East China November 1941-January 1942 &The 1st Battle of Huchow
Excerpts from "After I, The Monsoon: The Wars of Southeast Asia" I. Barham-Raybourne, London, UK, 1991.
THE First Battle of Huchow began on January 9th, 1942. Though not remembered as a battle that changed the course of history, it nonetheless shook up the Imperial Japanese Army.
The siege of Nanking was at a stalemate- the National Army found itself unable to break the siege, and the Allied forces were similarly unable to break the defenders. Tensions began to escalate, however.
General Xue Yue quickly made his reputation as the "God of War", having mastered the art of armoured and combined-arms warfare. Xue, leveraging his knowledge of the Chinese terrain and battlefield conditions, as well as the knowledge the German cadre taught in movement warfare, Xue was able to prevent MacArthur's forces from encircling Nanking. In many instances, Xue's forces were able to push MacArthur's back with greater ease than expected, particularly in late August through mid-September, owing to the fact that MacArthur's troops were not dug in properly. To address this matter, MacArthur made a series of visits to the front; a policy which earned him the moniker "Dugout Doug". As with many of MacArthur's actions, this too was polarizing. To his admirers, it was an act of proactive generalship; to his detractors, an act of micromanagement at best and needless, flamboyant showmanship at worst.
Although Xue earned some early successes, he grew increasingly concerned with the situation which was developing. He knew that a war of attrition would work against Japan alone, but with Japan, the British Empire, the United States and now the Union Army against the Republic of China, the situation was likely to worsen. Privately, Xue questioned just how defencible Nanking was, and how long it could hold against the opposition.
Xue's armoured forces met increasingly stiff resistance from those commanded by American Major General George S. Patton. Several fierce tank battles took place over the cool winter ground during November and December 1941, with neither side able to gain a decisive advantage. However, by January 1942, increasing numbers of Allied fighter aircraft began to inflict severe losses on Xue's Stukas, robbing him of a key piece of his ability to carry out movement warfare. Meanwhile, while the Allies had plentiful fuel, spare parts and ammunition, they lacked the veteran tank crews that Xue could call upon.
Chiang became increasingly concerned at the Allies' abilities to parry Xue's counterttacks, and regroup seemingly quicker each time to launch another attack. As such, in late December, he ordered the Kuomintang to temporarily relocate its headquarters to Chongqing. This was a decision that was not opposed by Xue, as Chongquing was a much safer location for Chiang, and the increased distance made it more difficult for Chiang to insert himself and micromanage operations. The relationship between the two had grown increasingly acrimonious- Xue grew frustrated with Chiang's obstinacy, while Chiang believed that Xue flirted too closely with insubordination.
The Allies' greatest victory in these difficult months was the full mobilization of their supply chain. Although they still decided not to carry out a strategic bombing campaign, the Allies' held another commanding advantage: their industrial capacity. Allied forces began to receive necessary equipment and supplies at a much faster rate. American convoys departed en masse from Seattle, San Francisco and Long Beach, loaded with troops and munitions. The Vancouver, British Columbia- Yokohama route now extended to Tsingtao and Shanghai, while British convoys sailed from Birkenhead and other ports, via Suez and Singapore. The importance of American supplies cannot be understated for the nascent Philippine and Union of China Armies. Supplies from Manchukuo also began to make their way southwards, including food and medicines.
These factors combined to create a scenario in which both sides were looking for a decisive victory, but neither was capable at the time of delivering the desired knockout blow.
None were so hungry for a victory as General Hideki Tojo. The Kwantung Army, once the largest and most prestigious command in the Imperial Japanese Army was now secondary in importance to the 1st China Expeditionary Army. Tojo's woes did not end with the loss of prestige either. Prince Regent Pujie, while far more cooperative than Puyi, still struggled to marshal large numbers of troops to send to the battlefields of eastern China. Jewish and White Movement Russian volunteer units, such as the famed Shaarei T'Zion foot guards and Svoboda armoured regiment also added to Tojo's numbers, but two years of hard fighting had left the Kwantung Army understrength.
Tojo, frustrated by months of what he perceived to be stalled progress, advocated a bold strategy: an attack on Huchow (present-day Xuzhou, Union of China), in order to not only make progress in surrounding Nanking but also to capture the first stop on the road to Chongqing. Tojo sought to assault the city before Nationalist defences could be fully prepared.
