Historically US airforce bombers were very close to useless against enemy shipping in the early months of the Pacific War. Their doctrine was designed for strategic bombing, and it didn't translate well to attacking enemy ships.
By 1943, various parts of the airforce developed more effective tactics, coming in low and skipping bombs off the water into enemy ships. General Kenny, the guy arguably behind the development of skip-bombing, had actually experimented with the technique in the 1920s, but the strategic bombing orientation of the airforce apparently kept the technique from going beyond experiments. The British and Australians experimented with the technique early in the war, with some success, but the US had lagged behind.
So, what if sometime in late 1940, with Japan becoming more belligerent and the US trying to figure out how to defend the Philippines, General Kenny manages to convince the right people that using bombers in skip-bombing raids is a key to holding off the Japanese. A group of B17 pilots are trained in the tactics. Maybe their planes are modified so that they have more forward-facing 50 cals to suppress anti-aircraft fire from the ships. The group is then sent to the Philippines as part of the buildup of the US airpower there.
So, what happens then? Historically, much of the B17 force in the Philippines got caught on the ground the day after Pearl Harbor. That might still happen, though given a different mission that's not a given. The planes involved would undoubtedly be flying in an environment of Japanese air superiority, which would make attacks where Japanese fighters were around costly. On the other hand, B17s that could actually sink enemy ships could dominate a large area around the Philippines.
How does this play out, both in the Philippines and in subsequent battles through the first year of the war?
By 1943, various parts of the airforce developed more effective tactics, coming in low and skipping bombs off the water into enemy ships. General Kenny, the guy arguably behind the development of skip-bombing, had actually experimented with the technique in the 1920s, but the strategic bombing orientation of the airforce apparently kept the technique from going beyond experiments. The British and Australians experimented with the technique early in the war, with some success, but the US had lagged behind.
So, what if sometime in late 1940, with Japan becoming more belligerent and the US trying to figure out how to defend the Philippines, General Kenny manages to convince the right people that using bombers in skip-bombing raids is a key to holding off the Japanese. A group of B17 pilots are trained in the tactics. Maybe their planes are modified so that they have more forward-facing 50 cals to suppress anti-aircraft fire from the ships. The group is then sent to the Philippines as part of the buildup of the US airpower there.
So, what happens then? Historically, much of the B17 force in the Philippines got caught on the ground the day after Pearl Harbor. That might still happen, though given a different mission that's not a given. The planes involved would undoubtedly be flying in an environment of Japanese air superiority, which would make attacks where Japanese fighters were around costly. On the other hand, B17s that could actually sink enemy ships could dominate a large area around the Philippines.
How does this play out, both in the Philippines and in subsequent battles through the first year of the war?