17: Hamburg and Ultimatums
XVII: Hamburg and Ultimatums
Siege of Hamburg of 1686
Siege of Hamburg of 1686
Even though Buda had been besieged for 75 days and Sari Suleyman Pasha’s army was defeated more than two weeks before the city fell, the news of Buda was still considered remarkable at Versailles. No matter much progress the Imperial army made, the French never let go of their belief that the Buda would hold out just as it had done in 1684. The Imperial army was weak, ill-organized, and poorly led. Charles of Lorraine was stubbornly set in his own ways and knew not how to coordinate with his subordinates. Max Emanuel was a young prince with all the brashness and foolhardiness which that entailed. Ludwig of Baden received higher marks but was still described as vain, more vain than he had the right to be. The soldiers under them were even worse. Their equipment was a disappointment, their logistics a nightmare, and their training lacking. This was not an army capable of conquering the central bastion of Hungary. Buda would hold on until the fall. At that point, the French expected disease and weather to wipe out the Imperial army. When instead, the French learned that Buda had fallen before the end of August they were uncertain on how to react. For a moment some wondered if the inefficient and incompetent Austrian army had successfully reinvented itself since its embarrassing setback at Esztergom in 1685. Could the Austrians have become a military machine worth fearing? How did this all bode for France’s own security? Might the Germans finally muster the strength to challenge the army of France?
The worried thoughts of Versailles did not last long. Letters from the front arrived shortly after the initial news of Buda’s fall. Two French military observers, Charles de Caradas, Marquis Du Heron, and Claude Louis Hector, Marquis de Villars, were embedded in the Imperial army as Bavarian officers and they produced their own versions of events for the Second Siege of Buda. The two Frenchmen described the Austrians as having won despite themselves and because of the Brandenburger and Bavarian armies. They reminded their king that the great victory over the Grand Vizier had been won by Max Emanuel of Bavaria while Charles of Lorraine had gotten distracted by a smaller wing of the Ottoman army. Throughout the siege, the Bavarians had been the ones who had operated in the thick of the operations and achieved the most success. The Saxon involvement in the Bavarian army received no notice or recognition from either Heron or Villars. Ultimately, when the rest of the Imperial army contributed, it was Brandenburg rather than Austria who Heron and Villars credited as overcoming the Esztergom Rondella. This fit with Louis XIV and his war minister, Louvois’ own notions about the Imperial army. The Brandenburgers were regarded highly and the Bavarians were earning a reputable name for themselves. The main question was what to make of the French-educated Max Emanuel. Was he a gallant fop who was carried to victory by his subordinates or was he was dangerous commander who deserved the respect and attention of France?
The negative perception of the Austrian military was emphasized by the leading French diplomats in the region. France’s new ambassador to Vienna, Andre de Betoulat, Comte de la Vauguyon, highlighted the heavy casualties suffered by the Imperial army and assured his superiors in France that the Imperial army would not be following up on their victory at Buda anytime soon. The campaign had reduced the Austrian treasury to shambles and just as the Austrians had difficulties putting together their 1686 campaign so too would they have difficulties putting together a 1687 campaign. Any further Imperial success would be achieved solely on the backs of the Electoral troops. Vauguyon’s report received heavy scrutiny in Versailles. Vauguyon was often slow in producing his reports, which still did not provide him enough time to avoid numerous inaccuracies. Louis Verjus, Comte de Crecy, the ambassador to the Imperial Diet at Regensburg often had to correct Vauguyon. Just earlier that year, Vauguyon had assured Versailles that the tolls of winter would make rebuilding the Imperial infantry an impossibility. Yet in August that Imperial infantry had broken through the gates of Buda. Despite Vauguyon’s obvious overstatement of Austrian issues, the theme of Austrian inadequacy was echoed by Verjus who gave special attention to the commendable actions of the soldiers of Cologne. Verjus pressed Louis XIV and Louvois to maintain the French friendship with Cologne for this reason. Finally, France’s lead agent in Constantinople, Pierre Girardin described the poor state of the Ottoman military and the preexisting questions of Sari Suleyman Pasha’s ability to handle the Imperial army. Girardin’s letter cemented a picture of Buda’s fall being the result of anything but Austria’s strength.
