The Union of the Two Crowns

Would you mind coloring the said passages to see the changes? I have some troubles to see them.

Yeah sure! Sorry, should have thought of that for people who had already read through Chapter 2.

Okay, I have put the changes I can remember making in bold. There may be some I missed.
 
Chapter 4: The Return of the King (1223-1224)
King Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
Chapter 4: The Return of the King (1223-1224)

The death of King Philip II in July 1223, effectively ended any hope that Louis might return to England that year in order to secure his position. Rumours had been circulating for months that Henry and Verraccio were planning a return to England, prompted and helped along by communication between many nobles and the Plantagenet court as well as the increasing number of Plantagenet supporters heading to Ireland or meeting in the North. Louis, of course, was by no means unaware of the risk to his position in England that was created by his absence and had left the Earls of Cornwall and Kent in charge of military forces in the region as well as putting Montfort and Langton in powerful administrative positions and these men had been far from inactive in the months leading up to Henry's return. Langton, especially, had been heavily involved in rallying support amongst the nobility in England in an attempt to prevent as many defections as possible should Henry return with a distinct focus on less loyal families and on the lords in regions that posed a potential landing point for Henry. Cornwall was relatively secure, held as it was by Fitzwalter, while the North was effectively beyond the power of either Louis or his supporters. Instead, Wales was to be the main focus for Langton and, to a lesser extent, regions such as Devon, Chester and Salisbury as well the Midlands in an attempt to bolster support at not only potential landing points but potential routes that Henry and his forces might have taken and potential allies of the Plantagenet court in England (Chester and Salisbury, for example, had been recently held by pro-Plantagenet nobles). Definitive news of the Plantagenet preparations in Ireland reached England in late July 1223 which, in turn, led to a meeting held in London in late August by Langton and Montfort and attended by a number of nobles as well as an envoy from the continent. The main goal of this meeting was, quite simply, to discuss the imminent arrival of the Plantagenet forces as well as to make preparations for when they arrived. Feeling that a landing in either the North, Wales or Cornwall was the most likely (due to their proximity to Ireland), an agreement was made to try and counter any potential landings in each area. Fitzwalter and Quincy would return to their respective Earldoms and raise forces in preparation to defend Cornwall against a potential landing by Henry to reclaim the Southwest. Meanwhile, letters were drafted to a number of Welsh lords, including Reginald de Braose to rally their forces in preparation to counter any landing that Henry might choose to make there. Clare, in the meantime, was to return to Gloucester and Pembroke and make further preparations and raise his own levies. The North, the area most removed from Louis' influence, was the area that needed the most attention. Langton immediately began drafting letters to King Alexander II of Scotland (who had paid homage to Louis on behalf of his English estates in 1216), urging him to denounce Henry and refuse to shelter or help the young king and his forces once they arrived in England. Bohun was, in turn, to make preparations for a potential campaign in the North come Spring 1224 in order to reduce the opportunity for Henry to make a concerted landing, while Thomas of Kent (Count of Perche) would head North from Kent to Warwick and meet up with the forces of William Maudit (the infant Earl of Warwick) who would be under the command of Montfort due to the royal guardianship of the young Earl.

While these decisions may seem to speak of an extraordinary level of cooperation and teamwork between the various pro-Capetian nobles and clergy, the truth is that most of it may well have come as instructions from Louis through his envoy (carefully planned out in advance to cover all his bases) or, if not, were at least done with the overview of Louis and most likely agreed and corroborated in correspondence before the meeting itself took place. Nor should what happened in the build up to Henry's return be mistaken for a unanimous support or loyalty of King Louis, but may well be also attributable to a mixture of loyalty and fear as those who had gained significant estates (such as Bohun, Fitzwalter, Clare, Quincy, Kent and others) seemed to stand to lose those estates (and possibly a whole lot more) should Henry emerge victorious. While Henry's arrival and the letter of November 1223 did nothing to assuage these fears, the reaction was far from the unanimity Louis may have hoped for. The letter served two purposes, to advertise Henry's return and fish for support but also to showcase Henry's intention to fulfil his bargain to his own supporters to not only return their own estates but also to reward them for their continued loyalty. By promising to remove the 'usurpers', the Plantagenets not only attacked Louis (reducing him to nothing more than a pretender) but promised to remove his supporters from the estates they had been granted, the very grants that had disinherited Henry's own supporters. In turn, this not only helped reinforce his position with the noble houses that were already behind him but also served to strengthen his position with those who were still wavering. It seems unlikely that the letter was ever intended to try and sway men like Fitzwalter or Quincy but rather to sway those who fell more in the middle and were, in many cases, shocked at Louis' seeming disregard for the terms set down in the Magna Carta, terms he seemed to have violated by so willingly disinheriting a number of noble houses. Henry's situation was further reinforced by problems in France following Louis' coronation, in which the king began to face serious criticism from a number of his own noble lords (most notably Theobald IV, Count of Champagne) for the vast expenses accrued by the crown and nobility for the campaign in England. Criticism only increased in the wake of Henry's return with a number of nobles drawing attention to the fact that Louis had campaigned in England for almost 7 years and Henry still hadn't been defeated despite large amounts of money that had been filtered into England by Philip as well as soldiers. Louis had quite rightly supported the local, English nobility since they were the ones who had invited him and had provided the majority of his forces while in England as well as funds and local support. That said, however, many nobles felt that their own contributions (financial or, sometimes, in actual military aid) hadn't been properly compensated nor addressed in the wake of Louis' victory and began to make a number of calls for Louis to provide compensation before he could return to England. Some, such as Theobald, went so far as to argue that the entire claim should be dropped and Louis should rather strike a treaty with Henry, promising to drop the claim in return for suitable financial compensation and recognition of French control of the former Angevin lands on the continent. Theobald would come into further conflict with Louis beginning in late 1223 and early 1224 when Louis passed a number of laws restricting the rights of the Jewish population, including declaring the interest on loans to Jews as no longer holding any weight and declaring that loans owed to Jews should be placed under the control of the lords who, in turn, would collect them for them. While Louis had decreed that the Jews should be repaid within three years and many barons willingly accepted this law, Theobald found the agreement that he had set up with the Jewish population (promising their safety in return for taxation) was under threat and tensions continued to grow between him and the crown. These disputes and criticisms would effectively bog Louis down in French politics from 1223 and severely limit his ability to actually campaign extensively in England as he had done prior to Philip II's death.

