The U.S. enters WWI but refuses to send troops to Europe

Fair enough, the British and French bowing out was a bad way to put it; reduce commitments to the Italian front to reconstitute the frontline in the west, instead.

That will not change a lot for the Italians, the few entente division here were kept in reserve and had not partecipated in general to the battle, except the British IRC with some minor fight.

stead.
Again, you provide half a reason not to plan the Piave offensive, though - the need to free up troops to aid the Germans isn't so apparent if they have already broken the frontlines. Instead, it would seem more likely that the Germans either continue their own way, or halt Michael (for logistic reasons, say) and divert their own troops to aid the Austrian offensive.

Depend if they have broken the line, as said the general offensive lasted months and just before second Piave there was the third battle of Aisne; it's not that without the american troops the entire Entente line will crumble at the first attack. It will be long and costly even in case of German victory...and soon, to at least stabilize nd replenish the front, they will need additional troops.
Plus is better remember that just because there is no general offensive, a front is not a quiet place and men and equipement are still used and spent; A-H military situation was not good at the time in term of both men, material and supply while by day the italian general situation was becoming better and better, so there were a serious fear that a prolonged delay will have been only an advantage for the italian and the K.u.K. coveted italian food and military equipment to replenish their reserve
 
Let's face it, the US didn't do much at all until May/June 1918. All that really happens is different plans being thought up to defeat the Hun. The war will, most likely not finish until late spring 1919, however France and the UK still win and the US will have very little say in any peace process.
 
Let's face it, the US didn't do much at all until May/June 1918. All that really happens is different plans being thought up to defeat the Hun. The war will, most likely not finish until late spring 1919, however France and the UK still win and the US will have very little say in any peace process.
There was also the mobilization, arming of people, two months training, and then trying to find a way to get everyone over to Europe. Perhaps if the Germans didn't have a third of their subs in the docks they could have quickly started blasting American ships out of the water long enough to keep the Americans from getting on their boats and getting to Europe in time. Might be enough to go with the 'refusal' to send troops to Europe the OP requires.
 
Very interesting PoD. Good discussions. Some thoughts:
1 For show the US would at least send a very small expedition force consisting of volunteers/professionals like Portugal did (and Brazil had planned and maybe in this timeline executed. Callogeras Plan for 50.000 men trained by French and paid for by US)
2 In compensation the English and French would ask a lot more money from the US, just like the US in 1990 demanded financial support from Germany and Japan fot the Gulf war when these countries didn't send troops.
3 If the US concentrates on the navy, there would be a clear effect on the fight against the U-boats. I think the battle would be ended succesfull earlier and that would have an effect on all kind of supply issues that are mentioned in earlier posts.
4 I don't think the central powers can win the war at this time. Engeland and France were as determined as Germany and in a much better supply situation. No way they would surrender after all the efforts already.
5 The fear for an open revolt in India was something the colonial administrators constantly feared and why they restricted conscription there. But i'm wondering how realistic those fears were? Some of the posters above are certain that there definitely will be a butterflied effect here. On what assumption?
6 The influence of Wilson on Versailles will be less. That would also mean that his idea of self determination of nations would have less effect. Two consequences. Less 'ethnic cleansing' in Eastern Europe in the direct post-war years. Also would the voice of nationalistic movements in colonies be weakened significantly.
 
If the Etente is in such desperate need of fighting men to replace the Americans, could they not have perhaps recruited Chinese volunteers for the job like they did for Chinese laborers?

Granted the idea of a hundred thousand to five hundred thousand Chinese soldiers blooded and trained on the trenches of Western Europe (or just in the Middle East with the Australians sent over to France) sounds like a long-term problem, even ignoring demobilization. You'd be having divisions of men going back to China with sizeable paychecks and in a position to threaten the Chinese government. You could be seeing a lot of warlords as a result, more than IRL...
 
Reading the discussion, I would have two questions/points:

1. It is assumed above that the Piave offensive would be carried out regardless of the success of Michael. However... what if the Italians, seeing the French and English buckle, initiate an attack before the A-H launches the Piave offensive?
2. The French have faced mutinies before, and someone said above, that even if Michael is successful, as long as they are on the defensive, they will not rise up again. However: if Michael takes Amiens and breaks the front in two, the Entente is back to square one. If they want to win this, they will have to push the Germans back again. And I assume that is where the French would face mutinies again. Especially if the 1917 peace terms are well-known.
 

trajen777

Banned
Mention has been made of manpower shortages of Britain and France but presumably the same applied to Germany too?

