The Union of the Two Crowns

Title Page
  • 410px-Arms_of_the_Kings_of_France_%28France_Moderne%29.svg.png


    The Union of the Two Crowns

    A History of the Capetian Dynasty

    Contents:

    Introduction (OOC)

    Credit and Sources (OOC)

    Part 1: Rise of the Capetian Empire (1200-1250):

    Chapter 1: The Barons War (1215-1219)
    Chapter 2: Louis I of England (1219-1223)
    Chapter 3: The King in Exile (1219-1223)
    Chapter 4: The Return of the King (1223-1224)
    Chapter 5: The Capetian Interregnum (1224-1228)
    Chapter 6: Plantagenets Victorious (1224-1227)
    Chapter 7: The Capetian Resurgence and the end of the Capetian-Plantagenet War (1227-1230)
    Chapter 8: A French King on the English Throne (1230-1240)
    Chapter 9: Guelphs and Ghibellines (1220-1240)
    Chapter 10: Henry and Frederick (1230-1240)
    Chapter 11: The King is Dead (1240-1244)

     
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    Credit, Sources and Announcements
  • Credit:
    Coat of Arms- Title Page: By Sodacan - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=38495212
    Map of France in 1223- Chapter 5: By Ian Mladjov, https://sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/imladjov/maps

    Sources:
    The Edge of the World: How the North Sea Made Us Who We Are, by Michael Pye
    The Holy Roman Empire: A Thousand Years of Europe's History, by Peter H Wilson

    Notes, Edits and Announcements:
    Edit: 19/08/2017: Notes, Edits and Announcements section created
    Announcement: 19/08/2017 I will be away on holiday for a couple of weeks and then busy for a bit afterwards so there won't be any updates for a while.
     
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    Chapter 1: The Barons War (1215-1219)
  • King Philip II of France and King John I 'Lackland' of England
    Chapter 1: The Barons War (1215-1219)

    There are four major kings who come to dominate our view of the very beginning of the Capetian Empire and the events that would lead to the unification of the Kingdoms of France and England at the beginning of the 13th Century and whose conflicts will, in time, threaten to tip both countries into anarchy. The first of these kings are King John I of England, the younger brother of King Richard I (whose death in 1199 left a succession dispute between John and his nephew, Arthur of Brittany), and King Philip II of France, the French counterpart to Richard 'the Lionheart' whose reign, from 1180, saw the inclusion of much of the Angevin lands into the growing French kingdom. Philip and John couldn't have been more starkly contrasted, Philip brought stability to France, expanded the boundaries of his kingdom and checked the power of the nobility while John's reign saw the loss of vast tracts of land, the growing power of the nobility and the country descend into anarchy and civil war. Following Philip's victory over the joint forces of the Holy Roman Empire, Flandres, Boulogne and England at the Battle of Bouvines, Western Europe saw a series of political changes with the overthrow of Otto IV of the Holy Roman Emperor by Frederick II. In France, the battle would play a major role in the process by which France started becoming a much stronger, much more centralised monarchy than it had been previously while, conversely, John's authority began to fall apart and resistance to his rule began to grow throughout England. As tensions began to grow in England, John played for time until he could attempt to garner papal support for his rule which he hoped might quell the increasingly rebellious vassals who, by April 1215, had elected Robert Fitzwalter (a man whose name will come to play a huge role in the events to come) as their leader and captured London, Lincoln and Exeter in quick succession. The two sides soon came to the negotiating table in June 1215 and, due to the mediation of Stephen Langton (Archbishop of Canterbury from 1207 to 1228), signed a peace treaty that would soon come to be known as the Magna Carta. Much more than just a peace treaty, the Magna Carta was a document of political reform under which the rights of free men were to be secured. This document effectively protected the rights of the church and the nobility, especially in regards to taxation, scutage and imprisonment by the king and would, in time, come to be one of the defining political documents of the 13th Century. Needless to say, given the events that followed, this document wasn't upheld for long. Later that year, Pope Innocent III declared, on John's behalf, the treaty to be illegal and excommunicated the barons. War was now upon them.

    The next two kings who deserve mention, although less explanation here, are the (future) Kings Louis VIII of France, the son and heir of Philip II who would ascend to the throne of France in 1223, and Henry III of England, the son and heir of John whose birth in 1207 meant he was only 8 at the time of John's death in 1216. In many ways, the bulk of the upcoming conflict comes to be defined by these two as the fight for the throne of England rages between Louis and Henry for years after the conclusion of the Barons War and will spill over to later claimants even after the death of Henry III. Louis, of course, is the first of these to come into play here, having been invited to become King of England by the various barons after a series of defeats at the hands of John's forces throughout 1215. He landed in May 1216 without opposition on the Isle of Thanet before marching straight for London, with Canterbury opening its gates to him as he approached and Rochester Castle falling after a short siege. John, fearing the approach of the prince, fled to Winchester leaving the route to London wide open for the encroaching baronial forces under Louis. In London, Louis was given a warm welcome by a number of rebel subjects and barons and was soon proclaimed king in St Paul's Cathedral by the rebelling nobles as well as by King Alexander II of Scotland. With the fall of Winchester to Louis on June 14th, it was felt by many that John's defeat was by now more or less inevitable and John began to lose large numbers of supporters.

    Taunted by his father for having tried to secure England without first having seized Dover, the key to reinforcements from France, Louis turned from London and marched to Dover Castle, besieging it on the 25th July 1216. However, finding the castle prepared for a siege, Louis' attempts to take the castle soon began to falter and after 3 months of the siege, he signed a truce and returned to London in October. However, with John's death only 4 days after the truce was signed, a change began to take place in the fortunes of the loyalist forces. With the ascension of the 8-year-old Henry III, who had the significant support of the papacy, and the efforts of his regent William Marshal, the Earl of Pembroke, a number of nobles who had initially been supporting Louis' cause began to switch sides and swear loyalty to the new English king. This is where Louis began to realise the large outstanding problem of the papacy's support for Henry III, Louis controlled London but he couldn't be crowned king, whereas the young Henry was crowned immediately in Gloucester Cathedral by Peter des Roches, the Bishop of Winchester. Meanwhile, in Kent, Louis found his control of the area constantly challenged by one William of Cassingham, a squire who was leading a large guerilla band of archers in resistance to Louis' position. In many ways, the war in England was all about winning over the nobility and it seemed that in this regard, Louis was constantly on the losing end. In November, the Magna Carta was reissued by Marshal who promised to uphold and treaty. Henry's position was further strengthened by the support of Pope Innocent who had had a cardinal preside over the coronation of the king and who had already excommunicated Louis, thus lending his support and legitimacy to the loyalist forces.

    This didn't mean that Louis' successes failed entirely, he captured Hertford Castle on the 6th of December and, later that month, Berkhamsted Castle. But, in desperate need of further soldiers, Louis was forced to make a return trip to France in February 1217 and his return to the coast was by no means unchallenged. En route, he faced loyalist resistance in Kent and Surrey and was ambushed at Lewes by Cassingham with his army pursued to Winchelsea where only the timely arrival of the French fleet under Eustace the Monk saved him from starvation. Things grew ever worse when Cardinal Guala declared Henry's war against Louis to be a religious conflict and Louis suffered ever more defections as well as disagreements within his army during his absence. Returning to England in April, Louis determined that it was time to make a real effort to turn the war around and decided to split his army in two, one force under Thomas, Count of Perche to march North to besiege Lincoln while another under his own command to strike up a second siege of Dover Castle, determined to stop the loyalists within from continuing to cut off communications and supply routes to France.

    Realising that the baronial forces were split in two, Marshal decided it was time to make a move to try and break the siege of Lincoln and thus cut off a significant portion of Louis' force. In Lincoln, the situation was at a critical point for Thomas who had managed to capture the city but was unable to capture the castle which refused to surrender. As Marshal advanced on the city, he was left with two options:

    -Fight Marshal in the field at the base of a nearby hill
    -Or defend the town

    While keeping a force to besiege the castle and hold down the defenders, Perche led the majority of his forces to garrison the outside of the city against the approaching loyalist forces. Marshal had led his forces to the northern gate of the city where, under the command of Falkes de Breaute, they made a number of assaults against the gate, repelled every time by the defenders. As the day wore on and casualties mounted (including Falkes himself), Marshal began to realise that the city was not going to fall and chose instead to fall back and break the siege of the city. This defeat would prove crucial for Perche, as the moral detriment suffered by the defenders of the castle at the defeat the relieving forces would prove decisive and by the end of the May 1217, the castle had fallen. The capture of Lincoln was of huge strategic importance as it lay on the crossroads of Fosse Way (cutting from East to West through a number of important settlements) and Ermine Street (which cut from North to South, reaching London itself). Not only were these important centres of trade and government, but the capture of the city and castle would allow further consolidation and strengthening of Louis' position in the South-East.

    Bolstered by the victory at Lincoln and hearing reports of approaching reinforcements and supplies with the French fleet under Eustace Busket, Louis continued to push forward the siege of Dover Castle despite staunch resistance by the defenders under one Hubert de Burgh, the constable of Dover. Eustace was sailing at the head of 80 ships (10 naval ships and 70 supply ships) and brought with him a significant investment by King Philip whose successes in France had allowed him to all but push the English off the continent complete with the conquest of Normandy. Eustace is a fascinating figure of the time, a skilled naval commander but a monk turned pirate reputed to practice black magic and who had spent a sizable portion of his life on a quest for vengeance against Renaud de Dammartin whose siding with King John was the very reason Eustace was fighting for Louis. Renaud, at the time, was currently rotting in a prison having sided once too often with King John against Philip and having been captured at the Battle of Bouvines in 1214 but Eustace continued to fight for the French for the time being. As Thomas pushed along the Fosse Way, capturing Newark on the 16th June, Eustace was preparing his ships and left France in August of 1217 sailing for the Cinque Ports in Kent. With Thomas moving South-West to cut Henry off from the South-East of the country, Henry sent 38 ships under Philip d'Aubigny, a major landholder and supporter of Henry who had fought at Lincoln in May, to intercept the French fleet. The two forces met on the 24th August, the French led by Eustace and his ally Robert of Courtenay and the English led by Philip. Eustace's greater naval skill and larger ships (both in size and numbers) led to him wreaking havoc on the English fleet as he outmanoeuvred the ships and his archers cut the marines to pieces. Finally, the English fleet retreated back to the South-West (loyalist territory) with heavy casualties including Philip himself who was found dead after the battle, supposedly pierced with dozens of arrows. Most of Philip's lands had been in the South-East and were constantly threatened by Louis' forces, despite this, they were, at least nominally, transferred to his brother Philip the Younger after his death by Henry III. Eustace's victory at the Battle of Dover effectively opened up the channel to French control, enabling reinforcements and supplies to be transported from the continent much easier than they could before.

    However, Louis' position hadn't entirely been saved from the fire. His siege of Dover Castle came under constant harassment by Cassingham's forces resulting in heavy casualties as the siege dragged on with the staunch resistance of Hubert and his forces and the preparedness of the castle itself. These factors took a heavy toll on the besiegers and the siege began to stall as winter of 1217 closed in. Meanwhile, the loyalist forces were gearing up for a counter-attack. Possibly fearing being cut off from the South-East entirely or even a move by Perche to actually attack Henry's position in the South-West, Marshall and Ranulf de Blondeville, the Earl of Chester began marching North-East towards Newark in another attempt to shatter Thomas' forces and cut off a significant portion of Louis' army. It is possible that their intention was to force Louis to an ultimatum, break the siege of Dover Castle or lose Thomas and his army at Newark. The siege of Newark in November 1217 threatened to do exactly that. Throughout Kent, Cassingham's fight against Louis continued to gain momentum as he extended his operations beyond simply attacks on Louis' forces but into the realms of actually raiding towns that had shown support for Louis and the barons. In turn, Eustace continued his frequent supply runs and even launched a series of raids along the southern coast of England against towns in territory still held by the loyalists. Throughout the winter of 1217, as the respective forces of the loyalists and the rebels settled down for continued winter siege, the war began to settle into a familiar dance of raids and counter-raids, often prosecuted by Eustace and Cassingham respectively. Eustace terrorised the seas, cutting off large amounts of trade income to England and even, for a period, controlling a number of Channel Islands. On land, meanwhile, Louis was engaged in frequent fighting with the forces under Cassingham and, occasionally, raids from the castle itself.

    Marshal had arrived relatively late in the year, a fact that proved to be fortunate in the extreme for Louis as he needed time to prepare siege weapons to properly prosecute the siege come spring while at the same time Louis himself began to gear up for his own attacks on Dover Castle once the winter ended. This isn't to say that siege operations ended entirely or even stalled during the winter months, raids and engagements still continued but the majority of the work in most sieges was simply waiting and, with food far less available during the winter, it is probable that neither side wished to expend their soldiers too much in large assaults until spring came and supplies were more available. Needless to say, the onset of spring brought with it a flurry of activity including a number of failed and costly assaults on Dover Castle by Louis. But these failures, costly as they were, began to betray the fraying defenders as the walls continued to suffer damage and erosion under the attacks and there were even a few minor breaches of the defences. While casualties suffered at the hands of Cassingham remained high, Louis had learnt from many of his mistakes from the previous year and greater defences around his camp evened out the engagements and raids that took place between the two. Despite increasing casualties and dwindling morale, Hubert's forces would continue to put up resistance to Louis until the castle finally fell in November 1218 resulting in Hubert's death at the hands of the besiegers.

    Thomas had spent the winter in feverish activity, doing whatever he could to try and repair and prepare the defences of Newark so that he might manage to hold out until Louis could relieve the defenders while, opposite him, Marshal and Blondeville continued to prepare their siege works in the hope that they would be able to take Newark before Louis had a chance to take Dover and move to relieve Thomas. As said previously, it has been argued that Marshal's purpose in the siege was to try and force Louis to break the siege of Dover Castle in favour of relieving Newark. Whether Louis' choice to continue the siege rather than relieve his forces shows his faith in Thomas' ability to defend the castle after his victory at Lincoln or simply shows that Louis felt capturing Dover to be more important is also up for debate. Nevertheless, the events to follow are quite clearly shown. Louis refused to abandon the siege of Dover and Thomas was forced to cobble together whatever defence he could in a desperate attempt to hold out until reinforcements could arrive. His repairs were by no means of high quality as a lack of resources forced him to often demolish houses for stone to use to patch the walls up and these areas were often the first to fall. Furthermore, his army's actions within Newark didn't exactly endear them to the populace who threatened at some points to let Marshal and Blondeville into the city. Yet Newark held, the city itself fell a number of times to the besiegers and the castle was breached in a number of assaults throughout 1218 but it never fell. Despite dwindling resources, Thomas continued his resistance up until the siege began to settle with the onset of winter in November. News of the fall of Dover, naturally, unnerved Marshal and Blondeville who began to fear the approach of Louis' army and the possibility that they might end up being caught between two opposing forces.

    Marshal was aware of one opportunity, however, the onset of winter meant that Louis only marched as far as London in November where he halted for the winter and instead chose to consolidate his position choosing, however, to resume his march earlier in the year in February. While situated in London, he had been able to continue to feed his army via supplies from France but his march in late February was largely fed from whatever remaining food could be found in granaries or personal stores. The obvious side effect of this was that people began to starve as vast amounts of food that might have been used to feed hungry people at the very end of winter went to feeding a marching army and, in turn, resistance in the South-East continued to grow. Cassingham is a perfect example of this and his guerilla force saw a massive uptake in numbers throughout the winter. Had Henry been in a better position to do so, such a decision might have possibly prepared the ground for him to make a counter-attack into the South-East to oust Louis from his foothold there. As it was, however, Louis was able to push onwards and arrived at Newark in early April of 1219. By this point, Marshal and Blondeville were gone, abandoning the siege in March and heading South-West to Henry's refuge in Cornwall.

    The lull in fighting that took place after the Siege of Newark Castle ended in April 1219 was time needed by both sides. On one hand, Louis' position in the South-East was becoming more and more unstable and, while his victories kept his supporters loyal, he began to wonder if this war was unsustainable. The Siege of Dover Castle is a perfect example of this given the amount of men and resources that Philip and Louis had had to invest into the siege just to take the castle, Philip couldn't sustain this economically forever and the seeming lack of real results seemed to be making the French nobility anxious to end the war. Those soldiers and nobles who were in England were anxious to return home while many back in France began to wonder if these resources might not be better suited elsewhere. Even Philip is said to have had his doubts about whether England was worth it and a supposed correspondence between him and his son had Philip questioning Louis about his ability to even hold England should he manage to actually capture it in the first place. Philip was by no means wrong, England would indeed prove to be a massive sink of resources for the early kings such as, most famously, Louis IX who would spend significant amounts of time trying to actually pacify England and her nobles. These are problems we will very much return to later, the concerns were being raised at the moment but they are concerns that do come into play later in the narrative.