As a result, Louis didn't return to England in 1223 as he may well have hoped he could and no reinforcements actually came from France, effectively leaving the pro-Capetian nobles to deal with Henry themselves. Some pro-Plantagenet historians have since termed this the 'Second Baronial War' or even 'Second Baronial Rebellion', arguing that this was not a war between kings but rather the rightful King of England returning to reclaim his throne from the rebellious Barons who held England against him. That said, the conflict has become better known, and is often referred to, as a separate war known as the 'Capetian-Plantagenet War' although some historians have gone on to subsume this within a larger-context conflict covering a number of kings and pretenders even after Louis' death. Louis' inability to return to England in 1223 was disastrous for events in England, leaving his supporters without a king present to actually support and the 'regency' of Montfort and Langton to go on into another year. Langton was controversial to say the least as his standing within the church (the basis upon which his position lay) was by no means strong as he fell on the opposite side of a succession dispute from the Papacy and had already been deposed by the previous Pope once before and Montfort was, in title, no higher than his peers and his continued regency began to irritate many who began to resent his power within the country. Between them, Montfort and Langton held a huge amount of sway and influence, especially in the absence of an actual king on the throne of England. The effect of Louis absence was even more profound on many of the nobles who remained neutral who now began to see that there was only one king in England whose rival wasn't actually able to return. That isn't to say that Henry's forces were completely unified and disagreements quite quickly began breaking out amongst Henry's advisers, most notably between Ranulf de Blondeville and Pandulf Verraccio over how the army should proceed. Verraccio argued that their forces should move straight for Lincoln, thus helping to secure both Fosse Way and Ermine Street and then move down the latter straight to London. Blondeville, meanwhile, advocated that the army should instead march straight South towards Chester, recapturing the Earldom and securing its resources to make a move straight South towards the sea, thus cutting the forces in the East off from those in the West and thus enabling them to secure a power base before making a march on London. Henry had only recently come into his majority and, as a result, his advisers still held a significant amount of influence. But Verraccio's arrogance during Henry's minority had alienated a number of nobles and both the House de Blondeville and House Marshal saw obvious benefits to marching straight South (reclaiming their own Earldoms) which, in turn, won out. Correspondence between the Plantagenets and King Alexander II of Scotland had been going on for years (since 1221 at least) but only increased its pace with Henry's return in 1223, in an attempt to prevent Alexander from coming in on Louis' side or, if possible, to secure his support for Henry's claim instead. For the time being, however, that was not to be the case. Alexander feared that Henry, as king, was much more of a threat to his dominions than Louis was if simply due to the logistics of imposing authority on the North or marching an army up to Scotland, which was much easier for Henry than it was for Louis. Furthermore, the weakness of Louis' rule in England was no small benefit to Scotland and large parts of Northumberland were paying homage to Alexander by 1224, a situation that Henry threatened should he return to the throne. That said, Alexander was not keen to fall entirely in on the side of Louis either and merely agreed not to provide any supplies to the advancing Plantagenet army while also agreeing not to supply the Capetian supporters but refused both requests to provide direct support to either claimant.

As Henry swept South, the Barons rushed to try and block the advancing Plantagenet forces from continuing onward through Chester. Disaster struck in early spring 1224 when Baldwin de Redvers declared his allegiance to Henry and, given his position as the Earl of Devon, effectively moved to block Fitzwalter from leaving Cornwall and actually going to reinforce his allies in the North. In turn, Quincy (who was still in Winchester at the time) was blocked from taking the most direct route towards Chester and from reinforcing Fitzwalter. This only grew worse when William FitzGeoffrey de Mandeville, Earl of Essex, similarly declared allegiance to Henry shortly afterwards, cutting Kent off from the North and providing Henry with a further ally but one very close to London itself. Fearing an attack on the city of London, Quincy and Kent both agreed to send a number of soldiers to garrison the city who would be commanded by Langton himself (as Montfort had returned in January to Leicester to prepare his own forces). What we can see here is the main disadvantage of Louis' supporters without Louis; their disunity. Fitzwalter was in Cornwall and cut off from Quincy and Kent who were cut off from Montfort and the forces from Warwick. Joint cooperation was achieved in the South around London with a garrison made up of local Londoners as well as forces from both Winchester and Kent. But the main front of the conflict remained in the North, between Henry and those nobles who were able to unite their disparate forces in the North. Under the joint command of Amaury de Montfort and Henry de Bohun, the 'army' arranged to oppose Henry was a force composed of men from Hereford, Chester, Leicester, Braose (in Wales), Gloucester and Pembroke as well as a small detachment sent by Llywellyn the Great of Gwynedd on the request of Braose (who had married in to the family of the Princes of Gwynedd). Clare's forces remained divided, as he continued to garrison his own castles for fear of Redvers attacking the Barons in the rear. In many ways, England had descended into a siege scenario in which Redvers held Fitzwalter and Quincy in check while Clare, Fitzwalter and Quincy held Redvers in check. FitzGeoffrey held Kent in check but was limited in what he himself could do due to fears of an attack in the rear by the Earldom of Norfolk as well as still hostile forces under the command of Langton in London. The entire war seemed to depend on the two main forces on the field; the Baronial forces under Montfort and Bohun and the Plantagenet forces under Henry.

Determined to block the advance of the Plantagenet forces, Montfort and Bohun moved to a place called Warrington, which formed the crossing point of the River Mersey in the North of Chester and there made their preparations to meet the Plantagenets in battle, hoping to prevent them from crossing the river and moving to unite with Redvers in the South. Montfort had moved quickly, returning to Leicester in January 1224 and mobilising what forces he could as quickly as possible before rushing North to reach Mersey before Henry. Montfort's preparations had paid off and the bulk of the Baronial forces had managed to mobilise at Warrington before Henry despite their disparate positions. Lancaster itself is only about 30 miles from Warrington so it is undoubted that both Montfort had already had Bohun reinforce the river during 1223 and likely that Braose and Clare were encouraged to send their forces earlier in the year than usual in an attempt (however risky due to lack of supplies) to reach the Mersey before Henry. Nevertheless, the Battle of Warrington on 17th March 1224 would come to be one of the most important battles of the war. Initially, the Baronial forces, although outnumbered, quite effectively managed to resist the attacking Plantagenets over the course of a number of hours, eventually managing to drive the attackers into a retreat. What happened next has been alternatively attributed to overconfidence on the part of the Barons who had successfully resisted the attacking Plantagenets or Baronial fears that if they didn't follow up their success with a counter-attack, Henry would simply re-encamp and continue trying day after day until his forces either broke the Baronial line or the Barons ran out of men to resist with. Whatever the case, the Baronial forces ended up actually abandoning the bridge in favour of a counter-attack against the, seemingly, broken and disoriented Plantagenet forces. One historian quite famously said of what followed;

'They made it across the river and that was it.'
Indeed, that would prove to be the extent of Baronial successes that day. Finding the Plantagenets not quite as broken as they had hoped or thought, the Baronial forces soon found themselves back on the defensive as the superior numbers of the Plantagenets were now actually able to surround their opponents and a ferocious assault led by Blondeville finally broke their resolve. Now trying to push back across the bridge, the Baronial forces were cut down by missile fire from the Plantagenets in their rear before a cavalry charge finally put an end to any attempts to retake the position they had held before the attack. Broken, their retreat descended into a panicked rout as the Plantagenets descended upon them. The survivors were scattered, many fleeing to Wales to either Llywellyn or, more commonly, Reginald de Braose or instead heading South-East towards Leicester. Montfort very definitely escaped the battle, fleeing back South to Leicester with the survivors of his retinue but Bohun's fate is less certain. We know for a fact he was captured at some point, either in the battle itself or shortly after near Gloucester. Either way, his fate ultimately remained the same. It was here that Henry showed his biggest strength in fighting against Louis, his willingness and ability to learn from his predecessor's mistakes and act in a conciliatory manner towards the barons. After capturing Bohun in March/April 1224, Henry officially had Bohun 'step down from the Earldom of Chester' and restored it to Blondeville. Bohun then made a very public proclamation of his loyalty to Henry and denunciation of Louis' claim as being false and Louis himself as being a usurper and then was allowed to return to his position as the Earl of Hereford. As he continued South, Henry did the same thing with Clare in turn in May 1224, having Clare 'step down' from being Earl of Pembroke and proclaiming Henry as rightful king while denouncing Louis as a usurper. As he went, Henry made a point of restoring his own supporters to their previous positions, making William Marshal the 2nd Earl of Pembroke (thus denying that Clare was ever the rightful Earl of Pembroke by saying that the late William Marshal was the 1st Earl of Pembroke and his son, William Marshal was the 2nd Earl of Pembroke rather than the 3rd, as he would be if Clare were a legitimate Earl). In doing so, Henry was very much making a point of showing himself as a conciliatory king, quite willing to uphold the Magna Carta that both John and Louis had failed to uphold. William de Ferrers was restored as the Earl of Derby, William Longespee as the Earl of Salisbury and Henry de Beaumont as the Earl of Warwick.