To this end, he ordered Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi to prepare his corps of approximately 50 000 to capture Huchow. This plan was vehemently opposed by Generals Count Hisaichi Terauchi and Toshizo Nishio, who believed that Xue would not be so unwise as to leave his northern flank unguarded, and questioned whether Huchow could be held even if it could be captured. The General Staff, on the strength of Tojo's intelligence reporting, approved the operation, not wanting to lose any more time to hesitation. On January 9th, 1942, IJAAS aircraft launched a night bombing raid on the dug-in defences of Huchow, followed by a brief artillery bombardment, and rapid deployment of Japanese and Manchurian troops and tanks.
The rush, however, proved to be a grave error on Mutaguchi and Tojo's part. Xue was fully expecting that Allied forces would attempt to flank his own forces to the North, and ordered his tankers and artillerists to dig in carefully, while keeping a highly mobile reserve. The Kwantung Army was speeding into a trap, to the tune of some 85 000 carefully prepared defenders. On the morning of January 10th, the Japanese advance was halted, and by the afternoon, reversed. The light Chi-Ha and Ha-Go tanks were no match for Xue's Pz. III and IVs, in addition to the well dug-in assault guns the National Army had readied. Even repeated sorties by Japanese aircraft were unable to turn the tide in the IJA's favour- and their fortunes would only get worse. As the IJA forces made a hasty retreat, their own antitank defences, relying mostly on lighter Type 99 2pdr guns were unable to hold the National Army's advance.
Tojo, hearing of the catastrophe, urged Mutaguchi to regroup, and launch a night counterattack on the National Army's forces, which by now, were low on fuel. The hastily retreating units could barely be marshaled into anything resembling a force ready to launch another attack, but Mutaguchi stubbornly insisted that the attck go ahead early on the morning of the 11th, still under the cover of darkness. Outnumbered, outgunned, exhausted, and reeling from the blows of yesterday's catastrophic losses, the second Japanese attack fared no better, mauled again and pushed back further towards Yunhe, which was now itself under threat. Tojo reluctantly ordered Mutaguchi to fall back towards the coast to prevent a total rout, even though the front line was now closer to the coast than it had been before, which now threatened the railways along the coast-the main artery between Tsingtao and Shanghai.
The General Staff was furious. The Emperor himself demanded answers. The answer, however, was known almost before anyone mentioned it.
On January 16th, 1942, Hideki Tojo was relieved of command of the Kwantung Army and ordered to report to Japan immediately.
THE First Battle of Huchow began on January 9th, 1942. Though not remembered as a battle that changed the course of history, it nonetheless shook up the Imperial Japanese Army.
The siege of Nanking was at a stalemate- the National Army found itself unable to break the siege, and the Allied forces were similarly unable to break the defenders. Tensions began to escalate, however.
General Xue Yue quickly made his reputation as the "God of War", having mastered the art of armoured and combined-arms warfare. Xue, leveraging his knowledge of the Chinese terrain and battlefield conditions, as well as the knowledge the German cadre taught in movement warfare, Xue was able to prevent MacArthur's forces from encircling Nanking. In many instances, Xue's forces were able to push MacArthur's back with greater ease than expected, particularly in late August through mid-September, owing to the fact that MacArthur's troops were not dug in properly. To address this matter, MacArthur made a series of visits to the front; a policy which earned him the moniker "Dugout Doug". As with many of MacArthur's actions, this too was polarizing. To his admirers, it was an act of proactive generalship; to his detractors, an act of micromanagement at best and needless, flamboyant showmanship at worst.
Although Xue earned some early successes, he grew increasingly concerned with the situation which was developing. He knew that a war of attrition would work against Japan alone, but with Japan, the British Empire, the United States and now the Union Army against the Republic of China, the situation was likely to worsen. Privately, Xue questioned just how defencible Nanking was, and how long it could hold against the opposition.
Xue's armoured forces met increasingly stiff resistance from those commanded by American Major General George S. Patton. Several fierce tank battles took place over the cool winter ground during November and December 1941, with neither side able to gain a decisive advantage. However, by January 1942, increasing numbers of Allied fighter aircraft began to inflict severe losses on Xue's Stukas, robbing him of a key piece of his ability to carry out movement warfare. Meanwhile, while the Allies had plentiful fuel, spare parts and ammunition, they lacked the veteran tank crews that Xue could call upon.
Chiang became increasingly concerned at the Allies' abilities to parry Xue's counterttacks, and regroup seemingly quicker each time to launch another attack. As such, in late December, he ordered the Kuomintang to temporarily relocate its headquarters to Chongqing. This was a decision that was not opposed by Xue, as Chongquing was a much safer location for Chiang, and the increased distance made it more difficult for Chiang to insert himself and micromanage operations. The relationship between the two had grown increasingly acrimonious- Xue grew frustrated with Chiang's obstinacy, while Chiang believed that Xue flirted too closely with insubordination.