    For now, Louis took the time to consolidate his position and make preparations to try and end the war as quickly as possible. His biggest fears were that Henry might try to retake the South-East, thus cutting Louis off from supplies from the continent or that Henry might flee to the North and thus prolong the war in what might turn into a bloody campaign in Northern England. At this point, much of the Fosse Way had still to be properly captured and Louis knew all too well that the South-East was potentially vulnerable as a result. Marshal, meanwhile, was 70 years old and almost on his death bed and, fearing that Louis was about to march straight on Henry, moved the young king west from Corfe Castle to
    Tremarton Castle and from there to Restormel Castle. Marshal arrived at Restormel in July but wouldn't last much longer. His devotion to Henry and loyalty the cause had kept him going so far but his body now began to fail. Now on his deathbed, Marshal summoned his son (William), the barons loyal to Henry, Pandulf Veraccio; the Papal Legate to England, and Peter des Roches. Here he would appoint Veraccio as the next regent of Henry III, overruling the claims to the regency of other nobles, such as Ranulf, and bishops, such as the Bishop of Winchester. Veraccio is quite starkly contrasted to Marshal. Marshal was a knight and, according to many, an exemplary example of what a knight should be, he was strong, militarily skilled, noble and loyal the very end even though many of his sons, even his heir William, had initially sided with Louis (but defected over time). Veraccio was, in comparison, a divisive figure whose arrogance and appointment over, arguably, better claims did not endear him to the nobility. He was accepted, thus far, due to the critical problems that Henry was facing and the desperate need for a regent and it's likely that Marshal appointed him due to his distrust of the barons, many of whom had initially sided with Louis, and the need for a stabilising figure not too tied up in local politics. But the choice would be neither popular nor particularly successful.

    As for himself, Marshal's death in July 1219 would be an event remembered for centuries to come. His loyalty to the Plantagenets would become a defining part of his figure which, a century or so later, had more or less become a near-legendary character in England. Maybe more importantly for our narrative, his opposition to Louis would make him an important political figure alongside Cassingham as a symbol of resistance to Capetian rule in England and as pretenders came and went, these two figures more than anyone would be invoked time and again to rally people to their cause in an attempt to dislodge the French kings who sat on the throne of England.

    The Barons War now entered its final stage as Louis left Newark in August 1219 and swept South-West along Fosse Way towards Cornwall, hoping to entrap Henry and Veraccio in the area and thus prevent any attempts to retake the South-East. On the way, Louis captured a number of loyalist strongholds throughout the Midlands although these would prove hard to hold due to the still strong support for Henry's position as king in the area and, due to his distraction capturing important strongholds and securing the road, Louis wouldn't arrive in Dorset until October 1219. Upon his arrival, Louis immediately sent Saer de Quincy, Earl of Winchester and Robert Fitzwalter to capture Corfe Castle which left Louis free to move on Henry. News of Louis' movements reached Veraccio quickly who, not wanting to risk making a stand in Cornwall that might risk Henry's capture by Louis, chose to flee from Cornwall that very month. Veraccio, Henry and his younger brother Robert (who had previously been the High Sheriff of Berkshire) made their way to Ireland where they set up their court in the English Lordship of Ireland. Many of the other nobles scattered throughout the country or took refuge abroad.

    The flight of Henry III in October 1219 is effectively considered the end of the Barons War and a clear victory for Louis and the Barons who were now left in control, at least nominally, of England. That isn't to say that Louis actually controlled England but for the time being he was the only claimant left standing on English soil with an army and in possession of most of the South, however weak it may have been in some areas. So here we leave off the war, Louis has emerged victorious and Henry is in exile in Ireland with his supporters scattered to the wind. This isn't the end, however, and the fight for England has only just begun.
     
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    Chapter 2: Louis I of England (1219-1223)
  • King Philip II of France and King Henry III or Louis I of England
    Chapter 2: Louis I of England (1219-1223)

    Before we may continue on our narrative, we need to take some time to discuss a term that will come into play with great importance as we continue to discuss the rising power of the union. That term, of course, is 'The Capetian Empire'. So far as having an emperor, this 'Empire' did not and neither was it a cohesive entity as with the Roman Empire. Neither was it like the Holy Roman Empire with an emperor who held jurisdiction over an increasingly autonomous hierarchy of duchies and states. Rather, the Capetian Empire can only be really compared to its predecessor from which we take the name; the Angevin Empire. The Angevin Empire is a term used to refer to the titles and lands held by the Angevin (Plantagenet) Kings up until the loss of the French lands to Philip. Just as the Angevin Empire is named after the House of Anjou, the Capetian Empire has come to be named after the ruling dynasty of France and, later, England; the House of Capet. In short, therefore, the 'empire' referred simply to the lands, titles and lordships held by the Kings of Capet. This is distinct from previous and, in some cases, contemporary empires such as Rome or the Holy Roman Empire. In both of those cases, the idea of the empire referred to the state and it was still Rome (or the Holy Roman Empire) regardless of who ruled it or what lands it held. In comparison, the Capetian Empire distinctly refers to the House of Capet and its kings and their rule of the Kingdoms of France and England. As such, the exact dating of the Capetian Empire can be tricky, especially at the very beginning. Opinion is massively divided as to when Louis actually became the King of England. Some believe that his ousting of Henry and his court from England in 1219 constituted his rise to power while others put the date even earlier at his proclamation in St Paul's Cathedral in 1216. Of course, this is the idea that many later Capetian Kings would argue; that the proclamation of Louis made him legitimate king of England and that, at least after the death of John in October of that year, the coronation of Henry was merely a pretender making a claim to the throne. By this argument, Louis was either king from his proclamation or from the moment John died at which point the throne was vacated and Louis thus became king. Of course, this is a point many later Capetians themselves would remain divided on as some argued that John had never been legitimate and that rather the throne should have gone to his nephew. In either case, some hold that the Capetian Empire could not begin until Louis became King of France in 1223 anyway while others maintain that since both kingdoms were ruled by Capetian Kings, the link still stands. Others argued that John's death ended the legitimate rule of the Plantagenets and opened the way for the House of Capet. Others, however, have argued a later date such as 1227 with Louis' coronation or 1236 with the death of King Henry III. As such, the beginning date of the Capetian Empire varies by over 20 years, putting much of Louis' reign in doubt as to whether or not it was legitimately part of 'The Capetian Empire'. Some attention has also been drawn to breaks in the Capetian rule of England or to breaks in the joint rule of both kingdoms by one king. Situations such as with Henry's return in the 1220s throw doubt as to the continued rule of England by Capetian Kings and thus cause doubt as to whether or not these periods constitute part of the empire's time. For the sake of this narrative, the beginning date is of less importance but it will work on the general consensus of the empire beginning with Louis' coronation as King of England in 1227.

    So for the time being, Louis was left in a position of being only nominally king of what was only nominally his kingdom and only nominally under his control. Louis' influence and control were largely confined to the South-East and, due to the actions of Cassingham and others, remained spotty throughout the countryside. Cornwall still remained largely independent from his control and so too did the Midlands, which he had only partially subdued on his march to the South-West, Wales and the North. This isn't even bringing into account areas that had once been under English control such as Ireland, which was well beyond Louis' influence and control. While making an exact determination of what areas Louis held influence over is difficult, we can broadly say that this was probably mostly the South-East. However, this control would, for the time being, remain very spotty and resistance would continue in some areas well into the reign of Louis IX and even X throughout the course of the century. For the time being, Louis held most of the urban centres of the South-East and all of the castles, yet much of the countryside was still fraught with resistance such as with the still very real problem of Cassingham in Surrey. Furthermore, many of the nobles still siding with Henry had estates in the South-East so much of this land was either being occupied by Louis and his soldiers or in open resistance to his rule which created large problems. Extending and consolidating his position remained difficult and fraught with dangers while his control over the South-East remained so weak, yet his control over the South-East was permanently under threat while the lands beyond it were still resisting Louis and, indeed, areas such as Wales and the North would come to pose major threats to the Capetian rule in England as potential breeding grounds for dissent and rebellion as well as a landing ground for Henry and his forces. However, this isn't to say that his position was necessarily bad or weak in any way. For the time being, the Plantagenets were in no position to launch an immediate counter-attack and Louis' campaigns were free to continue in an attempt to extend his power. Furthermore, we mustn't forget the English nobles he already had on his side whose lands and estates formed potential areas for Louis to exercise his power from while he also, nominally, had the power to establish a number of other families or grant estates in England to his French nobles.

    Henry's flight to Ireland freed Louis up to focus on consolidation of the gains he had made over the past three years. Determined to protect his position in the East, he sent Thomas of Perche with a large force of soldiers to Kent in an attempt put down Cassingham's resistance while he and Fitzwalter could continue West into Cornwall. With winter fast approaching and the land stripped bare from the marching armies, Louis had no intention of launching a campaign for Cornwall and Dorset straight off the bat. Instead, leaving Fitzwalter with a force in Corfe Castle, Louis returned with a sizeable portion of his force to London where he would spend the winter throughout which he would spend his time both preparing for the oncoming campaigns of spring and the administration of his new kingdom. While he still didn't actually control Cornwall itself, he officially restored Fitzwalter's Cornish estates (which had been seized by King John) and, for his loyalty and support, he raised Fitzwalter to become the 1st Earl of Cornwall. Similarly, he granted the Earldom of Leicester to Amaury de Montfort, Count of Toulouse whose father had been the 5th Earl of Leicester but had never been given the lands which had instead been given to Blondeville by John. He soon received the submission of Baldwin de Redvers, 6th Earl of Devon, whose father had been a prominent supporter of John's up until the King permitted Falkes de Breaute to kidnap his daughter, force a marriage and steal the dowry and Reginald de Braose, 5th Lord of Bramber and a powerful lord in Wales whose father and family had come into conflict with John before the Baronial war as well as other lords. The death of Earl William in 1217 meant that Devon passed to Baldwin. By this point, John was dead but with the triumph of Louis shortly after and the resentment still felt towards the Plantagenets, it's no wonder House Redvers came to give their submission to Louis with Henry's flight to Ireland. Determined to lock down the South-East through loyal vassals while rewarding those vassals who had fought by his side against Henry, Louis went further, granting the Earldom of Kent to Perche in 1220, thus locking down one of the most vital areas for landing soldiers and supplies with a loyal vassal and supporter. Saer de Quincy, already a major landholder, was granted the Earldom of Surrey, effectively disinheriting the existing House de Warenne. Louis' reasons for this were most likely the support of the House de Warenne for Henry III and Louis' desire to avoid leaving a potentially hostile peerage in the South-East but the decision has been criticised since for effectively ending any attempt at conciliation with not only the Warennes but many of Henry's other noble supporters who feared to lose their titles and lands to Louis.

    In late December 1219, Louis officially confirmed Amaury de Montfort in the position previously held by members of the family of being High Steward of England. Furthermore, he invited Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury to return to England from abroad where he had been instructed to stay until hostilities ended by Innocent III for his refusal to publish the excommunication of the barons in 1215. Langton had sided with the Barons in the first rebellion against King John in the build up to the signing of the Magna Carta and had been removed from his position of Archbishop of Canterbury when Innocent excommunicated the Barons shortly afterwards and Langton refused to publish. He had been told he would have the position restored to him if he left England and remained abroad until hostilities ended. Innocent's death and the end of the Baronial War in 1219 gave Louis scope to invite Langton back which would further legitimise his own rule of England. In early February 1220, Louis would go a step further by making Langton the Chief Justiciar of England, a position which hadn't been filled since Hubert de Burgh's death in 1217.

    With the return of spring in 1220, Louis turned his attention once again to Cornwall, hoping to enforce Fitzwalter's position as the new Earl of Cornwall and thus secure the South-West through one of his most loyal vassals. Undoubtedly, Louis saw that he would have to move quickly if he were to properly solidify and consolidate his position in England before Henry and his regent had an opportunity to mount another invasion of England. As such, while Louis and Fitzwalter advanced into Cornwall in spring 1220, the Earl of Kent was busy in the East playing a game of cat and mouse with Cassingham and his guerilla forces. Having been granted a portion of the forces from France as well as supporting soldiers from his own domains as well as those of Quincy, Earl of Winchester and William FitzGeoffrey de Mandeville, Earl of Essex, Thomas was to put down Cassingham as quickly as possible and to secure and repair the vital castles of the region such as Dover. Needless to say, Cassingham would be far from an easy foe to put down, as shown by his successes during the initial invasion of 1216-19 and Thomas would spend most of 1220 and 1221 failing desperately to defeat the rebels. Cassingham's eventual defeat would come early in 1222 after reinforcements arrived from Louis, whose campaigns had spread by that point to the Midlands, although he would evade capture until 1224 while making a number of attempts to raise similar insurgencies elsewhere in the country to varying degrees of success. Louis, as stated, campaigned throughout Cornwall throughout 1220 and by early 1221, Fitzwalter was in a secure enough position that he could be left to stamp out much of the remaining resistance on his own. Louis returned once again to London in winter 1220 before turning his attention North towards the Midlands. As stated previously, Louis had passed through the Midlands en route South from Newark to Devon but hadn't extensively secured the region. For the most part, the Midlands had generally shown loyalty to Henry during the war and mostly remained loyal now. As we know, Lincoln had been captured in 1217 by the, now, Earl of Kent. Meanwhile, Gilbert de Clare, Earl of Gloucester and Earl of Hertford, had fought against John and supported Louis' claim to the throne. But, for example, Henry de Beaumont, Earl of Warwick and Ranulf de Blondeville, Earl of Chester were both hostile. That said, Henry de Bohun the Earl of Hereford had sided with the barons and, while it is uncertain who he supported out of Henry and Louis, he certainly fell to Louis' side as the tide began to turn in his favour. It's possible he, like the Earl of Devon, came to pledge loyalty to Louis in winter 1219 as well but whatever the case, Hereford, like Gloucester, was a vassal of Louis' by 1220.

    Leaving London in spring 1221, Louis marched straight to Gloucester and North from there to Hereford wherefrom, joined by Clare and Bohun, he marched North into the Earldom of Chester, appointing Bohun as the Earl of Chester in July 1221 in recognition of his support for Louis' claim. This was a decision informed by a number of aspects one of which was, of course, Henry III. Remember that, at this point, Wales was very much beyond Louis' control and influence and there was undoubtedly some fear that Henry might strike a deal with one or more of the petty kings of Wales to allow him a foothold from which to launch an invasion of England. As a counter to this, and in possibly an attempt to help him assert his own influence over Wales, it seems likely that Louis wished to have a loyal and relatively strong vassal on the Welsh border. To this end, Bohun, as the Earl of Hereford, was an obvious choice since his earldom already bordered Wales. However, Louis now turned South-West and over the course of the rest of the year, expelled the Marshal family from the Earldom of Pembroke, restoring it to the House de Clare which had held it up until the death of Earl Richard de Clare in 1176 with no male heir, resulting in the title being passed to his daughter who had married the, now dead, William Marshal. Now bear in mind that Gilbert de Clare was only actually related to Richard de Clare by a long since dead common ancestor by the name of Richard Fitz Gilbert de Clare who had been one of the Norman lords to first arrive in England in 1066. Hoping to reign in Southern Wales and displace the hostile Marshal family, Louis instead returned the Earldom to the House de Clare by making Gilbert the new Earl of Pembroke.

    With that said, we need to bear in mind that there were nobles who did switch sides after Henry's flight to Ireland and not everyone remained hostile in the long run, such as John of Scotland, the Earl of Huntingdon who switched sides to that of Louis in winter of 1219, around the same time the Earl of Devon did the same. Despite attachments to the king before the Baronial War, Roger Bigod, the Earl of Norfolk had actually sided with the Barons and his excommunication by the Pope led to his siding with Louis in 1216. Alix of Thouars, the Countess of Richmond in her own right and the Duchess of Brittany by her marriage to Peter I of Brittany may well have supported John and Henry initially but, fearing that Louis who now held the country and thus her imprisoned sister Eleanor (who had been the Duchess of Brittany by her marriage to Arthur I of Brittany and the Countess of Richmond in her own right before both were imprisoned and Arthur killed in 1203) might choose to follow in the stead of what he had done with Quincy (making him the Earl of Surrey and displacing the nobles who had supported Henry), came over to support Louis either in 1219 or 1220. What is important to remember is that Louis VIII and Louis IX were very different in their approaches to the English nobility, Louis would take a very hard stance towards imposing royal prerogatives both in England and France as we'll see with his relationship to Theobald in later chapters. This did end up enforcing his rights but often trampled on what the nobility perceived as their rights which, as we know, was exactly what led to the Barons War in the first place. So while Louis did enforce his authority in this manner, his methods and ideas of how to rule England had a tendency to alienate supporters. Bear in mind that Louis' campaigns throughout Cornwall, the Midlands and Wales had just disinherited a number of powerful noble families from their Earldoms. On one hand, this approach did allow Louis to set up loyal vassals in these titles and thus enforce his authority much better but, by doing so, he risked going too far and making those very supporters angry at a seeming disregard for noble rights. Louis IX was more pragmatic, more conciliatory and generally better at working with the nobility of England, as evidenced by then Magni Tractatus. However, in turn, he would be unable to actually curb the power of the nobility as was happening in France at the time.

