The U.S. after a successful Confederate secession?

The Confederacy's track record on the offense was one of unrelenting failure. Their greatest success, the New Mexico Campaign, lasted two months and cost the Confederates over 1/3rd of their numbers in casualties. If one is generous to the Confederates, an independent Confederacy should be considered as controlling all of the 11 states that seceded. A far more credible division would be the Confederacy loses West Virginia and major portions of Arkansas ans Tennessee; though even that is optimistic for the Confederates.

At the very least it should lose East Tennessee along with West Virginia.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The Confederacy's track record on the offense was one of unrelenting failure. Their greatest success, the New Mexico Campaign, lasted two months and cost the Confederates over 1/3rd of their numbers in casualties.
But that's largely because of the greater force the Union could concentrate against them. In an ATL where the CSA is victorious it's quite possible that it's due to offensive success (e.g. in Maryland), possibly because of a Union inability to raise enough troops to get that numerical advantage (cf. Trent War) or due to a quick strike by the Confederacy before the Union can organize.

So we should segregate things out into "solid Union", "solid Confederacy" and "Border". This allows for a better appreciation of where the resources were - for example, if the PoD is a much more antislavery stance due to a victory by Fremont instead of Lincoln, then all the slave states may well have seceded.
 
Quit prattling on about trade, it wasn't an important factor in the US economy. If trade were cut off altogether it would merely slow it down a bit. It was already a continental sized great power, it had virtually everything it needed. Food? Check Metal? Check Coal? Check Wood? Check Labor? Check Land? Check and on and on. It also manufactured virtually everything by this time. Steel, paper, food , furniture, building supplies and more. It was the 2nd or 3rd most industrialized power on the planet by this time with vast quantities of raw materials, a large and well educated work force, a lot of empty land and a lot of capital. It would do fine even without any trade which would happen only in an ASB scenario. The US is not GB, it does not need trade to be rich. Trade helps, but it isn't necessary. It is just too damn big to need it.

Well, in 1860 the US was 3rd in industrial output (a bit behind France and just ahead of Russia), but it also wasn't the US of 1880 which had eclipsed the British in most industrial areas, by 1860 it produced only a 3rd of the iron Britain did (and imported 1/3rd of it), produced less than a fraction of the steel Britain did, produced much less coal, and even imported certain machine goods, if only for the reason that it was far cheaper to do. However, your point stands that with all the resources available to it a bump of say, 5% GDP isn't going to torpedoe its rise to Great Power status and industrial hegemon. It reached that point in 1880 historically when it outstripped British steel production (among others) and didn't look back, so maybe it takes 5-10 years longer here?

Though really the point boils down to, so what if it does? Yeah in 1860 the US wasn't what it would be in 1880, but as others have pointed out before, by 1900 the US will still be an economic giant with the resources of a continent at its fingertips and a churning industrial capacity that outstrips anything its southern neighbor could hope to produce. So yeah it might be on the grand scale poorer than it was OTL, but it'll still be bigger, even if it takes a little longer.

In summation, you're right.

At the very least it should lose East Tennessee along with West Virginia.

That would be a terrible border though! Imagine how ugly the maps would be :p
 
Negroes? What is this, 1950?

the least offensive terminology of the period.... Coloreds was acceptable to the NAACP at the time of founding (19th Century), you can also use African American (a relatively recent term), Blacks, (less recent but still 20th Century)

Take your pick

Negro was used in the time frame in question (along with more clearly racist terms)
 

dcharleos

Donor
the least offensive terminology of the period.... Coloreds was acceptable to the NAACP at the time of founding (19th Century), you can also use African American (a relatively recent term), Blacks, (less recent but still 20th Century)

Take your pick

Negro was used in the time frame in question (along with more clearly racist terms)

But you weren't quoting something from 1865. You were analyzing a situation from 1865.

Those are two very different things.

Since we're in 2017 and not 1865, I think using modern acceptable terminology is self-evidently more appropriate.
 
