The Syrian Invasion of Lebanon, 2006...

MacCaulay

Banned
...I was reading 34 Days by Amos Harel and Avi Isaacharoff, a book about the Second Lebanon War.

In one of the first chapters, the various plans that both the IDF, Israeli politicians, and the Bush Administration are outlined. One of the plans included an extensive bombing plan aimed towards the bridges and roads that could be used as possible escape routes.
What makes this plan so inflammatory was that at least two of the the targets were Syrian: the main highway out of Lebanon and towards Damascus and a bridge on that road.

The plan was knocked down, and another one (one that held onto many of the core tenets of the original) was enacted in it's place.

But let's suppose that this plan to enact an extensive bombing campaign of both Lebanon and Syria. The Syrians are pissed, to be sure, and call up...let's say...two armoured divisions and attack helicopters near the border.

They deploy them but don't move into Lebanon. On July 27th, after the Israelis have been held up for several days at Bint Jbeil and a few others, the Syrians decide to cast their die and move their armoured divisions into southern Lebanon after a public request from Hezbollah.

So...what happens?
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Bump. Seriously? Nothing? No one's got an opinion on this?

The Syrians and Israelis replay 1982 with Hezbollah in the place of the PLO and no one bites? I'm amazed. Truthfully, this seems like an interesting story idea to me.
 

Ak-84

Banned
The Syrians do what they did in 1982, aim to prevent any threat to Damascus. I suspect as in 1982 they will succeed.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
I've just finished the book...and it brings a couple more things into sharper focus: the Syrian force moving into Lebanon would probably outnumber the Israelis, and would do so for at least a week.

The Israeli call up of reservists for the 2006 Hezbollah War was so incredibly understrength that it was one of the first subjects brought up by a government inquiry after the conflict.

There's a very good chance that if the Syrians slammed into the Israelis with a division, or even put the force on the road towards Bint Jbeil, then Northern Command could only respond with a brigade at best. And it would have to go to the top brass (which would in turn have to go to Olmert and his 20 OR SO ADVISORS) to get an extensive change in ROEs in order to engage conventional forces in the way they have before.
 
I've just finished the book...and it brings a couple more things into sharper focus: the Syrian force moving into Lebanon would probably outnumber the Israelis, and would do so for at least a week.

The Israeli call up of reservists for the 2006 Hezbollah War was so incredibly understrength that it was one of the first subjects brought up by a government inquiry after the conflict.

There's a very good chance that if the Syrians slammed into the Israelis with a division, or even put the force on the road towards Bint Jbeil, then Northern Command could only respond with a brigade at best. And it would have to go to the top brass (which would in turn have to go to Olmert and his 20 OR SO ADVISORS) to get an extensive change in ROEs in order to engage conventional forces in the way they have before.

I'm sorry, but with US surging even more troops into Iraq, I just don't see this. Even if they somehow push the Israelis back in Lebanon, Syria would be in a vice between Israel and the US Army in Iraq. That means a US occupation of Syria.

Mike Turcotte
 

MacCaulay

Banned
I'm sorry, but with US surging even more troops into Iraq, I just don't see this. Even if they somehow push the Israelis back in Lebanon, Syria would be in a vice between Israel and the US Army in Iraq. That means a US occupation of Syria.

Mike Turcotte

It's kind of odd you should mention that: the book has interviews and quotes from several Israeli politicians and higherups in the IDF who pretty much say there were getting uncomfortable with how hawkish the US State Department was in the run up to the war.

This whole thing could be said to have started with the abduction of two Israeli soldiers along the northern border, which the Israelis took as a violation of the on/off-ceasefire which had been going on.

As soon as the soldiers' abduction went public, first Cheney and his people and then later the State Department were pressuring Israeli decision makers to make moves to bring Syria in directly.

It really looked to me like they wanted Israel as the catspaw so they didn't have to do it themselves. (EDIT: Because with the surge, the troops just weren't there for them to do it, anyway.)
 

HJ Tulp

Donor
Wouldn't the IDF be thrilled? Here they are having trouble with the elusivness of Hezbollah unconventional war and suddenly they are 2 divisions of conventional forces they can whoop? Sure they might have some frontage issues because of manpower issues but that doesn't concern the IAF does it?
 
Wouldn't the IDF be thrilled? Here they are having trouble with the elusivness of Hezbollah unconventional war and suddenly they are 2 divisions of conventional forces they can whoop? Sure they might have some frontage issues because of manpower issues but that doesn't concern the IAF does it?

This. Are the Syrians in any position to seriously challenge Israeli air superiority over Lebanon (or Syria proper)?

