The trope of excessive success in post-Cold war aerial and missile bombardment

[Sam R.]

Wotcher comrades,

For some time now (30 years or more) we have been speculating on post 1945 air bombardment. Despite the perfection of conventional aerial anti-industrial bombardment in Korea by United Nations forces, a rarely acknowledged war crime, most speculations regarding cold war strategic bombardment have under trained, under utilised, reserve formations, achieving singular success, in short mission frameworks. Compare this to the fuster cluck over the NFL(RVN)/PRG(RVN)/DRVN. The bombardment of the purportedly "communist" controlled Vietnam and adjunct areas was by highly trained, front line, blooded veteran units, occupying loose mission criteria, with little serious sustained opposition outside Hanoi. And unlike Korea it was a fuckup.

And yet in time line after time line instead of the abortive failures of doctrine we see in the 1914-1918 use of Battlecruisers and Dreadnaughts, inspite of the gross failure of Fast Battleships and early Carriers in 1939-1943, inspite of the Bomber not only Not Getting Through, but actually being a Gross Strategic Detriment until 1944 when the ground situation had altered OPFOR's concentration, Greenland is meant to successfully obliterate Orangeland through nuclear air bombardment with 50 metre CEPs from 40 000 feet, 100% of the time. The adolescent fumbling of new weapons systems seen in the North Sea, or the Pacific, is entirely unpresent.

This is made worse by what we know from US archives and diaries about the failures in the missileers. An elite organisation designed to sit underground expecting to die after killing hundreds of thousands of people, the morale and rediness issues were entirely unexpected. One may consider that similar effects were present in Soviet strategic land based missile forces. As for submariners, their average level of madness means that, should they not be destroyed by torpedos rapidly, that their insanity would be effective.

So for aeroplanes and land missiles, why do we consider that new untrained weapons systems lacking bloodedness, and with known failed elite statuses would be successful off the bat, even in hitting the correct city (+/-5 km, or worse).

We've heard these promises in 1913: they were shallow.
We've heard these promises in 1938: they were shallow.

Why do we believe the hype about on target, on time, effective fires just because it is yesterday's apocalypse?

To turn the keys may damn you to hell: but it doesn't mean Kiev is smoke with poor training and no live fires. (Silos, Phil Ochs)

yours,
Sam R.

 

[butch4343]

Am sorry what is this about is this the start of a story or is it some kinda question?

Am not sure I get whats meant here

Regards

 

[Riain]

Duds and Armageddon

We often about a global nuclear Holocaust destroying human civilization and the rest On the other hand I've read that 50-75% of W47 warheads w/could have been duds due to design flaws. Furthermore this doesn't appear to be uncommon, the British weren't happy with the W28 and designed their...

www.alternatehistory.com

Here's a little thread from years ago about nuclear warheads just not going off.

 

[jsb]

why do we consider that new untrained weapons systems lacking bloodedness, and with known failed elite statuses would be successful off the bat, even in hitting the correct city (+/-5 km, or worse).

We've heard these promises in 1913: they were shallow.
We've heard these promises in 1938: they were shallow.

Why do we believe the hype about on target, on time, effective fires just because it is yesterday's apocalypse?

Is it not more that at the hight of the Cold War only a small % of the weapons actually have to work to get a massive effect and even a massively inflated rate such as 75% of the failing (worse average WWII bomber raids would be still more like 25% failing) is not sufficient when we are talking 10,000+ weapons?

 

[marathag]

North Korea, nothing was off limits to the bombers, and North Korea of 1951 looked like Japan of 1945. B-29s had really run out of targets, in North Korea. China, off limits.

North Vietnamese cities were mostly all off limits, and dams and such were untouched. No area bombing of cities as in Japan and Korea.

A huge difference allowed targets between the three conventional bombing campaigns.

 

[fasquardon]

For some time now (30 years or more) we have been speculating on post 1945 air bombardment.

I am wondering where the WI is...

That said, this does remind me of post-WW1 ideas about air war. In the interwar years, people imagined that unstoppable bombers would sweep over enemy nations dropping high explosives and chemical weapons, scouring life from the enemy territory like we today imagine a nuclear war would be like.

Then during WW2, the WAllies invested heavily in bombers - as I recall Britain spent something like 80% of its resources on bombing Germany. While chemical weapons would be used far less than interwar thinkers had expected, the destructiveness (and military effectiveness) of the bombing turned out to be far less than had been foreseen. Indeed, one could argue that until the WAllied bombers started targeting German rail infrastructure, that the bombing effort was actually a net gain for the Germans, since in exchange for some inconvenient bombing raids they were troubled by less WAllied infantry, ships, tanks and artillery.

It seems to me that strategic airpower (and missile power) has always been both over-exalted and politically appealing. While strategic strikes can play a role in letting the fellows on the ground achieve their goals more quickly, I can't think of a single case where it has shown the ability to be win a war on its own...

fasquardon

 

[Riain]

North Korea, nothing was off limits to the bombers, and North Korea of 1951 looked like Japan of 1945. B-29s had really run out of targets, in North Korea. China, off limits.

I once read of a RAAF Meteor making multiple passes with rockets and guns at a single dude on a bike with a backpack of mortar bombs. THAT is overkill with airpower.