The Space(lab) Race

Apollo 11/S

On the 7th June, NASA launches Spacelab 2 on one of its large Saturn III rockets. All goes well until the S-IVA’s second engine burn, which is intended to raise the perigee of the Lab. The two-burn profile was known to be slightly more risky, but followed a more efficient path needed to launch this heavier second Lab into a high 380km orbit. At apogee, the stage's J-2 engine refuses to start and the Lab adn its booster are left in a 175x381km orbit. There is no trigger to separate the Lab from the stage and this is eventually done by ground command. After separation, the Lab seems to deploy its new upper experiment mount but the solar arrays fail to generate any power; the manual separation command did not trigger the right sequence to deploy the arrays. A small amount of power is generated by the upper array; enough to power the station’s control system but little else. NASA seems to be left with a crippled space station in a fast decaying orbit. The bulky body of the Lab causes a lot of drag even in the extremely thin atmosphere at 175km. On each orbit, the apogee of the Lab drops by nearly 3km. That rate will only increase and it will re-enter within 3 days.

NASA program directors advise the leadership that the loss of Spacelab 2 represents a six month setback to the Orbital Lab program. A backup vehicle which was used to test assembly techniques can replace the lost Lab and could be ready to fly before the end of the year. Of greater concern is the Saturn III rocket used to launch it.
Besides the problems with the J-2 re-ignition, ground tests have revealed flaws in the brazing process used in the construction of the giant F-1 engines fitted to the next rocket. Microscopic and X-Ray inspections of hundreds of joints on each engine will need to be conducted before they attempt to fly again, and the discovery of this flaw casts doubt on the strategy of using the F-1 engine as the basis for Space Shuttle booster designs.

When asked if NASA is in a position to respond to the Soviet and possible European lunar flights, the NASA administrator advises that the Saturn III may not be ready to fly again before the autumn and will then be used to launch Spacelab 2B. Testing and preparation for a manned launch would take a further 6 months, meaning that a US spacecraft cannot be launched towards the Moon before the summer of 1971. Subject to additional funding for a more capable service module for Apollo, this flight could enter lunar orbit, something neither the Soviets nor Selene will have done.

While these discussions are going on, a group of dedicated engineers at the Manned Space Flight Center have not given up on Spacelab 2. Early the following morning, they propose an audacious scheme; to launch Apollo 11/S the next day, and use it to attempt to rescue the Lab. The flight was originally scheduled to go up on the 8th with the Lab’s first crew, so launch preparations are almost complete and are only overshadowed by the problem with the S-IVA (a stage common to both Saturn III and IA rockets). Meanwhile, controllers at Marshall have re-orientated the Lab from its sun-fixed attitude to a minimum-drag attitude, reducing the rate of apogee decay to nearer 1.5km/orbit and buying a little more time. By the afternoon, telemetry from the Saturn III’s S-IVA has been analysed. It is clear that the engine failed to start, likely due to an igniter fault. More importantly, what didn’t happen was any sort of fire, explosion or anything that might damage the stage or harm a crew.

An Apollo CSM should be able to dock with the Lab and use its thrusters to raise the orbit. If this is not possible, the crew will be in no particular danger (other than the usual hazards of spaceflight) and can complete an alternative Earth orbit mission. Preparations for countdown on the Saturn 1A have been kept in hand and at 16:30EST, authorisation is given to make the attempt. Spacelab 2 is now in a 176x325km orbit. A normal countdown sequence takes 8 hours, plus planned holds. Controllers say they could do it in 6 hours, but are sharply overruled; after 48 hours of intense activity, rushing a launch would be a bad idea and besides, support and recovery ships need time to return to their stations.

At 0622 on the 9th June, Apollo 11/S heads into space, with the launch timed to allow an attempt at a fast rendezvous. By 0929, the CSM is station keeping with the lab. By happy chance, the crew of Apollo 11/S includes Dr Edwin Aldrin, an astronaut who pioneered some of the fast rendezvous techniques that are used to intercept the lab in just two orbits. Aldrin then pilots the CSM around the station, while Commander Tom Stafford and Mission Specialist Dave Scott keep a close lookout for any damage. As suspected, the Lab’s main solar arrays are still folded but the docking port is clear. By the time the inspection is complete, Spacelab is in a 175x302km orbit.

To the relief and cheers of staff in Mission Control, 11/S latches on at 1022 and the hard dock latches engage four minutes later. Unlike a normal space station flight, where they would open the hatches and move into their new orbital home, the crew stay in their Command Module while parameters for the vital orbit raising burns are checked and relayed to them. The burns must be done near apogee and they have to wait as the station skims the atmosphere once more. An hour later, they are back at 298km and fire their four rearward-facing RCS jets for over 5 minutes, raising the station’s perigee to 200km. One orbit later, they fire the thrusters again, pushing the orbit’s low point up to 212km. No more can be done, they have burned up half of their total RCS fuel supply in these two manoeuvres. The Apollo’s big main engine has far greater reserves available, but neither the CSM nor the Lab’s hatch are designed to withstand that much thrust.

Nevertheless, they have succeeded in slowing the Lab’s fall. Orbital decay is now measured to be less than 1km per day; they have bought enough time for the original primary mission of Apollo 11/S.

Their first task is to deploy the solar arrays; without these the mission will still have to be abandoned. Fortunately they are not stuck, the deployment mechanism was simply never triggered. The following day the crew are able to enter the cold, dark Lab to apply power to a particular circuit in order to release them. They then retreat to the relative comfort of their Apollo while the arrays charge the batteries overnight. It takes a couple of days for the Lab to warm up fully (it was a decidedly chilly 35F when they first entered) and the air is allowed to circulate through the filters for a day before they take up permanent residence in the main body of the station.

Although their Earth observation mission has to be curtailed due to the orbit’s different ground track, it leaves more time to use the solar telescope and test several more domestic innovations such as the station’s fan oven and an experimental recycling unit. As they will be the only crew ever to visit the station (it is likely to burn up within a few weeks of their leaving), consumables are not in short supply and the opportunity is taken to use up some of the excess water and gas reserves. The crew are able to enjoy hot (well, warmish anyway) showers every day instead of twice a week using a sealed concertina-like tube with a fan to extract the water droplets at one end. Three additional spacewalks are made to test new EVA work techniques and to place and retrieve samples that are exposed to space conditions. With their original flight plan shot to pieces, both crew and ground controllers learn much more about how people might really be able to work in space; not everything can be carefully pre-planned, but there still have to be limits on what is done and when.

Some of these ad-hoc techniques work and some don’t. The “off-schedule” mission is a fascinating but exhausting adventure for all involved. The original mission was to have been eight weeks long, but by week 7 everyone is tired and the number of mistakes and disagreements is starting to increase.

Everyone at NASA has always supported the idea that every moment spent in space is precious; they have spent tens or hundreds of millions putting a crew up there, so every opportunity must be taken to return data or test new technologies. Spacelab 2 provides the first hints that this may not be the right approach on long duration flights; no matter how exciting the work, people need time off. With some of the flight controllers stood down, and the crew not sent any of the usual task lists or maintenance requests, the first “holiday in space” begins on Day 54. “Holiday” is perhaps an exaggeration, the time is still quite busy for the crew, who take the opportunity to run a couple of experiments of their own, take hundreds of unscheduled pictures of the Earth and take part in a relatively unscripted live TV interview and broadcast showing the more “everyday” aspects of living in space.

Starting on Day 56 the crew begin a two-week extended mission, during which they are able to make up some of the ground observations that were lost due to the lower orbit. After 69 days on board the lab, they board their CSM, undock and start the journey home, splashing down east of the Bahamas on the 18th August. They have spent 70 days, 3 hours and 18 minutes in space, shattering all previous endurance records.

Spacelab 2 lasts a few weeks longer, but finally meets its much delayed end on September 17th. A mission that looked like a total failure barely an hour after launch had delivered three months of results, thanks to the quick thinking of NASA’s flight planners and the first class training of its controllers and crews. Primarily for US domestic consumption, NASA publicity surrounding the flight emphasises a new message:
Other nations may be exploring deep into space, but Americans are already learning to live there.
 