Each of these reports served to assuage the fears of Louis XIV that the Imperial army was far from becoming a formidable and capable opponent. Both the king and Louvois carried on in their belief that the Imperial army was slow, weak, and incapable of matching the larger and better French army. At the same time, the favorable reports of Brandenburg’s military strengthened Louis XIV’s interest in retaining the Brandenburger alliance which had become extremely fraught over the past year. Brandenburger’s revived relationship with the Dutch Republic, its contribution to the Hungarian campaign, and its suspected affiliation with the Augsburg League were all affronts to the dignity of the Franco-Brandenburger alliance. Yet with these reports keeping Brandenburg’s army in France’s sphere became a priority. The same reports of Bavaria’s prowess convinced Louis XIV that if Brandenburg was truly drifting out of his sphere the French-educated Maximilian Emanuel could be the ideal replacement. Still, the predominant thought in Louis XIV’s mind was the concern that in a few years' time that Emperor Leopold’s army would have the experience, discipline, and numbers to threaten French security. Emperor Leopold seemed to only be growing stronger with Buda now added to his realm. With Imre Thokoly wearing chains and the Hungarians tiring of their Muslim overlords, Emperor Leopold could soon command an army of thousands of Hungarians. Even if Louis XIV did not think highly of the rough and rowdy Hungarians, he understood that there was strength itself in numbers. Louvois was less concerned about Austria’s future strength but still believed the time to strike was close at hand. Better to destroy Austria while it was entangled in the east than to wage a longer and more complicated war against an undistracted Austria in the future.
In response to Louis XIV’s growing but inconsistent concern with Emperor Leopold, he issued a demand to the Emperor and the Imperial Diet for negotiations to begin on the basis of turning the Truce of Regensburg into a permanent peace settlement by the end of March 1687. This demand came at a critical time for Emperor Leopold who was trying to organize another campaign against the Ottomans to push them back further and thus secure Hungary as an Austrian crown. If the French attacked then Emperor Leopold would surely have to recall his army from the east and possibly open up Buda to a counterattack. However, Emperor Leopold could not bring himself to accept the demands of Louis XIV and refused to negotiate. At the same time, Pope Innocent XI recognized the inability of the rest of the Holy League to push onward without the Imperial army drawing the focus of the Ottomans. If the Imperials turned back then the small Venetian army in Morea or the struggling Polish army in Podolia would be beset by reinforced Ottoman armies that they doubtless could not handle. This eastern war had become the principle policy of Innocent XI’s papacy. Hundreds of thousands of ducats from around Europe were being funneled into the war by Innocent XI’s church. He wanted to bring Christendom back to Hungary and the Balkans and he could not afford for Louis XIV to ruin that.
Friedrich Wilhelm of Brandenburg recognized that for the time being, the Holy Roman Empire was entirely incapable of combating a French invasion. Too many soldiers were in the east, too many princes remained in French pay, and too few preparations for war had been made. Friedrich Wilhelm expected that if Emperor Leopold did not give Louis XIV something the Empire would be thrown into a war that it would not win. Thus, both Pope Innocent XI and Friedrich Wilhelm tried to pressure Emperor Leopold into changing his mind. Friedrich Wilhelm went so far as to decline to return his soldiers to the Hungarian front. Instead, Friedrich Wilhelm argued that France was the greater threat and his army should remain in Germany to provide for the safety of the Protestant faith. Ultimately, Pope Innocent XI resolved the crisis by personally vouching that Emperor Leopold would adhere to the Truce of Regensburg no matter what the outcome of the Turkish war was. Louis XIV was content with the Pope’s promise and the withdrawal of Brandenburger soldiers from the Imperial army. The first gave Louis XIV an important political weapon against Emperor Leopold and the latter took away one of Emperor Leopold’s finest weapons in the Ottoman war. Based on everything Louis XIV had heard and read, the Imperials would not get much done without the Brandenburgers, and if Leopold defied the Pope then the endless stream of Papal money might be cut off so that Austria would have to face the financial repercussions for its reckless war in the east. In the meantime, France strengthened its own hold over the disputed territories by building forts at Huningen and Giesenheim.