Henry united with Redvers in May 1224, effectively trapping Fitzwalter in Cornwall and allowing Henry complete freedom to march on London throughout summer of 1224, pushing through Quincy's attempts at resisting him and finally forcing Quincy to flee, first to Surrey and then, as a separate force moved along the Southern coast, to Kent where he met up with Thomas. Finally, in September 1224, Henry arrived in London, the king victorious. In a scene now famous for its hundreds of depictions and its celebration in the art of later centuries, Henry finally took the throne of England, 8 years after being crowned king. Solemnly marching down the hall, in a scene undoubtedly prepared for and choreographed, Henry was flanked by Blondeville on one side and Verraccio on the other (two of his main supporters and symbolising both the secular and clerical worlds). Henry's return to the throne seemed as clean as possible given the circumstances, the Barons had been swept aside as compared to the slower and harder conquest of Louis from 1216-19. But the situation was not in any way 'clean'. Braose was still active in Wales, Fitzwalter in Cornwall, Montfort in Leicester, Bigod in Norfolk and Quincy, Thomas of Kent and Langton were all still active in Kent. Henry had presented himself as this noble king upholding the Magna Carta but as far back as 1216, when his regents first reissued it, there had been clauses that had been changed so that the Magna Carta would be more favourable to the papacy than it had initially been. Henry had taken the throne easier than Louis had but his opposition hadn't been crushed and Louis hadn't been inactive during this period. Rather, if Henry wished to keep the throne, it was going to be a long fight.
 
Chapter 5: The Capetian Interregnum (1224-1228)
King Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
Chapter 5: The Capetian Interregnum (1224-1228)


france1223.jpg

France in 1223 upon the ascension of Louis VIII (note: It doesn't acknowledge the annexation of Gascogne by Philip II in the 1220s which still wasn't fully complete as of 1223 and would be completed in the period between 1224 and 1228)
Many of the pro-Capetian historians of the period covering Louis' rise from Prince of France to King of France and England have come to refer to the period between Henry's capture of London in September 1224 and the Capetian Resurgence in 1228 as the 'Capetian Interregnum' with some even refusing to accept Henry as being a legitimate king. Other historians simply refer to this entire area of study as one of two kings between whom the throne shifts with King John up until 1216 and then Henry until 1219 followed by Louis until 1223 and then Henry again until 1228. Part of Henry's success during this period was built upon how effectively he played upon divisions within France to effectively hold Louis at bay and to prevent him from being able to actually return to England, buying Henry valuable time to move against the resisting barons in England. As of September 1224, Louis had no option to return to England, facing discontent amongst his vassals for the expenses and perceived failure of the campaigns in England thus far as well as a distinct lack of legitimacy in the eyes of many of the more powerful figures in European politics at the time. In France, the general feeling was that Louis should make a peace treaty with Henry which would have Henry cede the former Angevin lands in France to the French and have Louis drop his claims to the throne of England. Instead, the prevailing view amongst both the French nobility and within the Papacy was that Louis should turn his attention South towards Languedoc and the Albigensian Crusade against the Cathars in the region. Nobody would support a return to England because it seemed to be nothing but costly, dangerous and not even legitimate according to either the rules of succession nor the Pope and Henry was well aware of this. In October 1224, Henry sent an emissary to Louis offering relatively favourable peace terms under which Louis would be allowed to keep the former Angevin lands and would receive significant compensation from Henry in return for dropping any and all claims to the throne of England and denouncing Fitzwalter and the other 'rebel' barons. By doing this, Henry was effectively putting Louis in a no-win scenario in which acceptance forced him to drop his claims to the throne of England and isolated the barons who continued to resist but refusal simply alienated the nobility of France. As an added incentive, Henry made an offer to contribute to any attempts by Louis to involve himself in the Albigensian Crusade, helping secure Papal legitimacy and support for his peace terms and thus helping drive Louis closer to an acceptance of the terms Henry proposed. The situation was further complicated for both sides by constant correspondence between the resisting English barons and King Louis including visits by both Thomas of Kent and Amaury de Montfort in an attempt to convince Louis that the situation in England could still be salvaged and not to abandon his attempts to take the throne. Brittany formed another complicating factor, as Peter of Dreux (former Peter I of Brittany jure uxoris and regent for the young John I) effectively posed a party with a vested interest that could swing either way. As it was, Peter had spent much of his life trying to secure his position as the Earl of Richmond as well as the associated income from the Earldom which meant that both Henry and Louis, depending on who won the war, had the power to ensure Peter's position as Earl and, as a result, to ensure that Richmond would pass to John upon Peter's death. This was further made difficult for Peter because the tradition in France was that John would only become ruler, upon his majority, of whatever lands he had inherited which meant that, contrary to 1214 where Peter seemed to have allowed John to pass through his territory for free, he couldn't risk angering Louis without risking Louis depriving John of certain gains made after Peter's wife's death. What this effectively meant was that the situation in England didn't appear hopeless to Louis as of September 1224 and this effectively increased his determination to effect a return to the country as soon as possible as he knew he had supporters in England and had a basis for support from Brittany (as well as Perche and Montfort) to effect a potential return.

Even in England, the situation was far from desperate for Louis' supporters. On one hand, his continued absence from the country demoralised his supporters and the increasing pressure from Henry on their respective territories as well as the fact that they were spread out across the country effectively served to demoralise and weaken them further. But resistance remained heavy from Louis' supporters along the Southern coast and with the French still holding the English Channel, communication could be continued between Louis and his supporters in England as well as, if the need should arise, transport for the nobles to flee the country. The problem was that with Louis' supporters spread out, Henry's forces were effectively spread thin trying to push back all of them at once as well as to prevent any counter-attacks which, in turn, would leave him vulnerable should Louis manage to actually raise a force to move against Henry. While Henry attempted to facilitate resistance to Louis' plans to return to England, Louis in turn moved to secure his position in the country even in his absence. In late 1224, he signed a treaty with King Alexander II of Scotland in which Alexander would recognise Louis' claim to the throne of England and would provide a contingent of soldiers in return for potential support from the French king against the Norwegians to the North as well as securing other concessions such as a trading agreement and possibly some financial compensation (details are sometimes sketchy on the exact nature of the treaty).

In many ways, the period between September 1224 and April 1228 is fascinating because it largely devolves into this game of politics played throughout Europe as both Louis and Henry begin to weave these webs of alliances in order to secure recognition for their various claims and to ensure allies against the other. In France, the main point of resistance to Louis came in the form of Theobald IV of Champagne, a powerful vassal who had begun to butt heads with Louis over the rights of the Jews within France. During Theobald's minority, Champagne had been involved in a succession dispute and the local Jewish population had played a large role in securing his victory and so Louis' policies against the Jews early in his reign quite quickly led to disputes between Theobald and the King. When Louis passed his anti-Jewish policies in 1223, Theobald refused to enact them and the feud grew ever deeper when Theobald became a major advocate against a return to England. Henry was only too keen to play upon this division and rumours soon began to spread amongst those in support or, at least, less opposed to a return to England of collusion between Theobald and Henry to prevent Louis enforcing his claims to England. Henry's successes in England throughout 1224 worsened these accusations in Louis' eyes and growing enmity between Theobald and Louis throughout the period led to both Theobald and Hugh X of Lusignan (who was married to King John's widow and had been accused of being influenced by Isabella to support Henry) being called to answer charges of treason in November 1224 for the alleged collusion with Henry III. Possibly fearing that they would be found guilty if they did appear before the king, Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan refused to appear before Louis, rather sending letters denying the charges and professing their loyalty to the crown. It wasn't enough. After they refused a second summons to appear before the court, Louis issued a statement to the effect of branding both Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan as traitors to the crown in December 1224.

