Antonov and Bradley, July 1944
Rokossovsky’s offensive had forced the Americans to pull Ridgway’s 4th American Army off the front line in front of the Czech forts in order to defend Nuremberg, leaving only the 1st and 2nd American Armies to cover the ground between Berlin and Plauen. With the situation in Bavaria continuing to appear favourable to the Red Army, it was time for the second part of the plan to retake Germany.
The commander of the Soviet Western Front, Aleksei Antonov, was a much quieter personality compared to most of the generals fighting in Europe. Most of his time throughout the war had been in Moscow, where he was responsible for much of STAVKA’s planning. Stalin had come to trust Antonov, and in early 1944 decided that the quiet, cautious but talented general would be an ideal opponent for the aggressive and unpredictable Patton.
Antonov’s plan was not bold or particularly aggressive, hoping to use the Red Army’s superiority in numbers, heavy armour and especially artillery to push the Americans out of central Germany, while Rokossovsky tied the Americans and French down further south. The overstretched Americans were pushed back and Leipzig and Magdeburg were retaken by the Soviets (much to Halder’s delight).
Antonov met his match in General Bradley, commander of the 1st American Army. Bradley had noticed throughout the war that most Soviet offensives begun with massive artillery bombardments, followed by an armoured assault on a broad front, known to the troops as a “headlong smash”. Following the fall of Magdeburg, Bradley proposed that the bulk of the Army fall back to prepared positions five or ten kilometres behind the front line, just leaving enough forces forward to hopefully deceive the Soviet forces into firing their artillery into mostly empty ground.
Bradley’s plan was tested when Antonov attempted to launch another attack in the direction of Hannover. Katyushas and conventional artillery fired a massive barrage into what they thought were the American lines, only for the tanks to then charge right into a well defended position further in the rear, complete with anti-tank guns and artillery of their own. Air strikes were launched targeting the Red Army’s position, and Antonov was forced to call a retreat, leaving a shattered Magdeburg in the hands of the Allies.
Vladivostock Under Siege, August 1944
The Far Eastern theatre had seen the first battleground of the war at Nomonhan, but by 1944 it was barely an afterthought in Moscow. The collapse of Germany forced Stalin to commit the majority of his forces to Europe, where it was increasingly obvious that the war would be decided on the plains of Germany and Poland. In the Far East, all forces had to be supplied over the Trans-Siberian Railroad, which had been sufficient to crush the Kwantung Army in 1939 but was now unable to supply enough forces to defeat a resurgent Japan in 1944.
Harbin, the last significant city in Manchukuo to be liberated, was occupied by the IJA in the early months of the year. Budyonny, commander of the Far Eastern Front, had barely contested them, as Japanese, Manchu and Chinese elements sabotaged what little transport networks existed between Harbin, North Manchukuo and Soviet power bases in Chita and Irkutsk. Budyonny had instead pulled his forces out, sending them east to defend Japan’s obvious next target: Vladivostock.
Vladivostock was a formidable position in its own right, and with fortifications capable of rivalling the Maginot Line, Stalin’s largest Pacific port was turned into a citadel. At the tip of a narrow peninsula, there was only one direction through which the Japanese could come, and any assault, especially a Banzai charge that they were well known for, would be costly.
The Japanese did not want to fight according to Budyonny’s plans. While the reckless IJA of 1939 may have attempted to charge the lines, the reformed IJA of 1944 was determined to do anything but that. With the defeat of the Kriegsmarine, Prime Minister Saito had pulled the Navy out of the Atlantic, allowing it to directly clash with the Soviets in the Far East. Musashi and Shinano, the two largest battleships ever constructed, were available to use their 18” guns as offshore artillery, pounding Vladivostock while Army units waited, having demolished a section of the Trans-Siberian Railroad and having set up machine gun positions where tracks had once lay. Vladivostock would now be under siege, far from the heroic battle that Budyonny hoped would allow him to destroy the Japanese Army and allow a recapture of Manchukuo.
The Oil Plan, August 1944
In World War I, France and Britain had both lost the cream of an entire generation of men fighting on the Western Front. After five years of fighting in World War II, the best of the next generation had fallen, some on the exact same battlefields that their fathers and uncles had fought against the Kaiser. Even with the support of colonial troops from their respective empires, it was clear that their manpower was dwindling, and that a total war effort would not be sustainable forever. France, which had borne the brunt of the fighting in 1939 and 1940, and had been a major contributor ever since, was feeling the effects the hardest, having merged several divisions together in an attempt to keep each active division at something approaching combat strength.
With Daladier urgently requesting that French units be pulled from the front line and given less taxing occupation duties, it was becoming obvious that a direct commitment to beat the Red Army in open battle, with millions of fresh Soviet recruits opposing exhausted Allied soldiers, would not be able to win the war by itself, despite Patton’s boasts to the contrary. The Red Army would need to be disabled and left unable to fight.
Despite the heavy losses taken in the Razorback raid on Baku, the destruction of oil facilities there inspired the combined Allied leadership to develop what became known as the Oil Plan. The Oil Plan envisioned a massive bombing campaign directed at all of the USSR’s oil-producing facilities within bombing range, most importantly those at Maikop and Grozny, in the hopes that without fuel, the Soviet war machine would grind to a halt. Once this had been accomplished, Allied bombers would focus their attention on destroying known Soviet airfields, especially those that were operating the VVS’ fleet of jet fighters. Once the VVS’ infrastructure had been destroyed, and its tens of thousands of aircraft grounded, the Red Army’s logistics columns would be vulnerable to strikes from above, while ground forces would be able to defeat it in a weakened state.
The raids on Maikop and Grozny were very successful, with anti-air defences much lighter than at Baku and an effective escort provided by RN and USN carriers operating in the Black Sea. Bletchley Park quickly intercepted Enigma messages from Moscow that indicated that although Soviet capacity had been badly damaged, synthetic fuel facilities and new developments of an oilfield near Ufa (well out of bomber range) meant that although the USSR was now producing less than it consumed, the difference was not so great as to be of any immediate risk to the nation’s military capabilities. Nonetheless, the rest of the Oil Plan could still be carried out, and efforts to destroy the VVS’ fighting capabilities began in early September.
- BNC