    What we have to bear in mind is that France and England would prove to be two very different countries to rule in regards to the relationship between the king and the nobility. In France, the country was becoming more and more centralised under royal rule and control whereas England, with the Barons War and the Magna Carta, was going the opposite way as the king's power was reduced in favour of the increasing power and distinguished rights of the nobility. In part, this was an issue for someone such as Louis who might have been used to the dominating power of his father in the very centralised and the royal-dominated Kingdom of France. This would ultimately make it difficult for a king trying to rule both kingdoms with their separate systems and relationships between the king and the nobility.

    Louis' successes in the Midlands and Wales had quite massively strengthened his position in England, transferring a number of titles held by hostile nobles to supporters of Louis' fight for the throne and thus consolidating his control of the South of England by both increasing his influence over certain areas of the country and helping to protect his borders while also cutting down on the number of viable landing sites for a potential resurgence of Henry and his supporters. After wintering in Gloucester, Louis would once again march North, turning West this time and advancing across the country towards Lincoln. Most notably, his path would take him through Warwick, the domain of Henry de Beaumont who had fought for Henry III at Lincoln in 1217 and had initially returned to Warwick after Henry's flight to Ireland. However, with the elevation of Bohun to the Earldom of Chester in 1221, Warwick began to fear that his Earldom was the obvious next target and fled while Louis was wintering in Gloucester, first North and then crossing the sea to Ireland where he met up with Henry. Throughout 1222, Louis pushed East from Chester to Lincoln before finally returning in late 1222 to London and settling there for the winter once again. As with the House Clare and the Earldom of Pembroke, Louis instead turned to relatives or descendants of the Earl or his family. Specifically, he found the infant son of Alice de Beaumont, the daughter of Waleran de Beaumont by his second wife and as such the nephew of Henry. Sensing an opportunity to put the Earldom in the hands of a house other than that of the Beaumonts and since Henry and, presumably, his younger brother Waleran were both in exile, Louis appointed the infant (barely two years old) to be the Earl of Warwick as the grandson of a previous Earl. This seemed to be an ideal opportunity, to ensure the future loyalty of Warwick by appointing his own regent for the young child and, in time, providing the education for the boy in London where Louis would be able to keep a close eye on him and his development. In later 1222, Louis created the Earldom of Lincoln in order to further solidify his control of the Midlands and granted it to his supporter and commander William d'Aubigny, a relative of the Philip d'Aubigny who had fought at Dover against Eustace the Monk but a supporter of Louis. Estates such as Belvoir, Ingleby, Saxilby and Boradhome were restored to Ralph d'Aubigny, the elder brother of Philip who had defected to the French in 1205 as well as Waltham Manor, which had been previously held by Philip.

    Louis, for his part, spent the winter in London and, it seems, was planning to push further Nore-establish control of the region, much of which had fallen away from John's control towards the end despite a campaign to contain Alexander in January 1216. The flight of Henry III and the increasing power of Louis I to the South meant that the North, which Henry could not establish control over and which largely didn't recognise Louis' claim, retained much of its independence from the two kings throughout this period. However, news of his father's illness and the seeming impending death of King Philip effectively put an end to Louis' plans for another campaign in 1223. Instead, he spent the spring making preparations for England so that he could return to France in the event of his father's death without risking the loss of his English territory to a potential rebellion or, worse, the return of Henry III. Knowing he couldn't keep his French forces in England forever, especially after such an extremely long campaign in England, Louis concluded on a joint command of the forces in England during his absence. To this role, he appointed Robert Fitzwalter, Earl of Cornwall and one of the primary movers in the Barons War and, of course, the Earl of Kent whose loyalty had been frequently proven during the war against John and Henry. In his absence, the administrative aspects of the country were to be held by Montfort, in his capacity as High Steward of England, and Stephen Langton, Archbishop of Canterbury and, after 1219, Chief Justiciar of England. With these arrangements made and these men in power, Louis finally had his hands free to return to France.
     
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    Chapter 2: The King in Exile (1219-1223)
  • King Philip II of France and Henry III or Louis I of England
    Chapter 3: The King in Exile (1219-1223)

    Henry and Verraccio's first priority, upon arrival in Ireland late October 1219, was consolidation, in order to secure their position in both Ireland and England before any moves could be made in an attempt to retake the mainland. Henry's flight had left the Plantagenet supporters defeated and scattered, many having fled North and others still in their estates back home only to be driven out by Louis in the campaigns of 1220-1222. Henry's entourage upon arrival in Ireland mostly consisted of himself, Verraccio, William Marshall, 2nd Earl of Pembroke after his father's death and Ranulf de Blondeville, Earl of Chester. As we know, many of these very same titles would end up being handed out by Louis to his supporters in the next few years leading to a situation in which these titles would frequently change hands during Plantagenet resurgences and Capetian reconquests. Henry's arrival was first greeted by Henry de Loundres, Archbishop of Dublin and Geoffrey de Marisco, Chief Justiciar of Ireland both of whom were supporters of the king. Having set up a court in exile in Dublin, the Plantagenet supporters quickly set about canvassing for support for King Henry, not just in Ireland but in England and even on the continent. Just as Louis invited Stephen Langton to return to England in December 1219, Verraccio would write to Pope Honorius III in an attempt to convince him to reaffirm the excommunication of the rebel barons and of Prince Louis that Innocent III had instituted. Attempts to achieve recognition of Henry III as rightful king by Frederick II of the Holy Roman Empire fell flat as, while the Emperor did not specifically show his support for Prince Louis, the recent War of Champagnian Succession in 1218 had seen Frederick II and Philip II fighting on the same side. More importantly, it seems, Frederick was unwilling to risk antagonising either King Philip or the, seemingly, victorious Prince Louis while he made preparations to fulfil his promise to go on crusade. Whatever the reasons, however, Frederick would neither show his distinct support for Henry or for Louis at this stage.

    In England, the Plantagenets saw much greater success, especially as Louis' campaigns continued to disinherit various noble lords especially in the North and, while those who were more radically in favour of Louis' rule such as Saer de Quincy and Robert Fitzwalter, would not shift from their position at this point, more ground could be made in regards to those who had sworn allegiance in the wake of Louis' victory or were still relatively neutral. The House de Redvers, for example, would not explicitly turn against Louis but tried to retain some neutrality by not entirely closing themselves off to supporting Henry. As the years went on and Louis' successes turned Northwards, many others soon swore allegiance towards the Plantagenets such as the House de Warenne in 1219 when Saer de Quincy was made the Earl of Surrey. The House de Beaumont was another of those quick to switch sides after fleeing England in 1221 following the elevation of Bohun to the Earldom of Chester and, especially, after the elevation of Henry de Beaumont's nephew, the infant William Maudit to be the 5th Earl of Warwick. William Longespee (the 3rd Earl of Salisbury), already a supporter of the Plantagenets, left England either in 1219 or 1220 and joined Henry in Ireland. 1221 saw many of those of the House Marshal leaving England following Louis' appointment of Gilbert de Clare as the Earl of Pembroke, a title formerly held by the House Marshal but now returned to the House de Clare. This would prove an especially controversial choice by Louis as many of the Marshals, including the eldest son of the famous William Marshal for a time, had actually supported Louis' claim to the throne despite their famous namesakes' support for Henry. By disinheriting the Marshals, Louis had ended any attempt at reconciliation with those elements supporting Henry and had driven the entire family to oppose his claim to the throne. The House d'Aubigny remained torn between Louis and Henry but, despite the allegiances of Philip, the majority stayed in England either with Ralph d'Aubigny or William d'Aubigny, Earl of Lincoln. Another William d'Aubigny had sided with Louis throughout the Baronial Revolt despite being a favourite of King John and was the Earl of Arundel.

    However, it was in the North that Henry found maybe the majority of his support. While many of the lords inhabiting border regions such as Northumberland had started paying homage to the Scottish king due to the instability of England at the time, there was still a significant support base available to Henry. This was especially important as Louis was never able to push much further North than Lincoln during the four years of Henry's exile and was compelled by the death of his father to return to France in 1223. The two secular leaders most important to mention here were the High Sheriffs of Northumberland and Lancashire, Philip of Oldcoates (although there were others at the time) and Jordan Fitzroger respectively. In the absence of any major Earldoms as existed in the South, the role of High Sheriff was one that proved crucial to extending and imposing the king's authority and law in the North of England (although the title existed elsewhere). We'll go into detail later on what this role entailed at the time but, for now, what is important is their role in that they effectively helped carry out the laws of the king and as a result were a major conduit through which the king could exercise his authority across the country and a major part of his influence in the North. That said, the support of John de Lacy, who held significant estates in Lancashire was far from secure at the time as he had been involved in the events leading up to the Magna Carta and one of those barons who had initially rebelled against King John in 1215. This was worsened when John married Margaret de Quincy, daughter of Saer de Quincy in 1221 bringing him closer to the very lords who were, at the time, supporting Prince Louis.

    Further support, however, could be found amongst the clergy, most famously Peter des Roches, Bishop of Winchester who had actually crowned Henry in 1216. Roches was very much a pro-Plantagenet bishop, having served as Chief Justiciar from 1213 and as Sheriff of Hampshire, even if only nominally, after 1216. Roches had been a prominent commander and support of Henry during the Baronial War and had fought, most notably, at Lincoln with distinction and so left England probably in 1219 either with Henry's entourage or shortly after Henry's flight from England. He would remain recognised by both Henry and Pope Honorius as the de jure Bishop of Winchester right through Henry's exile and would return in this capacity following the Plantagenet resurgence of 1223. Pandulf Verraccio, the Papal Legate, and Cardinal Guala Bicchieri, the former Papal Legate who had presided over Henry's coronation, were both staunch supporters of the Plantagenets and, though Bicchieri was not in England at the time, both formed important conduits of Papal legitimacy for Henry III and a link between Henry and the church. That said, the church was far from entirely supportive of Henry's position and, when in 1219 the cathedral chapter of Hereford sought permission for the chapter to hold an election, they actually went to the court of Louis rather than that of Henry as the Earl of Hereford began to swing towards supporting the rebellious barons. This act, in turn, provided some sense of religious legitimacy to Louis and resulted in the election of Hugh Foliot as the Bishop of Hereford in 129, only being consecrated in the same month as Henry's flight from England. Robert Grosseteste, the future Bishop of Lincoln and a very influential scholarly and religious figure in the early 13th Century had been educated because of his connections to William de Vere, a former Bishop of Hereford (until his death in 1198) and the brother of Robert de Vere, Earl of Oxford, who had supported the barons up until the fall of Castle Hedingham in March 1216 but defected to Louis after his arrival later that year. Vere, in turn, defected to Henry upon his ascension in 1217 despite Louis returning Castle Hedingham to him. However, with the defeat of Henry in 1219, Vere turned his allegiance back to Prince Louis in return for having the rest of his lands that had been seized handed back to him. In the North, Henry found huge support from Walter de Gray, the Archbishop of York who had often been a diplomatic envoy for the young king and now acted as one of the main routes of correspondence between the king and England. Situated in York, Gray fell beyond Louis' control as of 1219. This was of vital importance as the Archbishop of York, along with the Bishop of Durham and the Sheriff of Northumberland were of huge importance to imposing control of the North, especially since one king had little authority there and the other was in exile. Indeed, Richard Marsh (the Bishop of Durham) and Philip of Oldcoates were both pro-Plantagenet at the time. However, this was partly undermined by a long-running dispute between the Bishops of Durham and the High Sheriffs of Northumberland over who actually had jurisdiction of the area. The Bishops held that King Ecgfrith of Northumberland had granted a significant portion of land to St Cuthbert in 684 when he was elected to become the Bishop of Lindisfarne. However, since the time of the Norman Conquest, the area had been typically under the jurisdiction the Sheriffs of Northumberland leading to a conflict between both parties as to whether or not the county should belong to the church or to the sheriff. The third and final important clerical figure in Northern England at the time was Hugh of Beaulieu, the unpopular, greedy and vain Bishop of Cumbria. Between these three men as well as the respective High Sheriffs of Northumberland and Lancashire, Henry still held a significant amount of authority in Northern England during his stay in Ireland.

    Indeed, Ireland is the third major region that Henry's entourage began canvassing for support during his four-year regency. Support here generally came from the Anglo-Irish lords, primarily Henry de Loundres and Geoffrey de Marisco who were two of the most important men in Ireland at the time. Men such as Theobald le Botiller, 2nd Chief Butler of Ireland as well as Walter de Lacy, Lord of Meath and Hugh de Lacy, Earl of Ulster all gave their support to Henry throughout 1219-1220. These were the same Lacys who, under John de Lacy, held significant estates in the North of England (specifically Lancashire) and, like John, Walter de Lacy had a loyalty that the Plantagenets didn't entirely trust as Walter had actually rebelled against King John in 1215 (before the Magna Carta) due to a dispute with the Chief Justiciar of Ireland at the time. Moreover, he had been married to William de Braose's daughter which, like John, gave him links to a noble family that supported Prince Louis. The House de Braose was an especially dangerous factor, with links to Llywelyn the Great in Wales as well as reasonable grounds to at least claim very significant estates across both England and Ireland following the rise and fall of William de Braose under King John. Moreover, they had links to a number of different families and supported Prince Louis which secured his position in Wales further. This was a danger no less present in Ireland than it was in England through Margaret de Braose, Lady of Trim and the wife of Walter de Lacy. This meant a significant chunk of land in central Ireland was a potentially shaky allegiance for Henry. That said, he did manage to get their support, at least nominally, between 1219 and 1221. County Wexford was mostly brought to Henry's side by 1221 but certain areas took longer, until 1223 in some cases. In comparison, the Irish lords were a different story. The King of Connacht, Cathal Crobhdearg Ua Conchobair had already fought against the Norman lords in the past and was far from friendly towards the English especially since certain areas such as Breifne were under Norman control at the time while the Irish lords in Ulster were far from happy either although generally too preoccupied fighting amongst themselves to do much about it. Needless to say, this meant that Henry didn't exactly have a secure position in Ireland by 1223 and neither did he have a massive amount of support to return to in England. Yet, with Louis leaving England due to the illness and eventual death of his father that year, an opportunity finally presented itself in which Henry, now reunited with most of his supporters from before his flight to Ireland and with a relatively stable launching point in Ireland for his return to England as well as an available landing point (Lancashire or Cumbria), could finally try to return to England and reclaim his inheritance. News of the death of Philip Augustus in July 1223 reached Ireland quickly and the Plantagenets sprung into action readying ships for a return to England at the first possible opportunity and calling whatever support they could from across Ireland and England. Letters were sent ahead in advance, instructing Plantagenet supporters to ready their forces to meet with the returning king and his army in preparation to retake the country. Now 16, Henry had reached his majority and was ready to become the king of England in his own right, planning to return in spectacular fashion and forces were gathered in from all across the Lordship of Ireland including both Anglo-Irish soldiers are well as soldiers from subject Irish lords. Walter de Lacy and Theobald le Botiller were both to accompany Henry on his campaign (the former possibly to keep an eye on him) along with those supporters who had come from England such as Ranulf de Blondeville, William Longespee, William Marshall, Pandulf Verraccio, Peter des Roches and others.

    The returning Plantagenet army wouldn't leave Ireland until October 1223 with the plan being to land in England before winter set in, which might give Louis the chance to return to England and move to intercept the landing and then winter in Lancashire before marching South-East towards Lincoln and then down Ermine Street to London. Upon landing in Lancashire, Henry's army was soon united with the forces that had been building in the North commanded by Walter and Gilbert Marshal (who hadn't joined Henry in Ireland alongside others of the House Marshal but had remained in the North, probably staying in York with Walter de Gray). The forces were reunited and letters distributed across the country urging the 'rebellious barons' (an important distinction for the Plantagenets who refused to accept the supporters of Louis as anything other than simply rebelling in favour of a pretender) to surrender to the king. As an inducement, Henry swore a solemn oath to uphold the Magna Carta and only to remove nobles from positions they had 'usurped'. While some who were still wavering such as the House de Redvers in the South were more likely to accept this and once again turn their allegiance to Henry, many of those had been rewarded by Louis for their services in the Baronial War were far from enthusiastic about the promises Henry had made because he had effectively promised to take away the lands they had just been given. On one hand, the letter may have simply been a method to try and build more support in England prior to actually pushing south. But it is possible that the term 'usurp' intended to be quite a loosely used term in this case through which Henry may well have intended to justify removing a number of hostile nobles (in a similar manner to what Louis had done). The Earl of Cornwall, for example, would likely have ended up having his lands taken by the king and redistributed to his own supporters while Earl of Hereford may have kept his main Earldom but would have undoubtedly lost Pembroke which would have been returned to the House Marshal. It's also possible that by issuing this letter, Henry was maybe angling for a situation in which he could use the refusal to surrender as a justification to completely disinherit the earls who had refused and thus effectively purge the nobility of his enemies. Whatever the case, the letter didn't go down well for the most part and Henry found himself with little choice but to settle down for winter and prepare his campaign for the following spring.


