Update time!
Chapter III German Invasion and Soviet Intervention, 1-10 October 1938.
In the two weeks leading up to the formal declaration of war, Germany mobilized about 600.000 men in 36 infantry divisions, 2.000 tanks, 3.000 artillery guns and 2.500 aircraft. All-in-all, by adding Waffen SS and Landwehr divisions and support from SA stormtroopers and police units the Germans managed to mobilize a force of three quarters of a million men, totalling fifty divisions. They faced 35 infantry divisions, 500 tanks, 2.200 artillery guns and 880 aircraft from the Czechoslovakian armed forces. The Germans had greater numbers on their side and would’ve won in a matter of weeks, maybe three months at the most, without foreign involvement.
Contrary to Hitler’s speech, offensive German operations had already begun at five o’clock in the morning on October 1st, 45 minutes earlier than he claimed German forces had been “returning fire.” This didn’t come as a complete surprise to the Czechoslovakian army as they’d already carried out a partial mobilization, moving troops to the border fortifications and observing German movements on the other side of the border. They were powerless to do anything about it since they were under strict orders not to fire unless fired upon first to avoid being seen as the aggressor. The government of four star general Jan Syrový, who’d become Prime Minister on September 22nd, had issued a total mobilization order two days prior.
The Czechoslovak border fortifications were incomplete: the first stage of construction was to be complete by 1941-’42 and the entire system only by the early fifties. Nonetheless, 264 heavy blockhouses and 10.014 light pillboxes, 20% of the heavy objects and 70% of the light ones, were complete while the incomplete ones were at least useable as shelters and storages. The heavy fortifications had additional protection by being covered with boulders and debris, stopping most shells before they’d reach the concrete. The heavy defences had machine guns and artillery, some mounted in cupolas, with part of the fire directed laterally to stop the enemy from engaging from the flanks or from behind. The strongest ones had indirect fire mortars and heavy cannon mounts. Enemy forces trying to pass between the heavy blockhouses would face resistance from the pillboxes and would encounter anti-tank and anti-infantry barricades as well as machine gun and artillery fire. The line functioned as intended despite its incomplete status, with the defenders holding the Germans back for days and inflicting serious casualties by exploiting the defences and the terrain cleverly, carrying out strategic withdrawals where these were required.
Holding back the Germans for as long as possible and inflicting severe casualties, whilst trying to preserve their own forces when possible through strategic retreats, was the strategy of the Czechoslovak military leadership. They realized full well that in the medium to long term Germany’s greater industrial base and manpower pool would simply overwhelm them. Therefore they had to fight smart to prolong their ability to continue the war effort and hopefully make the enemy bleed enough to come to a peace agreement. Since they knew that Hitler, unfortunately, was unlikely to be deterred by any losses (though they hoped those around him might be), prolonging the fight served the second purpose of giving Prague’s allies time to mobilize and intervene. Therefore their effort had to be credible since nobody was going to go to war over a lost cause.
The advantageous materiel superiority of the Wehrmacht meant Prague absolutely needed allies to achieve victory. In terms of manpower the situation was roughly equal, but the Germans had four times as many tanks and almost three times as many aircraft. Though the LT-35 light tank was superior to the Panzer I and Panzer II the Germans used, this was nullified by the number of German tanks facing them. In the air it was much the same. The Czechoslovak air force had 880 airplanes and 450 of those were fairly modern Avia B-534 biplane fighters that surprisingly managed to hold their own against Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighters. The biplane Letov S-328 – with four forward facing 7.92 machine guns, two more in the rear cockpit and 500 kg of bombs – was a good attack aircraft and blew up its share of Panzers. Though some dogfights were spectacularly won by Czechoslovak pilots, the Luftwaffe gained air superiority and the Czechoslovak air force was spread out and kept hidden, only to be used when absolutely necessary. A handful of bombing raids against German targets just across the border were carried out by Avia B-71 fast bombers (license produced versions of the Soviet Tupolev SB).
Once Fall Grün (Case Green) was put into effect on October 1st 1938, the Luftwaffe bombed Czechoslovak fortifications, roads and main railways towards the front, after which their invasion commenced. In the northern theatre the German advance was checked after only eight kilometres, making it the most successful Czechoslovak defence. In the centre German forces advanced more steadily until they hit fortifications west of Pilsen, which took them four days to breach, forcing a Czechoslovak withdrawal to a secondary line southwest of Prague. In the south, German forces advanced towards and subsequently besieged defences around Brno and Bratislava, facing spirited defenders.
