The Trent Affair causes the British to mobilize

Well, the core problem is simply that the Civil War is still an unhealed wound in the American psyche. Or, as an old friend of mine liked to say, Never forgive, never forget is up there with no retreat, no surrender... Then he would mix up for us some Sazerac and gossip about Jazz.

Nah, this is more a wargaming scenario than any political fantasy. Not to mention most of the more fervent speculators are British.
 
it is an interesting question and the effect of such a conflict in the short medium and long term.

Short term, regardless of outcome (say 1865-1890) bad, BAD blood between Washington and London (and probably Paris) regarding each side's handling of the whole thing. The US is definitely going to be less particular about letting the Fenians muck about and probably sympathy for the Boers once passions run high in South Africa. I'd expect the Fenian Rising of 1867 to be far more bloody than historically.

It would be interesting to see what effect the loss of the south states have on Government of the people by the people for the people as mentioned in the Gettysburg address.
Would it mean and end to Democracy?
Would USA be seen as weak and lead to the great powers in Europe taking more interest in the America north and Latin America?

End to democracy? No way, the United States was far more robust than that. Delay the end of slavery? More probable than not.

If the Second Empire survives to prop up Maximillian in Mexico then the French and Spanish are probably going to do some serious mucking about in that region, which probably leaves Britain with a feeling of buyers remorse. There's more than a few nasty little butterflies prepared to jump up and bite people.
 
Short term, regardless of outcome (say 1865-1890) bad, BAD blood between Washington and London (and probably Paris) regarding each side's handling of the whole thing. The US is definitely going to be less particular about letting the Fenians muck about and probably sympathy for the Boers once passions run high in South Africa. I'd expect the Fenian Rising of 1867 to be far more bloody than historically.



End to democracy? No way, the United States was far more robust than that. Delay the end of slavery? More probable than not.

If the Second Empire survives to prop up Maximillian in Mexico then the French and Spanish are probably going to do some serious mucking about in that region, which probably leaves Britain with a feeling of buyers remorse. There's more than a few nasty little butterflies prepared to jump up and bite people.

Abraham Lincoln seems to be saying in the Gettysburg Address that if the Union lost the civil war it would be a threat to the survival of democracy.
 
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How long do you realistically think it would take a country that within a decade was to surpass Great Britain as the leading industrial manufacturer in the world (and was already close in 1860) to domestically replace lost military imports?
Yes, the U.S. was that economically powerful and certainly had the know how to gear up for a massive war effort. Reading the history of the North in terms of economy from the 1820's on, one gets staggered by how enormously it grew and continued to grow throughout the Civil War period - and by how the U.S became the industrial innovator of the age [one of the amusing side notes of history, early on we were very aggressive in stealing European technology, once we became a leader ourselves, very aggressive in preserving patent protection].
As I noted, the British Navy by itself isn't going to bring the U.S to its knees, and the South isn't either.

How long would it take? They won't, because there is absolutely no way to make up for the lack of British imports; the Haber Bosch Process for nitrates, for example, wasn't invented until 1912. What little the Federals did make IOTL was nowhere near requirements and this was after two years of effort with much expense. This is just the gunpowder issue alone.
 
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The US was importing lead because it was cheaper, but there were plenty of domestic supplies. Until the British could establish a blockade, the Union could still import powder and guns from other countries. After that, they could still have used blockade runners, like the Confederates did in OTL. Establishing that blockade would have taken months. The British identified 13 different points on the Union Coast that needed to be blockaded and estimated they needed "6 Line-of-battle, 11 Frigates, 23 Sloops, 20 Gunboats" plus a further frigate and 6 gunboats to block "Cay West and the Tortugas". That is more than 1/3 of the ships that Brain had available for active duty worldwide. Admiral Milne, the man who would have been in charge of establishing the blockade, noted on his copy of the report that the proposed number of ships was "entirely inadequate" and later wrote that the British "Line of Battle ships would never have stood the gales and seas off the American coast".

Domestic production of lead was under 15,000 tons until late 1863-early 1864 when it managed to reach 15,500 tons. This means that, even in the event of diverting all domestic production to the Army at the expense of the civilian economy and U.S. Navy, the Army would still run out of bullets without imports. Blockade running is also completely out of the question because that IOTL for the Confederacy depended upon use of Bermuda and the Bahamas; that's obviously out of the question for the Union. Likewise, most of said blockade runners were British or French in origin. Again, that isn't going to happen here.

Long story short, the Brits and Confederates would utterly bash the Union to pieces over the course of 1862 and it's not even going to be close.
 
Domestic production of lead was under 15,000 tons until late 1863-early 1864 when it managed to reach 15,500 tons. This means that, even in the event of diverting all domestic production to the Army at the expense of the civilian economy and U.S. Navy, the Army would still run out of bullets without imports.