I don't think the partitioning of states would be nearly as extensive as some people are claiming; the legal justification for West Virginia was that the non-secesh government was the legitimate state government of Virginia, which then voted itself out of the state. In a Civil War that ends in Confederate victory, the US is essentially forfeiting the legal grounds to do so by acknowledging secession. If it gets to the point where a peace candidate is elected to stop the fighting, and the US population is no longer willing to die for the Union, it's not going to be willing to die for East Tennessee. It would depend on the exact nature of the Confederate victory, but I think most peace negotiation trading would happen on a state by state level, rather than breaking up the states themselves.
 
But you weren't quoting something from 1865. You were analyzing a situation from 1865.

Those are two very different things.

Since we're in 2017 and not 1865, I think using modern acceptable terminology is self-evidently more appropriate.

The NAACP has not changed its name. Nor has the United Negro College Fund, and I know people who consider themselves Black, others who consider themselves African American, and some older folks who consider themselves Negros. I have worked in social services my entire adult life and have worked closely with people who are in the overall group above, plus of course literally thousands of people seeking services from the organizations I have worked for. You should know most of the actual paperwork only got updated to African American this century in some places, while Negro and Black are also still used on some official paperwork as well.

So when referring to Black African Americans in the 19th Century using the term Negro seems reasonable to me.
 
I don't think the partitioning of states would be nearly as extensive as some people are claiming; the legal justification for West Virginia was that the non-secesh government was the legitimate state government of Virginia, which then voted itself out of the state. In a Civil War that ends in Confederate victory, the US is essentially forfeiting the legal grounds to do so by acknowledging secession. If it gets to the point where a peace candidate is elected to stop the fighting, and the US population is no longer willing to die for the Union, it's not going to be willing to die for East Tennessee. It would depend on the exact nature of the Confederate victory, but I think most peace negotiation trading would happen on a state by state level, rather than breaking up the states themselves.

There was a lot of fighting internally in the states of Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and of course West Virginia, not to mention the Free State of Jones was not an isolated incident. Texas State Government forces murdered (there is really no other term for it) a number of Unionists trying to flee south across the Rio Grande

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nueces_massacre

So while the Confederacy and the United States might have an official opinion the people living in those areas have their own opinion and they also have guns.

Then of course there are the thousands, tens of thousands, or hundreds of thousands of former slaves and Black Freedman (depending on the scenario and conditions) who have their own views on the Confederate government and depending on when, might also have a lot of guns.
 

dcharleos

Donor
The NAACP has not changed its name. Nor has the United Negro College Fund, and I know people who consider themselves Black, others who consider themselves African American, and some older folks who consider themselves Negros. I have worked in social services my entire adult life and have worked closely with people who are in the overall group above, plus of course literally thousands of people seeking services from the organizations I have worked for. You should know most of the actual paperwork only got updated to African American this century in some places, while Negro and Black are also still used on some official paperwork as well.

So when referring to Black African Americans in the 19th Century using the term Negro seems reasonable to me.

"Some of my best friends call themselves Negroes!"
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It would depend on the exact nature of the Confederate victory, but I think most peace negotiation trading would happen on a state by state level, rather than breaking up the states themselves.
For my part, I did have a couple of state splits take place - basically this was because the CSA had the whip hand to some extent (though they didn't get everything they were after) and the border east of the Mississippi went up the Ohio to the Mason-Dixon Line, then went east from there to the Susquehanna and into the sea. Otherwise you get an odd situation on the Delmarva.
 
But that's largely because of the greater force the Union could concentrate against them.

If you're talking the New Mexico Campaign, you are wrong. The Battle of Glorietta Pass was the culmination of that campaign - the Confederates had slightly more men and half of the Union forces were territorial militia.