I realize it's not the most appropriate of comparisons, but the contemporary Israeli raid on a Syrian reactor/plant didn't speak well of the country's air defenses.

What's to stop the IAF from ravaging Syrian columns and cutting their supply routes over Lebanese roads and bridges?

It's also a dangerous game for Syria to play to intervene at all. Suppose Israel expands the war to include deeper Syrian targets, even if limited to ones directly related to supporting the intervention in Lebanon. Syria lacks the ability to respond with a similar measured escalation, unless it wants to try shelling or bombarding the Golan Heights... But an attack like that rapidly brings the risk of a full-scale Israeli-Syrian confrontation that the latter cannot win on its own.

Wildcard: If the war starts escalating to the point where Syria itself could face direct conflict with Israel, what does Iran do? Leaving its allies/clients to be crushed or at least chewed up by Israel in a conventional war would be a harsh blow to Tehran's prestige and influence, wouldn't it?

Edit: Is it also safe to say that given apparent US hawkishness toward Syria that Israel would be given what amounts to a blank check and diplomatic cover up to and including Israelis at Damascus? Especially if Iran attempts some form of public and concrete support to Syria and Hezbollah, it's hard NOT to see the Bush administration (and frankly, a lot of the American political community outside it) cheering Israel on in the hopes of breaking Iranian influence in Lebanon and Syria, and perhaps shaking up the regime in the latter, or at least scaring Assad into co-operation.
 
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I'm sorry, but with US surging even more troops into Iraq, I just don't see this. Even if they somehow push the Israelis back in Lebanon, Syria would be in a vice between Israel and the US Army in Iraq. That means a US occupation of Syria.

Mike Turcotte

That assumes U.S. intervention.

The surge's purpose had to with more boots on the ground to fight the insurgency and sending any of them off an anti-Syrian errand would jeopardize this.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Wouldn't the IDF be thrilled? Here they are having trouble with the elusivness of Hezbollah unconventional war and suddenly they are 2 divisions of conventional forces they can whoop? Sure they might have some frontage issues because of manpower issues but that doesn't concern the IAF does it?

That's what kind of concerns me about all this.

Two weeks ago, I'd have said: "Syrians move into the Bekaa Valley and towards the stalled Israeli forces at Bint Jbeil, proceed to get ther duds pwned."

Now...I don't know. Before this book, I read one on the Yom Kippur War by a writer from the Jerusalem Post, and one thing that seems to be very obvious is just how fractured the communication was between the military and the political leadership.

I looked back through the book, and at the date I picked the Israelis had called up literally less than 200 reservists, all officers. They did that because the Olmert's defense heads were still vacillating on whether or not there would be a large ground offensive and no one wanted to disrupt the economy.

And when some were called up, they were given a week of training for what to expect then sent on their way. I find it hard to believe that if the Israelis and Syrians came to blows in Lebanon in 2006, the Syrians couldn't at least field numerical parity, and probably superiority.
 
As pointed out though, numerical parity or superiority means what? Israel has absolute air superiority, it's conducted raids on Syrian territory with impunity. The last time there was an air war between Syria and Israel was 1982, when Syria actually had funding and a powerful patron. Back then, the score was like 90/0.

Moreover, even on ground parity, any advantage is likely to be temporary. Israel's likely able to mobilize far faster, and it has the commanding strategic position on the Golan Heights.

On the other side of the table, the Assad regime is broke, strapped, and surrounded by enemies.

I can't see the Syrians moving.
 

I think this sums up my thinking nicely. Sure, Syria might be able to get (temporary?) numerical superiority in Lebanon. But then what? Surely this, the prospect of an immediate conventional war, will be some motivation for Olmert and company to mobilize more comprehensively. And, honestly, man for man, I don't think that the Syrians can realistically stand up to the IDF. And then the Israeli's unleash the IAF on the Syrians. Armored divisions are much easier targets than terrorist cells for a modern air force, and I don't see how the Syrians can prevent a re-run of 1967 or 1991 on their exposed forces. This leaves them in a bit of a bind, with no real way of retaliating save perhaps a scud bombardment...

How much would all of this free up the pressure on Hizbullah?
 

Cook

Banned
This. Are the Syrians in any position to seriously challenge Israeli air superiority over Lebanon (or Syria proper)?
Tyg’s hit on the key issue of course.
The Syrian’s cross the border with two divisions and the IDf could only counter with a single armoured brigade, but the Syrian’s would be under continuous and sustained air attack.

...Israel has absolute air superiority...

