The U.S. Signs an Alliance with Britain and France in 1919-1920

CaliGuy

Banned
U.S. Senate Majority Leader Henry Cabot Lodge (a reservationist Republican during the Versailles Treaty negotiations, and a staunch opponent of Woodrow Wilson's) supported the idea of the U.S. having some sort of alliance with France (I would presume that the U.K. would also be included in such an alliance). My source for this information is page 160 in this book: https://books.google.com/books?id=_...n such as is included in Article 10,"&f=false

Basically, the PoD here is that U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's 1919 stroke is a bit more severe, thus killing Wilson rather than incapacitating him. Thus, Wilson's Vice President Thomas Marshall becomes the new U.S. President in 1919 and manages to compromise with Lodge's faction in the U.S. Senate to have the U.S. join the League of Nations with some reservations, as well as to implement a U.S. alliance with Britain and with France (which, as far as I know, was something which Wilson actually promised French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau at Versailles in early 1919).

Thus, in this scenario, the United States of America is a member of the League of Nations since 1919 or 1920, and the U.S. also has an alliance with Britain and France since that point in time.

How exactly do you think that history since 1919 (including World War II, if Hitler still eventually comes to power) in this scenario would have differed from real life?
 
In Europe? I'm not sure much would change. I think the same logic that led Britain to be ambivalent at best regarding the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 would sway the incoming Republican Administration as well, and after that, any hopes of a unified front against Germany in Europe would probably just die like OTL. There might be more effects in Asia if the three of them decide to be more vigilant about the Japanese.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
In Europe? I'm not sure much would change. I think the same logic that led Britain to be ambivalent at best regarding the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 would sway the incoming Republican Administration as well, and after that, any hopes of a unified front against Germany in Europe would probably just die like OTL. There might be more effects in Asia if the three of them decide to be more vigilant about the Japanese.
I agree that the interwar U.S. would probably follow Britain's lead in regards to ambivalence towards the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty and the resulting reparations. However, what I am curious about is this--could there be more arms sales and whatnot between the U.S., Britain, and France between 1920 and 1939 in this TL? Also, would generals and politicians from each of these countries meet every once in a while to discuss strategy and whatnot?

As for Japan, I completely agree with you in regards to this; indeed, this might very well be important in the 1930s and beyond.

Also, though, does the U.S. enter WWII in 1939 in this TL with the hope that it wouldn't need to send a lot of its own troops to Europe? Indeed, would the U.S. be willing to go to war on behalf of Poland in 1939 in this TL if both Britain and France are willing to do this?
 
I agree that the interwar U.S. would probably follow Britain's lead in regards to ambivalence towards the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty and the resulting reparations. However, what I am curious about is this--could there be more arms sales and whatnot between the U.S., Britain, and France between 1920 and 1939 in this TL? Also, would generals and politicians from each of these countries meet every once in a while to discuss strategy and whatnot?

As for Japan, I completely agree with you in regards to this; indeed, this might very well be important in the 1930s and beyond.

Also, though, does the U.S. enter WWII in 1939 in this TL with the hope that it wouldn't need to send a lot of its own troops to Europe? Indeed, would the U.S. be willing to go to war on behalf of Poland in 1939 in this TL if both Britain and France are willing to do this?

Like I said, I think most formal commitments on the part of the States would have lapsed by 1939. The British and French had already begun rearmament programs several years earlier, so short of earlier than OTL Lend Lease (not happening until the moment Germany starts winning), I don't think they'd get much else. As for what could be exchanged before that time, you'd need to ask wiking or one of the other members with more detailed knowledge of weapon systems than me. Maybe the US could have somewhat stronger naval aviation than OTL if there was more emphasis on readiness against Japan, but otherwise, I wouldn't expect too much.
 
... However, what I am curious about is this--could there be more arms sales and whatnot between the U.S., Britain, and France between 1920 and 1939 in this TL? ...

It does lay the ground for not voting in the Nuetrality Acts. A alliance that includes military commitments is in direct contradiction to the Nuetrality Acts as they were written. That allows the Europeans to realisitcally shop for weapons in the US.

My question is did Coolidge have any interest in European affairs & possiblly sustaining this alliance. While he had no problem sending the Marines off to the Banana Wars, or to China was he the sort who would pay attention when the Secretary of State talked about European affairs?

A second question is how much resistance to the effects of this treaty come from the pacifists & isolationists. Both groups, and many other US voters were deeply influenced by the post 1918 disillusionment with both the war & its outcome. This could create some trends or political dynamics different from OTL as the 1920s & 30s spin out.
 
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CaliGuy

Banned
It does lay the ground for not voting in the Nuetrality Acts. A alliance that includes military commitments is in direct contradiction to the Nuetrality Acts as they were written. That allows the Europeans to realisitcally shop for weapons in the US.

