The US Develops Skipbombing before Pearl Harbor

Historically US airforce bombers were very close to useless against enemy shipping in the early months of the Pacific War. Their doctrine was designed for strategic bombing, and it didn't translate well to attacking enemy ships.

By 1943, various parts of the airforce developed more effective tactics, coming in low and skipping bombs off the water into enemy ships. General Kenny, the guy arguably behind the development of skip-bombing, had actually experimented with the technique in the 1920s, but the strategic bombing orientation of the airforce apparently kept the technique from going beyond experiments. The British and Australians experimented with the technique early in the war, with some success, but the US had lagged behind.

So, what if sometime in late 1940, with Japan becoming more belligerent and the US trying to figure out how to defend the Philippines, General Kenny manages to convince the right people that using bombers in skip-bombing raids is a key to holding off the Japanese. A group of B17 pilots are trained in the tactics. Maybe their planes are modified so that they have more forward-facing 50 cals to suppress anti-aircraft fire from the ships. The group is then sent to the Philippines as part of the buildup of the US airpower there.

So, what happens then? Historically, much of the B17 force in the Philippines got caught on the ground the day after Pearl Harbor. That might still happen, though given a different mission that's not a given. The planes involved would undoubtedly be flying in an environment of Japanese air superiority, which would make attacks where Japanese fighters were around costly. On the other hand, B17s that could actually sink enemy ships could dominate a large area around the Philippines.

How does this play out, both in the Philippines and in subsequent battles through the first year of the war?
 
I think you're going to have to drop a lot of bombs which then miss a lot of targets before enough people and enough of the right people abandon their beliefs in high level "precision" bombing. One man of whatever rank making the argument isn't going to be enough.

All those bombs dropped and all those targets missed could occur during peacetime training missions but, as with what happened with USN torpedoes, you're going to need lots of reports from lots of "live" drops to overcome the institutional inertia at the heart of the problem.

While having Midway-based B-17s skip bombing the Kido Butai on June 4th, 1942 sounds great, getting enough peoples' minds changed early enough along is the real problem here.
 
The planes involved would undoubtedly be flying in an environment of Japanese air superiority, which would make attacks where Japanese fighters were around costly.
I actually think it may even work the other way around.
The Japanese fighters of 1941 (primarily the Zero) were severely hampered by not having adequate cannons and would thus have major problems in downing B17s.
 

CalBear

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Bigger issue than enemy fighters is the aircraft itself.

While the B-25 wasn't exactly a sports car it was far more maneuverable than the B-17, especially the "C" & "D" Models available at the time. The B-17 had a wingspan pushing 104 feet and was 74 feet long while a B-25 wingspan was only 67.5 feet and it was 57 feet long. The B-25 was also better than 50 MPH faster, had better acceleration, and was, ironically, almost as well armed as the vaunted Flying Fortress (B-25B 1 .30 and 4 .50, B-17D 1 .30 and 6 .50, neither aircraft had a tail gunner).

Perhaps the classic example of the B-25's remarkable handiness is the 400 foot take-off by the Doolittle Raiders (something achieved on the ground as well as on the 30 knot carrier) with a fully laden aircraft (the Raider aircraft had been lightened by removal of armor, but the weight was replaced by additional fuel, both in an additional fuel tanks and in 5 gallon cans that were poured into the centerline tank during flight).
 
So we have an airframe not suited for a tactic that no one in the late 1941 USAAF has yet seen the utility for?

The hurdle is getting higher...

The Germans did some pioneering work on this during the Spanish Civil War... perhaps the USN sends some observers who catch a "Swedish turnip attack" in action and get enthralled by the idea (although I don't know if anyone in the USAF or the USN had the necessary sway to push that type of idea through a la Ernst Udet)
 
The Germans did some pioneering work on this during the Spanish Civil War... perhaps the USN...

The USN doesn't operate multi-engine bombers and it's dive bombers perform their jobs very well already.

(although I don't know if anyone in the USAF or the USN had the necessary sway to push that type of idea through a la Ernst Udet)
Considering the constant warfare between the War and Navy Departments, can you really see the US Army Air Force gladly accepting advice from the Navy?

I can see some bright light in the USAAF observing the early German tactics and bringing the idea back as a way for the Army to screw another job and the money that come with it out of the Navy. There was a primitive strategic defense "triad" of sorts at work in the 1930s and early 40s with coastal defense carved up into various roles and then assigned to either War or Navy. (It's one of the primary reasons the 1942 Happy Time off the US East Coast occurred.)

Of course the Navy will then fight the Army getting another "bombing over water" job tooth and nail.
 
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The USN doesn't operate multi-engine bombers and it's dive bombers perform their jobs very well already.