Whether or not the accusations that Theobald and Hugh of Lusignan had been working with King Henry III is up for debate and nobody has ever been able to establish conclusive evidence either way in the build-up to Theobald's Revolt. Nevertheless, the revolt was seemingly a perfect scenario for King Henry and one that seemed likely to distract Louis for long enough for him to finish up in England. Beginning with Louis' statement in December 1224, Theobald's revolt was an event marked more by its impact rather than its effectiveness as resistance to Louis. The issue for both Theobald and Hugh (and his wife Isabella of Angouleme) was that the lands revolting were relatively small in number. The entire revolt was basically the Count of Champagne (Theobald IV), the Count of Lusignan and his wife the Countess of Angouleme. Furthermore, Champagne was pretty much isolated from Lusignan and Angouleme by the royal demesne which cut right between the two as well as the sheer distance between Champagne and the two other counties. As a result, some historians have gone so far as to divide the entire revolt into two smaller rebellions: Hugh and Isabella's Revolt (1224-1225) and Theobald's Revolt (1224-1226). The differences in dates only actually support this idea further as both Hugh and Isabella were beaten long before Theobald was. This isn't to say, however, that Theobald was entirely lacking in advantages as he still had a very powerful county under his command and the financial backing of the Jewish population in Troyes as well as being a capable commander himself. Furthermore, he wasn't actually that far from Paris itself (with Troyes and Paris being separated by only 178 km).

Campaigning, of course, wouldn't actually begin until Spring 1225, by which point both Louis and Theobald had made significant moves gearing up towards a war. Problems emerged very quickly for Theobald who found that Louis hadn't wasted his winter, having opened up communication with Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt (Theobald's former enemy in the War of Champagnian Succession), promising Erard Champagne in return for support against Theobald. As a result, with the arrival of Spring in 1225, Theobald found himself much closer to the enemy than he had initially expected with Erard of Brienne-Ramerupt (Lord of Ramerupt and Venizy, both of which were more-or-less on the doorstep of Troyes). The two forces met in March 1225 at the Battle of Ramerupt where Theobald's larger force (and his greater tactical skill) swept Erard's army aside in a bloody yet quick engagement that sent Erard back very quickly towards Paris. The surrender of both Ramerupt and Venizy shortly afterwards further solidified this victory. But Erard's flight took him right into the path of the advancing King Louis (who was leading the larger part of his force towards Troyes while his forces in the West fought against Hugh and Isabella under the command of John Tristan, Count of Maine.

Tristan, like Louis, swept South almost immediately in March 1225 with the intent of crushing Isabella and Hugh quickly so that the force under his command might go to support Louis' forces in the East. Tristan was a new vassal, having been given the County of Maine following its annexation by Philip II and this meant that he was a man very much seeking to secure recognition and support of King Louis and an important supporter in Northern France, especially if Louis wished to return to England. Isabella and Hugh hadn't been idle either, having raised their forces in preparation for an engagement against any potential invasion from the North. The two forces met at the Battle of Thouars in April, an ultimately indecisive battle between the relatively equal forces under Tristan (composed of his own retinue from Maine as well as further reinforcements from Normany, Anjou and Poitou) and those under Isabella and Hugh (composed of forces from Angouleme and Lusignan). While the Battle of Thouars was ultimately a stalemate, Isabella and Hugh had no scope to actually remain North of Poitiers for long and were forced to retreat, meeting Tristan once again at the Battle of Poitiers in May where they were soundly defeated. From here, Tristan pushed ever further South, capturing Angouleme after a short siege in August and laying siege to Lusignan in November, leading to the surrender of Hugh and Isabella in late November 1225.

Theobald was much harder for Louis to deal with, having greater resources than Hugh and Isabella could muster as Champagne had emerged from the succession crisis, much stronger than before. That said, Theobald was at risk of being surrounded very quickly should Erard convince his cousin (Count Walter IV of Brienne) to invade Champagne from the East (Walter was heavily involved in affairs in the Holy Lands at the time however). As a result, he needed a decisive victory quickly if he were to actually win the war because time was plainly not on his side. Ultimately, it has been argued that Theobald never really stood a chance against Louis because, at the end of the day, Louis had much greater financial and military resources than Theobald could ever hope to muster. The result of this was that when Louis and Theobald finally met on the battlefield at the Battle of the Seine (on the banks of the eponymous river which flows through both Troyes and Paris) in April. As compared to the previous Battle of Ramerupt, the Battle of the Seine was not a clear nor decisive victory for either side and, while Louis did end up holding the field at the end of the day and routing a significant portion of Theobald's left wing, the Champagnian forces were by no means entirely destroyed. This situation was ultimately not resolved with the even more indecisive Second Battle of the Seine only two months later in July.

Theobald and Louis would meet one more time on the battlefield at the infamous Battle of Troyes in August 1225 which preceded the bloody and long Siege of Troyes. The basic outline of the battle is that Theobald's forces initially pushed Louis back, even managing to almost overwhelm a significant portion of his army. However, Theobald's centre ended up dangerously overextended due to having managed to push the enemy further and faster than the two flanks. The result of this was that the centre ended up cut off from the two flanks, surrounded and almost annihilated. The battle, however, continued on into the evening as poor communication on both sides prevented either Louis or Theobald from really appreciating the scale of what had happened to Theobald's centre. In turn, the two flanks continued fighting for hours even after the centre had been annihilated and the battle descended into a bloodbath on both sides before Theobald, realising he was getting the worst of the situation, retreated back into the city and barred the gates. It was only in the aftermath of the battle that Theobald could finally appreciate just what had happened in the battle with some estimates putting the number dead overall (across both armies) at about 5-6000 (a significant number in Medieval Europe). Realising that Theobald had lost a very significant portion of his force in the battle, Louis sent an emissary calling for Theobald's immediate surrender. Theobald, seemingly, refused although stories that he sent back the emissary's head with its eyes gouged out and teeth missing (or a dozen other variations on the story) are undoubtedly myths. The result was the Siege of Troyes which, due to the onset of winter and the fact that Tristan wouldn't arrive until May 1226 as well as Theobald's own determination and tactical command, wouldn't actually conclude until the defenders finally surrendered in July 1226.

Theobald was promptly taken in chains to Paris where he was tried before the king and court and found guilty of treason and rebellion and sentenced to death. He was executed in Paris in August 1226. On one hand, the conflict was devastating for Louis because the resources required to defeat Theobald and the distraction it provided meant that Louis' return to England was even further delayed, resulting in Henry making further gains against the resisting vassals in England. But on the other hand, the war had devastated Champagne but not so much that it would never recover and it remained a powerful county that was now handed over to a loyal vassal in the form of the new Count Erard of Champagne on the condition that he swear another oath of loyalty to Louis and promise to provide soldiers for a return to England. Hugh and Isabella were pardoned after a short period of imprisonment from December 1225 to August 1226 and allowed to keep their titles on the condition that both swear loyalty to Louis, promise to provide soldiers for a return to England and pay a hefty fine to the crown. What this effectively meant was that Louis now had some very significant support in France starting to build up that could, soon, be turned to a war in England.

This support only grew starting in 1225 with the resumption of the Albigensian Crusade when, in November 1225, Raymond of Toulouse had been excommunicated by Pope Gregory IX and a call for a renewed crusade in Toulouse issued. The Albigensian Crusade had stalled since 1216 when both Simon de Montfort and Innocent III had died leaving the crusade without any leaders save for the cautious (and from 1223, dead) Philip II as Amaury de Montfort was busy in England and so too was Louis. Caught in the midst of a revolt and well aware that the lack of papal support had cost him dearly in England so far, Louis began moving to endear himself towards the pope, publicly taking up the cross in return for papal denouncement of the rebelling nobles in France. Initially, the forces sent by Louis were relatively small while he focused on putting down Theobald in the North but with the end of the revolt in June 1226, Louis found himself finally freed up to move South against Toulouse in force. Funded by a tax authorised by the pope at the same council at which Raymond VII of Toulouse had been excommunicated, Louis swept down into Toulouse in August with fortified cities and castles quickly and easily surrendering to him. Avignon, which was nominally ruled by Emperor Frederick II of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), however did choose to resist Louis leading to a three-month siege between August and November 1226. As the conflict continued on into 1227, the resisting Cathars found themselves increasingly desperate as their manpower wore thin and their ability to prevent the crusaders from ravaging their lands began to run out. It is at this point that the most important details in regards to the conflict between the Capetians and the Plantagenets emerge, the Siege of Avignon (1226) and the Excommunication of Frederick II (September 1227).