Within ten days the frontline had been pushed to the outskirts of Prague. Hitler wanted it to be over and threatened to destroy the country’s capital, hoping to bully the enemy into declaring it an open city so it would be spared. He fully expected that to happen since the Czechoslovak government would be mindful of the cultural treasures of the city: architecture from the Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance and Baroque periods, several museums, galleries, theatres and other historical exhibits. Besides that, a German bombardment would of course inflict terrible civilian casualties.
Hitler wanted to spare the city, if possible, for several reasons. Firstly, he had pictured a triumphant military parade in the historical city, which wouldn’t be so glorious if it was set against the backdrop of blackened ruins. Besides that, a long siege or house to house battle would lengthen the war, which was a problem for several reasons: the Germans only had fuel reserves for three weeks of intense combat; it would require manpower, which would force the Wehrmacht to pull older reservists in their forties, that were less well equipped and trained, from the incomplete Siegfried Line; and if the invasion didn’t go quick enough then he couldn’t present the world a fait accompli, increasing the risk of outside interference and a wider, more drawn out conflict Germany wasn’t yet equipped to fight.
Foreign intervention became a matter of time when the Soviet Union declared war on October 5th (after a four day marathon politburo session the Soviet leader ordered as he was having last minute doubts). Stalin promised a contingent of 350.000 men, adhering to the alliance between the two countries, and subsequent mobilization orders were issued in the Kiev and Odessa military districts. Meanwhile, Romania had given the Soviet Air Force permission to fly through their airspace to transport troops and supplies to Czechoslovakia. Soviet forces slowly started massing in Slovakia near Košice. As long as air transport was the only way for the Red Army to get in troops, their build-up would be fed by a small, slow trickle. Moscow, however, was also trying to negotiate overland corridors, guarded by the Romanian Army, through which they would be able to send troops and supplies. As time passed it looked like the Romanians would agree as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the other two members of the Little Entente, were pressuring them into it. That would send a message to Hungary, deterring it from launching a revanchist war of its own, which was the reason for the mutual defence arrangement of the three powers (it didn’t, however, scare Poland as it occupied the disputed Zaolzie region over Czechoslovakia’s protests).
At 10:00 AM on October 10th, Hitler had a meeting at the Bendlerblock, an office complex in Berlin used by several departments of the OKW and the OKH as well as the Abwehr military intelligence agency. Hitler met with OKW chief General Wilhelm Keitel, OKH chief General Walther von Brauchitsch, OKH chief of staff Franz Halder and Luftwaffe commander Hermann Goering, his right-hand man. Hitler declared a “a Bolshevik ulcer is growing in Slovakia. If we force a Czechoslovak collapse, be it a military collapse or a loss of political will to continue, we can surgically remove it. If not, the ulcer will burst with results we can scarcely foresee, never mind act upon. It could even encourage the cowardly French and British to act. A two-front war must be avoided at all costs.” In other words, if the enemy was forced out of the war quickly then the Soviets would be forced out too. If not, then the Soviet presence would grow to the point that the Germans wouldn’t have the upper hand in terms of men and equipment anymore. That would make this a long conflict with an unpredictable outcome and possible Anglo-French intervention, which would inevitably result in defeat.
The decision was made to bomb Prague despite its cultural and historical significance and with no regard whatsoever for its remaining civilian population. Hermann Goering promised his Luftwaffe would raze the city to the ground saying “we will annihilate Prague and its people will suffer. If this doesn’t break them, I don’t know what will.” On Tuesday October 11th at 09:00 AM a fleet of 75 bombers – composed of Heinkel He 111s, Dornier Do 17s, Junkers Ju 88s and Ju-52s – took flight. Bf 109 fighters kept enemy fighters at bay and Stuka dive bombers suppressed anti-aircraft guns. They dropped about sixty tonnes of bombs on the city, killing 552 civilians and wounding thousands as well as inflicting terrible damage. Entire boroughs in the city centre had been levelled. The bombing was condemned by several governments worldwide, most prominently by the Soviet Union, Britain and France of course. It didn’t have the intended effect of forcing a surrender, but stiffened resistance instead.
After his meeting at the Bendlerblock, Hitler’s plane departed with a southward heading the same day as he believed he could lead the war effort better if he was closer to the front. He planned to lead the military from the Berghof, his Alpine chalet, while remaining in control of politics through the “Little Chancellery” in the nearby town of Bischofswiesen. Little did he know that a plot was being forged against him. In fact, the plane taking him to Berchtesgaden had an object on board that could’ve killed the Führer if it had done its job. The bomb hidden in a briefcase with a false bottom didn’t go off and wasn’t discovered either, being discretely removed by one of the conspirators. No-one knows how the war would’ve gone if it had done what it was supposed to.