If you are talking Confederate offensives in general, you are also wrong. The Union was able to concentrate forces at Antietam and Gettysburg, but even when they couldn't, the Union beat the Confederacy. At Chickamauga, the Confederates outnumbered the Union. While the Confederates won that battle, General Bragg frittered away the results of that victory until the Union could concentrate at Nashville and a month later the Confederates were retreating, which does make it the second most effective Confederate offensive into Union held territory. Even when the Confederates concentrated forces against the Union, they were typically unable to defeat the isolated Union forces before the Union could counter with a concentration of their own. Due to Wallace taking the wrong road, the Confederates had a numbers advantage for most of the day at Shiloh. Hood outnumbered Schofield better than 3-to-2 at Spring Hill, but failed to crush him. At Franklin, the Hood's Confederates outnumbered the Union, but took 3 times the casualties and again failed at preventing Schofield from linking up with Thomas. Then there are times when the Union had no nearby forces to concentrate with and the Confederate offensives still failed. At the Second Battle of Corinth, Van Dorn's Confederates had almost the same number as Rosecrans Union forces, but the Confederates lost. At Fort Davison and at Fort Sanders the Confederates (Price and Longstreet respectively) couldn't destroy Union forces (Ewing and Burnside respectively) that they outnumbered by 6-to-1 and in both cases took about six times as many casualties as the Union. At Helena, the Confederates under Holmes had almost twice as many men as the Union forces under Prentiss,, but the Confederates took about eight times the casualties. At Pea Ridge the Confederates under Van Dorn outnumbered the Union under Curtis by 3-to-2, and the Confederates lost. Confederate troops under Hindman outnumbered the Union troops under Blunt at Prairie Grove, but the Confederates lost. At Cheat Mountain, Robert E Lee's Confederate outnumbered Reynold's Union troops by better than 3-to-2, but the Confederates lost.

The Confederacy's track record on the offense was one of unrelenting failure. This was seldom due to Union numbers.

In an ATL where the CSA is victorious it's quite possible that it's due to offensive success (e.g. in Maryland), possibly because of a Union inability to raise enough troops to get that numerical advantage (cf. Trent War) or due to a quick strike by the Confederacy before the Union can organize.

Even in a Trent War, the Union should be able to field almost twice as many forces as the combined British and Confederate forces in North America, which is better odds than the Union faced in most of the battles I have listed. The idea of the Confederates getting in a quick strike before the Union can organize does not makes sense. The Union started the war with an army, the Confederates had to build theirs from scratch. Only about 1/4th of the US Army officers went with the Confederacy, so the Union has a lot more established officers to help organize newly raised units.

So we should segregate things out into "solid Union", "solid Confederacy" and "Border". This allows for a better appreciation of where the resources were - for example, if the PoD is a much more antislavery stance due to a victory by Fremont instead of Lincoln, then all the slave states may well have seceded.

The Confederacy would have to produce at least one general who equals or exceeds Lee just to gain independence. Keeping all of the 11 states that seceded is even more unlikely. The Confederacy gaining any bits of the Union Border states is nigh-ASB.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
If you are talking Confederate offensives in general, you are also wrong. The Union was able to concentrate forces at Antietam and Gettysburg, but even when they couldn't, the Union beat the Confederacy. At Chickamauga, the Confederates outnumbered the Union. While the Confederates won that battle, General Bragg frittered away the results of that victory until the Union could concentrate at Nashville and a month later the Confederates were retreating, which does make it the second most effective Confederate offensive into Union held territory. Even when the Confederates concentrated forces against the Union, they were typically unable to defeat the isolated Union forces before the Union could counter with a concentration of their own. Due to Wallace taking the wrong road, the Confederates had a numbers advantage for most of the day at Shiloh. Hood outnumbered Schofield better than 3-to-2 at Spring Hill, but failed to crush him. At Franklin, the Hood's Confederates outnumbered the Union, but took 3 times the casualties and again failed at preventing Schofield from linking up with Thomas. Then there are times when the Union had no nearby forces to concentrate with and the Confederate offensives still failed. At the Second Battle of Corinth, Van Dorn's Confederates had almost the same number as Rosecrans Union forces, but the Confederates lost. At Fort Davison and at Fort Sanders the Confederates (Price and Longstreet respectively) couldn't destroy Union forces (Ewing and Burnside respectively) that they outnumbered by 6-to-1 and in both cases took about six times as many casualties as the Union. At Helena, the Confederates under Holmes had almost twice as many men as the Union forces under Prentiss,, but the Confederates took about eight times the casualties. At Pea Ridge the Confederates under Van Dorn outnumbered the Union under Curtis by 3-to-2, and the Confederates lost. Confederate troops under Hindman outnumbered the Union troops under Blunt at Prairie Grove, but the Confederates lost. At Cheat Mountain, Robert E Lee's Confederate outnumbered Reynold's Union troops by better than 3-to-2, but the Confederates lost.