Jul-70
FA-7
Black Anvil test flight from Rainbow Beach. At 352s a jolt is seen in the telemetry and long-range cameras show a puff of gas on the starboard side of the core. Sensors show Methane tank pressure is dropping at about 0.6bar per minute, while the tank pressurisation valve is fully open. The pressure drops until the end of powered flight at 413s. However, the missile reaches its programmed cut off velocity and deploys the RVGC as planned. It is known that several RVs impacted in the target area.

The new British government is briefed on the current state of Blue Streak and Black Anvil systems. There are currently only 31 operational Blue Streak missiles, with one more scheduled for use in a training flight in August. Black Anvil is on target to achieve an “emergency operational capability” later in the year, with 6 missiles stationed at the Christmas Island A site. Further silos at this and other sites are under construction and will be phased into operation during 1971-4.

The new government indicates that it will continue the existing policy that Selene requirements must not be allowed to interfere with the Black Anvil programme. Black Anvil and space programme requirements will start to clash in mid-1972, with a shortage of booster cores once 3-core "Constellation" launches are started.
The previous administration was ambivalent to the Selene-backed BAC solution of developing reusable booster cores. The programme is regarded as too risky and would show no payback on the cost over 20-30 flights. A plan to sell or licence the technology to the USA now seems unlikely to happen, following recent announcements by the American government.

Jul-70 Overseas
The White House advises NASA that the President wishes to be able to make a clear commitment to a "new" space project by the end of the summer.
After a considerable amount of internal negotiation and lobbying, the preferred Shuttle design has evolved towards a concept originally proposed by Martin-Marietta and Douglas, with the F-1 booster engines replaced by large solid rockets. Using improved “Titan” booster designs would offer commonality with existing Air Force operations and allow the deployment of a larger shuttle-derived expendable booster at a later date; an option which several agencies wish to have available, independently of NASA operations.
NASA will build and operate the Space Shuttle and conduct a significant program of robotic lunar and planetary exploration. Air Force "Titan" and "Atlas" rockets could be replaced with a new launcher based on the same engines and solid boosters as the Space Shuttle. Economic studies concur that the use of existing pads, engines and other infrastructure is the most practical way to make the Shuttle financially viable.

The Soviets announce that their Luna 14 robotic spacecraft has landed on the Moon. No pictures are ever published, although signals are detected for several days.
[Years later it is established that this was a failed attempt at sample return and that the spacecraft probably tipped over on landing.]


Jul-70
The Ministry of Technology and BAC confirm that additional booster cores could be produce in time to avoid any significant delays to either Black Anvil or Selene.
Improvements in production techniques mean that the firm could deliver 17 boosters in 1971 and 18 in 1972 (up from a planned 14 per year) subject to the Ministry authorising them to proceed. MinTech recommend that production be accelerated to avoid costly delays to Selene, while the MoD are also seeking to provide a buffer of spare cores for the Black Anvil programme.


Aug-70
Rolls-Royce engineers confirm that the performance of the Orion engine can be improved. Efforts to make the engine more reliable (with re-use in mind) have led to improved operational margins, some of which could be degraded to allow improved performance rather than a longer engine life.
A development engine on the test stand at Spadeadam has completed a set of full duration firings, delivering an average sea level thrust of 357,500lbf with a 3s improvement in sea level specific impulse. The firm is authorised to incorporate the changes into future engines for delivery from the middle of 1972.

Constellation Launch Vehicle Test Article No.1 is assembled on Pad 7 at Rainbow Beach. This is not a flight-capable rocket (it doesn’t even have real engines), but it is a full size model of the Constellation launcher, with weights and dimensions exactly like the real thing. The model will be used to finalise the setup of the pad and the support tower that will provide fuel, power and other supplies to the rocket.
Unlike their American and Russian contemporaries, Constellation rockets will be erected at the pad using a system of cranes, guide lines, interface jigs and buffers to assemble the huge components together inside a protective structure. The "Assembly Tower" will be rolled away once the rocket is complete, leaving it firmly attached to the launch pad and support tower.

Flight managers confirm to the Selene Board that the Aurora 7 flight will need to be postponed by four weeks. Delays in installing navigation equipment and changes to the PROM computer software mean that the spacecraft will not be ready before early September. For the lunar farside to be adequately illuminated, the launch cannot then happen before the 24th.


OTR-25
Blue Streak test and training flight from Benbecula. Also carries a charged particle experiment in a side pod. Range: 1627mi, impact 1,850' from target point


Explorateur 8
SSLV-13 launches the last flight of the Explorateur lunar lander programme.
The Silver Star launcher puts the probe into a nominal trajectory towards the Moon. Shortly after probe separation, ground controllers discover that the main cruise stage guidance system timer has failed. The analogue backup unit will have to be used, meaning more ground commands will have to be sent to compensate for the reduced capabilities of this system. The first course correction manoeuvre is delayed to allow controllers time to simulate the use of the backup controls. A second correction is made at T+60:17 and a lunar orbit of 88x623km is achieved, modified on the third orbit to 88x78km. At T+83:27, while behind the Moon, a thruster burn is made to put the spacecraft into its landing orbit of 89x12.5km.
On previous flights, controllers have targeted this "landing orbit" to descend to within 15km of the surface and have accepted anything up to 17km to avoid any chance of the probe crashing into poorly mapped lunar mountains.
Improved mapping and tracking techniques now allow this orbit to be lowered to near 10km. The change will help to reduce the amount of fuel the lander will use during the descent.

Once the cruise stage is gone, controllers can use the probe's on board guidance system. This is a much more sophisticated digital unit and will control the landing burn and final descent. The solid rocket motor’s 56s burn knocks the probe out of orbit, leaving it at 10.2km altitude, heading towards the surface at 104m/s, with a 21m/s horizontal velocity. Radar lock is achieved as it falls past 8,900m.
This time, everything runs almost perfectly, the lander stops its lateral movement by the time it reaches 4km and touches down at just 1.6m/s, 2 minutes 52 seconds after the end of the braking burn. 112s of fuel remain on board. Touchdown occurred about 3,300m southwest of the planned landing point.
A TV camera is deployed shortly after touchdown and the first lines of an image are transmitted 80s later. This mission carries a wider range of instruments than on earlier flights, and a robotic arm is used to measure soil properties such as conductivity and texture before placing an Alpha particle spectrometer on a nearby rock to measure its elemental composition.
The lander operates on the surface for 16 days, long enough to record the sharp drop in temperature once the sun sets. A solar powered transponder mounted on board remains operational over 9 lunar days, to May 1971. Scientists on Earth use radio telescopes and this transponder to measure the Moon's orbit with far greater accuracy than has been possible without access to a fixed surface reference.


Japan's Ministry of Communications agrees to order a Mk.2 Hermes TV relay satellite from Hawker Siddeley. The contract calls for the spacecraft to be launched by the end of 1973 on a Silver Star rocket. The £37M order is regarded as a breakthrough by both the firm and the British government, who have been promoting the sale of Britain’s space technology around the world. In the face of fierce commercial competition from the US, the Japanese have insisted on the delivery of an operational satellite to geostationary orbit; meaning that the launch must succeed for HSD to be paid in full.


Sep-70
Following experience on previous flights and advice from NASA, both main and backup crews for Selene 1 enter a pre-flight medical isolation. Several Selene and NASA crews have experienced cold or flu like symptoms during their first few days in orbit and it is hoped to avoid this by limiting the number of people in contact with the crew before the flight.

In one of its last acts before becoming the Department for Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Technology gives BAC the go ahead to produce Black Anvil cores "at the maximum rate that is compatible with existing facilities and Ministry quality control requirements". In practice, this means that BAC will attempt to produce 17 missiles in 1971 and 18 every year thereafter. The development of the booster recovery system is to be halted immediately.
Three cores per year will be built as special strengthened versions for use as the central core on Constellation launchers. The agreement to increase Black Anvil production is a double-edged sword for the Selene Project. The extra production means that there will be no shortage of boosters during testing and in the run up to the lunar landing in 1973 or 74. However, production of only 3 "special" cores per year means that subsequent landings will occur at a maximum rate of once every 8 months.

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The Constellation Launch Vehicle family​

The 1970 Farnborough Airshow features a full size mockup of a Constellation Launch Vehicle, set on its side to allow the public to walk around it. A real CLV could not be transported to Farnborough, so this wood and sheet metal model was built on site, although the display does include several real Orion booster engines. A flypast by a Princess flying boat with a genuine Silver Star core on its back is made on the Saturday.