Would all of the Europeans be able to shop for weapons in the U.S. or only Britain and France, though?

My question is did Coolidge have any interest in European affairs & possiblly sustaining this alliance. While he had no problem sending the Marines off to the Banana Wars, or to China was he the sort who would pay attention when the Secretary of State talked about European affairs?

I doubt that Coolidge was very interested in European affairs; however, he also doesn't seem to be the type of reckless U.S. President who would revoke an already existing U.S. alliance.

A second question is how much resistance to the effects of this treaty come from the pacifists & isolationists.

Probably not enough to kill it considering that this treaty apparently had very influential U.S. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge's support.

Both groups, and many other US voters were deeply influenced by the post 1918 disillusionment with both the war & its outcome. This could create some trends or political dynamics different from OTL as the 1920s & 30s spin out.

Didn't Wilson's stubbornness in 1919-1920 feed this disillusionment to some extent, though? If so, and considering that Wilson would die from his stroke in 1919 in this TL, the disillusionment in regards to this in the U.S. could certainly be a bit less in this TL. :)
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Like I said, I think most formal commitments on the part of the States would have lapsed by 1939.

I'm not so sure about that; after all, did the 1921 Franco-Polish alliance have an expiration date? Indeed, didn't that alliance cause France to go to war on Poland's behalf in 1939--a whopping 18 years later?

The British and French had already begun rearmament programs several years earlier, so short of earlier than OTL Lend Lease (not happening until the moment Germany starts winning), I don't think they'd get much else.

OK; however, could the U.S. begin rearming earlier in this TL?

As for what could be exchanged before that time, you'd need to ask wiking or one of the other members with more detailed knowledge of weapon systems than me. Maybe the US could have somewhat stronger naval aviation than OTL if there was more emphasis on readiness against Japan, but otherwise, I wouldn't expect too much.

OK.
 
I think you need a major German/Irish 5th column actually causing problems with strikes and violence throughout the US, enough to where the US essentially says Europe can't police itself and is harming our economic interests, so we're going to stay involved not as a senior partner.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Also, side question, but I wonder if Britain and France would be excluded from the quotas in the 1920s Immigration Acts in this TL; after all, if Latin America was excluded, couldn't some U.S. politicians argue that Britain and France--as U.S. allies--should likewise be excluded from U.S. immigration quotas during this time?
 

CaliGuy

Banned
I think you need a major German/Irish 5th column actually causing problems with strikes and violence throughout the US, enough to where the US essentially says Europe can't police itself and is harming our economic interests, so we're going to stay involved not as a senior partner.
Why exactly would there be such a strong fifth column in the U.S., though?
 
Huge immigrant communities of both were responsible for the US staying neutral for as long as it did. Alternately, have much more German negative activity happen against American interests earlier. Why Willie would stir that trouble/antagonism is beyond me, but then there's the hilariously asinine Zimmerman Telegram.
 
I'm not so sure about that; after all, did the 1921 Franco-Polish alliance have an expiration date? Indeed, didn't that alliance cause France to go to war on Poland's behalf in 1939--a whopping 18 years later?

Difference is that the US could afford to let European commitments lapse. France really couldn't, especially post-Czechoslovakia. Not least for this being that Germany's not a direct threat to the States.

OK; however, could the U.S. begin rearming earlier in this TL?

Perhaps, since the main obstacles were political. It's 30's rearmament that really matters, though, and so you have the Great Depression to contend with. I could see some Democratic Administration possibly expanding the armed forces as a way to get more people jobs, but a lot of people would probably be medically inadequate for service under the circumstances. Also, America's got a traditional suspicion of a standing army, so that's another issue. The big problem is that back in those days we were acutely aware of the conflict between military spending and expanded domestic programs, so there would be some resistance on those grounds. FDR would probably see it as a distraction from the New Deal.
 
Would all of the Europeans be able to shop for weapons in the U.S. or only Britain and France, though?

Most did after the nuetrality acts were repealed. Some shopping went on while they were in effect. In the latter 1920s Udet witnessed a public US Army demonstration of dive bombing. He found the aircraft in question could be purchased in a civilian version & he brought one or two back the Germany for experiments.