Let's look at the way you describe those examples:

Chickamauga - the Union concentrates at Nashville (and the subsequent campaigns in Chattanooga have a greater Union force than a Confederate one). The Union draws in reinforcements from elsewhere to strengthen their position, and ends up with more troops because they have a deeper well.
Most of the rest are basically making the point about the power of the defensive on the battlefield, something I never really contested (in some cases it's about the power of the defensive for forts). The thing is, though, that the Confederates in a given theatre tended to have fewer troops overall (because they concentrated their forces in Virginia), and this meant that the Union could avoid leaving points vulnerable (by garrisoning them) instead of having to pull in garrisons to make a field army in the first place.

Offensive campaigns are what should be looked at, not battlefields. For example, the Heartland Offensive manifestly suffered from a vast disparity of numbers (Bragg being outnumbered more than 3:1 at Perryville, which is generally viewed as a battle featuring the full campaign forces of both sides) and the place the Confederacy repeatedly got troops into the Union was the Eastern theatre, where the CSA prioritized it much more than the Union and so the force counts were relatively close to even (if not superior for the Confederacy at times, though not during actual offensives).

ED: some of those examples are poorly presented or in the wrong category - Cheat Mountain never really happened at all (the attack wasn't launched) and Prairie Grove saw the Confederates retreat in part because the Union was bringing up reinforcements (so it shouldn't go in the "no concentration" category).


Your argument as presented earlier (Confederate offensives tended to fail) has five possible readings:
1) The Confederacy tended to fail because of structural problems relating to a lack of resources (men, guns, rifles).
2) The Confederacy tended to fail because the Confederate Army was incompetent.
3) The Confederacy tended to fail because Confederate generals were incompetent.
4) The Confederacy tended to fail because the areas over which they attacked were highly defensible.
5) The Confederacy tended to fail because all offensives are hard.


Now, of these I tend to view (1) exacerbating (5) as the most credible, because the Confederacy was (especially later in the war) on the wrong side of a resource disparity. The alternatives are essentially that it's ASB to expect there to be a competent Confederate general, which is risible on the face of it, or that it was a feature of where the fighting was taking place.
However, your argument as elaborated upon seems to suggest that you feel (1) was unimportant compared to the other points.



Even in a Trent War, the Union should be able to field almost twice as many forces as the combined British and Confederate forces in North America, which is better odds than the Union faced in most of the battles I have listed.
Really? How?

We do have returns for the size of the Union Army in early-mid 1862, and we know how many small arms they had in store on 30 June 1862 (which included large numbers of imported British Enfield rifles, most of them arriving in 1862). The numbers simply do not add up.
If you feel they do, then please explain what number you feel that "almost twice as many forces" is - complete with some indicator of what you think the realistic British commitment would be, and preferably what you view the strength of the Confederacy as at the same time.
This is an extraordinary claim by you, and as such demands at least ordinary evidence.

Of course, if the Union could field the number of troops you suggest, then they should have won the war rather easily in 1862 by launching attacks all across the Continent at over 2:1 odds everywhere.
Self-evidently, they did not.