     
    Chapter 4: The Return of the King (1223-1224)
  • King Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
    Chapter 4: The Return of the King (1223-1224)

    The death of King Philip II in July 1223, effectively ended any hope that Louis might return to England that year in order to secure his position. Rumours had been circulating for months that Henry and Verraccio were planning a return to England, prompted and helped along by communication between many nobles and the Plantagenet court as well as the increasing number of Plantagenet supporters heading to Ireland or meeting in the North. Louis, of course, was by no means unaware of the risk to his position in England that was created by his absence and had left the Earls of Cornwall and Kent in charge of military forces in the region as well as putting Montfort and Langton in powerful administrative positions and these men had been far from inactive in the months leading up to Henry's return. Langton, especially, had been heavily involved in rallying support amongst the nobility in England in an attempt to prevent as many defections as possible should Henry return with a distinct focus on less loyal families and on the lords in regions that posed a potential landing point for Henry. Cornwall was relatively secure, held as it was by Fitzwalter, while the North was effectively beyond the power of either Louis or his supporters. Instead, Wales was to be the main focus for Langton and, to a lesser extent, regions such as Devon, Chester and Salisbury as well the Midlands in an attempt to bolster support at not only potential landing points but potential routes that Henry and his forces might have taken and potential allies of the Plantagenet court in England (Chester and Salisbury, for example, had been recently held by pro-Plantagenet nobles). Definitive news of the Plantagenet preparations in Ireland reached England in late July 1223 which, in turn, led to a meeting held in London in late August by Langton and Montfort and attended by a number of nobles as well as an envoy from the continent. The main goal of this meeting was, quite simply, to discuss the imminent arrival of the Plantagenet forces as well as to make preparations for when they arrived. Feeling that a landing in either the North, Wales or Cornwall was the most likely (due to their proximity to Ireland), an agreement was made to try and counter any potential landings in each area. Fitzwalter and Quincy would return to their respective Earldoms and raise forces in preparation to defend Cornwall against a potential landing by Henry to reclaim the Southwest. Meanwhile, letters were drafted to a number of Welsh lords, including Reginald de Braose to rally their forces in preparation to counter any landing that Henry might choose to make there. Clare, in the meantime, was to return to Gloucester and Pembroke and make further preparations and raise his own levies. The North, the area most removed from Louis' influence, was the area that needed the most attention. Langton immediately began drafting letters to King Alexander II of Scotland (who had paid homage to Louis on behalf of his English estates in 1216), urging him to denounce Henry and refuse to shelter or help the young king and his forces once they arrived in England. Bohun was, in turn, to make preparations for a potential campaign in the North come Spring 1224 in order to reduce the opportunity for Henry to make a concerted landing, while Thomas of Kent (Count of Perche) would head North from Kent to Warwick and meet up with the forces of William Maudit (the infant Earl of Warwick) who would be under the command of Montfort due to the royal guardianship of the young Earl.

    While these decisions may seem to speak of an extraordinary level of cooperation and teamwork between the various pro-Capetian nobles and clergy, the truth is that most of it may well have come as instructions from Louis through his envoy (carefully planned out in advance to cover all his bases) or, if not, were at least done with the overview of Louis and most likely agreed and corroborated in correspondence before the meeting itself took place. Nor should what happened in the build up to Henry's return be mistaken for a unanimous support or loyalty of King Louis, but may well be also attributable to a mixture of loyalty and fear as those who had gained significant estates (such as Bohun, Fitzwalter, Clare, Quincy, Kent and others) seemed to stand to lose those estates (and possibly a whole lot more) should Henry emerge victorious. While Henry's arrival and the letter of November 1223 did nothing to assuage these fears, the reaction was far from the unanimity Louis may have hoped for. The letter served two purposes, to advertise Henry's return and fish for support but also to showcase Henry's intention to fulfil his bargain to his own supporters to not only return their own estates but also to reward them for their continued loyalty. By promising to remove the 'usurpers', the Plantagenets not only attacked Louis (reducing him to nothing more than a pretender) but promised to remove his supporters from the estates they had been granted, the very grants that had disinherited Henry's own supporters. In turn, this not only helped reinforce his position with the noble houses that were already behind him but also served to strengthen his position with those who were still wavering. It seems unlikely that the letter was ever intended to try and sway men like Fitzwalter or Quincy but rather to sway those who fell more in the middle and were, in many cases, shocked at Louis' seeming disregard for the terms set down in the Magna Carta, terms he seemed to have violated by so willingly disinheriting a number of noble houses. Henry's situation was further reinforced by problems in France following Louis' coronation, in which the king began to face serious criticism from a number of his own noble lords (most notably Theobald IV, Count of Champagne) for the vast expenses accrued by the crown and nobility for the campaign in England. Criticism only increased in the wake of Henry's return with a number of nobles drawing attention to the fact that Louis had campaigned in England for almost 7 years and Henry still hadn't been defeated despite large amounts of money that had been filtered into England by Philip as well as soldiers. Louis had quite rightly supported the local, English nobility since they were the ones who had invited him and had provided the majority of his forces while in England as well as funds and local support. That said, however, many nobles felt that their own contributions (financial or, sometimes, in actual military aid) hadn't been properly compensated nor addressed in the wake of Louis' victory and began to make a number of calls for Louis to provide compensation before he could return to England. Some, such as Theobald, went so far as to argue that the entire claim should be dropped and Louis should rather strike a treaty with Henry, promising to drop the claim in return for suitable financial compensation and recognition of French control of the former Angevin lands on the continent. Theobald would come into further conflict with Louis beginning in late 1223 and early 1224 when Louis passed a number of laws restricting the rights of the Jewish population, including declaring the interest on loans to Jews as no longer holding any weight and declaring that loans owed to Jews should be placed under the control of the lords who, in turn, would collect them for them. While Louis had decreed that the Jews should be repaid within three years and many barons willingly accepted this law, Theobald found the agreement that he had set up with the Jewish population (promising their safety in return for taxation) was under threat and tensions continued to grow between him and the crown. These disputes and criticisms would effectively bog Louis down in French politics from 1223 and severely limit his ability to actually campaign extensively in England as he had done prior to Philip II's death.

    As a result, Louis didn't return to England in 1223 as he may well have hoped he could and no reinforcements actually came from France, effectively leaving the pro-Capetian nobles to deal with Henry themselves. Some pro-Plantagenet historians have since termed this the 'Second Baronial War' or even 'Second Baronial Rebellion', arguing that this was not a war between kings but rather the rightful King of England returning to reclaim his throne from the rebellious Barons who held England against him. That said, the conflict has become better known, and is often referred to, as a separate war known as the 'Capetian-Plantagenet War' although some historians have gone on to subsume this within a larger-context conflict covering a number of kings and pretenders even after Louis' death. Louis' inability to return to England in 1223 was disastrous for events in England, leaving his supporters without a king present to actually support and the 'regency' of Montfort and Langton to go on into another year. Langton was controversial to say the least as his standing within the church (the basis upon which his position lay) was by no means strong as he fell on the opposite side of a succession dispute from the Papacy and had already been deposed by the previous Pope once before and Montfort was, in title, no higher than his peers and his continued regency began to irritate many who began to resent his power within the country. Between them, Montfort and Langton held a huge amount of sway and influence, especially in the absence of an actual king on the throne of England. The effect of Louis absence was even more profound on many of the nobles who remained neutral who now began to see that there was only one king in England whose rival wasn't actually able to return. That isn't to say that Henry's forces were completely unified and disagreements quite quickly began breaking out amongst Henry's advisers, most notably between Ranulf de Blondeville and Pandulf Verraccio over how the army should proceed. Verraccio argued that their forces should move straight for Lincoln, thus helping to secure both Fosse Way and Ermine Street and then move down the latter straight to London. Blondeville, meanwhile, advocated that the army should instead march straight South towards Chester, recapturing the Earldom and securing its resources to make a move straight South towards the sea, thus cutting the forces in the East off from those in the West and thus enabling them to secure a power base before making a march on London. Henry had only recently come into his majority and, as a result, his advisers still held a significant amount of influence. But Verraccio's arrogance during Henry's minority had alienated a number of nobles and both the House de Blondeville and House Marshal saw obvious benefits to marching straight South (reclaiming their own Earldoms) which, in turn, won out. Correspondence between the Plantagenets and King Alexander II of Scotland had been going on for years (since 1221 at least) but only increased its pace with Henry's return in 1223, in an attempt to prevent Alexander from coming in on Louis' side or, if possible, to secure his support for Henry's claim instead. For the time being, however, that was not to be the case. Alexander feared that Henry, as king, was much more of a threat to his dominions than Louis was if simply due to the logistics of imposing authority on the North or marching an army up to Scotland, which was much easier for Henry than it was for Louis. Furthermore, the weakness of Louis' rule in England was no small benefit to Scotland and large parts of Northumberland were paying homage to Alexander by 1224, a situation that Henry threatened should he return to the throne. That said, Alexander was not keen to fall entirely in on the side of Louis either and merely agreed not to provide any supplies to the advancing Plantagenet army while also agreeing not to supply the Capetian supporters but refused both requests to provide direct support to either claimant.

    As Henry swept South, the Barons rushed to try and block the advancing Plantagenet forces from continuing onward through Chester. Disaster struck in early spring 1224 when Baldwin de Redvers declared his allegiance to Henry and, given his position as the Earl of Devon, effectively moved to block Fitzwalter from leaving Cornwall and actually going to reinforce his allies in the North. In turn, Quincy (who was still in Winchester at the time) was blocked from taking the most direct route towards Chester and from reinforcing Fitzwalter. This only grew worse when William FitzGeoffrey de Mandeville, Earl of Essex, similarly declared allegiance to Henry shortly afterwards, cutting Kent off from the North and providing Henry with a further ally but one very close to London itself. Fearing an attack on the city of London, Quincy and Kent both agreed to send a number of soldiers to garrison the city who would be commanded by Langton himself (as Montfort had returned in January to Leicester to prepare his own forces). What we can see here is the main disadvantage of Louis' supporters without Louis; their disunity. Fitzwalter was in Cornwall and cut off from Quincy and Kent who were cut off from Montfort and the forces from Warwick. Joint cooperation was achieved in the South around London with a garrison made up of local Londoners as well as forces from both Winchester and Kent. But the main front of the conflict remained in the North, between Henry and those nobles who were able to unite their disparate forces in the North. Under the joint command of Amaury de Montfort and Henry de Bohun, the 'army' arranged to oppose Henry was a force composed of men from Hereford, Chester, Leicester, Braose (in Wales), Gloucester and Pembroke as well as a small detachment sent by Llywellyn the Great of Gwynedd on the request of Braose (who had married in to the family of the Princes of Gwynedd). Clare's forces remained divided, as he continued to garrison his own castles for fear of Redvers attacking the Barons in the rear. In many ways, England had descended into a siege scenario in which Redvers held Fitzwalter and Quincy in check while Clare, Fitzwalter and Quincy held Redvers in check. FitzGeoffrey held Kent in check but was limited in what he himself could do due to fears of an attack in the rear by the Earldom of Norfolk as well as still hostile forces under the command of Langton in London. The entire war seemed to depend on the two main forces on the field; the Baronial forces under Montfort and Bohun and the Plantagenet forces under Henry.

    Determined to block the advance of the Plantagenet forces, Montfort and Bohun moved to a place called Warrington, which formed the crossing point of the River Mersey in the North of Chester and there made their preparations to meet the Plantagenets in battle, hoping to prevent them from crossing the river and moving to unite with Redvers in the South. Montfort had moved quickly, returning to Leicester in January 1224 and mobilising what forces he could as quickly as possible before rushing North to reach Mersey before Henry. Montfort's preparations had paid off and the bulk of the Baronial forces had managed to mobilise at Warrington before Henry despite their disparate positions. Lancaster itself is only about 30 miles from Warrington so it is undoubted that both Montfort had already had Bohun reinforce the river during 1223 and likely that Braose and Clare were encouraged to send their forces earlier in the year than usual in an attempt (however risky due to lack of supplies) to reach the Mersey before Henry. Nevertheless, the Battle of Warrington on 17th March 1224 would come to be one of the most important battles of the war. Initially, the Baronial forces, although outnumbered, quite effectively managed to resist the attacking Plantagenets over the course of a number of hours, eventually managing to drive the attackers into a retreat. What happened next has been alternatively attributed to overconfidence on the part of the Barons who had successfully resisted the attacking Plantagenets or Baronial fears that if they didn't follow up their success with a counter-attack, Henry would simply re-encamp and continue trying day after day until his forces either broke the Baronial line or the Barons ran out of men to resist with. Whatever the case, the Baronial forces ended up actually abandoning the bridge in favour of a counter-attack against the, seemingly, broken and disoriented Plantagenet forces. One historian quite famously said of what followed;

    'They made it across the river and that was it.'
    Indeed, that would prove to be the extent of Baronial successes that day. Finding the Plantagenets not quite as broken as they had hoped or thought, the Baronial forces soon found themselves back on the defensive as the superior numbers of the Plantagenets were now actually able to surround their opponents and a ferocious assault led by Blondeville finally broke their resolve. Now trying to push back across the bridge, the Baronial forces were cut down by missile fire from the Plantagenets in their rear before a cavalry charge finally put an end to any attempts to retake the position they had held before the attack. Broken, their retreat descended into a panicked rout as the Plantagenets descended upon them. The survivors were scattered, many fleeing to Wales to either Llywellyn or, more commonly, Reginald de Braose or instead heading South-East towards Leicester. Montfort very definitely escaped the battle, fleeing back South to Leicester with the survivors of his retinue but Bohun's fate is less certain. We know for a fact he was captured at some point, either in the battle itself or shortly after near Gloucester. Either way, his fate ultimately remained the same. It was here that Henry showed his biggest strength in fighting against Louis, his willingness and ability to learn from his predecessor's mistakes and act in a conciliatory manner towards the barons. After capturing Bohun in March/April 1224, Henry officially had Bohun 'step down from the Earldom of Chester' and restored it to Blondeville. Bohun then made a very public proclamation of his loyalty to Henry and denunciation of Louis' claim as being false and Louis himself as being a usurper and then was allowed to return to his position as the Earl of Hereford. As he continued South, Henry did the same thing with Clare in turn in May 1224, having Clare 'step down' from being Earl of Pembroke and proclaiming Henry as rightful king while denouncing Louis as a usurper. As he went, Henry made a point of restoring his own supporters to their previous positions, making William Marshal the 2nd Earl of Pembroke (thus denying that Clare was ever the rightful Earl of Pembroke by saying that the late William Marshal was the 1st Earl of Pembroke and his son, William Marshal was the 2nd Earl of Pembroke rather than the 3rd, as he would be if Clare were a legitimate Earl). In doing so, Henry was very much making a point of showing himself as a conciliatory king, quite willing to uphold the Magna Carta that both John and Louis had failed to uphold. William de Ferrers was restored as the Earl of Derby, William Longespee as the Earl of Salisbury and Henry de Beaumont as the Earl of Warwick.

    Henry united with Redvers in May 1224, effectively trapping Fitzwalter in Cornwall and allowing Henry complete freedom to march on London throughout summer of 1224, pushing through Quincy's attempts at resisting him and finally forcing Quincy to flee, first to Surrey and then, as a separate force moved along the Southern coast, to Kent where he met up with Thomas. Finally, in September 1224, Henry arrived in London, the king victorious. In a scene now famous for its hundreds of depictions and its celebration in the art of later centuries, Henry finally took the throne of England, 8 years after being crowned king. Solemnly marching down the hall, in a scene undoubtedly prepared for and choreographed, Henry was flanked by Blondeville on one side and Verraccio on the other (two of his main supporters and symbolising both the secular and clerical worlds). Henry's return to the throne seemed as clean as possible given the circumstances, the Barons had been swept aside as compared to the slower and harder conquest of Louis from 1216-19. But the situation was not in any way 'clean'. Braose was still active in Wales, Fitzwalter in Cornwall, Montfort in Leicester, Bigod in Norfolk and Quincy, Thomas of Kent and Langton were all still active in Kent. Henry had presented himself as this noble king upholding the Magna Carta but as far back as 1216, when his regents first reissued it, there had been clauses that had been changed so that the Magna Carta would be more favourable to the papacy than it had initially been. Henry had taken the throne easier than Louis had but his opposition hadn't been crushed and Louis hadn't been inactive during this period. Rather, if Henry wished to keep the throne, it was going to be a long fight.
     