US lead production was over 15,500 tons in 1860, so the Union was clearly capable of producing at least that much in 1861-1864. Even at the 1860 low, the Union was producing over 14,000 tons, which would be 28 million pounds of lead. Official records show that in the first year of the Civil War, the Union purchased about 23 million pounds of lead or lead bullets and issued or expended about 19 million pounds.

That means the Union, at the lowest production point and without expanding production due to the cut off of imports, could produce 10 million pounds of lead beyond what was needed for the army. A blockade would result in major problems for the Union, but running out of bullets would not be one of those problems.
 
US lead production was over 15,500 tons in 1860, so the Union was clearly capable of producing at least that much in 1861-1864. Even at the 1860 low, the Union was producing over 14,000 tons, which would be 28 million pounds of lead. Official records show that in the first year of the Civil War, the Union purchased about 23 million pounds of lead or lead bullets and issued or expended about 19 million pounds.

That means the Union, at the lowest production point and without expanding production due to the cut off of imports, could produce 10 million pounds of lead beyond what was needed for the army. A blockade would result in major problems for the Union, but running out of bullets would not be one of those problems.

The Union was not capable of producing 15,500 terms because 1860 numbers include the 11 States of the Confederacy; obviously their secession dropped American production and it took until 1866 to recover as documented by the charts provided. As for the meat of the matter, let us look at the numbers:

On hand in 1861: 1,302,000 lbs
Purchased to 30 June 1862: 23,057,000 lbs

Expended to 30 June 1862: 18,920,000 lbs
Purchased to 30 June 1863: 48,720,000 lbs
Expended to 30 June 1863: 31,139,000 lbs
Purchased to 30 June 1864: 12,740,000 lbs
Expended to 30 June 1864: 7,624,000 lbs

Lead imports from Britain by year
1861: 1,679,000 lbs
1862: 28,926,000 lbs

1863 5,777,000 lbs
1864 25,929,000 lbs

The numbers show that little lead was imported for 1861, thus suggesting much of the purchasing occurred after the Trent Affair IOTL. That is important, as the on hand figures and knowledge of American production show the Union has no reserve upon which to rely on. Given annual production for both 1861 and 1862 was ~14,000 lbs, this means that British imports for 1862 alone was equal to the entirety of American production.
 
Blockade running is also completely out of the question because that IOTL for the Confederacy depended upon use of Bermuda and the Bahamas; that's obviously out of the question for the Union. Likewise, most of said blockade runners were British or French in origin. Again, that isn't going to happen here.

Unlike the Confederacy, the Union already had a large merchant fleet, and established navy, and a large native shpbuilding industry, so they would not be dependent of Britain building blockade runners or commerce raiders for them. British Caribbean possessions were very helpful for Confederate commerce raiders, but most of the Caribbean is not British - Haiti; the Dominican Republic; plus Spanish, French, Danish, and Swedish colonies. And blockading the Union is a massive task that will take months for the British to establish.

Long story short, the Brits and Confederates would utterly bash the Union to pieces over the course of 1862 and it's not even going to be close.

The Confederacy lasted 4 years against worse odds; so there is no credible way that the Union would lose in a single year. There is zero chance that an Anglo-Confederate alliance would "utterly bash the Union to pieces". The Confederacy's aggregate present appears to have peaked at about 300,000 troops. Canada had a population roughly 1/3rd that of the Confederacy, so logistics would indicate that a combined British/Canadian force of about 100,000 would be the maximum sustainable size. The Union army peaked at about 700,000 present for duty, more than double their combined opposition. The Union also has vastly better infrastructure than OTL's Confederacy, and would have the advantage of interior lines in TTL. Confederate force projection was uniformly poor - every attempt to invade and seize Union territory in OTL failed, and usually failed badly, even under the Confederacy's best commanders. The British soldier was generally experienced, but often lived in unsanitary and overcrowded conditions. Of the 22,182 British soldiers who died in the Crimean War, 17,580 (almost 80%) died of disease. The Cadwell reforms didn't occur until 1871. Until then, officers held their commission by purchase, which allowed some particularly unskilled men to maintain command. And like many period armies, the British only used formations above the battalion level in war, which imposed a significant organizational and logistical learning curve on British commanders.
 
The Union was not capable of producing 15,500 terms because 1860 numbers include the 11 States of the Confederacy; obviously their secession dropped American production and it took until 1866 to recover as documented by the charts provided.

How did you miss that I was using Union production from 1861, the lowest point of US production, not US production from 1860?

Here it is again, with emphasis.

Even at the 1860 low, the Union was producing over 14,000 tons of lead, which would be 28 million pounds of lead. Official records show that in the first year of the Civil War, the Union purchased about 23 million pounds of lead or lead bullets and issued or expended about 19 million pounds. That means the Union, at the lowest production point and without expanding production due to the cut off of imports, could produce 10 million pounds of lead beyond what was needed for the army. A blockade would result in major problems for the Union, but running out of bullets would not be one of those problems.