Louis XIV’s mind remained unsettled because this temporary hold in the Rhine coincided with a dismal failure for French policy in the Baltic. While France had supported Sweden during the Scanian War and ensured that Sweden escaped the war without any loss of territory, King Karl XI showed little gratitude at all for France’s services. In response, Louis XIV had first allied with Brandenburg, a common foe of Sweden, and then in 1682, made France a partner of Denmark-Norway, Sweden’s traditional antagonist. With these two powers in hand, Louis XIV expected to keep the Baltic and Northern Germany in line with French interests. However, both Brandenburg and Denmark-Norway had interests of their own. The two longed for a war of revenge against Sweden, one which France had little desire to support. France’s enemies lay in Vienna, not Stockholm. Another Baltic war would leave Northern Germany free from fear of retaliation for consorting with the Emperor. So France refused to provide the support that Brandenburg and Denmark-Norway so desperately wanted. Although Brandenburg still tried to imagine ways to fight Sweden in Germany even without French support, Denmark-Norway’s trans-Baltic objectives did not afford it the same opportunity. The Scanian War had taught Denmark-Norway the difficulty of managing a long campaign across the Sound. Despite initial resounding victories, Denmark-Norway could not maintain the momentum of its campaign and ultimately found itself unable to fully reconquer Scania. Relegated to just holding Landskrona, Denmark-Norway was incapable of winning back Scania at the peace tables. Ultimately, Denmark-Norway gained nothing for all the lives it lost and all the money it spent. So if Louis XIV was determined to deny Denmark-Norway a Baltic war then King Christian V of Denmark-Norway would turn his attentions south, toward Germany, just as Louis XIV desired.
First, in 1683, Christian V demanded that Christian Albrecht, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf, give up his sovereignty and turn himself into a satellite of Denmark-Norway. Naturally, the duke refused. But the very next year, Christian V showed that whether Christian Albrecht was married to Christian V’s sister or not that Christian V would have his way. The Danes occupied all of Schleswig-Gottorf and sent Christian Albrecht into exile in Hamburg. Then in 1685, the Danes occupied the rest of the Gottorf lands, in Holstein. Even though France did not actively assist in these Danish conquests, the French alliance certainly helped ward against Swedish or German intervention in the illegal occupation of Gottorf lands. Yet this easy conquest was insufficient for Christian V. Schleswig-Holstein-Gottorf barely compared to the expanse of Scania. Christian V wanted more but still Louis XIV denied him a Swedish war. So once more Christian V focused his eyes to the south and zoned in on Hamburg. In 1679, directly after making peace with Sweden, Christian V ordered an attack on Hamburg to bring the city back under the possession of the Danish-held Duchy of Holstein, which Christian V believed to be the proper overlord of the Hanseatic city. Yet with pressure from France persisting, the Danes had to walk away after accepting a payoff of 220,000 thalers and a promise that Danish homage claims would be reviewed. In 1686, Christian V hoped to accomplish much more with France at his back.
The root of Christian V’s return to Hamburg was Hamburg’s own internal issues. Starting in 1683, the recurrent intra-political warfare between the high-born and oppressive senate and the popular citizen’s movement escalated and introduced chaos and turmoil into the city. The citizens gained a new rallying point with the Committee of Thirties and its leaders, Cord Jastram and Hieronymus Snitger. The more coherent and organized citizen’s movement was able to orchestrate the removal and expulsion of city councilman after city councilman under finally the aristocratic mayor of Hamburg, Heinrich Meurer, was forced to flee. In his place, the more acceptable Johann Sluter was appointed. However, Meurer’s flight was not one into retirement. Instead, Meurer had gone to Georg Wilhelm, Prince of Celle, and through him begged for Emperor Leopold’s assistance. Emperor Leopold answered Meurer's call affirmatively. Since the Emperor’s resources were dedicated to Hungary and the Emperor’s favorite prince in the region, Ernest August, Prince of Calenburg, had sent his men to fight for Venice, Emperor Leopold tasked Georg Wilhelm with restoring order to Hamburg. Celle’s army moved out in January 1686 and defeated the Hamburger grenadiers on the doorsteps of Hamburg. However, the small contingent of Luneburgers found it difficult to conquer the whole city and by April they had retreated to just one, albeit a strategically import one, suburb, Moorwerder. The aggression of Celle resulted in Jastram and Snitger making a desperate appeal to Denmark-Norway for relief. Invited by Hamburg and going to war with one of the disciples of the Emperor, Christian V expected to receive France’s full support. But despite France being a formal ally of Denmark-Norway in 1686 unlike 1679, the message from France remained the same. Louis XIV refused to sanction a Danish attack on Hamburg. France could see Germany organizing itself against it and France needed to preserve its strength until it was ready to strike. Louis XIV advised caution and patience to Christian V. He would have to wait to fight and in the meantime, Louis XIV suggested turning toward diplomacy to resolve the matter.