    Chapter 5: The Capetian Interregnum (1224-1228)
  • King Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
    Chapter 5: The Capetian Interregnum (1224-1228)


    france1223.jpg

    France in 1223 upon the ascension of Louis VIII (note: It doesn't acknowledge the annexation of Gascogne by Philip II in the 1220s which still wasn't fully complete as of 1223 and would be completed in the period between 1224 and 1228)
    Many of the pro-Capetian historians of the period covering Louis' rise from Prince of France to King of France and England have come to refer to the period between Henry's capture of London in September 1224 and the Capetian Resurgence in 1228 as the 'Capetian Interregnum' with some even refusing to accept Henry as being a legitimate king. Other historians simply refer to this entire area of study as one of two kings between whom the throne shifts with King John up until 1216 and then Henry until 1219 followed by Louis until 1223 and then Henry again until 1228. Part of Henry's success during this period was built upon how effectively he played upon divisions within France to effectively hold Louis at bay and to prevent him from being able to actually return to England, buying Henry valuable time to move against the resisting barons in England. As of September 1224, Louis had no option to return to England, facing discontent amongst his vassals for the expenses and perceived failure of the campaigns in England thus far as well as a distinct lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many of the more powerful figures in European politics at the time. In France, the general feeling was that Louis should make a peace treaty with Henry which would have Henry cede the former Angevin lands in France to the French and have Louis drop his claims to the throne of England. Instead, the prevailing view amongst both the French nobility and within the Papacy was that Louis should turn his attention South towards Languedoc and the Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars in the region. Nobody would support a return to England because it seemed to be nothing but costly, dangerous and not even legitimate according to either the rules of succession nor the Pope and Henry was well aware of this. In October 1224, Henry sent an emissary to Louis offering relatively favourable peace terms under which Louis would be allowed to keep the former Angevin lands and would receive significant compensation from Henry in return for dropping any and all claims to the throne of England and denouncing Fitzwalter and the other 'rebel' barons. By doing this, Henry was effectively putting Louis in a no-win scenario in which acceptance forced him to drop his claims to the throne of England and isolated the barons who continued to resist but refusal simply alienated the nobility of France. As an added incentive, Henry made an offer to contribute to any attempts by Louis to involve himself in the Albigensian Crusade, helping secure Papal legitimacy and support for his peace terms and thus helping drive Louis closer to an acceptance of the terms Henry proposed. The situation was further complicated for both sides by constant correspondence between the resisting English barons and King Louis including visits by both Thomas of Kent and Amaury de Montfort in an attempt to convince Louis that the situation in England could still be salvaged and not to abandon his attempts to take the throne. Brittany formed another complicating factor, as Peter of Dreux (former Peter I of Brittany jure uxoris and regent for the young John I) effectively posed a party with a vested interest that could swing either way. As it was, Peter had spent much of his life trying to secure his position as the Earl of Richmond as well as the associated income from the Earldom which meant that both Henry and Louis, depending on who won the war, had the power to ensure Peter's position as Earl and, as a result, to ensure that Richmond would pass to John upon Peter's death. This was further made difficult for Peter because the tradition in France was that John would only become ruler, upon his majority, of whatever lands he had inherited which meant that, contrary to 1214 where Peter seemed to have allowed John to pass through his territory for free, he couldn't risk angering Louis without risking Louis depriving John of certain gains made after Peter's wife's death. What this effectively meant was that the situation in England didn't appear hopeless to Louis as of September 1224 and this effectively increased his determination to effect a return to the country as soon as possible as he knew he had supporters in England and had a basis for support from Brittany (as well as Perche and Montfort) to effect a potential return.

    Even in England, the situation was far from desperate for Louis' supporters. On one hand, his continued absence from the country demoralised his supporters and the increasing pressure from Henry on their respective territories as well as the fact that they were spread out across the country effectively served to demoralise and weaken them further. But resistance remained heavy from Louis' supporters along the Southern coast and with the French still holding the English Channel, communication could be continued between Louis and his supporters in England as well as, if the need should arise, transport for the nobles to flee the country. The problem was that with Louis' supporters spread out, Henry's forces were effectively spread thin trying to push back all of them at once as well as to prevent any counter-attacks which, in turn, would leave him vulnerable should Louis manage to actually raise a force to move against Henry. While Henry attempted to facilitate resistance to Louis' plans to return to England, Louis in turn moved to secure his position in the country even in his absence. In late 1224, he signed a treaty with King Alexander II of Scotland in which Alexander would recognise Louis' claim to the throne of England and would provide a contingent of soldiers in return for potential support from the French king against the Norwegians to the North as well as securing other concessions such as a trading agreement and possibly some financial compensation (details are sometimes sketchy on the exact nature of the treaty).

    In many ways, the period between September 1224 and April 1228 is fascinating because it largely devolves into this game of politics played throughout Europe as both Louis and Henry begin to weave these webs of alliances in order to secure recognition for their various claims and to ensure allies against the other. In France, the main point of resistance to Louis came in the form of Theobald IV of Champagne, a powerful vassal who had begun to butt heads with Louis over the rights of the Jews within France. During Theobald's minority, Champagne had been involved in a succession dispute and the local Jewish population had played a large role in securing his victory and so Louis' policies against the Jews early in his reign quite quickly led to disputes between Theobald and the King. When Louis passed his anti-Jewish policies in 1223, Theobald refused to enact them and the feud grew ever deeper when Theobald became a major advocate against a return to England. Henry was only too keen to play upon this division and rumours soon began to spread amongst those in support or, at least, less opposed to a return to England of collusion between Theobald and Henry to prevent Louis enforcing his claims to England. Henry's successes in England throughout 1224 worsened these accusations in Louis' eyes and growing enmity between Theobald and Louis throughout the period led to both Theobald and Hugh X of Lusignan (who was married to King John's widow and had been accused of being influenced by Isabella to support Henry) being called to answer charges of treason in November 1224 for the alleged collusion with Henry III. Possibly fearing that they would be found guilty if they did appear before the king, Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan refused to appear before Louis, rather sending letters denying the charges and professing their loyalty to the crown. It wasn't enough. After they refused a second summons to appear before the court, Louis issued a statement to the effect of branding both Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan as traitors to the crown in December 1224.

    Whether or not the accusations that Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan had been working with King Henry III is up for debate and nobody has ever been able to establish conclusive evidence either way in the build-up to Theobald's Revolt. Nevertheless, the revolt was seemingly a perfect scenario for King Henry and one that seemed likely to distract Louis for long enough for him to finish up in England. Beginning with Louis' statement in December 1224, Theobald's revolt was an event marked more by its impact rather than its effectiveness as resistance to Louis. The issue for both Theobald and Hugh (and his wife Isabella of Angouleme) was that the lands revolting were relatively small in number. The entire revolt was basically the Count of Champagne (Theobald IV), the Count of Lusignan and his wife the Countess of Angouleme. Furthermore, Champagne was pretty much isolated from Lusignan and Angouleme by the royal demesne which cut right between the two as well as the sheer distance between Champagne and the two other counties. As a result, some historians have gone so far as to divide the entire revolt into two smaller rebellions: Hugh and Isabella's Revolt (1224-1225) and Theobald's Revolt (1224-1226). The differences in dates only actually support this idea further as both Hugh and Isabella were beaten long before Theobald was. This isn't to say, however, that Theobald was entirely lacking in advantages as he still had a very powerful county under his command and the financial backing of the Jewish population in Troyes as well as being a capable commander himself. Furthermore, he wasn't actually that far from Paris itself (with Troyes and Paris being separated by only 178 km).

    Campaigning, of course, wouldn't actually begin until Spring 1225, by which point both Louis and Theobald had made significant moves gearing up towards a war. Problems emerged very quickly for Theobald who found that Louis hadn't wasted his winter, having opened up communication with Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt (Theobald's former enemy in the War of Champagnian Succession), promising Erard Champagne in return for support against Theobald. As a result, with the arrival of Spring in 1225, Theobald found himself much closer to the enemy than he had initially expected with Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt (Lord of Ramerupt and Venizy, both of which were more-or-less on the doorstep of Troyes). The two forces met in March 1225 at the Battle of Ramerupt where Theobald's larger force (and his greater tactical skill) swept Erard's army aside in a bloody yet quick engagement that sent Erard back very quickly towards Paris. The surrender of both Ramerupt and Venizy shortly afterwards further solidified this victory. But Erard's flight took him right into the path of the advancing King Louis (who was leading the larger part of his force towards Troyes while his forces in the West fought against Hugh and Isabella under the command of John Tristan, Count of Maine.

    Tristan, like Louis, swept South almost immediately in March 1225 with the intent of crushing Isabella and Hugh quickly so that the force under his command might go to support Louis' forces in the East. Tristan was a new vassal, having been given the County of Maine following its annexation by Philip II and this meant that he was a man very much seeking to secure recognition and support of King Louis and an important supporter in Northern France, especially if Louis wished to return to England. Isabella and Hugh hadn't been idle either, having raised their forces in preparation for an engagement against any potential invasion from the North. The two forces met at the Battle of Thouars in April, an ultimately indecisive battle between the relatively equal forces under Tristan (composed of his own retinue from Maine as well as further reinforcements from Normany, Anjou and Poitou) and those under Isabella and Hugh (composed of forces from Angouleme and Lusignan). While the Battle of Thouars was ultimately a stalemate, Isabella and Hugh had no scope to actually remain North of Poitiers for long and were forced to retreat, meeting Tristan once again at the Battle of Poitiers in May where they were soundly defeated. From here, Tristan pushed ever further South, capturing Angouleme after a short siege in August and laying siege to Lusignan in November, leading to the surrender of Hugh and Isabella in late November 1225.

    Theobald was much harder for Louis to deal with, having greater resources than Hugh and Isabella could muster as Champagne had emerged from the succession crisis, much stronger than before. That said, Theobald was at risk of being surrounded very quickly should Erard convince his cousin (Count Walter IV of Brienne) to invade Champagne from the East (Walter was heavily involved in affairs in the Holy Lands at the time however). As a result, he needed a decisive victory quickly if he were to actually win the war because time was plainly not on his side. Ultimately, it has been argued that Theobald never really stood a chance against Louis because, at the end of the day, Louis had much greater financial and military resources than Theobald could ever hope to muster. The result of this was that when Louis and Theobald finally met on the battlefield at the Battle of the Seine (on the banks of the eponymous river which flows through both Troyes and Paris) in April. As compared to the previous Battle of Ramerupt, the Battle of the Seine was not a clear nor decisive victory for either side and, while Louis did end up holding the field at the end of the day and routing a significant portion of Theobald's left wing, the Champagnian forces were by no means entirely destroyed. This situation was ultimately not resolved with the even more indecisive Second Battle of the Seine only two months later in July.

    Theobald and Louis would meet one more time on the battlefield at the infamous Battle of Troyes in August 1225 which preceded the bloody and long Siege of Troyes. The basic outline of the battle is that Theobald's forces initially pushed Louis back, even managing to almost overwhelm a significant portion of his army. However, Theobald's centre ended up dangerously overextended due to having managed to push the enemy further and faster than the two flanks. The result of this was that the centre ended up cut off from the two flanks, surrounded and almost annihilated. The battle, however, continued on into the evening as poor communication on both sides prevented either Louis or Theobald from really appreciating the scale of what had happened to Theobald's centre. In turn, the two flanks continued fighting for hours even after the centre had been annihilated and the battle descended into a bloodbath on both sides before Theobald, realising he was getting the worst of the situation, retreated back into the city and barred the gates. It was only in the aftermath of the battle that Theobald could finally appreciate just what had happened in the battle with some estimates putting the number dead overall (across both armies) at about 5-6000 (a significant number in Medieval Europe). Realising that Theobald had lost a very significant portion of his force in the battle, Louis sent an emissary calling for Theobald's immediate surrender. Theobald, seemingly, refused although stories that he sent back the emissary's head with its eyes gouged out and teeth missing (or a dozen other variations on the story) are undoubtedly myths. The result was the Siege of Troyes which, due to the onset of winter and the fact that Tristan wouldn't arrive until May 1226 as well as Theobald's own determination and tactical command, wouldn't actually conclude until the defenders finally surrendered in July 1226.

    Theobald was promptly taken in chains to Paris where he was tried before the king and court and found guilty of treason and rebellion and sentenced to death. He was executed in Paris in August 1226. On one hand, the conflict was devastating for Louis because the resources required to defeat Theobald and the distraction it provided meant that Louis' return to England was even further delayed, resulting in Henry making further gains against the resisting vassals in England. But on the other hand, the war had devastated Champagne but not so much that it would never recover and it remained a powerful county that was now handed over to a loyal vassal in the form of the new Count Erard of Champagne on the condition that he swear another oath of loyalty to Louis and promise to provide soldiers for a return to England. Hugh and Isabella were pardoned after a short period of imprisonment from December 1225 to August 1226 and allowed to keep their titles on the condition that both swear loyalty to Louis, promise to provide soldiers for a return to England and pay a hefty fine to the crown. What this effectively meant was that Louis now had some very significant support in France starting to build up that could, soon, be turned to a war in England.

    This support only grew starting in 1225 with the resumption of the Albigensian Crusade when, in November 1225, Raymond of Toulouse had been excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX and a call for a renewed crusade in Toulouse issued. The Albigensian Crusade had stalled since 1216 when both Simon de Montfort and Innocent III had died leaving the crusade without any leaders save for the cautious (and from 1223, dead) Philip II as Amaury de Montfort was busy in England and so too was Louis. Caught in the midst of a revolt and well aware that the lack of papal support had cost him dearly in England so far, Louis began moving to endear himself towards the pope, publicly taking up the cross in return for papal denouncement of the rebelling nobles in France. Initially, the forces sent by Louis were relatively small while he focused on putting down Theobald in the North but with the end of the revolt in June 1226, Louis found himself finally freed up to move South against Toulouse in force. Funded by a tax authorised by the pope at the same council at which Raymond VII of Toulouse had been excommunicated, Louis swept down into Toulouse in August with fortified cities and castles quickly and easily surrendering to him. Avignon, which was nominally ruled by Emperor Frederick II of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), however did choose to resist Louis leading to a three-month siege between August and November 1226. As the conflict continued on into 1227, the resisting Cathars found themselves increasingly desperate as their manpower wore thin and their ability to prevent the crusaders from ravaging their lands began to run out. It is at this point that the most important details in regards to the conflict between the Capetians and the Plantagenets emerge, the Siege of Avignon (1226) and the Excommunication of Frederick II (September 1227).

    The Siege of Avignon effectively set the relations between the King of France and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire on a very distinct downward trend as Louis pointedly ignored Frederick's protests that Avignon was under his rule and took the city himself in November. In comparison, the latter event effectively set the tone for French-Papal relations in coming decades. With Frederick excommunicated, the beginnings of yet another conflict between the papacy and the empire began to stir and Gregory was well aware that he needed allies if he were to come out on top against Frederick. It should be no wonder, then, that Louis was the obvious choice. As the king of an increasingly powerful kingdom with an interest in balancing out the power of the Holy Roman Emperor, Louis was a much safer bet not just for his strength but his proximity and relatively stability (despite the recent revolt) compared to the more distant Henry III. This was exactly what Louis needed. Louis' peace terms to Raymond VII in early 1228 were probably modelled on what he had done with Hugh only two years earlier, allowing Raymond to keep his titles and lands in return for support against his enemies, particularly the Cathars. Raymond's daughter, Joan, was to be married to Louis' eldest son, Louis (the future Louis IX) to further secure the support of the County of Toulouse. Raymond ended up imprisoned for a time in early 1228 before finally being released with a sizeable fine and indemnity to be paid to the crown. What we see here is a distinct departure from the very tactics Louis had used in England, tactics which had alienated nobles and led to him losing England in the first place back in 1224.

    Theobald's defeat, Hugh's imprisonment and now the defeat of Raymond had served to very efficiently secure support wherever possible for Louis to finally do what he had been hoping to do ever since his coronation; return to England. But, most importantly, the excommunication of Frederick II in September 1227 gave Louis the leverage he needed to secure a shift in Papal support. In return for a promise to support the Papacy and her Italian allies against Frederick's encroachments as well as recognition of the illegitimacy of Frederick's claims to the throne of Sicily, Louis was able to finally bargain Papal recognition of his claim to the throne of England. At this stage, it is possible that Gregory didn't go so far as to give definitive support for Louis as the King of England but rather stopped contesting or denying his claims to the throne and maybe hinted that, should Louis retake the country, he could probably be crowned with Papal support and recognition. Whatever the case, the change in how the papacy officially regarded the entire Capetian-Plantagenet conflict would prove especially important in areas where support for Louis was waning, bolstering the resolve of his supporters in England and allowing Louis to make some real headway towards securing support from Peter of Dreux. This came to a head with the Treaty of Nantes in January 1228 in which Peter promised to provide a contingent of Bretons and renew his oath of fealty in return for Louis confirming him as the Earl of Richmond and John I of Brittany as the heir to the Earldom as well as Brittany. With this, Louis finally jumped into action, raising forces from his own demesne as well as from Champagne, Montfort, Perche, Lusignan, Angouleme, Maine (under the aforementioned John Tristan) and a contingent from Toulouse while once again enlisting Eustace the Monk as his primary naval commander against the Plantagenets. Finally, in April 1228 he issued a statement proclaiming himself as the rightful king of England and stating his intent to return to the country as soon as possible before finally setting sail later that month.