On hand in 1861: 1,302,000 lbs
Purchased to 30 June 1862: 23,057,000 lbs

Expended to 30 June 1862: 18,920,000 lbs
Purchased to 30 June 1863: 48,720,000 lbs
Expended to 30 June 1863: 31,139,000 lbs
Purchased to 30 June 1864: 12,740,000 lbs
Expended to 30 June 1864: 7,624,000 lbs

Thanks for the numbers, but they show the amount of lead "issued or expended", not just expended. That would include the 40 rounds per man carried by the troops in the field and probably regimental stores as well. The figures show that from mid 1862-63 the Union army issued or expended about 2 million more pounds of lead than the country produced that year, but the Union army started that period with a surplus of over 5 million pounds of lead.

The numbers show that from mid-1863-64 the Union army only "issued or expended" 7.6 million pounds of lead. Considering that this time period included the Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, East Tennessee, Knoxville, Red River, Atlanta, Bristoe Station, Mine Run, Valley, Bermuda Hundred, and Overland Campaigns; it seems obvious that major portions of the 31 million pounds of lead issued from mid-1862-63 had not been expended.

Lead imports from Britain by year
1861: 1,679,000 lbs
1862: 28,926,000 lbs

1863 5,777,000 lbs
1864 25,929,000 lbs

The numbers show that little lead was imported for 1861, thus suggesting much of the purchasing occurred after the Trent Affair IOTL.

After the Trent Incident, the Union Army made sure it had a 2 year supply of gunpowder on hand, so it is no surprise that they massively increased their on hand stores of lead as well.

That is important, as the on hand figures and knowledge of American production show the Union has no reserve upon which to rely on. Given annual production for both 1861 and 1862 was ~14,000 lbs, this means that British imports for 1862 alone was equal to the entirety of American production.

The figures show that save for the mid-1862-63 buildup of a multiyear reserve of of lead, US lead production exceeded the needs of the army. From mid 1861-62, the US produced 20% more lead than the army purchased and almost 50% more than the army issued. From mid 1863-64, the US produced 135% more lead than the army purchased and over 290% more than the army issued.

A British blockade would definitely prevent the Union from building up a multi-years reserve of lead and would result in major problems for the Union, but running out of bullets would not be one of those problems.
 
Domestic production of lead was under 15,000 tons until late 1863-early 1864 when it managed to reach 15,500 tons. This means that, even in the event of diverting all domestic production to the Army at the expense of the civilian economy and U.S. Navy, the Army would still run out of bullets without imports. Blockade running is also completely out of the question because that IOTL for the Confederacy depended upon use of Bermuda and the Bahamas; that's obviously out of the question for the Union. Likewise, most of said blockade runners were British or French in origin. Again, that isn't going to happen here.

Long story short, the Brits and Confederates would utterly bash the Union to pieces over the course of 1862 and it's not even going to be close.
Don't at best, you force the Union to go to a total war footing with a WWII style draft, full armament, and aggressive invasion of the CSA complete with Shermaneqsue destruction methods? Could they not develop trade routes through Mexico to France, and through the West to Russia, both of whom would have financial interests in supply the USA as well? If the CSA starts losing badly, which it will if the Union mobilizes, the UK is in a poor position to continue fighting. Eventually the US will turn and drive into Eastern Canada to deprive the BrN of bases.

As noted, the UK has no interest in this. They don't want to be allied with the CSA for strategic, economic, and moral reasons frankly. The Union is has similar reasons to avoid conflict as well.
 
In OTL the Union navy stopped, boarded and captured two Confederate ambassadors on the British vessel the Trent. Lincoln was able to successfully find a diplomatic solution to the crisis, but what if Great Britain was less receptive to diplomacy and war broke out between GB and the Union, thus giving the CSA legitimacy?

My opinion is that the Royal Navy would break the blockade of the South thus allowing the Confederate States access to international trade. GB would send a small army South from Canada but I suspect that Union forces would successfully defeat any British invasion. With British recognition, Napoleon III might be willing to officially recognize Confederate independence, if the CSA helps with the subjugation of Mexico. Great Britain might force the Union and Confederate leaders to negotiate peace in 1863.

Canadian winter is going to severely hamper immediate campaigning there by either side. And while the British could eventually produce overwhelming naval force, there won't be any of these instant, total mobilizations some posters seem fond of.

The Lincoln administration would devote all its diplomatic resources to ending the war with Britain quickly. The question is how much of a breather would this provide for the Confederates? Probably enough for them to exhaust Union will to fight, leading to the election of a Democrat in 1864 and a peace in place in 1866, with lines similar to OTLs 1863. The Union has control of the Mississippi River. They have West Virginia, northern Virginia, most or all of Tennessee and Arkansas, much of Louisiana, and likely portions of Mississippi and the Union isn't giving any of it back to the Confederacy.