BAC engineers are authorised to brief the Selene Project about the anomaly on a recent Black Anvil missile test flight. A replacement roll control unit had been fitted shortly before the flight and it is suspected that the chamber of one of the small engines exploded. Debris punctured the lower Methane tank of the missile, resulting in a leak of pressurising gas. The damage was sufficiently small that the missile structure remained intact and the fuel supply to the main engine was not affected.
It is suspected that the unit was damaged during installation on the pad, however future missiles (including Silver Star launchers) will incorporate a lightweight honeycomb armour sheet between the thruster units and the tank.
There are complaints from Selene personnel, as their SSLV-13 flight had been allowed to fly without any reference to this failure. BAC merely advise the issue was not serious and that future Silver Stars are cleared to fly. In practice, they were prevented from discussing it due to the secrecy surrounding the missile tests. There is now a degree of separation between the military Black Anvil and the civil Silver Star and Selene test programmes, ever since the tests moved on to the Top Secret Re-entry Vehicle Guidance Carrier, rather than just the missile core.

Booster S-131 and PROM 109 are moved out to the pad at Rainbow Beach. Pre-flight tests will take until the 22th, when an extended 48 hour countdown will begin. There are launch opportunities on the 24th, 25th and 26th.

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The Last Roar of Empire

Selene 1​

Commander William Randall and Navigator Henri Poincare blast off into a bright morning from Rainbow Beach. Their ship, the “Discovery”, is a fully fuelled PROM mounted on a stripped down VDL-A. This structure is a far cry from the complex landers that will follow, it is a simple framework which only carries the weight of the PROM and the 9.2 tons of fuel it will need to reach the Moon.

Despite a slight underperformance from the Silver Star’s "cherry picked" core engine, the spacecraft is released into the planned 183x185km Earth orbit. Unlike previous missions, the crew waste no time separating their PROM from the spent booster and inert VDL-A.

An intensive period of checks and systems tests occupies much of their first day in orbit. Just over eight hours after liftoff, Cdr Randall gives the go ahead to fire the PROM's main engine for the first time, both to verify its performance and raise their orbit to 183x825km. The crew's first "night" in space begins at T+09:30. During this time, ground controllers monitor the performance of the PROM for any hint of any problems before committing to the next phase of the flight. The crew re-establish contact at T+17:29 (they had been awake for some time and were ahead of schedule with breakfast), before performing the last tests on their mission checklist. Commander Randall signs off by radio at T+19:55:00, and the Aurora 7 mission comes to an end.

At T+19:55:05 the new mission begins, with the words "Hello Biscay, this is Selene One" broadcast by Cdr Randall. The flight plan starts with preparations for Translunar Injection (TLI). Two orbits later, at T+22:58:45, the main engine is fired for 334s to boost the PROM onto a course towards the Moon. Six and a half hours out, a correction is made using the RCS thrusters to refine the trajectory, nudging the ship’s orbit to pass slightly higher above the Moon’s surface so that lunar gravity will slingshot the ship back towards the thin band of Earth’s atmosphere. The course is now judged to be sufficiently precise that ground controllers are certain that any additional corrections can be made using the PROM's thrusters rather than having to rely on the main engine.

At T+43:25, Randall and Poincare make their first live TV broadcast from an altitude of 183,000km. Their 20 minute transmission is shown all over the world. It includes a [heavily scripted] interview with both crewmembers, but the show is stolen by the colour views of Earth taken through the PROM's windows. Almost fully illuminated, most of the daylight side can be seen, centred on the Pacific, with some of Asia and much of North America also visible.

A further trajectory refinement is made at T+53:45, the result announced as being "almost perfect" for the complete flight around the Moon and back to Earth. Mission day 4 is a shortened one, followed by a compressed sleep period to prepare the crew for the most important event of the flight; the lunar flyby.

At T+86:01, the crew of the Discovery are woken by Mission Control with the sound of Strauss' Blue Danube. Still over 30,000km out from the Moon, they can only see it partly illuminated; for them it will wax and wane during the course of this single day. Closest approach is scheduled to occur at T+92:32:22. The morning is occupied with navigation checks, partly as a continuation of earlier deep space navigation exercises, and as it is essential that they swing around behind the Moon very precisely. Correctly aligned and timed, lunar gravity will slingshot the PROM onto exactly the right trajectory back towards Earth. Stellar observations and ground tracking are completed by T+87:27, at which time they are still 24,000km from the lunar surface. Ground and crew are satisfied. Only the tiniest of corrections will be needed after the flyby.

The main lunar observation mission starts at T+88:00. They re-orientate the ship and start automatic cameras 45 minutes later, before deploying a micrometeoroid sensing experiment from the side of the PM. At T+90:30, they start their primary mission; a lunar surface navigation exercise. Although Randall and Poincare are only the second and third humans ever to reach this far out into space and see the far side of the Moon with their own eyes, they are not here to go sightseeing. For the astronauts and engineers of the Selene Project, the primary purpose of the flight is to find out how easy or difficult it is to identify lunar landmarks and navigate accurately using them as reference points. Smaller landmarks prove hard to locate amid the heavily cratered surface of the lunar farside, and the crew report that lighting conditions make a big difference; a feature that is clear on a map can be hard to see when illuminated from above. With no atmosphere to scatter the light, the Moon can appear very flat, while sharp contrasts between lit and shaded areas can be confusing to the eye.

Communication with Earth is lost at T+92:19 as Discovery passes behind the Moon and closest approach is at T+92:32 while the ship is still out of contact. Discovery falls to within 274km of the lunar surface, exactly as planned. Signals are reacquired at T+92:45 and a TV transmission is started eight minutes later, showing the lunar surface from about 900 miles up. With the navigation exercise over, the next two hours are spent taking targeted photographs of the surface before the ship flies too far from the Moon.

The primary mission ends at T+94:36, when Discovery climbs above 10,000km from the surface, after which navigation and systems checks are repeated by both spacecraft and ground. After an exciting day, at T+101:30 the crew settle down to watch the now crescent Moon recede from view. Little sleep is had that night.

The briefest of RCS burns at T+119:20 is all that is needed to push the ship onto the correct path for re-entry in 2 days’ time, and rest of the long fall back to Earth passes smoothly. Two short TV transmissions are made on the way home, the first showing views of the part-illuminated Earth from an altitude of nearly 200,000 miles, the second as the ship passes geostationary altitude, giving the folks back home much the same perspective as their TV relay and communications satellites.

Preparation for re-entry begins at the end of the second transmission. The PM is jettisoned at T+162:00 at an altitude of 860km and the crew feel the effects of the atmosphere pressing them back into their flight couches at T+162:06, when they are just under 100km up.

Deceleration peaks at a relatively gentle 6.38G as the capsule uses its lifting ability to briefly climb, having dived deep into the atmosphere. This technique is vital as it ensures that the ship makes a long, steady re-entry. If it had attempted to dive straight in, crew and capsule would have been flattened by loads of over 20G. Discovery's RM splashes down in the Indian Ocean, 6 days 18 hours and 27 minutes after liftoff, 21 miles from the primary recovery ship, HMAS Melbourne.

The Project’s first manned lunar mission is also the last time a crew flies on what is effectively an all-British spacecraft, launched on an all-British rocket from the territory of Britain’s closest Commonwealth ally.
Making the trip to the lunar surface will require the powerful new stages and spacecraft now being built in France.
 
Space is for Shuttles

On the 26th of September, at a stage managed event at Cape Canaveral, President Nixon announces that Grumman Aerospace have won the contract to build the Space Shuttle; a reusable spaceplane designed to fly into Earth orbit and back, to land “like a conventional airplane”. The event is timed to distract US attention from the Selene 1 flight, which is on course to fly by the Moon on the 28th.

Nixon and his administration know that the US retains a healthy lead in space technology, however this underlying strength has been overshadowed by the conspicuous Soviet success and the problems with Spacelab 2 earlier in the year. Although the partial rescue of the Lab was carefully publicised as a demonstration of NASA’s underlying flexibility and technical competence, there is no denying that, fundamentally, it was a partial failure.

Any attempt to compete directly with the Soviets and "go one better" by building a lunar base or launching a Mars mission would be costly and of little strategic value. Seeing Old Glory raised on the Martian surface might be a great demonstration of US power, but cheap and routine access to space would be a far greater near-term asset. It would also make those dreams of the Moon or Mars much cheaper and easier to accomplish.