In fact, this point of yours directly contradicts the argument you made above (which was that the Union did not rely on superior numbers) - both can be false (in the case where the Union had a slight advantage in early 1862 which expanded as the war went on), but both cannot be true unless the Union was OTL commanded by fools.

The idea of the Confederates getting in a quick strike before the Union can organize does not makes sense. The Union started the war with an army, the Confederates had to build theirs from scratch.
But the Union didn't make a call for more than a few tens of thousands of troops until July - and, more accurately, the Union started the war with about a division, which spent most of the war as formed troops instead of breaking up for cadre (probably because it had to absorb a lot of new recruits just to reach authorized strength).


The Confederacy would have to produce at least one general who equals or exceeds Lee just to gain independence. Keeping all of the 11 states that seceded is even more unlikely. The Confederacy gaining any bits of the Union Border states is nigh-ASB.
That's certainly your opinion, but it doesn't really address the point which I was making - which is that we're discussing the idea of a successful Confederate secession. I can think of several possible avenues for that to happen (Fremont wins the Republican nomination and the Presidency, but goes full Emancipation once in office and every state with slavery secedes; rapid campaign against Washington in late 1861; Trent War; Peninsular Campaign goes horribly wrong and Army of the Potomac surrenders in early July...) but the point is that we should at least look at how important the Border States were economically to make a proper evaluation of the economic issues.
 
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SNIP



That's certainly your opinion, but it doesn't really address the point which I was making - which is that we're discussing the idea of a successful Confederate secession. I can think of several possible avenues for that to happen (Fremont wins the Republican nomination and the Presidency, but goes full Emancipation once in office and every state with slavery secedes; rapid campaign against Washington in late 1861; Trent War; Peninsular Campaign goes horribly wrong and Army of the Potomac surrenders in early July...) but the point is that we should at least look at how important the Border States were economically to make a proper evaluation of the economic issues.

Not to put too fine a point on it but these "What if the Confederacy somehow won its independence" threads all too often get derailed on whether the Confederacy COULD win its independence.

Unless we are talking a specific scenario, it isn't really on topic to ask the 'if' question.

There are several ways
1. Anglo-French intervention in the Trent Affair tied in with more aggressive Confederate military operations manages to force Lincoln to sue for peace. As major land operations by the Confederacy or the Anglo-French are unlikely before April (the end of winter), odds are excellent the Union holds on to Missouri, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland, and New Mexico as the forces in place to hold them are already present and the offensive operations there do not require reinforcements from elsewhere.

The Confederate offensive against New Mexico is certain to fail as it is over 1,000 miles to the nearest port and over 800 miles from the nearest railhead (which is why when their supply train got wiped out they had to retreat). Transportation geography (rivers and railroads) favor the Union in the other contested states above. Most likely situation, Lincoln is forced to sue for peace in April once the weather improves granting the South the states they actually hold because the blockade is hopeless, assaulting New Orleans impossible, and even a successful campaign in Canada is not worth the cost in blood and treasure compared to winning the Confederacy back

2. War of exhaustion - some military failures (and it takes a cascading series of them) makes the North realize that reconquering the South is hopeless at an acceptable cost. Most likely result is the Republicans losing the Presidency in 1864. This however probably means major issues for the South due to a lot of unhappy freed, escaped and for that matter slaves in bondage still who just lost their last hope for outside liberation. Could get ugly. It also doesn't solve the Confederate problem with sizeable (or even majority) Unionist populations in areas like eastern Tennessee, parts of Texas and elsewhere in the South (mainly in Appalachia). It this situation the Confederacy has taken enormous manpower losses, considerable damage to places like Tennessee, northern Virginia, parts of the Carolina and Florida coasts, and indeed if the Union took New Orleans, that leaves a massive (in numbers and percentage) Black population who is not likely to take reoccupation lightly by the Confederate government.

Any other scenario is a combination of both of the above

The only way the Confederates expand their territory is in 1861-62, and most of that period predates the actual Trent Affair, much less any other likely or plausible foreign intervention and is too early for a war of exhaustion.