The key was that after the defeat of Russia, the German army was able for the first time outnumber the French and British troops,by over 50 divisions. This was a significant force advantage. It is true that the Germans were running out of reserves however this was more of a future issue. The defense that stopped the German offensive was the fresh USA troops and more important to the Germans was the realization of the fresh USA troops that can be used to plug holes and go on the offensive. It was as much of a "shit they have 2 mm fresh troops training in France and 5 mm more on the way" moment for Germany.
 
The most accessible "colony" would probably be Ireland.But introducing conscription there would bring a lot of soft brown stuff into intimate contact with rotating fan blades.
They did studies, at most, like 100K, most of whom were working farms, you know, rather vital apparatus.

And that's not even counting the fact it was able to get both unionists and nationalists to come out opposed to it.

But you know, I'm sure the Irish people would never seek to rise up against English authority, the Irish always love being under English boots.
 
What if, in response to the German declaration of USW, the U.S. would have entered World War I but refused to send any U.S. troops to Europe?

Basically, this would be an attempt at compromise by President Wilson--specifically, he would look tough by declaring war on Germany over USW but try to honor the substance of his 1916 campaign slogan "He kept us out of war" by keeping U.S. troops out of Europe.

What would the consequences of this have been? For instance, would the Entente powers be more receptive to seeking a compromise peace with Germany if they knew that U.S. troops were not forthcoming? Or, with their financial problems being solved (after all, the U.S. would still fund the Entente in this TL), would the Entente powers keep trying to get the U.S. to send over troops to Europe?

Also, would the U.S. public have supported such a compromise (a U.S. declaration of war on Germany, but no U.S. troops being sent to Europe) on Wilson's part? If so, could this have resulted in a much better Democratic performance in the 1918 and 1920 elections?

In addition to this, how would Germany have reacted to such a U.S. move?

Any thoughts on all of this?
well the USA would never ever have been able to use the term "Cheese-eating French surrender monkeys" given such a monumental act of pitiful gutlessness. But if the US banks were still willing to put their money to work there would be little significant military problem. The western powers would still win. On the positive side the US would have had rather less influence over the peace settlement and its daft fanning of irredentism. Wilson could have confined his selective idealism to screwing over the black population of the USA, instead.
 
France did conscript large numbers of people from their colonies, most famously West Africa, and the 1918 recruitment campaign in West Africa alone not only fulfilled its objective of 50,000 recruits, but it exceeded it at 63,000, without any resistance in the territory.
Recruits and are not conscripts. France, like Great Britain, was able to draw upon a certain number of willing volunteers.

These volunteers usually came from ethnic groups, or in some cases, ethnic subgroups with long traditions of service in their respective Empires. To my knowledge, France, though willing to use some coercion in the hunt for colonial volunteers (ethnic Algerians were arguably territorial French nationals and were probably subjected to more pressure), stopped short of conscription.
 
Recruits and are not conscripts. France, like Great Britain, was able to draw upon a certain number of willing volunteers.

These volunteers usually came from ethnic groups, or in some cases, ethnic subgroups with long traditions of service in their respective Empires. To my knowledge, France, though willing to use some coercion in the hunt for colonial volunteers (ethnic Algerians were arguably territorial French nationals and were probably subjected to more pressure), stopped short of conscription.
I used the word "and", separating them out my response into two distinct thoughts, to respond to the claim that colonial manpower was exhausted and that colonial conscription was not imposed. Both are false. The 1918 recruitment drive was a change of policy, they utilized conscription extensively throughout the previous conscription drives in West Africa. 140,000 West Africans had been conscripted throughout the war. This was the voie d'appel, compulsory recruitment which was utilized in the 1914-1916 recruitment drives in West Africa. Conscription had also been utilized in North Africa among the native populations.

"The creation of a Foirce Noire in West Africa dated back to 1912, when, at Ponty's urging, the French government decreed that 5,000 Africans be recruited annually for the next four years. These troops were to replace the French units serving in Algeria, as well as to fight in Europe in the event of war. Although enlistment was intended to be primarily voluntary, compulsory enlistment-by voie d'appel- as introduced, which quickly became the norm before and during World War 1. Recruitment by voie d'appel assigned quotas to chiefs, who then had to present the necessary number of men to a commission de recruitment for medical inspection and enrollment. When war broke out, Africans recruited by voie d'appel gradually rose from 4 percent to more than 10 percent of the adult male population. It is estimated that 200,000 Africans were eventually mobilized between 1912 and 1919, and that 30,000 to 31,000 lost their lives."

Alice L. Conklin, A Mission to Civilize The Republican Idea of Empire in France and West Africa 1895-1930, pg. 143

The number of men supplied increased throughout the war, showing that the claim that the French were hitting their manpower limits is false, and the French utilized conscription extensively, demonstrating that they had made no such decision that they wouldn't engage in conscription.
 
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