The Siege of Avignon effectively set the relations between the King of France and the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire on a very distinct downward trend as Louis pointedly ignored Frederick's protests that Avignon was under his rule and took the city himself in November. In comparison, the latter event effectively set the tone for French-Papal relations in coming decades. With Frederick excommunicated, the beginnings of yet another conflict between the papacy and the empire began to stir and Gregory was well aware that he needed allies if he were to come out on top against Frederick. It should be no wonder, then, that Louis was the obvious choice. As the king of an increasingly powerful kingdom with an interest in balancing out the power of the Holy Roman Emperor, Louis was a much safer bet not just for his strength but his proximity and relatively stability (despite the recent revolt) compared to the more distant Henry III. This was exactly what Louis needed. Louis' peace terms to Raymond VII in early 1228 were probably modelled on what he had done with Hugh only two years earlier, allowing Raymond to keep his titles and lands in return for support against his enemies, particularly the Cathars. Raymond's daughter, Joan, was to be married to Louis' eldest son, Louis (the future Louis IX) to further secure the support of the County of Toulouse. Raymond ended up imprisoned for a time in early 1228 before finally being released with a sizeable fine and indemnity to be paid to the crown. What we see here is a distinct departure from the very tactics Louis had used in England, tactics which had alienated nobles and led to him losing England in the first place back in 1224.

Theobald's defeat, Hugh's imprisonment and now the defeat of Raymond had served to very efficiently secure support wherever possible for Louis to finally do what he had been hoping to do ever since his coronation; return to England. But, most importantly, the excommunication of Frederick II in September 1227 gave Louis the leverage he needed to secure a shift in Papal support. In return for a promise to support the Papacy and her Italian allies against Frederick's encroachments as well as recognition of the illegitimacy of Frederick's claims to the throne of Sicily, Louis was able to finally bargain Papal recognition of his claim to the throne of England. At this stage, it is possible that Gregory didn't go so far as to give definitive support for Louis as the King of England but rather stopped contesting or denying his claims to the throne and maybe hinted that, should Louis retake the country, he could probably be crowned with Papal support and recognition. Whatever the case, the change in how the papacy officially regarded the entire Capetian-Plantagenet conflict would prove especially important in areas where support for Louis was waning, bolstering the resolve of his supporters in England and allowing Louis to make some real headway towards securing support from Peter of Dreux. This came to a head with the Treaty of Nantes in January 1228 in which Peter promised to provide a contingent of Bretons and renew his oath of fealty in return for Louis confirming him as the Earl of Richmond and John I of Brittany as the heir to the Earldom as well as Brittany. With this, Louis finally jumped into action, raising forces from his own demesne as well as from Champagne, Montfort, Perche, Lusignan, Angouleme, Maine (under the aforementioned John Tristan) and a contingent from Toulouse while once again enlisting Eustace the Monk as his primary naval commander against the Plantagenets. Finally, in April 1228 he issued a statement proclaiming himself as the rightful king of England and stating his intent to return to the country as soon as possible before finally setting sail later that month.

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Notes from the author:

1) On the Albigensian Crusade: In our timeline Louis VII actually did take part in the crusade at around the same time (albeit leaving in June rather than August). Many of the castles and towns did surrender OTL and I saw few reasons why this should change in this timeline, especially given Louis' recent success against Theobald. Once again, Avignon resists ITTL as it did in OTL but with the major change (because of Louis' later arrival) of Louis not getting sick and dying as he did IOTL. With greater pressure from the French crown and Louis in command, the crusade progresses faster ITTL than IOTL and Raymond surrenders in early 1228 rather than 1229.

2) On conflicts in Chapter 5: I've skimmed over Theobald's Revolt as well as Henry's operations against the rebelling vassals in England and the exact details of the Albigensian Crusade so as to keep the chapter from becoming too long, rather I've focused on saying the basics of what happened and why and the outcomes.

3) EDIT: 14/08/2017. Changes in bold.
 
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2) On conflicts in Chapter 5: I've skimmed over Theobald's Revolt as well as Henry's operations against the rebelling vassals in England and the exact details of the Albigensian Crusade so as to keep the chapter from becoming too long, rather I've focused on saying the basics of what happened and why and the outcomes.
Well, in the first version, that was a good moment to read on. Is that still the same lines as in the first version? Or will you write it in a separate chapter?
 
The worst part about the last chapter is that it ended, when can we expect an update? Do you have any ideas related to the english parliment i.e will Louis keep it, disband it this could set the tone for how effective the kingdoms become later in life. It would be wisest I think if louis works upon the parliamentary model and creates one for France to govern in his stead while he's in England and vice versa. Looking forward to the next chapter.;)
 
Well, in the first version, that was a good moment to read on. Is that still the same lines as in the first version? Or will you write it in a separate chapter?

Well I can certainly do an update covering Theobald's revolt if you'd like, I didn't do it in this update but I can as a separate chapter. That said, I don't remember the exact way the first version played out but it is probably different in some details in regards to how it played out but not really in its outcome and impact.

The worst part about the last chapter is that it ended, when can we expect an update? Do you have any ideas related to the english parliment i.e will Louis keep it, disband it this could set the tone for how effective the kingdoms become later in life. It would be wisest I think if louis works upon the parliamentary model and creates one for France to govern in his stead while he's in England and vice versa. Looking forward to the next chapter.;)

I know, I actually wanted to keep going but I think the chapter system works best if I keep them kinda separate from one another in content, you know? That said, it WAS a bit of a brief update this time.

As for the parliamentary model, that is definitely something I will be covering (because I did in the first version) in later updates although I'm not sure what route I will be going with it yet so we'll see about that. In the meantime, you might find this interesting:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parlement#History
 
Well I can certainly do an update covering Theobald's revolt if you'd like, I didn't do it in this update but I can as a separate chapter. That said, I don't remember the exact way the first version played out but it is probably different in some details in regards to how it played out but not really in its outcome and impact.
If I remember, you covered the revolt in continuation with the coronation.

Else, you may cover Henry's efforts as a prelude to the chapter on the Capetian reconquest.
 
Chapter 6: Plantagenets Victorious (1224-1227)
Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
Chapter 6: Plantagenets Victorious (1224-1227):

Before the events surrounding Louis' return to England in 1228 can properly be considered, we need to turn out attention to the events of Henry's four year stretch as King of England from 1224 to 1228 so that we understand the situation in England upon Louis' return. As of September 1224, Henry finally sat in London as the King of England in his own right and yet, despite his successes over the last few months, resistance remained strong in a number of areas throughout the country. The two primary regions of resistance at the time of the fall of London were the South-East (from Winchester in the West to Kent in the East) held by Saer de Quincy and Thomas of Kent and Cornwall, held by Robert Fitzwalter. In the West, Reginald de Braose (who had been given estates by Louis that had been confiscated by King John) continued his resistance against Henry with the help of Llwellyn the Great (who had often fought with Braose against King John). In the North, resistance was headed in both Leicester and Lincoln by Amaury de Montfort. What this meant was that, even as Henry controlled much of the North-West and a sizeable portion of the Southern coast as well as London, he was surrounded on every side by enemies. This was a situation worsened for Henry by the nature of these enemies, many of whom were stronger supporters of Louis' claims to the throne and stood to potentially lose a lot in the wake of Henry's statement upon returning to England. Montfort, Kent, Quincy and Fitzwalter all stood to lose Earldoms should they be defeated while Braose was effectively kept in resistance to Henry by Llwellyn's sizeable influence throughout Wales. Correspondence between Louis and his English supporters continued extensively between 1224 and 1228 and, in the French king's absence, was the main method by which Louis could provide support and moral boosting to his allies on the English mainland. While the French nobility would not support an actual conflict in England, this also didn't prevent Louis from providing some actual help for his allies through the occasional deposit of money and even, on one occasion, helping them to hire some mercenaries to help resist Henry. Combined with the tendency for both France and Scotland to provide refuge for rebellious nobles should Henry manage to oust them from their lands and the French domination of the seas between England and France (Henry hadn't had much of a chance to really recover any naval strength after Dover, having been on the back foot until his defeat in 1219 and then in exile until 1223), these factors all effectively played into why, despite being free from the risk of Louis actually invading until 1228, Henry never managed to actually defeat the rebellious vassals.