Louis XIV’s advisements were viewed like poison by the Danes. Already, the Danes had blocked the Elbe and begun the assembly of an army in Holstein. Yet Louis XIV expected them to wait until France said otherwise. Christian V could hardly imagine passing up the golden opportunity presented to him. Hamburg was calling for a Danish intervention, how could he say no? Still, Christian V hesitated. The last attack on Hamburg had not conquered the city, and what if Sweden attack Denmark-Norway while it was distracted? Just as Christian V hesitated, the most unexpected letter arrived from Stockholm. Rather than threatening to intervene or demanding compensation for staying aloft, Karl XI strongly encouraged Christian V to attack Hamburg. Karl XI’s motivations were simple. The Swedish army and navy were still in need of rebuilding after the Scanian War and so long as the Danish-Norwegian army remained preoccupied Sweden could rebuild without fear of imminent war. Whatever the Swedish reasons, this encouragement was all Christian V needed to push forward with his Hamburg campaign. In August 1686, Christian V arrived at Altona and from there sent an ultimatum to Hamburg. Firstly, the city would perform hereditary homage to Denmark-Norway. Secondly, a single payment of 400,000 thalers would be due to Denmark-Norway from Hamburg. Finally, Hamburg would welcome 2,000 to 3,000 Danish soldiers for its own protection. If any of these terms were refused then the Hanseatic City of Hamburg would be leveled by Danish cannons before being overrun by Danish infantry.
When the city council failed to answer Denmark-Norway’s demands in a timely fashion, the king’s half-brother, Ulrich Friedrich Gyldenlove, led an army of 16,000 men toward Hamburg. As promised, the Danes opened their siege with a massive and unrelenting bombardment of Hamburg. This Danish attack immediately resulted in a shift in Hamburg's sentiments. No longer were Celle and the Emperor the enemy. Instead, Denmark-Norway was the oppressor that needed to be stopped and so pro-Danish politicians, Jastram and Snitger, were arrested and a more pro-Imperial government was formed. With the pro-Danish leaders in shackles, the Hamburgers made clear their determined resistance to Christian V’s ambitions, and the Danes dug in for a siege. Over the first week, the Danes did significant damage to Hamburg’s defenders but failed to break through the city’s defenses. Meanwhile, Swedes within Hamburg organized the city’s counter-bombardment of Altona, which resulted in widespread destruction of the latter town. A brief armistice was agreed as a result. During that time, Christian V called up a further 2,000 Danes to replenish his besieging army. However, the failure of the Danes to completely cut off Hamburg meant that the city found 8,000 reinforcements from Celle and Brandenburg. Thus, the defense of Hamburg swelled to 20,000 men in total while the siege numbered just 18,000. To add to matters, another 6,000 Brandenburgers were on their way. After just two weeks, Christian V was already reconsidering the feasibility of his siege. The numbers at the moment did not favor an assault and if Christian V waited any longer then in all likelihood his army would be mauled by a considerable counterattack. With France still holding out from providing any help, the only option left to Christian V was to give up and retreat. Less than three weeks after the siege of Hamburg had begun, the Danish army completed its full withdrawal from Hamburg.
