support would have been very viable.
Also you are giving the BB's a little less then their due as regarding taking punishment from modern weapons- no naval weapons are currently designed to penetrate more then a few inches of armor plate.
The Russians were VERY worried about the Iowa Class when we brought them back in the 80's= they scrambled to figure out how to take them out.
I do believe the real number is about half.
The ability to take out hardened bunkers really only came about in the last 20 years-missiles did not have the punch and even the bombs we tried were not accurate enough or have the penetration power. It was only in the years just before desert storm that we got the ability. So through the 70's gunfire support would have been very viable.
Also you are giving the BB's a little less then their due as regarding taking punishment from modern weapons- no naval weapons are currently designed to penetrate more then a few inches of armor plate.
The Russians were VERY worried about the Iowa Class when we brought them back in the 80's= they scrambled to figure out how to take them out.
Taking out hardened bunkers - not meaning underground complexes but just well fortified positions - was before the era of LGB's basically a job for direct fire. Either in form of flamethrowers, tank guns, artillery or ATGM's. Indirect means included "stitching" (? I don't know a term in English for it, basically firing with single heavy gun, correcting first the shot in lateral view, then increasing and decreasing range until destruction fire could be made) and very few tactical missiles, such as Lacrosse. (preferably with nuclear warhead).
But, IMHO, if resources were spent, the missile technology of 1960's would be up to the task. One could well use shipborne radar to guide missile into basket and then FO / FAC could handle the rest. Not as surgically as with LGB's, but well enough.
I've heard the claim but never seen the source. First off, torpedoes of 1980's were all equipped with effective magnetic fuzes. I very much doubt ability of any ship, spare supertankers and USN CV's, to survive a single hit without at very least a total mobility kill. Second, as CalBear wrote, Russian ASM's had a shaped charge warhead. Without going to details, a modern ATGM's have shaped charge warhead weight of some 6kg's. They can damage or kill modern tanks which have more and better armor than battleships.
Now, SS-N-2 Styx, a small oldie, had a shaped charge warhead weight of some 450kg's. SS-N-19 of Oscar-II's had shaped charge warhead weight of some 750kg's...
On top of what has been offered by Jukra to counter the old chestnuts about no weapons being able to penetrate the armour belt of the battleships or the Soviets being greatly worried to the point of distraction over their reactivation, there are a few other salient points.
Not only the 1950s Styx and subsequent AShMs had shaped charge warheads capable of penetrating the armour scheme, but also air launched weapons of similar capability. These in many cases would not necessarily hit the redundant side belt, but hit the superstructure or deck. It does not matter how much armour is sported on the belt if the ship has been mission-killed by destruction of fire control, radars and communications.
The belt is also utterly redundant not only against the 650mm heavyweight torpedoes but also standard sized modern weapons; the battleships were actually worse off than subsequent post-war vessels against the shock of an under the keel explosion.
This is without using atomic warheads on the torpedos or AShMs.
Not only the 1950s Styx and subsequent AShMs had shaped charge warheads capable of penetrating the armour scheme, but also air launched weapons of similar capability. These in many cases would not necessarily hit the redundant side belt, but hit the superstructure or deck. It does not matter how much armour is sported on the belt if the ship has been mission-killed by destruction of fire control, radars and communications.
The belt is also utterly redundant not only against the 650mm heavyweight torpedoes but also standard sized modern weapons; the battleships were actually worse off than subsequent post-war vessels against the shock of an under the keel explosion.
This is without using atomic warheads on the torpedos or AShMs.
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Even more reason to use smaller ships, such as the monitors I mentioned, to mount large calibre guns for shore bombardment.
These big enough?
Ah, the Roberts class. The monitors built with a turret from a WWI battleship. That would indeed solve the bigger hammer problem, but how do you make such a weapon work on most oceangoing naval warfare vessels?
Briefly, you can't, they were purpose built. However they were ocean going deep water vessels. They were not expensive ships to build or man and quite capable of defending themselves from air or surface attack, what ship short of a BB was going to take on those big hammers?
With more modern propulsion and electronics monitors or amphibious fire support ships(LFS), as they call them today, would be extremely useful vessels in. Look how many of them the RN had when they were policing the seas in the late 19th and early 20th century.
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