This doesn't mean that, contrary to what some people have come to believe, Henry had no chance of ever actually defeating the rebels in the first place. After the sweeping successes of 1224 and the defection or subjugation of a number of Louis' 'supporters', Henry was very much winning the war. Upon taking London in September 1224, Henry issued a letter calling for the surrender of the still-rebellious vassals, offering a pardon if they laid down their arms and renounced their support for Louis. Possibly still confident that Louis would return imminently or worried about losing the lands they had only just gained, the response from the still-resisting nobles was lukewarm at best. It's very possible that Henry anticipated this very response and, by refusing to lay down their arms, the remaining nobles had allowed themselves to be branded traitors to the crown, legitimising whatever punishment Henry saw fit upon their defeat. Henry, of course, wasted no time in pointing this out, denouncing all of them as traitors to the crown and calling for their capture. Some have argued that Henry's choice to denounce them as traitors was probably his biggest mistake because it made his enemies desperate and only drove them to resist all the harder. But, in context, it's a problematic argument to make because Henry had little reason to think that he wasn't going to win given the circumstances which, seemingly, were very much against Louis as of 1224 and by branding them traitors there and then, he was making a statement that disloyalty wouldn't be tolerated. There's little doubt this was aimed at people who had defected from Louis to Henry in 1223, whether voluntarily or under duress. That said, the response was what Henry possibly should have expected: resistance. By declaring Fitzwalter and his allies traitors, he gave them little to lose and, in turn, drove them to subsequently denounce Henry as king (on the basis that King John had forfeited his right to rule when he broke faith with the nobles and refused to uphold the Magna Carta, which Henry had followed through on by altering the terms when he reissued it) and pronounce Louis the rightful king. With the onset of winter, the two sides settled in for a protracted game of diplomacy throughout the British Isles.

As Henry moved to undermine Louis both in England and in France, Louis' barons worked just as hard to undermine Henry in their own favour. Correspondence continued between Louis and King Alexander II of Scotland with the assistance (and often use) of the pro-Capetian nobility in England which, in turn, led to the 'Treaty of Edinburgh' between Louis and Alexander in December 1224 in which Alexander promised to recognise and assist Louis with his claims to the throne of England in return for Louis' support against Scottish enemies to the North. Beyond this, the two kings established a trade deal. For the time being, the importance of this treaty was in how it effectively gave the barons a powerful ally in the British Isles who could not only provide soldiers when the time came but potentially refuge and even diplomatic or financial support. Correspondence between Reginald and his sister Margaret (Lady of Trim) and her husband, Walter de Lacy (Lord of Meath) show a distinct hope to try and undermine Henry's support back in Ireland and it seems likely that there may have been some correspondence between the still-rebellious vassals and those who had been forced to side with Henry under duress in 1223-4. Further issues in Ireland for Henry probably came from correspondence between the pro-Capetian nobles and the Irish lords and petty kings, possibly hoping to distract Henry with another conflict in Ireland to further stretch his resources. Many of these attempts fostered by the pro-Capetian nobles wouldn't actually come into proper effect until as late as 1228 as we'll see during the Capetian Resurgence and, when campaigning began again in 1225, their efforts were hindered by their inability to actually defeat Henry.

Determined to secure Kent and prevent Louis from maintaining control of the most easily accessible landing point in Britain, the bulk of Henry's efforts were concentrated in the South-East under his own command as he swept down upon Quincy and Thomas of Kent in the hope of quickly crushing them and securing his position so that he could turn elsewhere. The campaign was to be decided at Rochester Castle because it formed the lowest crossing point of the River Medway and, as such, the quickest route by which Henry could hope to reach the Cinque Ports and capture Kent and everyone knew that. While Henry was determined to capture the castle, Louis was just as determined to prevent it from falling and, according to some sources, invested his own money into hiring Brabantian mercenaries to support the barons at Rochester. The two forces met at the Battle of Rochester Castle and, after a quick engagement, Henry drove the baronial forces back and laid siege to the castle, a siege that would drag on far longer than Henry had probably hoped. Ultimately, Rochester wouldn't fall until November 1225 by which point it was too late for further campaigning until spring 1226. While Henry's return to campaigning in 1226 proved successful, driving quickly through most of Kent and making significant inroads (with the help of Redvers in Devon) into Winchester by June, the onset of winter and the time spent at Rochester in the first place had allowed Kent and Quincy to fall back upon Dover Castle and to hold it against Henry. The focus on the South-East, however, proved detrimental elsewhere in the country. While Montfort was soundly defeated by Blondeville at the Battle of Leicester in July 1225 and then driven fully out of both Leicester and Lincoln by July 1226, the campaigns in Cornwall didn't go quite as well. By December 1226, Leicester and Lincoln had fallen while Dover Castle was under siege, a siege that floundered due to the skills of Eustace the Monk. Given French naval dominance and Eustace's skills as a pirate, the siege of Dover Castle dragged on and on due to the constant smuggling in of food and even reinforcements to the castle. Fitzwalter had fallen back further into Cornwall but still held a number of castles with plans to flee to France should the need arise and constant correspondence requesting whatever help Alexander or Louis could provide. In Wales, the situation hadn't gone well at all for Henry and the forces led by the Marshals had found themselves bogged down and soundly defeated by the Welsh and Braosian forces in a number of engagements, culminating in a few incursions into Pembroke throughout 1226.

The shifting events and attitudes in France in 1227 began to mark the point at which the tide began to turn in England. Worries of a shifting papal attitude towards the conflict and the inability of Henry to seemingly gain a decisive victory began to undermine his situation back home as the costs began to mount (and, given his lack of control in the country he didn't have money to spare) and Louis was finally freeing himself up to possibly return. This wasn't helped by the fact that not only was Louis building support back in France but he was increasingly appearing like a better option, having taken the cross of crusade and having restored order to France by crushing Theobald's rebellion by 1226 (something Henry had failed to do in 4 years). The toll this began to take was more than just psychological, there were a number of nobles whose loyalty to Henry wasn't exactly firm and with events in France suggesting that Louis might soon return to take back the throne, events began to shift into motion. Correspondence began to pick up once again between Reginald and his sister as well as between Fitzwalter and the Earls of Hereford and Gloucester. Montfort finally resurfaced in France in 1227 and the siege of Dover Castle began to fall into a slump as discontent began to spread amongst the nobility within Henry's army. Discontent and rumour abound throughout the country and, just across the Channel, the French King engineered his return.
 
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Sounds like Henry is not long for this world.
It is interesting though that he is recognised in the future of TTL as a rival king and numbered accordingly, rather than a mere usurper.
This suggests a future king claiming title from both Henry and Louis against another, possibly only descended from Louis.
Maybe Louis only leaves daughters whose sons fight it out over France and England before dividing between them.
 