Didn't Wilson's stubbornness in 1919-1920 feed this disillusionment to some extent, though? If so, and considering that Wilson would die from his stroke in 1919 in this TL, the disillusionment in regards to this in the U.S. could certainly be a bit less in this TL. :)

Wilson was just one of dozens or hundreds of wartime leaders who were seen post war as duplicitious, inept, greedy, uncaring... That extended to industry which was popularly suposed to have been a tool of the 'Death Merchants' who were thought to have made obscene profits from the war & who probablly instigated it to begain with. There was also the problem that the cease fire of 11 November only stopped the fighting in France. Widespread warfare continued throughout Europe & Middle East through 1922. ie: Having stood out of the Great War the Greek army invaded Asia Minor & fought a two year war with the new Turkish state. Border skirmishes & ethnic cleansing riots were common as dirt in central & eastern Europe. The Russian civil war continued on & then turned into a war with Poland. As the Americans saw it 53,000 citizens died in battle to bring peace to Europe & four years later there still was no peace. The post war recession in the US left folks with the feeling in 1920 there would be no prosperity either.
 
I can't imagine either the Anglo-American or Franco-American alliances would last that long, and would almost certainly be allowed to lapse in the mid 20's or early 30's. I also seriously doubt that the United States would have joined the League of Nations even when factoring in these alliances given the 'military commitment' that would still be required, on paper, to defend other members of the League; that unanimous consent of its membership would be required to drop that provision makes the possibility of that happening nil, given I can see at least one or two small nations hoping that it would oblige the Great Powers to defend their independence against aggressors.
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
EXTREMELY unlikely.

The American electorate was very turned off by the post WW I politics, all of which tended to reinforce the very worst beliefs that were held toward the British (and less so of the French). While American losses in the war pale compared to a single bad quarter suffered by the British or France (which also had its territory chewed to bits for four+ years), there were still huge. When reviewing the casualties it is worth keeping in mind that, at the time, total deaths in the ACW were usually quoted at 450K, not the 700K+ that is accepted today, so a bit over a year in France had cost the U.S. around 1/3 of the entire Civil War, or almost exactly the actual number of combat deaths of the ACW on both sides.

It had already become clear that, rather than Wilson's stated beliefs, the War was really nothing but an effort to see which European countries wound up with more colonies (Amercans hated colonial powers... yes I see you waving your hand Philippines, just sit down). 170,000 American boys had died and hundreds of thousands more had been maimed to make the British and French Empires bigger. One reason the League of Nations was defeated in Congress was that the U.S. voter didn't want to get entangled in Europe again, and REALLY didn't want to be the world's policeman. Isolation was hugely popular, especially among the GOP.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
EXTREMELY unlikely.

The American electorate was very turned off by the post WW I politics, all of which tended to reinforce the very worst beliefs that were held toward the British (and less so of the French). While American losses in the war pale compared to a single bad quarter suffered by the British or France (which also had its territory chewed to bits for four+ years), there were still huge. When reviewing the casualties it is worth keeping in mind that, at the time, total deaths in the ACW were usually quoted at 450K, not the 700K+ that is accepted today, so a bit over a year in France had cost the U.S. around 1/3 of the entire Civil War, or almost exactly the actual number of combat deaths of the ACW on both sides.

It had already become clear that, rather than Wilson's stated beliefs, the War was really nothing but an effort to see which European countries wound up with more colonies (Amercans hated colonial powers... yes I see you waving your hand Philippines, just sit down). 170,000 American boys had died and hundreds of thousands more had been maimed to make the British and French Empires bigger. One reason the League of Nations was defeated in Congress was that the U.S. voter didn't want to get entangled in Europe again, and REALLY didn't want to be the world's policeman. Isolation was hugely popular, especially among the GOP.
I don't dispute that isolationism became very popular in the U.S. in the 1920s and 1930s. However, this book also talks about how, up to late 1919, many U.S. politicians--including many Republicans who had reservations about the League of Nations--were willing to support an alliance with France and to guarantee it against a future German invasion:

https://books.google.com/books?id=w...epage&q="french security treaty" 1919&f=false

Indeed, even though the Versailles Treaty was signed in June 1919, this book points out that there was large-scale support in the U.S. Senate for an alliance with France even several months later. In turn, what this shows is that in spite of WWI resulting in hundreds of thousands of U.S. casualties (including the wounded who survived) in order to expand the British and French Empires, many U.S. politicians were still willing to fight another, future war with Germany on France's behalf if France was attacked by Germany in an unprovoked manner.

Overall, what this causes me to conclude is that a large part of the reason for why isolationism became so popular in the U.S. is not because of WWI's massive casualties, but rather because of Wilson wanting to extend U.S. security guarantees to the entire world through the League of Nations. In turn, if a different U.S. President (such as Wilson's VP Thomas Marshall--in the event of a 1919 death by Woodrow Wilson) had been in power in 1919 and agreed to limit U.S. security guarantees only to Western Europe, it is possible that isolationaism would not have been as popular in the 1920s and 1930s as it actually was in our TL.
 