The Space Shuttle program is aimed at keeping everybody reasonably happy - the contractors, NASA, the Air Force and voters in several key states. It will do this relatively cheaply in comparison with some other options and avoids the desire of many in NASA for a set of all new, cutting edge designs.

Tough negotiations over the summer have left Grumman in first place, with a derivative of their original design for an orbiter with separate external fuel tanks. Cost and engineering studies now favour solid rocket motors to boost the vehicle off the pad, before higher performance liquid Hydrogen fuelled engines carry it on to orbit. Politics as well as engineering has played a big role in the design of the Shuttle and the administration is keen to ensure the work is distributed across the nation. The Thiokol Corporation of Utah will be contracted to upgrade their Titan 3 solid rocket motors for use on the Shuttle. The external tank will be built by North American Rockwell in California, whose experience of building the Saturn III's LH2 fuelled second stage will be vital in producing this large, lightweight structure.

The Grumman-built orbiter will be fully reusable and powered by four improved Rocketdyne J-2 engines, versions of which are currently used to power the upper stages of Saturn rockets. The new J-2R will be more powerful and capable of being flown up to 10 times before replacement or refit.
The orbiter itself will be a delta winged glider, equipped with a 40'x12' payload bay. It will be able to carry up to eight crewmembers in a large pressurised cabin and payloads of up to 30,000lbs inside the bay. The shuttle system will replace the existing “Atlas” and “Delta” launchers, in addition to providing the ability to fly up to 24 manned flights per year (versus the 2 or 3 that NASA currently flies). Development is expected to take 5 years, at a cost of $3.8 billion.

The boosters, tank and engines used by the shuttle will also be used to build the USAF’s "Pegasus" heavy launch vehicle. Versions of this expendable rocket will be capable of lifting payloads between 35-100,000lbs into low Earth orbit and will ultimately replace the “Titan” vehicles currently in use. NASA will have also be able to use the rocket in order to launch spacecraft that will not fit in the shuttle's payload bay.

Following the Shuttle announcement, a series of details are resolved behind the scenes.
By mutual agreement, NASA's “lunar focussed” administrator Thomas Paine will step down to be replaced by someone who is more sympathetic to the Space Shuttle concept.

While the Shuttle is being developed, NASA is tasked with making progress towards its other major goal; that of a permanent space station. Two additional Orbital Labs will be launched over the next three years. The second of these will be a new two-module design, equipped to receive resupply flights by Shuttle later in the decade.

The Labs will be sent up using Saturn III launchers, of which there are 6 remaining following the shutdown of the production line in 1969. Four of these will fly in support of the Orbital Lab programme and a fifth will send a pair of robotic landers to Mars in 1973. The remaining Apollo spacecraft will be used to send crews to the labs in the period through to 1975. Saturn launch facilities will then be converted to support Space Shuttle flights.
Finally, NASA’s robotic program is not overlooked, and authorisation is given for the development of a series of unmanned landers and rovers which will reach the Moon in 1974 and 75.


[A Retrospective View]-
Documents and evidence that have become available since the 70s show that Nixon’s administration was more in favour of the Apollo lunar programme than many observers have suggested. However, the rising tide of environmental and social campaigning and the need for fiscal restraint combined to restrict the funds available for big technology programs. A lot of political capital had been expended in defending the Boeing 7227 SST against a concerted effort to cancel it. That “high tech” program had been attacked in Congress and was the subject of a series of protests claiming it would cause earthquakes, hurricanes, irreparable damage to the atmosphere and all the stuff that environmentalists usually go on about.*

After such a fight, there would be no free lunches for other high-tech programs. The Administration wanted to see results, rather than be exasperated by NASA's continued delays, or requests for ridiculously high levels of funding to pursue a wide variety of ill-defined projects. If they allowed NASA to continue without making any changes, they were at risk of taking the blame for the failure of the under-funded and over-ambitious lunar program that NASA had embarked on under President Johnson. To be fair to Johnson, he had consistently requested more funds for NASA, but his budget proposals were repeatedly cut back by Congress.

In the early 60s, NASA had been working towards meeting a series of goals; long duration flight, the Orbital Labs, circumlunar flights, then a lunar landing. This steady, progressive program was interrupted by the reallocation of the Air Force's X-20 spaceplane to NASA. This decision would ultimately alter the entire course of the US space program; preventing NASA from reaching the Moon, while developing many of the technologies needed to build the Shuttle.

Between 1963 and 1968, the XS-20 program cost the agency nearly $2Bn, eating up the funds available for development of a lunar lander. Budget cuts in the final years of the 60s then limited the rate of development while the hardware for the Orbital Labs and the Saturn III launchers was being built. Subsequent problems with the Saturn III meant there was little money available for anything beyond lab-scale tests and paper studies. By the autumn of 1969, NASA still did not have a fully reviewed design for a lunar lander.

At this point, the new administration felt that a new program would help to clear away all of the mess and perhaps allow credit to be claimed as and when it succeeded. In the summer of 1970 (it is hard to define an exact time in the many evolving discussions), many of the “lunar enthusiasts” within NASA accepted that both the Soviets and the Europeans might beat the US to the Moon, even if NASA embarked on an expensive all-out program. The administration calculated that entering and loosing a “race to the Moon” could look worse than not trying at all.

The final Shuttle decision also killed one of the better known “might-have-been” projects of the 60s/70s space programme. In 1968 and ‘69, BAC studies into booster reuse had developed from a plan to recover the outer cores of a Constellation rocket, on to building a new, fully reusable vehicle. Eliminating the upper stage and re-designing the centre core to incorporate a heatshield would allow it to survive the plunge back through the atmosphere. The firm believed such a system should be able to put 25t into orbit, while costing “only” £150-200M to develop and as little as £1M per flight. However, even these sums were not available from the cash-strapped British government.
In 1969, a solution seemed to come from Lockheed; the firm wanted to fit a reusable Shuttle (of their own design) in between two reusable BAC booster cores. Although it raised hopes in Britain, the design never stood a chance in the US, where Lockheed’s questionable costing methods and use of foreign rockets came in for heavy criticism.

There has been endless debate in the years since over whether BAC’s 3-core reusable rocket would have worked. The general consensus is that it could have been made to work, but probably only after an extensive redesign of the booster cores; it wasn’t just a question of adding some heat shields and thrusters to a Silver Star core. However, the design was simpler and would probably have been cheaper than the Shuttle that NASA eventually built. Maybe it could have given the UK a totally dominant position in the space launch industry and kick-started the commercial exploitation of space…
… we shall never know.

Some say “if only we hadn’t spent all the money on Selene, we could have done that instead…”, however they are missing the point. If Selene had never existed, Britain might not even have built Silver Star, let alone any sort of reusable rocket.


*to misquote Douglas Adams. Bonus points to anyone who knows what his next sentence was; it certainly fits in with a few of the events of 1970.
 
that very good Shuttle a variant of Saturn Shuttle, i had not imagine

Fuel tank based on S-II, four to six Titan III booster and orbiter

would look something like this ?

shuttle-titan.jpg
 
*to misquote Douglas Adams. Bonus points to anyone who knows what his next sentence was; it certainly fits in with a few of the events of 1970.

However a representative of Disaster Area met with the environmentalists, and had them all shot
 
On the 26th of September, at a stage managed event at Cape Canaveral, President Nixon announces that Grumman Aerospace have won the contract to build the Space Shuttle; a reusable spaceplane designed to fly into Earth orbit and back, to land “like a conventional airplane”...
Now I am glad that earlier attempts of mine to comment on the evolving Shuttle program floundered, then foundered. It looks now like the design has largely converged on OTL's.

There is still a question lingering from earlier iterations; the matter of scale.

OTL, "Saturn Shuttle" was an early concept as well as here, but note that this TL's maximum Saturn has just 60 percent of the boost thrust of our Saturn V, and this seems to imply the designers of this TL have been thinking smaller. Was this the case, and if so, have various considerations led to a larger design? Will they converge on pretty much the same size as OTL, be constrained to a smaller one, or actually make it bigger?