The Union will blame Britain for the Union losing the Civil War. The Confederacy will consider Britain to have betrayed and abandoned them, even though they weren't formally allied. That's not reasonable, but Confederate leadership generally wasn't and they were very, very good at grudges. The region will be destabilized, the Monroe doctrine deceased, and Britain will need to beef up their troops in their territories in the Americas. Confederate slave smuggling will also require greater British commitment to the Anti-Slavery Patrols.
 
Unlike the Confederacy, the Union already had a large merchant fleet, and established navy, and a large native shpbuilding industry, so they would not be dependent of Britain building blockade runners or commerce raiders for them. British Caribbean possessions were very helpful for Confederate commerce raiders, but most of the Caribbean is not British - Haiti; the Dominican Republic; plus Spanish, French, Danish, and Swedish colonies. And blockading the Union is a massive task that will take months for the British to establish.

The same France and Spain currently in Mexico? The same France currently supplying the Confederacy with hundreds of thousands of arms interested in an independent Confederate state? The same colonies that must pass by British Bermuda, travelling at least 1,200 nautical miles to the nearest American port?This is, of course, ignoring that all of said ports will be closed to the Union anyway because said Union just spent the past year arguing that neutrality laws prevented the use of neutral ports by Confederate raiders?

All of this plus the simple fact that Britain still has control over the nitrates trade.

The Confederacy lasted 4 years against worse odds; so there is no credible way that the Union would lose in a single year. There is zero chance that an Anglo-Confederate alliance would "utterly bash the Union to pieces". The Confederacy's aggregate present appears to have peaked at about 300,000 troops. Canada had a population roughly 1/3rd that of the Confederacy, so logistics would indicate that a combined British/Canadian force of about 100,000 would be the maximum sustainable size. The Union army peaked at about 700,000 present for duty, more than double their combined opposition. The Union also has vastly better infrastructure than OTL's Confederacy, and would have the advantage of interior lines in TTL. Confederate force projection was uniformly poor - every attempt to invade and seize Union territory in OTL failed, and usually failed badly, even under the Confederacy's best commanders. The British soldier was generally experienced, but often lived in unsanitary and overcrowded conditions. Of the 22,182 British soldiers who died in the Crimean War, 17,580 (almost 80%) died of disease. The Cadwell reforms didn't occur until 1871. Until then, officers held their commission by purchase, which allowed some particularly unskilled men to maintain command. And like many period armies, the British only used formations above the battalion level in war, which imposed a significant organizational and logistical learning curve on British commanders.

And none of this matters because the Union won't have lead or gunpowder.
 
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How did you miss that I was using Union production from 1861, the lowest point of US production, not US production from 1860?

Here it is again, with emphasis.

Even at the 1860 low, the Union was producing over 14,000 tons of lead, which would be 28 million pounds of lead. Official records show that in the first year of the Civil War, the Union purchased about 23 million pounds of lead or lead bullets and issued or expended about 19 million pounds. That means the Union, at the lowest production point and without expanding production due to the cut off of imports, could produce 10 million pounds of lead beyond what was needed for the army. A blockade would result in major problems for the Union, but running out of bullets would not be one of those problems.

I'm actually the one that originally provided this citation and you're misreading the graph to start with; the light dotted line is production, not the dark line. If you look on the right side of the chart it says "Lead Production in Thousands of Tons". 1860 was actually the high point of production until 1866:
ggIZiz7p_o.png


The dark line is the cost of, for what its worth.

Thanks for the numbers, but they show the amount of lead "issued or expended", not just expended. That would include the 40 rounds per man carried by the troops in the field and probably regimental stores as well. The figures show that from mid 1862-63 the Union army issued or expended about 2 million more pounds of lead than the country produced that year, but the Union army started that period with a surplus of over 5 million pounds of lead.

The numbers show that from mid-1863-64 the Union army only "issued or expended" 7.6 million pounds of lead. Considering that this time period included the Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, East Tennessee, Knoxville, Red River, Atlanta, Bristoe Station, Mine Run, Valley, Bermuda Hundred, and Overland Campaigns; it seems obvious that major portions of the 31 million pounds of lead issued from mid-1862-63 had not been expended.

Need to look at both 1861-1862 and 1862-1863 figures, because the way Federal statistics work is they divided the year from June to June, not calendar wise. From June 30th of 1862 to June 30th of 1863, the Union Army alone expended 31 million tons of lead; total production during that same space was only 28 million tons.

After the Trent Incident, the Union Army made sure it had a 2 year supply of gunpowder on hand, so it is no surprise that they massively increased their on hand stores of lead as well.

And a Trent War means neither happens here.
 
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