The Allies' greatest victory in these difficult months was the full mobilization of their supply chain. Although they still decided not to carry out a strategic bombing campaign, the Allies' held another commanding advantage: their industrial capacity. Allied forces began to receive necessary equipment and supplies at a much faster rate. American convoys departed en masse from Seattle, San Francisco and Long Beach, loaded with troops and munitions. The Vancouver, British Columbia- Yokohama route now extended to Tsingtao and Shanghai, while British convoys sailed from Birkenhead and other ports, via Suez and Singapore. The importance of American supplies cannot be understated for the nascent Philippine and Union of China Armies. Supplies from Manchukuo also began to make their way southwards, including food and medicines.
These factors combined to create a scenario in which both sides were looking for a decisive victory, but neither was capable at the time of delivering the desired knockout blow.
None were so hungry for a victory as General Hideki Tojo. The Kwantung Army, once the largest and most prestigious command in the Imperial Japanese Army was now secondary in importance to the 1st China Expeditionary Army. Tojo's woes did not end with the loss of prestige either. Prince Regent Pujie, while far more cooperative than Puyi, still struggled to marshal large numbers of troops to send to the battlefields of eastern China. Jewish and White Movement Russian volunteer units, such as the famed Shaarei T'Zion foot guards and Svoboda armoured regiment also added to Tojo's numbers, but two years of hard fighting had left the Kwantung Army understrength.
Tojo, frustrated by months of what he perceived to be stalled progress, advocated a bold strategy: an attack on Huchow (present-day Xuzhou, Union of China), in order to not only make progress in surrounding Nanking but also to capture the first stop on the road to Chongqing. Tojo sought to assault the city before Nationalist defences could be fully prepared.
To this end, he ordered Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi to prepare his corps of approximately 50 000 to capture Huchow. This plan was vehemently opposed by Generals Count Hisaichi Terauchi and Toshizo Nishio, who believed that Xue would not be so unwise as to leave his northern flank unguarded, and questioned whether Huchow could be held even if it could be captured. The General Staff, on the strength of Tojo's intelligence reporting, approved the operation, not wanting to lose any more time to hesitation. On January 9th, 1942, IJAAS aircraft launched a night bombing raid on the dug-in defences of Huchow, followed by a brief artillery bombardment, and rapid deployment of Japanese and Manchurian troops and tanks.
The rush, however, proved to be a grave error on Mutaguchi and Tojo's part. Xue was fully expecting that Allied forces would attempt to flank his own forces to the North, and ordered his tankers and artillerists to dig in carefully, while keeping a highly mobile reserve. The Kwantung Army was speeding into a trap, to the tune of some 85 000 carefully prepared defenders. On the morning of January 10th, the Japanese advance was halted, and by the afternoon, reversed. The light Chi-Ha and Ha-Go tanks were no match for Xue's Pz. III and IVs, in addition to the well dug-in assault guns the National Army had readied. Even repeated sorties by Japanese aircraft were unable to turn the tide in the IJA's favour- and their fortunes would only get worse. As the IJA forces made a hasty retreat, their own antitank defences, relying mostly on lighter Type 99 2pdr guns were unable to hold the National Army's advance.
Tojo, hearing of the catastrophe, urged Mutaguchi to regroup, and launch a night counterattack on the National Army's forces, which by now, were low on fuel. The hastily retreating units could barely be marshaled into anything resembling a force ready to launch another attack, but Mutaguchi stubbornly insisted that the attck go ahead early on the morning of the 11th, still under the cover of darkness. Outnumbered, outgunned, exhausted, and reeling from the blows of yesterday's catastrophic losses, the second Japanese attack fared no better, mauled again and pushed back further towards Yunhe, which was now itself under threat. Tojo reluctantly ordered Mutaguchi to fall back towards the coast to prevent a total rout, even though the front line was now closer to the coast than it had been before, which now threatened the railways along the coast-the main artery between Tsingtao and Shanghai.
The General Staff was furious. The Emperor himself demanded answers. The answer, however, was known almost before anyone mentioned it.
On January 16th, 1942, Hideki Tojo was relieved of command of the Kwantung Army and ordered to report to Japan immediately.
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. Compared to OTL, a near miss is a fortunate thing indeed, and perhaps a sign of things to come- flirting with catastrophe but managing to narrowly avoid it. With OTL RN luck, the destroyers would have collided, one would have sunk, the other one would have caught fire from the spilled fuel and blew up when the torpedoes cooked off, and the tanker would have been torpedoed by a marauding U-boat.