    ----------
    Notes from the author:

    1) On the Albigensian Crusade: In our timeline Louis VII actually did take part in the crusade at around the same time (albeit leaving in June rather than August). Many of the castles and towns did surrender OTL and I saw few reasons why this should change in this timeline, especially given Louis' recent success against Theobald. Once again, Avignon resists ITTL as it did in OTL but with the major change (because of Louis' later arrival) of Louis not getting sick and dying as he did IOTL. With greater pressure from the French crown and Louis in command, the crusade progresses faster ITTL than IOTL and Raymond surrenders in early 1228 rather than 1229.

    2) On conflicts in Chapter 5: I've skimmed over Theobald's Revolt as well as Henry's operations against the rebelling vassals in England and the exact details of the Albigensian Crusade so as to keep the chapter from becoming too long, rather I've focused on saying the basics of what happened and why and the outcomes.

    3) EDIT: 14/08/2017. Changes in bold.
     
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    Chapter 6: Plantagenets Victorious (1224-1227)
  • Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
    Chapter 6: Plantagenets Victorious (1224-1227):

    Before the events surrounding Louis' return to England in 1228 can properly be considered, we need to turn out attention to the events of Henry's four year stretch as King of England from 1224 to 1228 so that we understand the situation in England upon Louis' return. As of September 1224, Henry finally sat in London as the King of England in his own right and yet, despite his successes over the last few months, resistance remained strong in a number of areas throughout the country. The two primary regions of resistance at the time of the fall of London were the South-East (from Winchester in the West to Kent in the East) held by Saer de Quincy and Thomas of Kent and Cornwall, held by Robert Fitzwalter. In the West, Reginald de Braose (who had been given estates by Louis that had been confiscated by King John) continued his resistance against Henry with the help of Llwellyn the Great (who had often fought with Braose against King John). In the North, resistance was headed in both Leicester and Lincoln by Amaury de Montfort. What this meant was that, even as Henry controlled much of the North-West and a sizeable portion of the Southern coast as well as London, he was surrounded on every side by enemies. This was a situation worsened for Henry by the nature of these enemies, many of whom were stronger supporters of Louis' claims to the throne and stood to potentially lose a lot in the wake of Henry's statement upon returning to England. Montfort, Kent, Quincy and Fitzwalter all stood to lose Earldoms should they be defeated while Braose was effectively kept in resistance to Henry by Llwellyn's sizeable influence throughout Wales. Correspondence between Louis and his English supporters continued extensively between 1224 and 1228 and, in the French king's absence, was the main method by which Louis could provide support and moral boosting to his allies on the English mainland. While the French nobility would not support an actual conflict in England, this also didn't prevent Louis from providing some actual help for his allies through the occasional deposit of money and even, on one occasion, helping them to hire some mercenaries to help resist Henry. Combined with the tendency for both France and Scotland to provide refuge for rebellious nobles should Henry manage to oust them from their lands and the French domination of the seas between England and France (Henry hadn't had much of a chance to really recover any naval strength after Dover, having been on the back foot until his defeat in 1219 and then in exile until 1223), these factors all effectively played into why, despite being free from the risk of Louis actually invading until 1228, Henry never managed to actually defeat the rebellious vassals.

    This doesn't mean that, contrary to what some people have come to believe, Henry had no chance of ever actually defeating the rebels in the first place. After the sweeping successes of 1224 and the defection or subjugation of a number of Louis' 'supporters', Henry was very much winning the war. Upon taking London in September 1224, Henry issued a letter calling for the surrender of the still-rebellious vassals, offering a pardon if they laid down their arms and renounced their support for Louis. Possibly still confident that Louis would return imminently or worried about losing the lands they had only just gained, the response from the still-resisting nobles was lukewarm at best. It's very possible that Henry anticipated this very response and, by refusing to lay down their arms, the remaining nobles had allowed themselves to be branded traitors to the crown, legitimising whatever punishment Henry saw fit upon their defeat. Henry, of course, wasted no time in pointing this out, denouncing all of them as traitors to the crown and calling for their capture. Some have argued that Henry's choice to denounce them as traitors was probably his biggest mistake because it made his enemies desperate and only drove them to resist all the harder. But, in context, it's a problematic argument to make because Henry had little reason to think that he wasn't going to win given the circumstances which, seemingly, were very much against Louis as of 1224 and by branding them traitors there and then, he was making a statement that disloyalty wouldn't be tolerated. There's little doubt this was aimed at people who had defected from Louis to Henry in 1223, whether voluntarily or under duress. That said, the response was what Henry possibly should have expected: resistance. By declaring Fitzwalter and his allies traitors, he gave them little to lose and, in turn, drove them to subsequently denounce Henry as king (on the basis that King John had forfeited his right to rule when he broke faith with the nobles and refused to uphold the Magna Carta, which Henry had followed through on by altering the terms when he reissued it) and pronounce Louis the rightful king. With the onset of winter, the two sides settled in for a protracted game of diplomacy throughout the British Isles.

    As Henry moved to undermine Louis both in England and in France, Louis' barons worked just as hard to undermine Henry in their own favour. Correspondence continued between Louis and King Alexander II of Scotland with the assistance (and often use) of the pro-Capetian nobility in England which, in turn, led to the 'Treaty of Edinburgh' between Louis and Alexander in December 1224 in which Alexander promised to recognise and assist Louis with his claims to the throne of England in return for Louis' support against Scottish enemies to the North. Beyond this, the two kings established a trade deal. For the time being, the importance of this treaty was in how it effectively gave the barons a powerful ally in the British Isles who could not only provide soldiers when the time came but potentially refuge and even diplomatic or financial support. Correspondence between Reginald and his sister Margaret (Lady of Trim) and her husband, Walter de Lacy (Lord of Meath) show a distinct hope to try and undermine Henry's support back in Ireland and it seems likely that there may have been some correspondence between the still-rebellious vassals and those who had been forced to side with Henry under duress in 1223-4. Further issues in Ireland for Henry probably came from correspondence between the pro-Capetian nobles and the Irish lords and petty kings, possibly hoping to distract Henry with another conflict in Ireland to further stretch his resources. Many of these attempts fostered by the pro-Capetian nobles wouldn't actually come into proper effect until as late as 1228 as we'll see during the Capetian Resurgence and, when campaigning began again in 1225, their efforts were hindered by their inability to actually defeat Henry.

    Determined to secure Kent and prevent Louis from maintaining control of the most easily accessible landing point in Britain, the bulk of Henry's efforts were concentrated in the South-East under his own command as he swept down upon Quincy and Thomas of Kent in the hope of quickly crushing them and securing his position so that he could turn elsewhere. The campaign was to be decided at Rochester Castle because it formed the lowest crossing point of the River Medway and, as such, the quickest route by which Henry could hope to reach the Cinque Ports and capture Kent and everyone knew that. While Henry was determined to capture the castle, Louis was just as determined to prevent it from falling and, according to some sources, invested his own money into hiring Brabantian mercenaries to support the barons at Rochester. The two forces met at the Battle of Rochester Castle and, after a quick engagement, Henry drove the baronial forces back and laid siege to the castle, a siege that would drag on far longer than Henry had probably hoped. Ultimately, Rochester wouldn't fall until November 1225 by which point it was too late for further campaigning until spring 1226. While Henry's return to campaigning in 1226 proved successful, driving quickly through most of Kent and making significant inroads (with the help of Redvers in Devon) into Winchester by June, the onset of winter and the time spent at Rochester in the first place had allowed Kent and Quincy to fall back upon Dover Castle and to hold it against Henry. The focus on the South-East, however, proved detrimental elsewhere in the country. While Montfort was soundly defeated by Blondeville at the Battle of Leicester in July 1225 and then driven fully out of both Leicester and Lincoln by July 1226, the campaigns in Cornwall didn't go quite as well. By December 1226, Leicester and Lincoln had fallen while Dover Castle was under siege, a siege that floundered due to the skills of Eustace the Monk. Given French naval dominance and Eustace's skills as a pirate, the siege of Dover Castle dragged on and on due to the constant smuggling in of food and even reinforcements to the castle. Fitzwalter had fallen back further into Cornwall but still held a number of castles with plans to flee to France should the need arise and constant correspondence requesting whatever help Alexander or Louis could provide. In Wales, the situation hadn't gone well at all for Henry and the forces led by the Marshals had found themselves bogged down and soundly defeated by the Welsh and Braosian forces in a number of engagements, culminating in a few incursions into Pembroke throughout 1226.

    The shifting events and attitudes in France in 1227 began to mark the point at which the tide began to turn in England. Worries of a shifting papal attitude towards the conflict and the inability of Henry to seemingly gain a decisive victory began to undermine his situation back home as the costs began to mount (and, given his lack of control in the country he didn't have money to spare) and Louis was finally freeing himself up to possibly return. This wasn't helped by the fact that not only was Louis building support back in France but he was increasingly appearing like a better option, having taken the cross of crusade and having restored order to France by crushing Theobald's rebellion by 1226 (something Henry had failed to do in 4 years). The toll this began to take was more than just psychological, there were a number of nobles whose loyalty to Henry wasn't exactly firm and with events in France suggesting that Louis might soon return to take back the throne, events began to shift into motion. Correspondence began to pick up once again between Reginald and his sister as well as between Fitzwalter and the Earls of Hereford and Gloucester. Montfort finally resurfaced in France in 1227 and the siege of Dover Castle began to fall into a slump as discontent began to spread amongst the nobility within Henry's army. Discontent and rumour abound throughout the country and, just across the Channel, the French King engineered his return.
     
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    Chapter 7: The Capetian Resurgence and the End of the Capetian-Plantagenet War (1227-1230)
  • Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
    Chapter 7: The Capetian Resurgence and the end of the Capetian-Plantagenet War (1227-1230 )

    News of Louis' imminent return was a massive boost to the resolve of the pro-Capetian nobility in England but, more importantly, was accompanied by some significant moves made by Louis in the build-up to his return. From as early as November 1227, the pace at which soldiers and resources were smuggled into Dover Castle began to increase and correspondence between Louis and his supporters in England picked up significantly as well. The Treaty of Nantes in January 1228 and the declaration of Louis' rightful kingship April only served to further weaken Henry's position in England. Needless to say, the response and result was panicked within the Plantagenet nobility as all the main players in Henry's court were spread out across England. Henry had been fighting since 1223 to reestablish his control and, even as he fought the pro-Capetian nobles in the South, he was constantly putting up with raids across the border from Alexander of Scotland, raids which only picked up with the Treaty of Edinburgh in December 1224 and increased massively in 1227 and 1228. Along the Southern coast, Henry was being faced with raids by Eustace and the French fleet, not to mention smuggling which only slowed down any gains being made in the Siege of Dover Castle. Those vassals who had been pressured to turn on Louis such as the Earls of Hereford and Gloucester began to become problematic once again for Henry and correspondence picked up between them and the resisting barons. Henry was well aware that he needed to capture Dover Castle if he wished to prevent Louis from landing but resistance and discontent amongst his army only slowed things down further, especially as Ranulf de Blondeville, Earl of Chester began voicing concerns that Hereford and Gloucester might turn on Henry and invade Chester and began asking for permission to take his retinue and return to Chester. Some worried that Henry risked being cut off from London should he fail to take Dover Castle before Louis could return to England, a worry exacerbated by Eustace capturing the Cinque Ports in April which forced Henry to send a contingent under Hugh de Vere, Earl of Oxford, to dislodge the French forces from the ports.

    In Wales, the campaigns of the Marshal family came to a halt from January onward amidst disagreements between the Marshal family and the Earl of Gloucester, culminating in the desertion of Gloucester in March 1224 and a treaty between Llywellyn in which Louis recognised him as the Prince of Wales in return for Llywellyn's acknowledgement and support for Louis' claim to the throne of England. Ultimately, the return of Louis in late April was the point at which the boiling pot of 1220s England finally exploded. It began with a relatively simple engagement as Louis' forces landed in Kent and quickly overran the defenders of the Cinque Ports, driving Vere back to Dover Castle to report the landing of the French army. Fearing that he would end up being trapped between a rock and a hard place should he try to keep up the siege, Henry instead opted to break the siege of the castle and retreat as quickly as possible to London where he could assemble his forces in preparation to meet Louis in battle. But it's at this point that the negotiations between the rebelling vassals and Henry's supporters began to show themselves as discontent amongst the Irish forces led by the House de Braose led to Henry dismissing them from his army in May 1228 while Gilbert de Clare (Earl of Gloucester) defected to Louis in June and Henry de Bohun (Earl of Hereford) defected in July. William d'Aubigny (Earl of Arundel) and William FitzGeoffrey de Mandeville returned to Louis' side in September following further victories against the Plantagenet forces. But Louis had no intention of letting Henry unite with the greater part of his supporters across the country and made a beeline for Rochester Castle, hoping to take the castle and prevent Henry from crossing over towards London. The problem for Henry came when Louis ran into the dismissed forces of the House de Braose in early June 1228 and, there, received oaths of loyalty from Margaret of Trim (by correspondence later in the month) and Walter de Lacy, bolstering his forces further. The subsequent Battle of Rochester and the events that would follow are the culmination of 4 years' efforts to undermine and outdo Henry on every front. Louis had no chance of capturing Rochester before Henry could arrive but he had no intention of just letting Henry cross to take refuge in the castle and so, in a repeat of what had happened at the Battle of Lincoln 11 years earlier, Louis left a small force to maintain a siege of the castle while he marched two miles to face up against Henry. This was the first time that Louis and Henry met on the field of battle and the events of the campaign so far and in months to come show two kings who have both spent years fighting. Henry had been leading the war against his vassals since 1223 while Louis had fought three separate conflicts since 1216 (The Baronial War, Theobald's Revolt and the Albigensian Crusade). The Battle of Rochester was by far the largest engagement in the Capetian-Plantagenet War with Louis leading a force composed of soldiers from his own demesne as well as Maine, Angouleme, Champagne, Toulouse, Lusignan and Brittany as well as mercenaries and whatever forces could be sent from Dover Castle to support him plus the now defected Irish forces under Walter de Lacy. Before we can go on to talk about the battle we need to remind ourselves that there were two 'de Lacy's' brought from Ireland in 1223. The first was of course Walter de Lacy but the second was Hugh de Lacy who hadn't been dismissed unlike Walter and was about to play a decisive role in events to come. It's probable that Louis had been in communication with Hugh for hours beforehand and Hugh was likely in correspondence either with the king or with Walter or even both. Not entirely trusting Hugh after Walter's defection, Henry had put his forces on the front lines so that they would be pushed into fighting the Capetians first with the irony, of course, being that Henry's very attempt to prevent defection possibly pushed Hugh over into defection and made its impact worse.

    Most of our primary sources are pretty clear on what happened next and, as Henry's forces advanced, Hugh raised a banner and shouted some variation of 'For England, I urge you, strike down that tyrant' and turned to face Henry. Henry's vanguard had been broken by the defection and a massive gap of hostile soldiers now existed right in the centre of his army that was not about to be pushed on by Louis' advancing force. Determined to push Hugh and his retinue out from the centre of the vanguard and restore his lines before Louis could push to deepen the fissure, Henry and Ranulf led a spirited charge against the Irish soldiers, supported on the flanks by the remaining members of the vanguard. Despite initial success, however, Hugh's forces weren't completely dislodged, allowing Louis to close the remaining distance and drive forward the split in the English lines. Henry's vanguard now found itself increasingly pressured, facing the Irish defectors under Hugh in the centre (fittingly supported by Walter who had been in the vanguard of Louis' army) and Louis' own forces as they pushed on their sides. Soon enough, the break in Henry's lines became a fissure in his army, pushing the two flanks wider and wider apart as Louis continued to exert pressure on the centre. Gradually, the flanks were forced to retreat step by step until they had been driven completely apart. In truth, Henry's army split into about 5 different contingents as the far flanks were driven apart from the forces at the back on either side and the centre back forces ended up separated as well. Those towards the back of Henry's army ultimately got lucky in the battle, with Henry and Ranulf both escaping with their lives and even some small forces of soldiers who began to band back together in the weeks following Rochester. Others weren't so lucky. Hugh de Vere, Earl of Oxford was captured and William Longespee, Earl of Salisbury and a talented commander in his own right was killed.