Sounds like Henry is not long for this world.
It is interesting though that he is recognised in the future of TTL as a rival king and numbered accordingly, rather than a mere usurper.
This suggests a future king claiming title from both Henry and Louis against another, possibly only descended from Louis.
Maybe Louis only leaves daughters whose sons fight it out over France and England before dividing between them.
RiseofBubblez said he was more or less following the great lines of the first version, so without spoiling too much, Henry has another few years to live before ...:rolleyes:
 
Sounds like Henry is not long for this world.
It is interesting though that he is recognised in the future of TTL as a rival king and numbered accordingly, rather than a mere usurper.
This suggests a future king claiming title from both Henry and Louis against another, possibly only descended from Louis.
Maybe Louis only leaves daughters whose sons fight it out over France and England before dividing between them.

Honestly, the inclusion of Henry as a rival king (being numbered accordingly) is a point I thought a lot about. It seems highly unlikely that the Capetians would choose to ever recognise Henry as the legitimate Henry III and thus refer to any future Henry as Henry IV. Ultimately the view I took was to refer, as part of the timeline, to Henry as Henry III (and so I will refer to any Capetian Henry's as Henry III/IV, Henry V/VI and so on) so as to not show any favouritism and so as to acknowledge that, ITTL, there ARE pro-Plantagenet historians who would undoubtedly refer to Henry as Henry III. Simply put, I did it to retain neutrality in regards to who is king and who is not. This is especially important given that I am trying to deal with both kingdoms fairly and so the kings of both should be recorded. In such a situation, periods such as 1224-1228 in which the Capetians don't actually hold England become difficult.

RiseofBubblez said he was more or less following the great lines of the first version, so without spoiling too much, Henry has another few years to live before ...:rolleyes:

Okay so yes, I am following the general lines and gist of the first one so far. That said, there have already been a few major changes in how things have progressed and so the differences between the 2017 and the 2016 timeline (the rewrite and the original respectively) will grow as time goes on. Case in point, in the 2016 timeline Louis wasn't absent from England for long and returned relatively quickly which resulted in his absence when Theobald revolted. In turn, this led to a larger revolt if I recall but also greater difficulties in putting it down as the royalist forces were headed by Blanche of Castile and her supporters. (By the way I'm making an edit to the chapter with Theobald's revolt to give an overview of the conflict which I honestly should have given the first time around).
 
Chapter 7: The Capetian Resurgence and the End of the Capetian-Plantagenet War (1227-1230)
Louis VIII of France and I of England or Henry III of England
Chapter 7: The Capetian Resurgence and the end of the Capetian-Plantagenet War (1227-1230 )

News of Louis' imminent return was a massive boost to the resolve of the pro-Capetian nobility in England but, more importantly, was accompanied by some significant moves made by Louis in the build-up to his return. From as early as November 1227, the pace at which soldiers and resources were smuggled into Dover Castle began to increase and correspondence between Louis and his supporters in England picked up significantly as well. The Treaty of Nantes in January 1228 and the declaration of Louis' rightful kingship April only served to further weaken Henry's position in England. Needless to say, the response and result was panicked within the Plantagenet nobility as all the main players in Henry's court were spread out across England. Henry had been fighting since 1223 to reestablish his control and, even as he fought the pro-Capetian nobles in the South, he was constantly putting up with raids across the border from Alexander of Scotland, raids which only picked up with the Treaty of Edinburgh in December 1224 and increased massively in 1227 and 1228. Along the Southern coast, Henry was being faced with raids by Eustace and the French fleet, not to mention smuggling which only slowed down any gains being made in the Siege of Dover Castle. Those vassals who had been pressured to turn on Louis such as the Earls of Hereford and Gloucester began to become problematic once again for Henry and correspondence picked up between them and the resisting barons. Henry was well aware that he needed to capture Dover Castle if he wished to prevent Louis from landing but resistance and discontent amongst his army only slowed things down further, especially as Ranulf de Blondeville, Earl of Chester began voicing concerns that Hereford and Gloucester might turn on Henry and invade Chester and began asking for permission to take his retinue and return to Chester. Some worried that Henry risked being cut off from London should he fail to take Dover Castle before Louis could return to England, a worry exacerbated by Eustace capturing the Cinque Ports in April which forced Henry to send a contingent under Hugh de Vere, Earl of Oxford, to dislodge the French forces from the ports.

In Wales, the campaigns of the Marshal family came to a halt from January onward amidst disagreements between the Marshal family and the Earl of Gloucester, culminating in the desertion of Gloucester in March 1224 and a treaty between Llywellyn in which Louis recognised him as the Prince of Wales in return for Llywellyn's acknowledgement and support for Louis' claim to the throne of England. Ultimately, the return of Louis in late April was the point at which the boiling pot of 1220s England finally exploded. It began with a relatively simple engagement as Louis' forces landed in Kent and quickly overran the defenders of the Cinque Ports, driving Vere back to Dover Castle to report the landing of the French army. Fearing that he would end up being trapped between a rock and a hard place should he try to keep up the siege, Henry instead opted to break the siege of the castle and retreat as quickly as possible to London where he could assemble his forces in preparation to meet Louis in battle. But it's at this point that the negotiations between the rebelling vassals and Henry's supporters began to show themselves as discontent amongst the Irish forces led by the House de Braose led to Henry dismissing them from his army in May 1228 while Gilbert de Clare (Earl of Gloucester) defected to Louis in June and Henry de Bohun (Earl of Hereford) defected in July. William d'Aubigny (Earl of Arundel) and William FitzGeoffrey de Mandeville returned to Louis' side in September following further victories against the Plantagenet forces. But Louis had no intention of letting Henry unite with the greater part of his supporters across the country and made a beeline for Rochester Castle, hoping to take the castle and prevent Henry from crossing over towards London. The problem for Henry came when Louis ran into the dismissed forces of the House de Braose in early June 1228 and, there, received oaths of loyalty from Margaret of Trim (by correspondence later in the month) and Walter de Lacy, bolstering his forces further. The subsequent Battle of Rochester and the events that would follow are the culmination of 4 years' efforts to undermine and outdo Henry on every front. Louis had no chance of capturing Rochester before Henry could arrive but he had no intention of just letting Henry cross to take refuge in the castle and so, in a repeat of what had happened at the Battle of Lincoln 11 years earlier, Louis left a small force to maintain a siege of the castle while he marched two miles to face up against Henry. This was the first time that Louis and Henry met on the field of battle and the events of the campaign so far and in months to come show two kings who have both spent years fighting. Henry had been leading the war against his vassals since 1223 while Louis had fought three separate conflicts since 1216 (The Baronial War, Theobald's Revolt and the Albigensian Crusade). The Battle of Rochester was by far the largest engagement in the Capetian-Plantagenet War with Louis leading a force composed of soldiers from his own demesne as well as Maine, Angouleme, Champagne, Toulouse, Lusignan and Brittany as well as mercenaries and whatever forces could be sent from Dover Castle to support him plus the now defected Irish forces under Walter de Lacy. Before we can go on to talk about the battle we need to remind ourselves that there were two 'de Lacy's' brought from Ireland in 1223. The first was of course Walter de Lacy but the second was Hugh de Lacy who hadn't been dismissed unlike Walter and was about to play a decisive role in events to come. It's probable that Louis had been in communication with Hugh for hours beforehand and Hugh was likely in correspondence either with the king or with Walter or even both. Not entirely trusting Hugh after Walter's defection, Henry had put his forces on the front lines so that they would be pushed into fighting the Capetians first with the irony, of course, being that Henry's very attempt to prevent defection possibly pushed Hugh over into defection and made its impact worse.