Considering the constant warfare between the War and Navy Departments, can you really see the US Army Air Force gladly accepting advice from the Navy?

I can see some bright light in the USAAF observing the early German tactics and bringing the idea back as a way for the Army to screw another job and the money that come with it out of the Navy. There was a primitive strategic defense "triad" of sorts at work in the 1930s and early 40s with coastal defense carved up into various roles and then assigned to either War or Navy. (It's one of the primary reasons the 1942 Happy Time off the US East Coast occurred.)

Of course the Navy will then fight the Army getting another "bombing over water" job tooth and nail.


The Germans did the Swedish Turnip attacks with a number of different aircraft (including the HE-51 single engined fighter... although the overwhelming majority where with DO-17's and HE-111's later in the war)... your probably right that AF would have to be the prime mover. The OP only called for the US (not a specific branch) to have the technique in the arsenal

Given that it was being experimented with, with observable results 5 years before, its not utterly impossible for the US to observe and adopt the method (it could follow a track like the tank corps reorganization following the battle of france)
 
... your probably right that AF would have to be the prime mover.


I replaced the USN in you suggestion with the USAAF for a few reasons. First, the USAAF will be operating the aircraft which can undertake the role.

Second, the USN already has an effective bombing tactic and a history of aircraft designed to employ that tactic. The idea of adding a new tactic to the USN bag of tricks which USN planes are not optimized for in return for the unproven benefits the tactic may provide increases the chances that the USN will ignore what it sees.

Third, and most importantly, the USAAF could see skip bombing as a way to fuck the Navy out of more combat roles and the funding which comes with them. We need a carrot more immediate than "Maybe we can kill Japanese ships with this in the future".

The OP only called for the US (not a specific branch) to have the technique in the arsenal.
He certainly did. You suggested a method by which the concept could be transmitted and I suggested a better participant for that method. Nothing more.

Given that it was being experimented with, with observable results 5 years before, its not utterly impossible for the US to observe and adopt the method (it could follow a track like the tank corps reorganization following the battle of france)
Agreed, although what the US Army observed in 1940 France didn't always bear fruit. Remember what you've taught me about tank destroyers? :)
 
I replaced the USN in you suggestion with the USAAF for a few reasons. First, the USAAF will be operating the aircraft which can undertake the role.

Second, the USN already has an effective bombing tactic and a history of aircraft designed to employ that tactic. The idea of adding a new tactic to the USN bag of tricks which USN planes are not optimized for in return for the unproven benefits the tactic may provide increases the chances that the USN will ignore what it sees.

Third, and most importantly, the USAAF could see skip bombing as a way to fuck the Navy out of more combat roles and the funding which comes with them. We need a carrot more immediate than "Maybe we can kill Japanese ships with this in the future".

He certainly did. You suggested a method by which the concept could be transmitted and I suggested a better participant for that method. Nothing more.

Agreed, although what the US Army observed in 1940 France didn't always bear fruit. Remember what you've taught me about tank destroyers? :)


Ok so we agree there can be a will and a way and its within historical parameters... so the challenge is met

Well to be fair to Leslie McNair, when the Army observed France in 1940; the Germans used "massed" panzers (250+ tanks to a division, operating in big groups)... the penny packet tank destroyer concept kind of made sense against that (although why they gave them shit armor is still confusing)... the problem was that the US army didn't get into sustained ground combat against the German army until 1943 (Torch only saw them get a slight taste of what the Germans where doing since they where only a small component of the 5th panzer army/1st Italian army)... and by 1943 the Germans where no longer using the "massed" panzers "blitzkrieg" doctrine but instead had shifted to the semi modern all arms "kampfegruppen" doctrine which made the penny packet TD's useless

If they had bothered to seriously observe the eastern front in 1942; they might have decided it was a good idea to up armor the TD's that where already built and cancel the rest of the construction in favor of more well rounded AFV's :rolleyes:
 
Ok so we agree there can be a will and a way and its within historical parameters... so the challenge is met.


And Dale has his answer. :)

Well to be fair to Leslie McNair...
I understand the "tactics based on 1940 observations not doing too well in 1943" issue, due in no small part to you, but I'm suggesting that a nascent tactic observed during the mid-30s might give the USAAF certain ideas that somewhat hinder it's development of that tactic later on.

For example, will the pre-war USAAF assign skip bombing role to smaller fighter-bombers rather than the mediums which performed it in the OTL? That could impose a learning curve of sorts and mean the US won't be pulling off an earlier version of the OTL's Battle of the Bismarck Sea off Lingayen Gulf in December of '41.
 
And Dale has his answer. :)

I understand the "tactics based on 1940 observations not doing too well in 1943" issue, due in no small part to you, but I'm suggesting that a nascent tactic observed during the mid-30s might give the USAAF certain ideas that somewhat hinder it's development of that tactic later on.