    Rochester was a disaster for Henry, both militarily and politically. Large swathes of his army had been wiped out and the subsequent siege of Rochester threatened to allow Louis to cross over and move on London while defections picked up their pace in the wake of the defeat. Unable to retreat North, Henry fell back West towards Devon where he met up with Redvers. Determined to prevent himself from being completely surrounded following the recapture of the South-East and the capture of Vere, which effectively meant that Oxford was far from safe, as well as the defections of Gloucester, Henry and his contingents pushed on to join Redvers' forces in capturing Cornwall. Progress in Cornwall sped up significantly after Henry's arrival, ultimately forcing Fitzwalter to abandon the Earldom in September and flee around the coast to Kent. But in the South-East, Henry's success faded rapidly as Louis set about repairing and strengthening Dover Castle and sent Quincy and Thomas of Kent to push West and reclaim Winchester which they did by March 1229. Rochester fell in November 1228, too late for Louis to launch a serious march to London (which wouldn't take place until March the following year) but allowing Louis time to reinforce and garrison the castle against any attempts Henry might make to retake it. In the West, Bohun swept back North into Chester while Clare, with support from Llywellyn and Braose, gradually pushed the Marshal family on two fronts. Having secured the South-West as a power-base and with support from some portions of Ireland weakened but still available as well as surviving contingents from other noble supporters, Henry began turning his attention back to the other fronts of the war starting in Spring 1229. He had two options available to him with the first being to try and retake the South-East and cut Louis off from France and the second being to try and push North through Gloucester and Hereford to secure access to the Marshals and whatever other resources could be brought from Chester (although Ranulf was with him in Cornwall). The death of Verraccio in 1226 now proved especially damaging for Henry's links to the Papacy who now began to fall back to a more neutral position following the arrangement between Louis and Gregory in 1227 and the loss of the main pro-Plantagenet advocate in the Papacy the year prior to that. Without the Papal legitimacy he had had before, Henry found his list of allies growing thin in England, especially after Louis' capture of London in late March 1229. Resolving to try once more to cut off reinforcements from France and thus to isolate Louis in London, Henry decided to make another move East beginning in March and, for three months, successfully pushed Quincy back from his recently recaptured positions in Winchester.

    Louis', meanwhile, had been celebrating his victory by taking the chance to actually make the political moves he had been unable to make back in 1219 and presided over the appointment (chosen by Gregory IX himself) of Richard le Grant as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1229. By the time Louis reached the capital, however, the crown itself had been spirited away by Henry's supporters and wouldn't actually be recovered until 1231 and so Louis' coronation was an affair that actually ended up taking place with a replica rather than wait. Louis was well aware that he couldn't afford to wait forever before being crowned king, he needed to be crowned as soon as possible to help legitimise his position. With his coronation having finally taken place, Louis now turned to securing what remained of the country. By about June 1229, the war in Wales had been won effectively but Henry continued to push in Winchester while large swathes of land North of London remained contested. Louis now split his forces up, sending a force under Amaury de Montfort North towards Lincoln to reestablish Montfort and Maudit as Earls of Leicester and Warwick respectively before moving against Chester to support Bohun. Meanwhile, Louis himself would lead the rest of his forces South to Winchester to finally put down Henry once and for all. Louis and Henry met for the second time at the Battle of Petersfield in July 1229 where Louis gained a second victory over the Plantagenet forces, allowing him to make a counter-attack beginning shortly afterwards and continuing on well into 1230. Ultimately, the war is considered to have ended with Henry's second flight from the country in October 1230 following the Battle of Sidmouth in September 1230 and the capture of Redvers with the subsequent rapid push into Cornwall. In a repeat of the events of 1219, Henry now found himself trapped in Cornwall with nowhere to go but abroad if he hoped to actually survive Louis' advance and so, like in 1219, Henry fled. We'll go into more detail on the situation in 1230 and why Henry fled to Europe rather than to Ireland but, in short, Henry had little choice but to turn to a foreign country and no better option than the very country Louis had started vying against politically only 3 years earlier due to an arrangement between Louis and Gregory IX, the Holy Roman Empire. Once again, the flight of Henry marked the end of the war that was tearing England apart but not quite the end of all the fighting. The Marshals were, once again, driven into exile following their defeat at the hands of the Earl of Gloucester and the Lord of Braose as well as Lllywellyn but fled, instead, to Ireland where they would come to play a role in the events there in the next few years. Ranulf left with Henry once again, one of the few major supporters Henry had left in England while Bohun was restored to Chester. This is where we are going to leave things, on the eve of Louis' victory in the Capetian-Plantagenet War (1223-1230) so that we can really cover the situation of 1230 and how Louis would move, once again, to secure the country in the wake of his victory over Henry.
     
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    Chapter 8: A French King on the English Throne (1230-1240)
  • King Louis VIII of France and I of England
    Chapter 8: A French King on the English Throne (1230-1240):

    The period between Louis' victory at Petersfield in 1230 and his death in 1244 was, by on large, one of the most peaceful periods in the early years of Capetian England, contrasted starkly against the previous struggles between Louis and Henry for the throne and the subsequent chaos of Louis IX's early years. It is also the first real period in which we can definitively say that Louis was King of England, having been crowned as such during the Capetian Resurgence and having no physical rival in England for the time-being, given Henry's exile in Germany as of 1230. Interestingly enough, Henry's choice to go into exile in Germany actually served to further undermine his legitimacy in the eyes of the European monarchs as he was now effectively taking refuge in the court of a man who had recently been excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX. This legitimacy would only be further undermined by Louis' fervent moves towards stabilising England in the wake of his rival's defeat. The loss of England following his initial conquest and the success of more lenient policies in France had taught Louis a lot about reconciliation (a policy his successor would famously use to great effect) in regards to dealing with the nobility. The first step, of course, in securing England once and for all was to turn his attention to the North, the same region Henry had initially landed in, and to set up a number of friendly lords in the region who could help stabilise it and extend royal authority. Before we can really go on, however, we need to look a bit at the state England was in in the 1230s because this situation will come to play a major role in the events to come, especially in regards to Louis IX.

    England had been consumed by warfare on and off for a decade and a half and the result of this was that, by 1230, royal authority in many regions had grown very weak indeed. The North had fallen far from Louis' control and he would spend much of the 1230s trying to keep it in check while Wales wouldn't be fully reigned in until well into Louis IX's reign. Ireland, comparatively, was even worse because the loss of the Plantagenet Kings in the region as well as the preoccupation of the new Capetian Kings in English affairs for the time being, effectively left the entire region out in the cold and, in particular, the Anglo-Irish lords. The warfare of the last 3 years and Henry's use of Anglo-Irish soldiers in the wars in England had cost many of those very Anglo-Irish lords dearly back home as the native Irish lords pushed their distracted and weakened foes back, leading to a resurgence of the native Irish lords throughout the 13th and early 14th Centuries. Two of those Anglo-Irish lords, however, were Walter and Hugh de Lacy as well as Margaret de Braose, Lady of Trim, all of whom came under attack throughout the late 1220s and early 1230s. The difference for the House de Lacy and the House de Braose was that both had ultimately stood by Louis at various points in the latter portion of the Capetian-Plantagenet War and all three had the benefit, as a result, of being rewarded for their actions by the new, victorious King Louis VIII. Now, despite his preoccupation with English politics and securing his throne, Louis was not entirely blind to the events in Ireland and nor did he have any intention of just letting the region fall from his grip and both he and his heir, King Louis IX and II, would fight to secure their position against the Irish lords and the House de Lacy would come to be a very major player in Irish politics in years to come. Indeed, during the 1230s it was through the Lacy family that Capetian influence actually survived in Ireland despite the chaos in England of the 1210s and 1220s.

    In many ways, this situation was only exacerbated by the situation existing at a much more local level throughout England. 15 years of warfare had very much taken its toll on those regions of England that had seen the majority of the fighting, primarily the South-East. Lincoln, having been contested between the pro-Plantagenet and pro-Capetian forces no less than three times since 1217, had suffered especially badly at the hands of the various forces that had fought over it time and again. Kent and Cornwall, meanwhile, had been fought over almost continuously since 1224 with the latter having been captured by Henry only shortly before Louis returned and recaptured it. Not only had the land and agriculture of these regions been ruined by the constant presence of the armies but local government and justice systems had been heavily disrupted. Arguably the greatest damage had been done to the local economic and trade systems across England, as the warfare often prevented travel which ultimately severely curtailed trade and commerce. That is not to speak of the damage to infrastructure, with roads having often been ruined by passing armies and the damage inflicted to cities and castles during sieges, or the simple loss of life, both of those called to actually fight in the conflict as well as of civilians killed by the passing armies. Ultimately, this devastation was far less pronounced in the areas further from Louis' control such as Northern England, Wales and Ireland as these areas had seen less fighting since 1215 as compared to the South and South-East of England.

    The effective result of this was that not only was Louis' England far poorer in 1230 than it had been in 1215 but far less politically stable as well, with local justice having been severely compromised by the war. To add to this, the sometimes volatile nature of political loyalties in Medieval Europe and the divisions caused by the recent civil war had undermined a lot of local political unity, a situation that would soon be worsened by growing disputes amongst the higher nobility throughout the 1230s and 40s in response to recent events. This, in turn, not only limited and undermined the political authority of the new king, but further destabilised the region and led to greater violence, especially amongst some of the lower nobility, a nobility that was neither high enough to be kept in check by Louis' relatively limited powers in 1230 but that couldn't be kept in check by the compromised judicial system. Further, the devastation and exhaustion of 15 years of warfare had led to more than a little discontent amongst some of the lower ranks of the nobility, who were less able to actually recover from the conflict and devastation than their higher counterparts. This was especially pronounced given the gains that some of those higher counterparts made as a result of the conflict such as Quincy and Clare, both of whom gained an extra Earldom and the revenue they brought. In local areas, many appointments had changed hands multiple times as the conflict shifted back and forth between the two competing parties. For example, the Sheriff of Herefordshire in 1215 had been Engelard de Cigogne who sided with John and Henry until Louis' victory in 1219 when he was displaced from that position until 1224 when Henry de Bohun surrendered to the returning Plantagenet force, leading Henry to reappoint Engelard as Sheriff to place a loyal figure in the position of sheriff and thus help keep Hereford in line. With the return of Louis in 1227 and Bohun's subsequent defection to Louis, Engelard was once again deposed and the office actually remained vacant for another 3 years until after Henry's flight to Germany when it was filled with none other than Walter de Lacy, who held significant estates in Weobley in Herefordshire. This was very much the situation all across the country, with local posts such as that of Sheriff often switching hands or even being left vacant for periods of time during heavy conflict. In fact, in 1230, the nominal High Sheriff of Wiltshire was still William II Longespee (son of the former Earl of Salisbury who had been killed during Louis' return to England). Needless to say, this simply served to undermine the authority of many of these positions and very much damaged the means by which Louis could actually transmit his authority throughout the country. In turn, this effectively meant that the period of 'peace' between 1230 and 1244 saw much of England with significantly higher crime rates and significantly more disorder than prior to 1215. It also meant that much of England was a hotbed for potential conflict, especially between the petty nobility or even between some of the higher and lower nobility.

    In turn, it was here that tensions began to boil in English politics, the same tensions that would become endemic in later English politics as events began to develop. The situation, for many, was only exacerbated by Louis himself, a king whose legitimacy was based on having been asked to come to England by the nobles and whose claim to the throne was resting upon his victory over Henry and Papal support for his rule. This was far from a steady base upon which he could build his reign, especially since he was still relying on the loyalty of the same nobles who had deposed the last king. The lack of royal authority in much of England and the regions beyond combined with the political instability and local tensions throughout England effectively left some areas with little in the way of actual governance and simply helped to facilitate growing conflicts in the regions. This, along with the fear of Henry making another attempt to seize the throne of England, were quite clearly issues that, even by 1230, Louis was well aware of, as evidenced by the much quicker reconstruction and repairs of castles and fortifications as compared to other infrastructure. Lincoln, for example, wouldn't be fully rebuilt until the late 1240s whereas Lincoln castle had been rebuilt and further fortified by 1234. By turning his attention towards fortification, Louis was quite clearly making a determined effort to both protect his gains and to make preparations in case local discontent and conflict should spill over into more general warfare. It seems, as well, that the large uptake in the number of peerages and titles handed out in the 1230s was in an attempt to help establish local control throughout England by placing loyal nobles in charge of large portions of England. In 1230, those who had lost lands to Henry's resurgent Plantagenet forces in 1224 were reinstated in their Earldoms, including the House de Clare in Pembroke and the House de Bohun (under Henry up until his death in 1235) in Chester. Peter of Dreux (former Duke of Brittany) was officially confirmed as the Earl of Richmond in the same year. Thomas of Perche and Amaury de Montfort were the first in a series of French nobles who were given English peerages in return for their services, both in men and money, and were followed in 1230 and 1231 by Peter of Dreux and John Tristan, who was made Earl of Salisbury in place of the now-deceased William Longespee (and taking into account the exile, with Henry, of his son) and in 1233 by Erard of Champagne who was made the 1st Earl of Lancaster and Robert Capet (his son, born in 1216) who was made the Earl of Northumbria. It seems likely that the local disorder in much of England, as well as the loss of royal authority in control in many regions, was exactly what prompted such a large divestment of titles and lands to the nobility, in an attempt to reestablish authority across the country and to further spread his authority in the North (hence why so many of the Northern Earldoms were passed to French nobles rather than their English counterparts).

    In the short-run, Louis' divestment of lands and titles was exactly what was needed and his treatment of those nobles who had defected back to him (such as Mandeville) and even those who had been captured (such as Hugh de Vere) was exactly what was needed in England. Through reconciliation with them, Louis was able to slowly bring regions that had rebelled in 1224 back into the fold and establish his authority in these regions. Hugh de Vere, Earl of Oxford, was pardoned in 1232 and allowed to retain the Earldom of Oxford, on the condition that upon his death, the title (but not Vere's other estates) would revert to the crown. Ferrers was pardoned on similar terms. Those who had fled with Henry, such as the House de Redvers and William Longespee II, were branded traitors and their estates and titles revoked. Interestingly enough, Devon was one of the few Earldoms that Louis would retain right up until his death in 1244 as Redvers, as of 1230, had nobody to actually pass the Earldom on to and was in exile as a traitor. Mandeville, Earl of Essex, remained the Earl until his death without heirs in 1231 when the title reverted to the crown. Furthermore, much of England could be further stabilised and any attempts by Henry to actually return to England post-1230 came at much greater risk, given the loss of noble support after his defeat at Petersfield and and greater numbers of nobles throughout England. But the long-term effects of this policy, while not bad as such, were very different to what Louis probably expected or even hoped. With so many nobles and the natural tensions that existed in the wake of a civil war, the various nobles throughout England found themselves exceptionally prone to further conflict amongst themselves. In particular, the 1224 to 1230 period had done a lot to inflame tensions between those who had fought on either side of the conflict at various points.

    In Wales, the period of 1224 to 1228 had seen the Welsh under Reginald de Braose and Llywellyn the Great arrayed against Henry de Bohun and Gilbert de Clare throughout Wales and this conflict had served only to sow distrust between the various Welsh and Marcher lords. These tensions would become particularly pronounced in 1228 with the defection of Bohun and Clare and the subsequent recapture of Southern Wales by the joint Welsh and English forces under Braose and Clare. This became especially pronounced when, in reward for his services in the conflict, Braose was made Lord of Glamorgan in 1231, effectively putting a wedge between Pembroke and Gloucester. More than that, Braose's links to the powerful Prince Llywellyn only stoked the already existing fears held by both Clare and Bohun of the growing power of Gwynedd in Welsh and Marcher politics. What it, in basic terms, came down to in Wales was distrust sown by the previous conflict and the fears of growing Gwynnedian power in local politics. This was a situation mirrored throughout England, as the 6 years between Henry's return and the Capetian Resurgence had sown the seeds of mutual distrust between those who had fought for Henry and those who had fought for Louis, a situation worsened by the frequent defections of the period. By adopting a policy of reconciliation, Louis secured his bases much better than in the 1219-1223 period but he was also welcoming the very people who had defected against him back into English politics, a move that was both unpopular and fraught with tensions, especially since many of those who held major peers by the 1230s had been enemies only a few years previously. Another source of tensions arose, almost inevitably, between the older families in English politics and those newcomers had come along with Louis' arrival. In this regard, Perche and Montfort are relative curiosities because they were ultimately much more respected in English politics, probably as a result of their actions in the 1224-1230 period, than latecomers such as Peter of Dreux and John Tristan. While initially less pronounced in the initial damage and chaos in the wake of Henry's defeat, these tensions between the English and French nobility would continue to grow throughout the 1230s and 40s. It would also come to have an interesting effect on English politics for a long time to come given that, from the 1230s, large swathes of Northern England were presided over by French nobility rather than their English counterparts.