Consider that in OTL, the STS system actually put about the same mass into orbit (or nearly so, bearing in mind the choice of boost trajectory was made to deliberately avoid the tank winding up in orbit) as the Saturn V could do. This seems amazing when we consider the 15-20 at most ton payload is dwarfed by what Saturn V routinely orbited--but after all not all of that was actual payload either. The Orbiter itself could mass over 100 tons all up all by itself, while the external tank, carried quite as far as the main engines could fire since it was their fuel source, massed another 30--say 140 tons all up once the main engines shut down, leaving the combined craft in a suborbital trajectory with enough energy to qualify for orbital, just the wrong eccentricity to be sustained. At which point the Orbiter would separate and fire its hypergolic orbital maneuvering rockets to stabilize its chosen orbit, leaving the tank to reenter the atmosphere at perigee and burn up. The Orbiter's mass upon achieving stable orbit is quite comparable to an Apollo mission Saturn V's combined Lunar stack (45 tons) and partially depleted Saturn third stage, some 55 tons of propellant plus 12 or so dry mass.

So--is this coincidence, or is this because the Orbiter's early design iterations assumed a Saturn V first stage to boost the tank/Orbiter combo off the pad, and because thrust sufficient to bear later iterations of the design off the pad would be in the same ballpark as a Saturn V, meaning that the program reused the old Apollo program equipment--VAB, crawler, and launch pads, therefore the size was constrained by that equipment--one could not aim for a much larger mass, while using a smaller one would seem like a waste considering the legacy capability lying around?

If it is not coincidence, then for this TL's Shuttle system to match ours in scale, they have to make a 70 percent upgrade of equipment meant to handle a Saturn III, or conversely the overall system has to be somewhat smaller to fit Saturn III legacy stuff.

I'm guessing it falls in the middle. IIRC, OTL Saturn Shuttle was going to use not 4 but 5 J-2S engines, so that implies 80 percent of an OTL Orbiter will emerge as the standard for a Shuttle here.

Tough negotiations over the summer have left Grumman in first place, with a derivative of their original design for an orbiter with separate external fuel tanks. Cost and engineering studies now favour solid rocket motors to boost the vehicle off the pad, before higher performance liquid Hydrogen fuelled engines carry it on to orbit. ...The Thiokol Corporation of Utah will be contracted to upgrade their Titan 3 solid rocket motors for use on the Shuttle.
Uh-oh!:eek:

But there is a lot that isn't said yet. A major thing to consider--the design is going ahead with a version of J-2, rather than developing a completely new SSME. One reason for the long delay of OTL developing the SSME is that the J-2 was designed to be air-fired, when a booster stage had already reached an altitude in near-vacuum, and the engine had extremely poor performance at sea level. (I am not sure if the J-2S addressed some of the issues already, as I recall a big problem of the J-2 original version for sea level was that it used a gas generator cycle and it was this gas generator/turbine combo that required vacuum external pressures to operate correctly, whereas the J-2S used chamber tap-off for the turbine driver and was less impacted. But the point is, the J-2 family was designed originally for operation in vacuum, not on the ground). OTL the decision had been made to fire the hydrogen burning engines at launch, in parallel with the solid boosters, and this, in combination with a desire for somewhat higher ISP as well as engines some 5/3 the thrust of J-2S, required the new engine design, which was challenging and much delayed in development.

If the design ITTL is sticking with J-2, it is possible they might be kludged to give some decent performance at sea level I suppose. Certainly there was a plan OTL to develop a plug-nozzle version of J-2 that surely would have had to work at sea level. But it is also suggestive that perhaps the notion of firing the main engines on the ground has not been adopted, and the hydrogen burners will not be lit until the booster stage has burned out--which would have been the case for Saturn Shuttle.

Air firing means a smaller tank for the Shuttle.

It also suggests alternatives to OTL for the stacking. Instead of being attached to the side of the tank, the solids might be grouped under the tank, making two vertical stages. Since it is envisioned that the Air Force will make a flexible cargo launch system with apparently variable numbers of J-2 based engines, instead of making 2 solids the standard for the manned Shuttle, it might be 4--a general rule of one solid per J-2 engine installed. So the manned Shuttle might be a stack of a smaller than OTL tank with the Orbiter riding side-saddle as OTL, but this on top of a cluster of 4 solids. These solids in turn might not have the same proportions as OTL, but be shorter and squatter.

Thus, if a Shuttle of TTL has a 4-engine Orbiter massing say 90 tons all up hanging from a 20-ton (dry) tank atop 4 solids, the smallest Air Force launcher would have a 5 ton dry tank atop a single solid, with a payload of 22.5 tons to orbit! (Or a bit less, if dropping the tank in atmosphere requires the 22.5 ton top load to include auxiliary third stage rockets, hypergol or solid, or conceivably a Centaur type with RL-10 engines and a big hydrogen-oxygen tank to send lighter loads up to geosynch or otherwise into deep space).

Note that this already exceeds the cargo capability of OTL's Shuttle--it is essentially a version of the Saturn IB, with a solid replacing the old ker-lox first stage.

The external tank will be built by North American Rockwell in California, whose experience of building the Saturn III's LH2 fuelled second stage will be vital in producing this large, lightweight structure.
In addition to developing the SSMEs, developing the ultra-light tankage was another pacing item OTL, but I gather it was ready long before the engines.
The Grumman-built orbiter will be fully reusable and powered by four improved Rocketdyne J-2 engines, versions of which are currently used to power the upper stages of Saturn rockets. The new J-2R will be more powerful and capable of being flown up to 10 times before replacement or refit.
25 percent more powerful? If so, the TTL Orbiter and tankage would be the same size as OTL.
10 reuses is less ambitious than the SSME's projected reuses. That's good, it means the engines can be ready sooner, especially if there is no attempt to light them on the ground. They should be simpler than SSMEs and lighter, with a superior thrust/weight ratio. And they might prove, in operation, to be reusable more than 10 times with some refurbishment of critical parts.
The orbiter itself will be a delta winged glider, equipped with a 40'x12' payload bay. It will be able to carry up to eight crewmembers in a large pressurised cabin and payloads of up to 30,000lbs inside the bay. The shuttle system will replace the existing “Atlas” and “Delta” launchers, in addition to providing the ability to fly up to 24 manned flights per year (versus the 2 or 3 that NASA currently flies). Development is expected to take 5 years, at a cost of $3.8 billion.
That's 13 tons payload, correct? Metric tons? And one more crew member than OTL.

24 flights a year is less ambitious, I think, than OTL's giddy hopes. But it is still overambitious. This Shuttle might be a bit more realistic in expectations than ours, but it is still being grossly oversold, I fear.

Along with the SSME's and the fuel tank, the third critical pacing item for STS of OTL was the thermal protection system for reentry. Is this TL's Shuttle going to develop thermal tiles similar to OTL, or will NASA's experience with the metal-shielded Dynasoar favor a more robust if heavier metal system? Or some other alternative entirely?
The boosters, tank and engines used by the shuttle will also be used to build the USAF’s "Pegasus" heavy launch vehicle. Versions of this expendable rocket will be capable of lifting payloads between 35-100,000lbs into low Earth orbit and will ultimately replace the “Titan” vehicles currently in use. NASA will have also be able to use the rocket in order to launch spacecraft that will not fit in the shuttle's payload bay. ...

Now--suppose that the plan ran backwards. Instead of there being a Shuttle program, with Pegasus being a spin-off and sop to the Air Force, the Air Force had conceived of Pegasus on their own. (Would they? Does it make sense to replace the legacy rockets with a new modular system of solids and J-2 powered upper stages? Why not continue to use the F-1 family of engines instead as well as the J-2? Oh well, just say they do).

And then someone noticed, the J-2 engines are kind of expensive and worth recovering. And rather than loading them into a single spaceplane, a system of recovering these engines, in a cluster or individually, from low orbit is developed instead. Give each engine its own recovery capsule, and then assemble launchers from these units. The engines return to Earth after one orbit (or several, if necessary to phase them to suitable ground recovery sites) and are retrieved to the launch assembly site within a day of launch, ready to be examined, refurbished and prepared for reuse immediately.

With such a system in place, a manned spaceplane can be perched on top of the stack, a la DynaSoar, as just another payload. The spaceplane need not be burdened with recovering the engines it needs to reach orbit--and once it does reach orbit, it has no need of those engines, whereas they are useful on the ground. The spaceplane can be much lighter for a given crew size, freeing up mass for equipment or down-mass.