Yes, we’d witness something like a scaled down Desert Storm; devastating are attacks before mopping up by ground forces.


How much would all of this free up the pressure on Hizbullah?

It would probably give them a brief respite, but with the Israeli’s rapidly mobilising more forces because of the threat from Syria, once the Syrians were dealt with they’d redirect those extra forces against Hezbollah and be much more thorough than IOTL.
 

MacCaulay

Banned
Yes, we’d witness something like a scaled down Desert Storm; devastating are attacks before mopping up by ground forces.




It would probably give them a brief respite, but with the Israeli’s rapidly mobilising more forces because of the threat from Syria, once the Syrians were dealt with they’d redirect those extra forces against Hezbollah and be much more thorough than IOTL.

I think these statements are at the heart of the issue: Israel didn't go into Lebanon to start a war with Syria, but it made so many political miscalculations through the use of military force that it could've happened.

And it's kind of obvious that none of their objectives lay in Damascus. It's not in their best interest (or Syria's, really) to make this thing into a full-fledged war, but rather a game (like 1982) where you only take the gloves off in Lebanon.

I think someone would have to look at the SAM envelope in Syria and see if there's any chance it could stretch in any way over Palestine, or if the Syrians could move SA-6s or something in with the first wave of armour across the border.

The Israelis could very well end up coming out better than in OTL with this: it might make the IDF step up to the plate and finally tell the political leadership what needed to be said, that the only thing that would get rid of the Hezbollah missile launchers was a sustained large-scale ground assault on a 2-or-3 Division wide front.

If the Israelis just move up into Hezbollah's territory and try to keep clearing the villages (we'll suppose they call up another brigade) while spinning up the reserves, then they can wait for the Syrians to make the first move and have at least some political ammunition before they begin the assault.
 
I've just finished the book...and it brings a couple more things into sharper focus: the Syrian force moving into Lebanon would probably outnumber the Israelis, and would do so for at least a week.

The Israeli call up of reservists for the 2006 Hezbollah War was so incredibly understrength that it was one of the first subjects brought up by a government inquiry after the conflict.

There's a very good chance that if the Syrians slammed into the Israelis with a division, or even put the force on the road towards Bint Jbeil, then Northern Command could only respond with a brigade at best. And it would have to go to the top brass (which would in turn have to go to Olmert and his 20 OR SO ADVISORS) to get an extensive change in ROEs in order to engage conventional forces in the way they have before.


Israeli buildup was such as it was because Israelis had basically no idea what they wanted to do and how to do it. Look at stated goals: get soldiers back, destroy Hezbollah, destroy Hezbollah's ability to launch missiles into Israel, limit Hezbollah's ability to launch missiles into Israel, clear land up to Litani, reach Litani.

At first IDF wanted to do a re-run of Accuntability/Grapes of Wrath, then realized they need boots on the ground. When Hezbollah's defences proved to be tougher than expected they realized they need more boots on the ground.

One can understand Israel's reluctance to risk ground troops and suffer high number of casualties and using firepower instead. but that doesn't work.

Syrain itnervention would be a godsend for SIrael. Conventional target and actual invasion (in 1982 Syrians were already there).
 
...I was reading 34 Days by Amos Harel and Avi Isaacharoff, a book about the Second Lebanon War.

In one of the first chapters, the various plans that both the IDF, Israeli politicians, and the Bush Administration are outlined. One of the plans included an extensive bombing plan aimed towards the bridges and roads that could be used as possible escape routes.
What makes this plan so inflammatory was that at least two of the the targets were Syrian: the main highway out of Lebanon and towards Damascus and a bridge on that road.

The plan was knocked down, and another one (one that held onto many of the core tenets of the original) was enacted in it's place.

But let's suppose that this plan to enact an extensive bombing campaign of both Lebanon and Syria. The Syrians are pissed, to be sure, and call up...let's say...two armoured divisions and attack helicopters near the border.

They deploy them but don't move into Lebanon. On July 27th, after the Israelis have been held up for several days at Bint Jbeil and a few others, the Syrians decide to cast their die and move their armoured divisions into southern Lebanon after a public request from Hezbollah.

So...what happens?

I can understand that the bridge on the main highway between Lebanon and Syria would be in Syria, but you said at least two of the targets were in Syria and that one of those targets was the main highway leading between Lebanon and Syria. But if that highway was one of the targets couldn't the IAF simply have bombed the stretch of highway on the Lebanese side of the border to the same effect as bombing the stretch on the Syrian side of the border? In that case wouldn't it mean that only the bridge would be the sole target in Syria?