The only other plausible scenario is the death (murder most likely) of Lincoln in 1861 (which was a threat the Union was worried about) in which case the Union's war could be seriously mishandled to the point of losing Kentucky and Missouri (or at least western Kentucky and southern and central Missouri). But if we are going to assume the Union is incompetent, we could just as easily assume the Confederacy is, so this seems unprofitable as a likely POD unless the writer has some need to Wank the Confederacy for some reason.

As to increasing territory... Lincoln saw Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland as vital, so even at the expense of British armies roaming through Maine and upper New York State he would do his utmost to hold them, figuring that peace will end the British problem but the Union must have those states. Dreams of a Confederate California are a pipe dream. By mid 1861 the Union firmly controls the means of making weapons and getting more to California, has a massive preponderance of troops over anything the Confederacy could raise or send there, and unless the British can spare a 25,000 man army from someplace (where exactly?) the only thing the British can likely do is seize one of the cities. They can grab San Diego (one of the best anchorages in the Pacific) with ease, and can dominate the Bremerton, Olympia and Seattle areas but if they go for San Francisco they are gambling heavily thousands of miles from dockyards and replacements. (the little harbor of San Pedro is probably possible to seize but Los Angeles is a glorified village in 1861, so why bother?)

So the most probable Confederacy is the OTL version, with Indian Territory possibly thrown in (where throughout the ACW that population fought their own civil war along Free/Pro Slavery lines, so it isn't a given either).

Now an ACW in 1850 or even 1855 makes things harder for the Union (much so), but the lines were not yet firmly set during those years and it takes a major POD to light the match sooner. It took a full decade for opinions to harden enough to justify shooting.

As to the importance of the various border states
Maryland must be held as it deprives the Confederacy from gaining and industrial city and port (Baltimore) and has DC in it. It also shields Delaware.
Missouri must be held as it is literally the gateway to the West both in terms of railroad construction and because the Missouri River is navigable by steam boat to the future site of Bismark North Dakota. Plus of course it connects the Union to Kansas and Colorado.
Kentucky must be held as it secure the Ohio River, as well as numerous other river transportation routes.
West Virginia must be held because it is far easier for the Union to grab and hold it than it is for the Confederacy to hold it (or take it back) due to railroad and river transportation lines once again.

I have posted before the importance of the river transportation lines to the Union and why they so easily dominated them (having most of the industrial cities on those rivers and actually owning most of the steamboats on them).

Lincoln is quoted that he must have Kentucky. So clearly he thought so. Major reinforcements flowed into Missouri early too, while an aggressive Pro Union urban population in Saint Louis ensured it stayed in the Union. As to Maryland, well it was where pretty much every regiment that wasn't needed urgently elsewhere went. The Union well understood the importance of those states. So did the Confederacy, but the Confederates had lacked the means due to logistics, manpower, and firepower to take them away unless the Union is completely incompetent. Which they were not.
 
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CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
"Some of my best friends call themselves Negroes!"

That is a bridge too far.
the least offensive terminology of the period.... Coloreds was acceptable to the NAACP at the time of founding (19th Century), you can also use African American (a relatively recent term), Blacks, (less recent but still 20th Century)

Take your pick

Negro was used in the time frame in question (along with more clearly racist terms)

Historically you are correct. Nevertheless, unless you are either quoting, or creating as part of a T/L, dialogue from the period it is simply far too distracting to use the out of date, and needlessly provocative, terms. All that insisting on doing so accomplishes is tread derailment.

Both of you need to retract the claws and allow this thread to proceed, assuming the derail is not fatal at this point.
 
That is a bridge too far.


Historically you are correct. Nevertheless, unless you are either quoting, or creating as part of a T/L, dialogue from the period it is simply far too distracting to use the out of date, and needlessly provocative, terms. All that insisting on doing so accomplishes is tread derailment.