Most of our primary sources are pretty clear on what happened next and, as Henry's forces advanced, Hugh raised a banner and shouted some variation of 'For England, I urge you, strike down that tyrant' and turned to face Henry. Henry's vanguard had been broken by the defection and a massive gap of hostile soldiers now existed right in the centre of his army that was not about to be pushed on by Louis' advancing force. Determined to push Hugh and his retinue out from the centre of the vanguard and restore his lines before Louis could push to deepen the fissure, Henry and Ranulf led a spirited charge against the Irish soldiers, supported on the flanks by the remaining members of the vanguard. Despite initial success, however, Hugh's forces weren't completely dislodged, allowing Louis to close the remaining distance and drive forward the split in the English lines. Henry's vanguard now found itself increasingly pressured, facing the Irish defectors under Hugh in the centre (fittingly supported by Walter who had been in the vanguard of Louis' army) and Louis' own forces as they pushed on their sides. Soon enough, the break in Henry's lines became a fissure in his army, pushing the two flanks wider and wider apart as Louis continued to exert pressure on the centre. Gradually, the flanks were forced to retreat step by step until they had been driven completely apart. In truth, Henry's army split into about 5 different contingents as the far flanks were driven apart from the forces at the back on either side and the centre back forces ended up separated as well. Those towards the back of Henry's army ultimately got lucky in the battle, with Henry and Ranulf both escaping with their lives and even some small forces of soldiers who began to band back together in the weeks following Rochester. Others weren't so lucky. Hugh de Vere, Earl of Oxford was captured and William Longespee, Earl of Salisbury and a talented commander in his own right was killed.

Rochester was a disaster for Henry, both militarily and politically. Large swathes of his army had been wiped out and the subsequent siege of Rochester threatened to allow Louis to cross over and move on London while defections picked up their pace in the wake of the defeat. Unable to retreat North, Henry fell back West towards Devon where he met up with Redvers. Determined to prevent himself from being completely surrounded following the recapture of the South-East and the capture of Vere, which effectively meant that Oxford was far from safe, as well as the defections of Gloucester, Henry and his contingents pushed on to join Redvers' forces in capturing Cornwall. Progress in Cornwall sped up significantly after Henry's arrival, ultimately forcing Fitzwalter to abandon the Earldom in September and flee around the coast to Kent. But in the South-East, Henry's success faded rapidly as Louis set about repairing and strengthening Dover Castle and sent Quincy and Thomas of Kent to push West and reclaim Winchester which they did by March 1229. Rochester fell in November 1228, too late for Louis to launch a serious march to London (which wouldn't take place until March the following year) but allowing Louis time to reinforce and garrison the castle against any attempts Henry might make to retake it. In the West, Bohun swept back North into Chester while Clare, with support from Llywellyn and Braose, gradually pushed the Marshal family on two fronts. Having secured the South-West as a power-base and with support from some portions of Ireland weakened but still available as well as surviving contingents from other noble supporters, Henry began turning his attention back to the other fronts of the war starting in Spring 1229. He had two options available to him with the first being to try and retake the South-East and cut Louis off from France and the second being to try and push North through Gloucester and Hereford to secure access to the Marshals and whatever other resources could be brought from Chester (although Ranulf was with him in Cornwall). The death of Verraccio in 1226 now proved especially damaging for Henry's links to the Papacy who now began to fall back to a more neutral position following the arrangement between Louis and Gregory in 1227 and the loss of the main pro-Plantagenet advocate in the Papacy the year prior to that. Without the Papal legitimacy he had had before, Henry found his list of allies growing thin in England, especially after Louis' capture of London in late March 1229. Resolving to try once more to cut off reinforcements from France and thus to isolate Louis in London, Henry decided to make another move East beginning in March and, for three months, successfully pushed Quincy back from his recently recaptured positions in Winchester.

Louis', meanwhile, had been celebrating his victory by taking the chance to actually make the political moves he had been unable to make back in 1219 and presided over the appointment (chosen by Gregory IX himself) of Richard le Grant as Archbishop of Canterbury in 1229. By the time Louis reached the capital, however, the crown itself had been spirited away by Henry's supporters and wouldn't actually be recovered until 1231 and so Louis' coronation was an affair that actually ended up taking place with a replica rather than wait. Louis was well aware that he couldn't afford to wait forever before being crowned king, he needed to be crowned as soon as possible to help legitimise his position. With his coronation having finally taken place, Louis now turned to securing what remained of the country. By about June 1229, the war in Wales had been won effectively but Henry continued to push in Winchester while large swathes of land North of London remained contested. Louis now split his forces up, sending a force under Amaury de Montfort North towards Lincoln to reestablish Montfort and Maudit as Earls of Leicester and Warwick respectively before moving against Chester to support Bohun. Meanwhile, Louis himself would lead the rest of his forces South to Winchester to finally put down Henry once and for all. Louis and Henry met for the second time at the Battle of Petersfield in July 1229 where Louis gained a second victory over the Plantagenet forces, allowing him to make a counter-attack beginning shortly afterwards and continuing on well into 1230. Ultimately, the war is considered to have ended with Henry's second flight from the country in October 1230 following the Battle of Sidmouth in September 1230 and the capture of Redvers with the subsequent rapid push into Cornwall. In a repeat of the events of 1219, Henry now found himself trapped in Cornwall with nowhere to go but abroad if he hoped to actually survive Louis' advance and so, like in 1219, Henry fled. We'll go into more detail on the situation in 1230 and why Henry fled to Europe rather than to Ireland but, in short, Henry had little choice but to turn to a foreign country and no better option than the very country Louis had started vying against politically only 3 years earlier due to an arrangement between Louis and Gregory IX, the Holy Roman Empire. Once again, the flight of Henry marked the end of the war that was tearing England apart but not quite the end of all the fighting. The Marshals were, once again, driven into exile following their defeat at the hands of the Earl of Gloucester and the Lord of Braose as well as Lllywellyn but fled, instead, to Ireland where they would come to play a role in the events there in the next few years. Ranulf left with Henry once again, one of the few major supporters Henry had left in England while Bohun was restored to Chester. This is where we are going to leave things, on the eve of Louis' victory in the Capetian-Plantagenet War (1223-1230) so that we can really cover the situation of 1230 and how Louis would move, once again, to secure the country in the wake of his victory over Henry.
 
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Very nice chapter, quick question if you'll be so kind as to answer. How far are you going to take this TL? I would personally love to see an King of "United Kingdoms" (great britain + france) come into fruition and challenge a more united german HRE and Iberia. But I'm not much for writing, and would really like to know were you're going.
 
Very nice chapter, quick question if you'll be so kind as to answer. How far are you going to take this TL? I would personally love to see an King of "United Kingdoms" (great britain + france) come into fruition and challenge a more united german HRE and Iberia. But I'm not much for writing, and would really like to know were you're going.

I plan to follow this TL as far as possible, though it may be unlikely that I'll get to the modern age (we'll see). That said, I'm not entirely sure what direction I'm going with it as of yet and am only following a vague outline from the '2016 Timeline' but things have already changed to some degree from that basis so I'm not sure.
 
Authors Note: Could readers check out the 'Notes, Edits and Announcements' section in the same section as the sources and credit? Thanks.

 
I'm looking for mentions of Richard of Cornwall's fate (Henry III) brother. In the first version, I had read at some moment he diead early on, but I can't find where in this version it's written. I just think this is quite an important detail when we know what's gonna happen.
 
I'm looking for mentions of Richard of Cornwall's fate (Henry III) brother. In the first version, I had read at some moment he diead early on, but I can't find where in this version it's written. I just think this is quite an important detail when we know what's gonna happen.

Actually I've deliberately left him out so far, he's not dead in this timeline because I felt t was a bit of a stretch that he was captured so easily in the original timeline. He's going to become more relevant as time goes on but for now we can assume he's been without Henry, first in Ireland and then in England and then in the Holy Roman Empire. That said, I should have specified where he's been all this time.
 
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