    English Secular Peers in 1239:

    Earl of Surrey: Saer de Quincy
    Earl of Winchester: Saer de Quincy
    Earl of Cornwall: Walter Fitzwalter
    Earl of Kent: Thomas of Perche
    Earl of Warwick: William Maudit
    Earl of Arundel: William d'Aubigny*
    Earl of Leicester: Amaury de Montfort
    Earl of Lincoln: William d'Aubigny*
    Earl of Richmond: Peter of Dreux
    Earl of Chester: Humphrey de Bohun
    Earl of Hereford: Humphrey de Bohun
    Earl of Gloucester: Gilbert de Clare
    Earl of Pembroke: Gilbert de Clare
    Earl of Salisbury: John Tristan
    Earl of Lancaster: Erard of Champagne
    Earl of Northumbria: Robert Capet
    Earl of Oxford: Hugh de Vere
    Earl of Derby: William de Ferrers
    Earl of Norfolk: Hugh Bigod

    The introduction of a number of French nobles into English politics after 1230 such as Erard of Champagne or John Tristan had one peculiar effect in how, despite what Louis likely intended by granting them titles in England, it ultimately helped stabilise French politics at the expense of English politics. In France, a number of nobles now held lands and titles in England which gave them a vested interest in the region and helped calm any political backlash and remaining resentment in France at the time in regards to Louis' focus and campaigns in England. But in England, the entire affair led to a great deal of resentment felt by some of the 'older' English nobility such as Quincy and even Montfort as both families had held titles in English politics for a long time and even the newer arrival of Thomas of Perche had ended up fighting alongside Quincy and others during the 1224-30 period. In comparison, men such as Erard and Tristan were seen to have only actually jumped into the conflict in the last few years whereas others such as Montfort and Perche had fought in England during the entire 1224-30 period and it was felt that a lot of those who had played very vital roles in the conflict were not amply rewarded for those roles in favour of men who had only come along right at the end. Particular animosity seems to have been felt between Erard and Montfort, an animosity built upon, it seems, power disputes in both England and France. In France, Erard's possession of the powerful County of Champagne was one that had catapulted the former minor lord to an important and powerful position in French politics, a situation that led to a significant amount of resentment amongst other French lords. This, in turn, manifested itself back in England where Erard's unpopularity with the English lords, as a newcomer from 1230, as well the resentment already felt by some others such as Montfort himself in France, led to Montfort becoming a relatively natural rallying point for those bitter and resentful about the rise of 'new' French lords. In turn, Montfort's power as the High Steward, combined with the lengthy absences of the king while he was in France, only led to the increasing exclusion of Erard and other nobles from politics from 1233 onward. Louis' inability to spend all his time in England led to prolonged absences from 1234-6 and 1239-42 while he spent time back home in France.

    It was during these absences that the rifts between the various lords and peers of England began to grow. Without the king present, the numerous and increasingly powerful English nobility proved much harder for Louis to keep in check and their subsequent conflicts and dissent much harder for Louis to combat. In turn, his answer was to increasingly rely upon certain members of the nobility and, in particular, his High Steward, Amaury de Montfort. Already, as of 1234, complaints were levied against Montfort for his arrogance in his dealings with a lot of his peers and, while nobody went so far as to outwardly claim so, there were some suggestions that Montfort wouldn't accept being 'just' High Steward forever. In part, these complaints very definitely had some basis in Montfort's steadily growing power in English politics. His position as High Steward already brought with it a lot of influence and power in the running of English government, especially in the absence of the king but the 1224-1230 conflict had done a lot for him as well. During the period, Montfort had had a large hand in commanding and governing not only Leicester but Warwick as well (since William Maudit wouldn't come of age until 1235). Strictly speaking, Montfort was never appointed to the position of regent of Warwick but he had emerged from the conflict with a lot of influence in the Earldom and, in later years, Maudit would become an important supporter and advocate for Montfort's cause. This would become especially important because Montfort, in turn, had a very clear hand in securing the title of 'Chamberlain of the Exchequer' as well as Lord of Hanslope (a hereditary title that was held by William de Maudit, the Earl of Warwick's father). Montfort was also said to have built up strong relations with Thomas of Perche, Earl of Kent, possibly building on a shared dislike of the increasing power of Erard back in France.

    Since Louis was leaning on Montfort to keep order during his absences and continue to extend royal authority, the feeling amongst many of his peers was that he was becoming interventionist in their own affairs. This was most pronounced, of course, in the areas where royal control was weakest and, incidentally, most of his enemies were situated. During Louis' first absence in 1234-1236, Montfort made a distinct attempt to help bring the allegiance of some of the Northern lords back towards London as, during the chaos of the Barons' War, a lot of Northern lords had started doing homage to King Alexander of Scotland. With Louis' authority, Montfort travelled North in 1234 and spent time in Northumbria. Given what had happened with Maudit down in Warwick, many soon began to feel that Montfort was simply using the trip in order to try and influence the young Robert Capet (14 in 1234) in his own favour and thus to increase his own influence in the North. In turn, Louis was soon forced to send orders for Montfort to return to Leicester later that year amidst a series of complaints about Montfort's conduct as High Steward. These complaints only worsened as Montfort became, as the king's main representative in England, the arbitrator of a series of noble disputes. Most prominently was a dispute between Gilbert de Clare and Llywellyn the Great of Gwynedd in late 1235. When Montfort gave his support for Clare's claims over those of Llywellyn, the result was backlash both from Montfort's critics in the North and from Llywellyn and the House de Braose in Wales. The former claimed that Montfort was simply using his position to help out his friends and supporters rather than actually dispensing justice in such disputes while Llywellyn and Braose both felt that Montfort's decision was unjust and went so far as to even suggest that Montfort was acting without the proper authority of the king. Later complaints, particularly during Louis' second absence, were levelled at what seemed to be Montfort's attempts to actually secure the Earldom of Devon for his younger brother, Simon de Montfort.

    As the complaints continued to mount against Montfort and, even, slight stirrings of conflict began to build towards the end of 1235, Louis found himself increasingly pressured to return to England to put things in order once again. In March 1236, Louis cut his time in France short and returned to England, where he would stay until the very end of 1239 while he restored order to the best of his ability. Upon arriving, Louis made his way straight to London where he remained until March 1237 before spending the rest of 1237 touring the country and, in particular, the North and the Welsh Marches. He then returned to London and spent 1238 focusing on administration within England before returning to France in 1239. This was a short period of time defined by a number of important events in English politics as, while Louis tried to slow what was becoming an increasingly fast train moving towards anarchy, the political system only continued to fall apart. Having landed at Dover in March, Louis was greeted almost immediately by Amaury de Montfort, Thomas of Perche and the Archbishop of Canterbury. The office of Archbishop of Canterbury had been held by Stephen Langton until 1228 and then by Richard le Grant until 1231 and was now, as of 1236, held by Ralph Neville who had formerly been a Keeper of the Seal before being made a bishop in the late 1220s and then being elected Archbishop of Canterbury after Richard le Grant stepped down. Neville is an important character in the events to come because not only was he a Keeper of the Seal, but he was now the Archbishop of Canterbury and the Bishop of Chichester, positions which all put him in close political and geographical proximity to either Montfort or his ally and supporter, Perche. Furthermore, he was then made Chancellor in 1233 by King Louis. This is where issues began to arise because, while Neville has since become known for his impartiality, many of Montfort's political rivals felt that Neville was nothing more than another example of what Montfort had been doing all throughout the 1230s, attempting to monopolise government. It was felt that Neville, since his bishopric was within Kent and due to his political proximity to Montfort, was most likely yet another of Montfort's supporters and this, in turn, led to Neville becoming a figure of huge political controversy during the 1230s, especially from 1236 onward due to growing fears of Montfort's power in English politics. First and foremost were accusations that Neville was little more than a puppet of Montfort although his actions as Lord Chancellor from 1233 onward show the very opposite and he was praised for his impartiality in the chancery as well as instituting a number of reforms within the chancery. On the contrary, other accusations claimed that Neville was far too independent from King Louis' authority due to his tendency to issue writs on his own authority and his own growing influence which led to his involvement in both the exchequer and the appointment of royal justices. Some, in particular, noted a strong correspondence between Neville and Roger Niger, Bishop of London and Lord High Treasurer which some went so far as to suggest actually implied Neville's hopes to influence important areas of government. What really, ultimately, worried many was Neville's perceived ties to Montfort and Perche although Perche himself had a fair number of issues and minor conflicts with Neville throughout the 1230s, as Neville strongly defended the rights of his see.**

    On an episcopal and religious level, the criticism was largely levelled at him on the basis that Neville had been criticised in some circles in Rome upon his election for being, apparently, unlearned, although his literacy had actually already been proven when he was made Bishop of Chichester in the 1220s. More worryingly, for some, was that Neville had been previously criticised by none other than Stephen Langton for being unlike a priest and more like a courtier who wished to free England from the papacy. However, while many of these accusations did exist before 1234, they didn't actually become pronounced until Louis' first absence and the growing fears of Montfort's power in conjunction with Neville's appointment as Lord Chancellor in 1233. But these accusations would, in turn, prove to be Neville's downfall and the growing controversy around him by 1236 led to his, likely forced, resignation in November that year. The downfall of Ralph Neville in 1236 was one that shook English politics, both for Montfort and for his rivals throughout the country. While, in truth, Montfort's growing power wasn't actually tied to Neville's own influence within the government, the very act of bringing Neville down only served to further facilitate the growing rifts between Montfort and his rivals. Montfort took it as an attempt to strike out against him by Erard's faction while Erard's faction, in turn, felt that Montfort's anger at Neville's fall from power was a clear sign that the two had been working together to oust Erard and his supporters from English politics. This was only aggravated by the fact that, until 1237, Louis was largely in the presence of Montfort, Perche and Neville while down in London and the South-East and had spent most of his time in what amounted to Montfort's political power-base. Erard's support was in the North of England where Louis wouldn't visit until 1237 and where Louis wouldn't return, after 1237, until 1240. This meant that Erard and his supporters, who were mostly based in the North, only found greater issues with Montfort's political influence of the day because he seemed to be in a position, both politically and geographically, to actually influence King Louis against Erard.

    These fears were by no means baseless and we know Montfort was a growing power at the time and had very real reasons to want to influence and dominate English government and we know from later events that Erard did have reason to fear Montfort's power in England, especially as the rifts and divisions widened between the two. More notably, we do see that there was some bias shown by King Louis towards Montfort, either as a result of his political and geographical proximity towards Montfort or as a result of Montfort's direct attempts to influence him. While we can't say for certain whether or not Montfort had any intentions to oust Erard from politics in the 1230s, his power was certainly growing and enough to be resentful of and as his enemies became more opposed to him, there was reason to fear that he was attempting to oust them from politics. In turn, we need to be aware that Erard wasn't trying to simply get fair share of government and he too probably wanted to rise to the top and influence government to whatever degree he could. In effect, the growing conflicts between Montfort and Champagne were not a struggle to avoid the monopolisation of power and influence by one group but a power struggle between two groups who wanted that power and influence for themselves. This was a power struggle that festered on weak royal authority, tensions caused by a recent civil war, a breakdown in local justice systems and the absence and inability of Louis to constantly be in England to watch over the nobility. But the issue was that the weakened royal authority led to greater conflict which, in turn, weakened royal authority ever further and led to greater conflict.

    In January 1237, Louis was there to preside over the election of the new Archbishop of Canterbury before leaving London in March to tour the country. Initial plans were to involve Montfort joining him for the tour which would travel up along the East coast of England towards Northumbria before Louis would meet with King Alexander of Scotland at the border for discussions related to those Northern lords who had began paying homage to Alexander after 1215. He would then turn around and make his way back down the West of England and through the Welsh Marches before returning to London. As he moved through the country, he would take up the usual duties of a king on tour, dispensing justice and using the opportunity to be physically present before the noble lords in England. As far as his schedule, the tour went off without a hitch but was marked by a number of troublesome circumstances. When Louis met with Alexander that year, the entire meeting and diplomatic exchanges were fraught with tension due to a number of complaints by Alexander about the actions of certain Northern lords and their tendencies to raid across the border into Scotland. Needless to say, this was an issue created and further exacerbated by Louis' relatively weak royal authority in the region and the diplomatic exchanges avoided any distinct problems emerging between the two kings. Furthermore, his stay with his own son, Earl Robert of Northumbria was one filled with its own tensions, not between Louis and Robert but between Robert and Montfort. Robert had been put in the North-East as a method of extending royal authority in the region by placing a lord of the king's own family there but his distance from London and the general hostility felt by other Northern lords towards Montfort as well as Robert still being young in the early 1230s had ultimately helped to turn Robert against Montfort. Robert Capet, being Louis' son, will come to be a name that will crop up time and again in the political conflicts to come as he was, in effect, one of the most important political pieces that Erard had on the board given the young lord's family ties to the king and unique position to influence the king in the Erard faction's favour.

    These tensions only grew worse in Lancaster and the near-open hostility between Erard and Montfort, especially due to Erard's anger at Montfort's seemingly constant presence around the king, led to Montfort eventually being sent back to Leicester. For Montfort, being sent away from the king was a very politically damaging move and one that only facilitated further conflicts and rifts between him and Erard whereas, for Erard, it was an event of great importance and one that would give Erard his own chance to influence and win over the king. What it is important to remember is that Louis was by no means just a blank figure not involved in the conflicts developing around him and his entire trip was a very clear attempt to try and close the rifts that were tearing England apart. By sending Montfort away in 1237, it seems likely that Louis was hoping to show Erard and his supporters his own impartiality towards the various lords and trying to ease resentment felt at Montfort's power. In turn, Louis also spent an extra month in Lancaster and the North than he had initially intended and spend the time listening to complaints and grievances held by the various local lords as well as helping to dispense justice and strengthen his influence in the region. The problem that Louis really faced in 1237 was that he couldn't hope to please everyone because nearly every lord was resentful of someone else and if he acted to appease one group then he simply angered another. By lengthening his stay in the North he appealed to Erard and his supporters but led to accusations by some who felt resentful of the 'newcomer' French lords such as Fitzwalter whose Earldom wasn't even on the schedule for Louis to visit. By sending Montfort away, he helped soothe fears of Montfort's influence amongst some other lords but angered Montfort and his supporters, who felt that Louis was being influenced by those lords and began to fear being distanced from politics themselves.

    What we have to bear in mind is that these political conflicts were not organised divides between two distinct groups but were, rather, a series of personal divides between various nobles which, in some cases, drew in other nobles. Most notably, at the time, was Erard and Montfort's conflict which brought in a number of other lords but we have to remember that Erard's supporters were supporting him because of their own issues with Montfort at the time while Fitzwalter, initially, had issues with Erard for sometimes different reasons to why Montfort had issues with Erard. But, by 1237, the conflict between Erard and Montfort and their respective supporters was the one that was beginning to increasingly draw in other nobles and other, smaller, conflicts between those nobles. Ultimately, the 1237 tour of the country had both served to further divide the noble lords while also, simultaneously, giving Louis much more context and information about those very divides which resulted, after his return, in a series of attempts to fix the administration and close the divides in 1238. Louis' 1238 'reforms' (although the term here is relatively loosely used), were mostly defined by Louis' attempts to effectively balance out the powers of Montfort within English politics. At the same time, he hoped to enforce his authority in the North and to put an end to the cross-border raids in the region and to end a number of other local conflicts and issues between various groups of nobility. Ultimately however, Louis quite quickly found that he couldn't just remove Montfort or his supporters (or others for that matter) from positions in the government as easily as he hoped without risking their own enmity and further dislike and distrust as they, inevitably, blamed their opponents in the North. He also found that the disputes he had hoped to solve were not so easy to actually resolve without risking further conflicts between the various nobles. As a result, these 'reforms' of 1238 ended up floundering and going nowhere and even Louis' success in stopping cross-border raids in 1238 ended up falling apart when he returned to France in 1239 (not willing to risk spending too long in England to his own detriment in France and given the political issues in Italy and on the Continent at the time). As it was, with the arrival of 1240 and Louis' second absence from England, the conflicts remained not only unresolved but actually widened and increasingly dangerous and, across the country, the divides began to spiral and the fragile political stability of the country began to fall apart.

    Notes: *Do not conflate these two 'William d'Aubigny's' as one was the Earl of Arundel prior to Louis' ascension while the other was a rebel who fought against King John and was a surety of the Magna Carta.

    **Side note about the 1230s: In 1231, likely due to the negotiations and agreements between Louis and Pope Gregory towards the end of the 1220s, Louis officially freed the Bishops of Durham from the authority of the Sheriff of Northumbria, thus concluding a long running dispute between the two and establishing an episcopal lordship in Durham.
     
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