To avoid a war breaking out, a negotiated settlement became the preferred conclusion to the Hamburg episode. In light of Denmark-Norway’s military failure, Emperor Leopold, Sweden, and Spain wanted to force a punitive outcome. Naturally, Emperor Leopold wanted to punish Denmark-Norway for its transgression against the Imperial Free City of Hamburg, a status that Denmark-Norway had refused to recognize for centuries. Spain still saw itself as an important power despite its horrific half-century and thought of negotiations around Hamburg as a way to remind its European colleagues of Spain’s strength. Sweden revealed its true colors as an enemy rather than a friend of Denmark-Norway who had simply been baiting Denmark-Norway into a trap. Even France showed favorability to Hamburg while Brandenburg was seeking to reconcile Denmark-Norway. France wanted to assuage the fears of Germany ahead of any Franco-Austrian war while Brandenburg wanted to explore the possibility of extricating Denmark-Norway from its French partnership. Ultimately, Denmark-Norway chose Hesse-Kassel and Electoral Saxony as neutral mediators with France and Brandenburg respectively supporting the interests of Denmark-Norway and Hamburg. England was excluded from the mediation on the principle of its new alliance with Spain despite Prince George of Denmark being the son-in-law of James II. No one quite understood where England stood anymore.
Gottorf Castle, stolen from the Gottorfs by Christian V, was ironically the seat of negotiations. Hamburg was reluctant to accept Gottorf as the mediation venue and also shied away from accepting the principle of compensation payments due to Denmark-Norway. However, Brandenburg’s eagerness for peace and reconciliation meant that Hamburg was forced to give way. Ultimately, France showed its worth as an ally when it proposed that Hamburg paid the 400,000 thalers that Christian V had demanded. This sum was reduced by 100,000 thalers for the damages caused by the Danish army during the siege, but the Danish claim of homage was again going to undergo legal examination. All in all, this agreement was surprisingly generous to Denmark-Norway given its military failures. As a result, Christian V granted both Elector Johann Georg III and his second son, Friedrich August, the Order of the Elephant as Christian V viewed them as responsible for the favorable conclusion. Even if negotiations for Hamburg ended in Christian V’s favor, the conflict allowed for the issue of Schleswig-Holstein to be revived. Even though Sweden, Celle, and Emperor Leopold were excluded from the Hamburg mediation, they began to vigorously discuss the issue of Schleswig-Holstein and the Gottorf exile. Although France and Brandenburg avoided involving that issue with the Hamburg mediation, it became clear that Schleswig-Holstein would also be something that Christian V would have to negotiate over.
Denmark-Norway’s unwanted attack and subsequent bungling of the siege of Hamburg hurt French strategic positioning. Denmark-Norway discredited itself by failing to take Hamburg and also Denmark-Norway brought Hamburg, Celle, and Brandenburg together. This both weakened French-aligned interests in the region and promoted German unity. Furthermore, by putting Brandenburg at odds with itself, Denmark-Norway disrupted the alliance system that France had built in the Baltic. For two French allies to squabble was detrimental to French power projection. Still, Brandenburg’s willingness to negotiate gave Louis XIV hope that Brandenburg still remained a friend of France. Meanwhile, the easy exclusion of Emperor Leopold, Spain, and Sweden from the Hamburg mediation served as evidence of Emperor Leopold’s continued distraction in Hungary, Spain’s unending military weakness, and Sweden’s unwillingness to act alone. The fact that the Dutch Republic had stayed entirely out of the Hamburg mess made Louis XIV think that bribes and interference in the Staten-Generaal were still keeping the Dutch from becoming an active and immediate threat to France. Louis XIV still believed that war with Emperor Leopold, William van Oranje, and the rest of Europe was inevitable. However, with the episode in Hamburg, Louis XIV also believed that his enemies remained unready for that war. But the episode also served to remind Louis XIV that he and his allies were not ready yet either. Denmark-Norway’s military had been completely ineffective and the French army was not ready to support Denmark-Norway. Louis XIV both felt as if he had the time and as if he needed the time to plan a meticulous war that would knock the German army out so quickly that it would have no choice but to accept the permanence of the Regensburg. The peace promised by Pope Innocent XI only reinforced Louis XIV’s belief in having time and enabled his patience to quietly plan a war. While Louvois organized supplies and planned further campaigns, Vauban worked on developing French fortifications along the periphery, and Marquis de Seignelay added to the navy’s size. Louis XIV himself began to speculate on ways he could break apart the League of Augsburg so that he might isolate Emperor Leopold and William van Oranje to face the weight of France’s military on their own.