I also suspect that if only 2 targets at most (or just a single bridge very close to the border at the least) were in Syria then the Israelis can pass it off as an unfortunate-yet-fortunate "accident". It isn't like Israel hasn't deliberated bombed Syria (and deep into Syrian territory too) without anything much coming of it. During a war where Israel was bombing the length and breadth of Lebanon it would be fairly easy I imagine for the Israeli politicians and military to use an "accident" excuse (after all, it's not beyond possibility for pilot error or gravity to cause a bomb or five to drop just across the Lebanese border into Syria) with Syria promising retaliation for any further attacks and condemning the ones that too place without actually doing anything about them.

Especially given that the Syrians more than anyone else should be acutely aware of just how vulnerable their ground based forces are to IAF attack, the Syrians would probably think long and hard before using a few IAF bombings as a reason to intervene whilst the IDF is being held up around Bint Jbeil. Any intervention would probably be of the more unconventional kind if Syria actually decided to do anything - such as maybe openly providing Hezbollah with money, more advanced rockets and maybe SAMs and general ammunition for engagements with the IDF in southern Lebanon.

EDIT: To get a Syrian-Israeli engagement in Lebanon again after 1982 and after 2000 it might be better to find a way for Syria not to be forced to withdraw from Lebanon in 2005. If Hariri isn't killed then perhaps Syria remains in Lebanon into 2006 but with increasing pressure to withdraw. If Hezbollah isn't somehow restrained from kidnapping the IDF soldiers and the war starts as in OTL then some Syrian targets in Lebanon are likely to be hit even if as collateral damage. With a Syrian presence still in Lebanon however the IDF would probably have gone about calling up reservists differently and may well have pushed for very early preparations for significant ground forces to be deployed along the border and if necessary into Lebanon.
 
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EDIT: To get a Syrian-Israeli engagement in Lebanon again after 1982 and after 2000 it might be better to find a way for Syria not to be forced to withdraw from Lebanon in 2005. If Hariri isn't killed then perhaps Syria remains in Lebanon into 2006 but with increasing pressure to withdraw. If Hezbollah isn't somehow restrained from kidnapping the IDF soldiers and the war starts as in OTL then some Syrian targets in Lebanon are likely to be hit even if as collateral damage. With a Syrian presence still in Lebanon however the IDF would probably have gone about calling up reservists differently and may well have pushed for very early preparations for significant ground forces to be deployed along the border and if necessary into Lebanon.

i doubt we'd see the war if Syria stayed in Lebanon. Syrians were pretty good at restraining Hezbollah back then.
 

Spengler

Banned
It's kind of odd you should mention that: the book has interviews and quotes from several Israeli politicians and higherups in the IDF who pretty much say there were getting uncomfortable with how hawkish the US State Department was in the run up to the war.

This whole thing could be said to have started with the abduction of two Israeli soldiers along the northern border, which the Israelis took as a violation of the on/off-ceasefire which had been going on.

As soon as the soldiers' abduction went public, first Cheney and his people and then later the State Department were pressuring Israeli decision makers to make moves to bring Syria in directly.

It really looked to me like they wanted Israel as the catspaw so they didn't have to do it themselves. (EDIT: Because with the surge, the troops just weren't there for them to do it, anyway.)


Just a question I know this is kind of political, but why would cheney want that? I mean wouldn't that have made the already bad situation in iraq much worse?
 

Cook

Banned
Just a question I know this is kind of political, but why would cheney want that? I mean wouldn't that have made the already bad situation in iraq much worse?

I think the reasoning would be that if Syria was badly pounded in Lebanon and directly in Western Syria, they would have less funds and equipment to provide to insurgents in Iraq; they’d be too busy licking their wounds and rebuilding and young Syrian kids wanting to go fight someone on their own would head to Lebanon rather than Iraq.
 
The MacCaulay TL name generation system

The (Attacker) Invasion of (Defender), (Year) :p


In all seriousness though Mac I really like the idea, just hope that the touchy subject matter doesn't make things difficult.

EDIT:

I think the reasoning would be that if Syria was badly pounded in Lebanon and directly in Western Syria, they would have less funds and equipment to provide to insurgents in Iraq; they’d be too busy licking their wounds and rebuilding and young Syrian kids wanting to go fight someone on their own would head to Lebanon rather than Iraq.

Exactly, during 2006 Syria and the Sunni militias it supported were the primary threat to stability in Iraq. It wasn't until well into 2007 that this dubious honor was transfered to the Shia militias and their Iranian backers, thus destabalizing Syria in 2006 would've seemed like a major blow against the Iraqi insurgency.
 
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