CaliGuy

Banned
Most did after the nuetrality acts were repealed. Some shopping went on while they were in effect. In the latter 1920s Udet witnessed a public US Army demonstration of dive bombing. He found the aircraft in question could be purchased in a civilian version & he brought one or two back the Germany for experiments.

OK; understood. However, how much more U.S. weapons could Britain and France have bought if they were exempted from the Neutrality Acts due to their alliance with the U.S. in this TL?

Wilson was just one of dozens or hundreds of wartime leaders who were seen post war as duplicitious, inept, greedy, uncaring... That extended to industry which was popularly suposed to have been a tool of the 'Death Merchants' who were thought to have made obscene profits from the war & who probablly instigated it to begain with.

Yes, all of this information appears to be accurate. However, it appears that the mood in the U.S. Senate was much different back in 1919:

https://books.google.com/books?id=w...epage&q="french security treaty" 1919&f=false

In turn, what this suggests is that talk of "Death Merchants" and whatnot only became popular later on. Indeed, in 1919, many U.S. Senators--including some (if not many) Republicans--were willing to support a U.S. alliance with France against unprovoked German aggression. Surely, if stories about "Death Merchants" and whatnot were already widespread in 1919, the proposed U.S. security treaty with France wouldn't have gotten as much support in the U.S. Senate as it actually did during this time.

There was also the problem that the cease fire of 11 November only stopped the fighting in France. Widespread warfare continued throughout Europe & Middle East through 1922. ie: Having stood out of the Great War the Greek army invaded Asia Minor & fought a two year war with the new Turkish state. Border skirmishes & ethnic cleansing riots were common as dirt in central & eastern Europe. The Russian civil war continued on & then turned into a war with Poland. As the Americans saw it 53,000 citizens died in battle to bring peace to Europe & four years later there still was no peace. The post war recession in the US left folks with the feeling in 1920 there would be no prosperity either.

That's a fair point; however, Senate Majority Leader Lodge was only willing to extend U.S. security guarantees to France (and presumably to Britain as well). In other words, as long as France and Britain were and remained secure, the U.S. might not have cared much about what happened in other parts of Europe or in other parts of the world.
 
Carl Schwamberger said:
Most did after the nuetrality acts were repealed. Some shopping went on while they were in effect. In the latter 1920s Udet witnessed a public US Army demonstration of dive bombing. He found the aircraft in question could be purchased in a civilian version & he brought one or two back the Germany for experiments.

OK; understood. However, how much more U.S. weapons could Britain and France have bought if they were exempted from the Neutrality Acts due to their alliance with the U.S. in this TL?

They purchased all they could from the repeal of the nuetrality acts in late 1939. France had 1800 aircraft scheduled for delivery from the US in 1940 (600 shipped by June). 3,000+ ordered for 1941 with more in negotiation. A final assembly plant and parts depot for the Martin model 167 was operating in Morroco & a similar facility nearing completion in Algeria for Douglas aircraft. Machine tools, chemicals, alloys, ect.. ect... were ordered by France in large and increasing quantities. The huge influx of French and British cash and credit from October 1939 abruptly yanked the US out of the Depression by the spring of 1940.



Yes, all of this information appears to be accurate. However, it appears that the mood in the U.S. Senate was much different back in 1919:

https://books.google.com/books?id=w9tlCwAAQBAJ&pg=PA95&dq="french+security+treaty"+1919&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj_pquAgNrUAhUU0WMKHcbQCMEQ6AEIKTAB#v=onepage&q="french security treaty" 1919&f=false

In turn, what this suggests is that talk of "Death Merchants" and whatnot only became popular later on. Indeed, in 1919, many U.S. Senators--including some (if not many) Republicans--were willing to support a U.S. alliance with France against unprovoked German aggression. Surely, if stories about "Death Merchants" and whatnot were already widespread in 1919, the proposed U.S. security treaty with France wouldn't have gotten as much support in the U.S. Senate as it actually did during this time.

The Senate lagged a bit behind the sentiment of the voters.
 
The US could sign such a treaty with France, unlikely but possible You will have to somehow change America's public opinion. It will have to be sold as a means of safe guarding what was won.

In such a scenario, the US would remain in Europe and participate in the occupation of the Rhineland. Unlike the British, the Americans have no need to play games or balance of power. They would simply have no use for a strong Germany and wouldn't be interested in allowing one to emerge. Chances are, instead of reneging on the reparations and rearming, the Germans get to pay the bill

That doesn't mean it will extend beyond France- anti English (not a typo) sentiment remained strong in America especially among the Irish and the British monarchy offended America's Republican ideals. The British would probably also not like to be in alliance where they would differently not be first violin In fact, with a weak Germany such an alliance might even morph into a Republican anti-British alliance
 
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