Both of you need to retract the claws and allow this thread to proceed, assuming the derail is not fatal at this point.

My apologies, I will do so. The matter closed as far as I am concerned and I will try to avoid offense in the future.
 

dcharleos

Donor
That is a bridge too far.

Fair enough. I wasn't planning on taking it any further.

FWIW, the only reason I said what I said was because I thought that the usage of the word "Negro" in 2017 by a person who (based on the othering of black people in their comments) didn't seem to be black was a bridge too far.

I wasn't trying to be mean so much as illustrate the equivalency between the defense of archaic and more or less offensive terms through references to the NAACP and some dusty old government forms and the old "some of my best friends are ___" canard. Both types of arguments are typically irrelevant to whatever the original complaint is. Just because a person has friends of other races or religions doesn't mean that they don't harbor racial or religious prejudice. Likewise, simply because a hundred year old civil rights organization hasn't dropped "colored" from its name doesn't mean that it isn't offensive for an individual to call black and brown people "colored" 100 years after that organization was formed.

Since it wasn't my intention to, nor is it desirable to derail a thread, how should I handle an issue like this in the future? DM a moderator?
 

CalBear

Moderator
Donor
Monthly Donor
Fair enough. I wasn't planning on taking it any further.

FWIW, the only reason I said what I said was because I thought that the usage of the word "Negro" in 2017 by a person who (based on the othering of black people in their comments) didn't seem to be black was a bridge too far.

I wasn't trying to be mean so much as illustrate the equivalency between the defense of archaic and more or less offensive terms through references to the NAACP and some dusty old government forms and the old "some of my best friends are ___" canard. Both types of arguments are typically irrelevant to whatever the original complaint is. Just because a person has friends of other races or religions doesn't mean that they don't harbor racial or religious prejudice. Likewise, simply because a hundred year old civil rights organization hasn't dropped "colored" from its name doesn't mean that it isn't offensive for an individual to call black and brown people "colored" 100 years after that organization was formed.

Since it wasn't my intention to, nor is it desirable to derail a thread, how should I handle an issue like this in the future? DM a moderator?
Yes, or hit the report button.
 
I can think of a few major issues for the United States after a successful secession:

Representation in Congress and the Senate: Do you just strike the rebel states from the floor? They were vacant after 1861 so not a huge deal, but after that do you accept the inevitable and remodel the two houses?

The Electoral College: Again, the electors were suspended during the war in rebel states, but after the war is the college just remodeled?

Dual Citizenship: How do you address the issue of former American citizens now being citizens of a foreign state? Can they claim properties or stocks they might have owned in the North before the war, or is that forfeit?

Secession: I imagine this one would be solved with a constitutional amendment specifically banning secession, but it could be more contentious...
 
I can think of a few major issues for the United States after a successful secession:

Representation in Congress and the Senate: Do you just strike the rebel states from the floor? They were vacant after 1861 so not a huge deal, but after that do you accept the inevitable and remodel the two houses?

The Electoral College: Again, the electors were suspended during the war in rebel states, but after the war is the college just remodeled?

Dual Citizenship: How do you address the issue of former American citizens now being citizens of a foreign state? Can they claim properties or stocks they might have owned in the North before the war, or is that forfeit?

Secession: I imagine this one would be solved with a constitutional amendment specifically banning secession, but it could be more contentious...

Reapportionment would settle both the Congressional and Electoral College issues. I suspect that we would see a 14th Amendment declaring who or who is not a citizen (which may or may not have that number). As to property, it may depend on how the war ended and the South got its nation. I seem to recall at least one US treaty where the two parties agreed to be responsible for the debts owed to their citizens (War with Mexico I think, although operating on memory for that one)

A specific amendment regarding secession seems very likely, particularly as new states carved out of the already organized territories are reasonably expected eventually (which is why they are already territories after all) to avoid such problems in the future. Unspoken would be concerns (well maybe shouted in Congress but not in the legal language) about the Mormons in Utah for example.
 
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