And a very important difference from OTL would be, that realistic recovery options from an abort are much more feasible than for the 100 ton for 14 ton payload single Orbiter. OTL, the Orbiter could not even be expected to survive a ditching into water--but of course that meant that a launch abort of a Shuttle mission, each one sure to be carrying human crew, would either have to attempt a desperate turn-around (with no engine power to speak of!) back to its Florida launch base, or hope that nothing bad happens until they had enough momentum to reach Africa. This strikes me as insanely irresponsible. And after all, the odds that an Orbiter could separate far and fast enough from the unstoppably burning solids and the fuel tank were pretty grim. A much smaller spaceplane atop the stack instead of on its side ought to have better options, including escaping in the first place, and then surviving a crash-landing on the ocean.

Upon consideration, I believe the reason the OTL STS was such a white elephant was the misguided attempt to cram all sorts of diverse functions into one standard Orbiter. The engines had to be there, so did crew accommodations for up to 7 astronauts, and cargo then shoehorned in--no wonder the cargo wound up being less than 1/5 the overall mass put into orbit! There was little need in most cases for cargo to be shepherded into orbit or beyond by a human crew. Decoupling the missions, so that delivery of cargo to orbit and manned missions were separated, and the task of returning the engines to Earth also separated, would have allowed far greater performance, or alternatively much more economical launches of the given payload actually launched OTL.

Give Pegasus the ability to recover the J-2R engines, and Nixon's claim to have been investing wisely in a space future would be vindicated.
 
that very good Shuttle a variant of Saturn Shuttle, i had not imagine

Fuel tank based on S-II, four to six Titan III booster and orbiter

would look something like this ?

Along those lines, yes, except I only looked at two or four SRBs.
Its pretty much a miniature version of the real Shuttle, but with adapted 7 segment Titan motors and a quad of "J-2R" motors (essentially the real J-2S, re-engineered for longer life and with nozzle/Mixture Ratio tweaks) on the orbiter.
It's an attempt to make the whole thing cheaper to develop, and keep the USAF sweet with the promise of a new rocket "Pegasus" for their various large payloads. As things stand, they hope to use the same tankage to mount 2 to 4 J-2R engines to build the Pegasus; whether that comes off, we don't know yet.
It's a slightly less adventurous design than the real shuttle. They have more experience via the X-20 program, and (in my opinion) a better prime contractor, so they may pull it off.
 
Along those lines, yes, except I only looked at two or four SRBs.
Its pretty much a miniature version of the real Shuttle, but with adapted 7 segment Titan motors and a quad of "J-2R" motors (essentially the real J-2S, re-engineered for longer life and with nozzle/Mixture Ratio tweaks) on the orbiter.
It's an attempt to make the whole thing cheaper to develop, and keep the USAF sweet with the promise of a new rocket "Pegasus" for their various large payloads. As things stand, they hope to use the same tankage to mount 2 to 4 J-2R engines to build the Pegasus; whether that comes off, we don't know yet.
It's a slightly less adventurous design than the real shuttle. They have more experience via the X-20 program, and (in my opinion) a better prime contractor, so they may pull it off.

What is payload range of this Space Shuttle ?
must be smaller as OTL shuttle
OTL shuttle had two SRB with total thrust of 23600 kN.
But two titan III SRB give in total 10680 kN and four 21360 KN

rough estimate give around 37.5% to 75% Shuttle Payload with Titan III SRB and J-2R engines.
 
Now I am glad that earlier attempts of mine to comment on the evolving Shuttle program floundered, then foundered. It looks now like the design has largely converged on OTL's.

There is still a question lingering from earlier iterations; the matter of scale.

OTL, "Saturn Shuttle" was an early concept as well as here, but note that this TL's maximum Saturn has just 60 percent of the boost thrust of our Saturn V, and this seems to imply the designers of this TL have been thinking smaller. Was this the case, and if so, have various considerations led to a larger design? Will they converge on pretty much the same size as OTL, be constrained to a smaller one, or actually make it bigger?

-This shuttle is much smaller than the real one; in round figures about half the mass all around (although not everything scales).

Consider that in OTL, the STS system actually put about the same mass into orbit (or nearly so, bearing in mind the choice of boost trajectory was made to deliberately avoid the tank winding up in orbit) as the Saturn V could do. This seems amazing when we consider the 15-20 at most ton payload is dwarfed by what Saturn V routinely orbited--but after all not all of that was actual payload either. The Orbiter itself could mass over 100 tons all up all by itself, while the external tank, carried quite as far as the main engines could fire since it was their fuel source, massed another 30--say 140 tons all up once the main engines shut down, leaving the combined craft in a suborbital trajectory with enough energy to qualify for orbital, just the wrong eccentricity to be sustained. At which point the Orbiter would separate and fire its hypergolic orbital maneuvering rockets to stabilize its chosen orbit, leaving the tank to reenter the atmosphere at perigee and burn up. The Orbiter's mass upon achieving stable orbit is quite comparable to an Apollo mission Saturn V's combined Lunar stack (45 tons) and partially depleted Saturn third stage, some 55 tons of propellant plus 12 or so dry mass.

So--is this coincidence, or is this because the Orbiter's early design iterations assumed a Saturn V first stage to boost the tank/Orbiter combo off the pad, and because thrust sufficient to bear later iterations of the design off the pad would be in the same ballpark as a Saturn V, meaning that the program reused the old Apollo program equipment--VAB, crawler, and launch pads, therefore the size was constrained by that equipment--one could not aim for a much larger mass, while using a smaller one would seem like a waste considering the legacy capability lying around?

-For the real STS, they wanted a 65klb payload and designed around that. The “reuse” of Apollo equipment was a nice thing to be able to say, but the VAB was extensively re-purposed, the crawlerway was upgraded to cope with the extra weight and the pads were extensively rebuilt.
They’ll still have to do some of that in the story.

If it is not coincidence, then for this TL's Shuttle system to match ours in scale, they have to make a 70 percent upgrade of equipment meant to handle a Saturn III, or conversely the overall system has to be somewhat smaller to fit Saturn III legacy stuff.

I'm guessing it falls in the middle. IIRC, OTL Saturn Shuttle was going to use not 4 but 5 J-2S engines, so that implies 80 percent of an OTL Orbiter will emerge as the standard for a Shuttle here.


Uh-oh!:eek:

But there is a lot that isn't said yet. A major thing to consider--the design is going ahead with a version of J-2, rather than developing a completely new SSME. One reason for the long delay of OTL developing the SSME is that the J-2 was designed to be air-fired, when a booster stage had already reached an altitude in near-vacuum, and the engine had extremely poor performance at sea level. (I am not sure if the J-2S addressed some of the issues already, as I recall a big problem of the J-2 original version for sea level was that it used a gas generator cycle and it was this gas generator/turbine combo that required vacuum external pressures to operate correctly, whereas the J-2S used chamber tap-off for the turbine driver and was less impacted. But the point is, the J-2 family was designed originally for operation in vacuum, not on the ground). OTL the decision had been made to fire the hydrogen burning engines at launch, in parallel with the solid boosters, and this, in combination with a desire for somewhat higher ISP as well as engines some 5/3 the thrust of J-2S, required the new engine design, which was challenging and much delayed in development.

If the design ITTL is sticking with J-2, it is possible they might be kludged to give some decent performance at sea level I suppose. Certainly there was a plan OTL to develop a plug-nozzle version of J-2 that surely would have had to work at sea level. But it is also suggestive that perhaps the notion of firing the main engines on the ground has not been adopted, and the hydrogen burners will not be lit until the booster stage has burned out--which would have been the case for Saturn Shuttle.

Air firing means a smaller tank for the Shuttle.
-It’s a ground lit design. I’ve called it “J-2R”, because it’s a engine that never existed in reality - although there were a few similar proposals. It’s modelled on a J-2S, with an adapted nozzle and the ability to run at a higher mixture ratio (raising mass flow and chamber pressure). The real J-2S wouldn’t have been a bad sea-level engine, as the CC pressure was much higher than the original J-2 (about 1200psi vs 750 IIRC). Raise that a bit and shape the nozzle to ensure no flow separation and you would have an engine safe to start at sea level. Nowhere near as good as the SSME, but then it doesn’t need to be.

