The U.K. and the unification of Italy and Germany in the 1860ies

This isn't exactly an AH question. I've been reading about the unification of both countries, and I found it a bit odd that the British didn't seem to have intervened, in one way or another.

Obviously, the unification of both nation-states radically alterended the European balance of power in the continent (which was an esential goal of the British policy). Of course, it didn't mean directly that the equilibrium had been completely broken and that one country had united the continent. But it was still a significant change in the status quo established in 1815. Morover, the unification of Germany would be a challenged to British world dominance (a challenge that might had easilly been predicted even in the 1860ies)

So, the questions I have are:

Were the British reluctant to intervene in the continent in that decade?

If so, why? Was it because by that time they had realize thet fighting nationalists aspirations was pointless? Or was it because intervenenig in the continent was seen as risky and contrary to the laissez faire ideology en vogue at the time?

Or was it because they still saw France or Russia as the main threats, and didn't though a Piamonte-unified Italy or a Prussia-unified Germany would pose any threat?

Or was it because theyknew that, in any case, their unifications wouldn't imply that one single country would dominate the continent any time soon?

Or was it because these process were to fast for the politicians to realize what was happening?

Or was it because the liberal British favoured the aspirations of the italian and German nationalists, in the same way they had favoured the Greek national aspirrations 30 years ago?

And finally, an AH related questions: could they had intervened, if they had wanted to? Would such an intervention be effective?
 
This isn't exactly an AH question. I've been reading about the unification of both countries, and I found it a bit odd that the British didn't seem to have intervened, in one way or another.

We were actually somewhat mixed up in the earlier stages of the Italian thing. Struggle for Mastery in Europe would be a good read for you. It's free on thar internets.

Obviously, the unification of both nation-states radically alterended the European balance of power in the continent (which was an esential goal of the British policy). Of course, it didn't mean directly that the equilibrium had been completely broken and that one country had united the continent. But it was still a significant change in the status quo established in 1815.

Thing is, we weren't so terribly keen on said status quo.

Morover, the unification of Germany would be a challenged to British world dominance (a challenge that might had easilly been predicted even in the 1860ies)

Not really. Nobody really thought of it like that until around the turn of the century.

So, the questions I have are:

Were the British reluctant to intervene in the continent in that decade?

Well, it depends what you mean. Wars are expensive and unpopular and we as a state beholden to a certain kind of public opinion did our best to avoid it, but really so did everyone, and we got heavily involved with things like Schleswig.

If so, why? Was it because by that time they had realize thet fighting nationalists aspirations was pointless? Or was it because intervenenig in the continent was seen as risky and contrary to the laissez faire ideology en vogue at the time?

Or that liberal opinion was pro-nationalist? This is a massive simplification. Opinions on France and Germany wobbled constantly. But Italy was the darling of radicals everywhere.

Or was it because they still saw France or Russia as the main threats, and didn't though a Piamonte-unified Italy or a Prussia-unified Germany would pose any threat?

Certainly there was no inherent threat to our interests. We didn't really have "main enemies" or "concrete interests". Our purpose was to prevent anything that could destabilise the balance, and none of the individual steps on the road to unifications seemed to threaten it. After all, after 1870, a new balance, very much like the old, quickly re-asserted itself.

Or was it because theyknew that, in any case, their unifications wouldn't imply that one single country would dominate the continent any time soon?

That too.

Or was it because these process were to fast for the politicians to realize what was happening?

A bit of that. Some people might have been a pit worried if you'd told them in 1863 Prussia was going to Tek Ofer Eferyzsing. But that was a seocndary thing, really.

Or was it because the liberal British favoured the aspirations of the italian and German nationalists, in the same way they had favoured the Greek national aspirrations 30 years ago?

Italy, definately. Germanophilia was more of an opinion thing, but it was a common opinion to have, and Bismarck was sure to expose some juicy snippets about Napoleon III's (extremely vague and harmless) Belgian ambitions to the British press.

And finally, an AH related questions: could they had intervened, if they had wanted to? Would such an intervention be effective?

When? Does it have to be militarily? Does it have to come to a fight? Anyway, Schleswig or the earlier stages of the Italian question (for Italy) are your best bets.
 

Thande

Donor
It was the period of Splendid Aloof-ness. Of course that wasn't true in reality as far as government was concerned, but the man in the street would not have had an appetite for interventionism in Europe.
 
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