For example, will the pre-war USAAF assign skip bombing role to smaller fighter-bombers rather than the mediums which performed it in the OTL? That could impose a learning curve of sorts and mean the US won't be pulling off an earlier version of the OTL's Battle of the Bismarck Sea off Lingayen Gulf in December of '41.


I know US medium bombers (B-25's and the like) where well suited to that role... but it would be interesting if they saw it as a useful method for fighter bombers (Perhaps after witnessing an HE-51 Swedish turnip attack). US heavy duty fighters (Like the P-47 and the Corsair) had really solid carrying capacity, and their high speed and ability to maneuver would probably make them tough targets... with skip bombing you don't need big bombs (The Germans sank numerous ships with semi armor piercing SD250 bombs which had 303lb's of explosive in them)

The FW-190G put in excellent service doing this on the black sea against Russian transport ships...I'm sure a P-47 or Corsair could as well (Although they might be a bit hard pressed to carry anti capital ship bombs, they could be uber effective against merchies, destroyers and cruisers)
 
A couple of points: First, as I mentioned in the original post, the US army air corp general who eventually implemented skip-bombing had experimented successfully with the technique in the twenties. The air corp didn't need to find the technique from somewhere else. They had already experimented with it in-house.

The technique just needed to get into the right position in terms of interservice rivalry to be adopted earlier. I forget who said it, but someone had the right idea when they said that the army air corp could use the technique to screw the navy out of money.

Second, as Calbear pointed out, B25s were a better plane for this sort of thing. At the same time, B17s were used historically for skip-bombing, so it wasn't impossible to use the airframe that way. It's possible that something about the early B17 models made skip-bombing difficult to the point of not being worth it, but to be a show-stopper it would have to be something that couldn't be tweaked in time for start of war.

The main problem with this technique is that you had to come in low and pretty slow. That gave anti-aircraft a good shot at bringing you down. The B25 was better in this role partly because it had a lot of forward-firing firepower to suppress the anti-aircraft, especially after field modifications to add a bunch more 50 cals.
 
I know US medium bombers (B-25's and the like) where well suited to that role... but it would be interesting if they saw it as a useful method for fighter bombers (Perhaps after witnessing an HE-51 Swedish turnip attack).


The turnip attack you've mentioned is why I suggested the fighter-bomber angle. A USAAF officer witnesses the tactic being used in the Spanish Civil War by fighters or FBs and brings the idea back to the States with that size firmly in mind.

CalBear already explained about how the B-17 wasn't as well suited for the tactic as the B-25, so maybe the tactic remains "mentally pigeon-holed" as the fighter/FB trick due to maneuverability concerns. Later when USAAF gets medium bombers which are more maneuverable, someone thinks "I might just be able to do that with this..." and the tactic that we know from the OTL is developed.

I'd rather see the tactic develop "naturally" than have someone come up with everything necessary to do it perfectly the first time right out of the blue.

US heavy duty fighters (Like the P-47 and the Corsair) had really solid carrying capacity, and their high speed and ability to maneuver would probably make them tough targets... with skip bombing you don't need big bombs...

Taking notes Dale? ;)

(Although they might be a bit hard pressed to carry anti capital ship bombs, they could be uber effective against merchies, destroyers and cruisers)

Just the things this tactic loves to eat. The Bismarck Sea "battle" saw skip-bombing aircraft sink 8 of 8 transports and 4 of 8 DDs through a 100 aircraft available for CAP duties.

If MacArthur pulls his head out soon enough to save some fighters, USAAF in the Philippines could make Lingayen Gulf very interesting for Japan.
 
The air corp didn't need to find the technique from somewhere else. They had already experimented with it in-house.


Experimented with it in the 20s and then did nothing with it until 1943?

So, watching the Germans in Spain doesn't create the concept in the USAAF's collective mind, it dusts off the concept instead. Someone back from Spain says in the O-Club "Remember that stuff Kenney was doing with bouncing bombs way back? You won't believe what i saw the Krauts doing..."

I forget who said it, but someone had the right idea when they said that the army air corp could use the technique to screw the navy out of money.

That was me and I think an immediate "use" for the tactic would be very important because USAAF is going to need to practice the maneuvers involved. That requires gas, parts, and dummy payloads and they all require money.

Second, as Calbear pointed out, B25s were a better plane for this sort of thing.

Having an intermediate fighter/FB step would allow USAAF to gain the experience necessary without having the best aircraft for the job.

The trick is eventually going to migrate to bombers due to the suppression fire requirement you mention and the fact that bombers can make multiple attack passes. IIRC, you'd only drop 2 or 4 bombs at a time so a bomber could make a few runs while a fighter/FB could not.
 
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