It also suggests alternatives to OTL for the stacking. Instead of being attached to the side of the tank, the solids might be grouped under the tank, making two vertical stages. Since it is envisioned that the Air Force will make a flexible cargo launch system with apparently variable numbers of J-2 based engines, instead of making 2 solids the standard for the manned Shuttle, it might be 4--a general rule of one solid per J-2 engine installed. So the manned Shuttle might be a stack of a smaller than OTL tank with the Orbiter riding side-saddle as OTL, but this on top of a cluster of 4 solids. These solids in turn might not have the same proportions as OTL, but be shorter and squatter.
-It’s still a parallel arrangement (Michael Van’s illustration above is about right, except for the number of SRBs).
I (briefly) looked at the numbers for two and four SRB versions of the idea. For a simple low-mass mission (e.g. space station crew rotation plus a few supplies), they should be able to get away with two. For a full 8 crew plus 30,000lb cargo, they would certainly want 4.
At that point, the line between the Shuttle and the smaller versions of the “Pegasus” concept I suggest is quite blurred.

Thus, if a Shuttle of TTL has a 4-engine Orbiter massing say 90 tons all up hanging from a 20-ton (dry) tank atop 4 solids, the smallest Air Force launcher would have a 5 ton dry tank atop a single solid, with a payload of 22.5 tons to orbit! (Or a bit less, if dropping the tank in atmosphere requires the 22.5 ton top load to include auxiliary third stage rockets, hypergol or solid, or conceivably a Centaur type with RL-10 engines and a big hydrogen-oxygen tank to send lighter loads up to geosynch or otherwise into deep space).

Note that this already exceeds the cargo capability of OTL's Shuttle--it is essentially a version of the Saturn IB, with a solid replacing the old ker-lox first stage.


In addition to developing the SSMEs, developing the ultra-light tankage was another pacing item OTL, but I gather it was ready long before the engines.

25 percent more powerful? If so, the TTL Orbiter and tankage would be the same size as OTL.
10 reuses is less ambitious than the SSME's projected reuses. That's good, it means the engines can be ready sooner, especially if there is no attempt to light them on the ground. They should be simpler than SSMEs and lighter, with a superior thrust/weight ratio. And they might prove, in operation, to be reusable more than 10 times with some refurbishment of critical parts.

-Yes. No “gold-plated” chambers, no high pressure LH2 pumps, no nasty start sequences. Much less stress at every point of the design. The original J-2 could have come close to meeting those requirements without any modification – they were over-engineered. The J-2S is less clear as it was a higher performance design, but in any case the job should be much easier than it was with the SSME.
That's 13 tons payload, correct? Metric tons? And one more crew member than OTL.

24 flights a year is less ambitious, I think, than OTL's giddy hopes. But it is still overambitious. This Shuttle might be a bit more realistic in expectations than ours, but it is still being grossly oversold, I fear.

Along with the SSME's and the fuel tank, the third critical pacing item for STS of OTL was the thermal protection system for reentry. Is this TL's Shuttle going to develop thermal tiles similar to OTL, or will NASA's experience with the metal-shielded Dynasoar favor a more robust if heavier metal system? Or some other alternative entirely?

-Any Shuttle that isn’t oversold isn’t going to get built. They had positively ridiculous thoughts of 50/year at the start, but that came down to 25 long before it flew. They carried 8 crew on a couple of flights.
The heatshield is where they have the big advantage in the story – far fewer fears/unknowns over hot structures, reusable heatshields and hypersonic flow over a winged glider. The silica tiles would still look good, but with a Titanium airframe fewer of them will be needed, and those that are will be thinner. RCC would still look good for the leading edges and nose – its much lighter than those exotic metal alloys.

Now--suppose that the plan ran backwards. Instead of there being a Shuttle program, with Pegasus being a spin-off and sop to the Air Force, the Air Force had conceived of Pegasus on their own. (Would they? Does it make sense to replace the legacy rockets with a new modular system of solids and J-2 powered upper stages? Why not continue to use the F-1 family of engines instead as well as the J-2? Oh well, just say they do).
-In the story, they’ve lost faith in the F-1. It’s a bit expensive and has suffered a couple of failures and build issues.
The AF were quite happy with “their” Titan – a view that is difficult to disagree with, there wasn’t much wrong with it.


And then someone noticed, the J-2 engines are kind of expensive and worth recovering. And rather than loading them into a single spaceplane, a system of recovering these engines, in a cluster or individually, from low orbit is developed instead. Give each engine its own recovery capsule, and then assemble launchers from these units. The engines return to Earth after one orbit (or several, if necessary to phase them to suitable ground recovery sites) and are retrieved to the launch assembly site within a day of launch, ready to be examined, refurbished and prepared for reuse immediately.

With such a system in place, a manned spaceplane can be perched on top of the stack, a la DynaSoar, as just another payload. The spaceplane need not be burdened with recovering the engines it needs to reach orbit--and once it does reach orbit, it has no need of those engines, whereas they are useful on the ground. The spaceplane can be much lighter for a given crew size, freeing up mass for equipment or down-mass.
- A giant X-20 / X-38? That sounds like the sort of thing the USAF will be wanting for the next 20 years.
And a very important difference from OTL would be, that realistic recovery options from an abort are much more feasible than for the 100 ton for 14 ton payload single Orbiter. OTL, the Orbiter could not even be expected to survive a ditching into water--but of course that meant that a launch abort of a Shuttle mission, each one sure to be carrying human crew, would either have to attempt a desperate turn-around (with no engine power to speak of!) back to its Florida launch base, or hope that nothing bad happens until they had enough momentum to reach Africa. This strikes me as insanely irresponsible. And after all, the odds that an Orbiter could separate far and fast enough from the unstoppably burning solids and the fuel tank were pretty grim. A much smaller spaceplane atop the stack instead of on its side ought to have better options, including escaping in the first place, and then surviving a crash-landing on the ocean.
-I think the ditching characteristics of any hypersonic glider and going to be pretty horrible – they’re bad enough for ordinary aircraft. All that stuff about “if the plane lands on water, the lifevest is under your seat" is, err … taking the optimistic view.
For low altitude aborts with the SRBs running, they would still need an escape motor to pull the crewed vehicle away.

Upon consideration, I believe the reason the OTL STS was such a white elephant was the misguided attempt to cram all sorts of diverse functions into one standard Orbiter. The engines had to be there, so did crew accommodations for up to 7 astronauts, and cargo then shoehorned in--no wonder the cargo wound up being less than 1/5 the overall mass put into orbit! There was little need in most cases for cargo to be shepherded into orbit or beyond by a human crew. Decoupling the missions, so that delivery of cargo to orbit and manned missions were separated, and the task of returning the engines to Earth also separated, would have allowed far greater performance, or alternatively much more economical launches of the given payload actually launched OTL.
-Yes, far too much was attempted and on too low a budget; but then, that was the only way to sell it, and even then, there was a lot of political convenience involved.
If I could make just one change to the real shuttle program, it would be calling it something like the “X-25 Spaceplane”, not the “Space Shuttle”. It was an experimental vehicle throughout its life, but was treated as “operational” on several occasions. If it had been treated as a development program – an X-25A, B, C etc.. they could still have flown most of the missions that they did fly, while never fooling anyone that it was a finished product. Perhaps then, something a bit more viable could have been built in the late 80s/early 90s.

Give Pegasus the ability to recover the J-2R engines, and Nixon's claim to have been investing wisely in a space future would be vindicated.
I don't disagree, however Pegasus is currently lower priority than the shuttle.
 
What is payload range of this Space Shuttle ?
must be smaller as OTL shuttle
OTL shuttle had two SRB with total thrust of 23600 kN.
But two titan III SRB give in total 10680 kN and four 21360 KN

rough estimate give around 37.5% to 75% Shuttle Payload with Titan III SRB and J-2R engines.

The design calls for a maximum of 30,000lbs payload in the bay, plus 8 crew and their supplies - that would certainly need 4 SRBs.
With a light payload it should be able to fly with only 2 (although whether it ever will is another question).
 
Behind the Scenes

Oct-70
The crew of Selene 1 are picked up by helicopter from the recovery ship and flown back to Europe. An open top parade through Paris on the 8th is concluded with a formal reception at the Elysee Palace. The next day, they are rather less publicly received in London, with a press conference, followed by a reception at Buckingham Palace. The astronauts then tour their home countries separately before departing on a world publicity tour.

Although British press and TV were granted good access to the crew of Selene 1 and there was extensive coverage in all the papers and TV channels, the British public reaction is one of dissatisfaction with the way the whole event was handled. Papers and TV stations receive huge numbers of letters and calls complaining that the crew were hardly seen in public. What many Brits wanted was to see and have the chance to meet “their” astronauts in person - not just watch them on TV or read about them.
The tour of the country by Commander Randall did do something to alleviate the sense of disappointment, but never quite made up for lack of public appearances immediately after they returned home.

Several significant changes to the design of the VDL-C are approved.
To save weight, the walls of the main Hydrogen tank will be made thinner and it will be pressurised to 3 bar, versus the 5 bar that will be used on the VDL-B. The heavy fuel cell power system will be replaced with Hydrogen fuelled versions of Rolls-Royce’s semi-closed cycle (SCC) generators, together with a load-levelling battery. Landing gear and internal structures have also been refined to reduce weight. The changes reduce the design’s dry mass at the cost of developing several new systems and increasing the mass of consumables that have to be loaded. Overall, the unfuelled vehicle will be about 350kg lighter than the previous design.

The elimination of the fuel cells means that the VDL will now have to carry a separate water supply for the crew (of about 115kg), however this weight is more than offset by the removal of the heavily insulated supercritical Hydrogen tanks, fuel cell radiators and the 3 cells themselves, each of which weighed nearly 100kg. Separate Oxygen tanks, which contain breathing gas for the crew are of course retained.

The SCC generators do not require the same ultra-pure reactants as fuel cells do and will therefore be able to tap their fuel directly from the VDL's main tanks. One advantage of this is that once the VDL reaches the surface, the generators can use up the pressurised gas that will be left in the tanks and pipes. This gas cannot be burned by the main rocket engine, it serves to pressurise the tanks and force the liquid fuels into the engine's pumps. Without the SCC, it would otherwise be wasted. Any unburned liquid fuel left in the tanks can also be used, potentially extending the operational life of the VDL, or increasing the amount of electrical power available to the crew when on the surface.
Another advantage is that during the flight to the Moon, the SCCs are able to burn the gas that boils off from the propellant tanks. Despite thick insulation and multi-layered reflective sheets, the extremely cold liquid Hydrogen is expected to boil away at a rate of about 125kg/day. With the fuel cell system this would just be vented, but it can now be pumped into the generators and put to use.
All of this helps with the weight reduction exercise and offsets that fact that the SCC generators are only 65% as efficient as the fuel cells would have been (they only produce about 1850Wh/kilo of fuel versus 2,800Wh/kg for the cells).


FA-8
Black Anvil test from Rainbow Beach. Details remain classified, but it is understood to have been a complete 8 RV test of the system, with target points to the East of Christmas Island.


The Nord Aviation division of the recently formed Aerospatiale delivers the first VDL-B spacecraft to SNES for transport to Rainbow Beach. This vehicle is the first of series of flightworthy prototypes that will be used to test the lunar lander in Earth orbit.
Until now, the VDL-A frame has merely been used to support the PROM during launch. The VDL-B development versions will carry many of the operational systems needed to allow them to fly and support a crew. This first vehicle has a pressurised crew module (the “habitat” or “Hab”), a complete electrical power system, control thrusters and a basic guidance system. It will be flown out to Australia on board a newly completed Aerospatiale "Giant Guppy" aircraft, a conversion of an old Boeing transport aircraft.

Nov-70 Overseas
NASA selects Martin Marietta to build a new series of robotic landers which will be sent to the Moon starting in 1974. Early versions will be static scientific stations, followed by mobile landers and finally a sample return system. Parts of the design are based on the firm's work on Mars landers, two of which are due for launch in 1973.


Nov-70
Selene Project and NASA officials meet in Paris to discuss the sharing of lunar science data. Although there was an agreement in 1965 to share some photography and radiation data, it was never fully implemented and both sides have images, tracking, engineering and other science data that would be of value in planning future missions.


Hermes 3
SSLV-14 launches the third British TV relay satellite. The launch was a success, however the upper stage shut down earlier than planned at apogee, leaving the satellite in a 28,602x35901km orbit instead of the planned near circular geostationary one. The on board thrusters are used to make up the deficit, roughly halving the fuel reserve left for orbital operations.
Hermes 3 itself had Gremlins in the works right from the beginning. The spacecraft had a tendency to lose its ground radio lock until transmitter patterns were subtly altered in 1971. On board electronics were prone to overheat, leading to the need to shut down or idle components at regular intervals.
The satellite operated with only one (of two) transponders from February 1972. Half of the power regulation circuits failed in May '73. Short of fuel and with a reduced capability, it was moved to a higher orbit and switched off in January 1974.


The Lockheed Tristar makes its first flight, powered by Rolls-Royce RB211 engines.
The aircraft and its engines are late, overweight and over budget and sales have been much slower than the rival DC-10. Delivery to customers is expected to start in 1972.


Nov-70 Overseas
NASA launches SA-307, a test flight to verify the performance of the Saturn III rocket.
The test is a complete success and clears the way for the remaining Saturns to be used in support of the Orbital Lab and other programs. Meanwhile, several facilities used in the construction of these huge rockets are being mothballed or converted to support the Space Shuttle program.


Dec-70
British Intelligence confirms that an N-1 rocket was recently launched from Baikonur. The test is known to have failed and the vehicle crashed about 20 miles from the pad.

Selene Project and NASA officials sign a memorandum of co-operation rather quietly in London. The intention is that each organisation will provide the other with support on a zero-cost basis. In practical terms, it cements information sharing agreements on lunar scientific data and will allow Selene astronauts to train in the US, in return for US instruments being carried on future Selene flights.

Dec-70 Overseas
NASA leaders meet with the Vice President, who emphasises the desire for "discrete co-operation" with the Selene Project. NASA will develop and build a wide range of experiments for Selene to deploy on the Moon, and American scientists will receive the data from these directly for their own use.
In return, technical assistance will be provided to the Selene Project. This will include training Selene astronauts in the US, access to US built telemetry equipment and NASA computer facilities. Several valuable American developments such as fuel cell regenerator systems and high performance insulation materials will be licenced for use on Selene flights. Although there will be no direct US funding for any part of Selene, the point is made that the US is prepared to trade services "on favourable terms".


Dec-70
Intelsat 4A-1
SSLV-15 launches the first of two British built satellites which are owned and operated by the US based International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation.
The design is based on the Hermes TV relay satellites, however these Intelsat versions are equipped to relay 16,000 telephone and 4 TV channels between large ground stations, rather than directly into people’s homes. Preparations for launch had continued during the investigation into the SSLV-14 upper stage failure. This concluded that a fuel leak in pipes leading to the J-650-100 engine led to the engine shutting down earlier than planned. Although investigation into the cause of this is ongoing, the SSLV-15 stage was re-tested and shown to be in good order.
Launch and transfer to geostationary orbit is as expected. Upon entry into service in February 1971, the spacecraft can carry almost as many telephone calls as all other Atlantic communications satellites put together. It operates until April 1977, when its manoeuvring fuel is depleted.


The Black Anvil missile enters service with the RAF. Two missiles are given interim operational status at a hardened shelter site on Christmas Island. A further six rockets will be commissioned over the next three months, to complete 254 Strategic Missile Squadron.

The first complete Constellation core booster and ECPS upper stage are erected on Pad 7 at Rainbow Beach. This test vehicle (called CLV-1c) does not include the two outer "wing" boosters. Plans call for it to fly without a payload in early 1971 to test the strengthened central core and the basic operation of the ECPS.
 

Archibald

Banned
Dec-70 Overseas
NASA leaders meet with the Vice President, who emphasises the desire for "discrete co-operation" with the Selene Project. NASA will develop and build a wide range of experiments for Selene to deploy on the Moon, and American scientists will receive the data from these directly for their own use.
In return, technical assistance will be provided to the Selene Project. This will include training Selene astronauts in the US, access to US built telemetry equipment and NASA computer facilities. Several valuable American developments such as fuel cell regenerator systems and high performance insulation materials will be licenced for use on Selene flights. Although there will be no direct US funding for any part of Selene, the point is made that the US is prepared to trade services "on favourable terms".

Good, OTL situation in reverse - Europe rules, NASA merely follow. ;)
 
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