The Schlieffen Plan

I have been doing some reading on the original Schlieffen Plan and I was wondering could it have worked? If Moltke had not modified the plan could it have worked, could victory over France had been realized? I have to assume that the move through the Netherlands would have been cancelled no matter what, but what if that was the only modification to the plan? Your views and opinions please!
 
I've always wondered what would have happened if the Germans at the fortifications had let the French slowly come into Germany. Apparently that was part of the original plan so the French funneled more troops on the "breakthrough" and weakened their forces for the main swing,
 

tenthring

Banned
I don't think taking Paris was possible in 1914, but I do think they could have done better in the Race to the Sea. There are several timelines on this.
 
I've always wondered what would have happened if the Germans at the fortifications had let the French slowly come into Germany. Apparently that was part of the original plan so the French funneled more troops on the "breakthrough" and weakened their forces for the main swing,

The French lost an estimated 300,000 troops in their initial attack. I am not sure how far the French would continue an advance after that costly of a "victory."
 
I don't think taking Paris was possible in 1914, but I do think they could have done better in the Race to the Sea. There are several timelines on this.

I have read several of these timelines. I have not read one where they achieved the anticipated quick victory. I wonder if it could be possible?
 
I don't think taking Paris was possible in 1914, but I do think they could have done better in the Race to the Sea. There are several timelines on this.

Can you point me to them? I've just read Marne without Moltke.

I have read several of these timelines. I have not read one where they achieved the anticipated quick victory. I wonder if it could be possible?

I think they weren't supposed to bloody the French that much, but the Generals wanted their "glory" and disobeyed orders to slowly give up ground.
 

tenthring

Banned
Even if the Germans could plug the whole that caused them to fall back at the Marne (through having some more troops from somewhere else) that's still probably not enough to actually push through. Paris is a pretty well defended position. How are they going to get through that? They can't really outflank it.

The way I see it the French already played August 1914 about as bad as they could possibly play it. It seems unfair to pile on even more mistakes.
 
I assume your "original Schlieffen Plan" is Schlieffen's memorandum from 1905/6. This memorandum "invented" (or added) troops that Germany didn't have in 1905/6 - and neither had in 1914. - So, using the memorandum as a war plan wouldn't have worked in 1905/6, and it wouldn't have worked in 1914.

Looking at the "Schlieffen Operation" - extend the right wing beyond the French left wing and roll them up in a continuous move to the south, always threatening their flank and rear - as prepared by the annual deployment plans: these operations were wargamed - and worked about half of the time. It all depended on the reaction of the "enemy".

And as 1914 showed, even an enemy initially willing to enter the trap was eventually able to counter the move. And the German commanders were as prone to blundering as their French and British counterparts.

So: with a lot of luck it could have worked, but the chances rather stood that it would fail in world were luck was distributed evenly.
 

Perkeo

Banned
IMO the Schlieffen Plan was bound to fail from the very beginning, because the whole reasoning behind it was utterly false:

1) There was no way to win the war in the west before Russia mobilizes for the eastern front

In 1870/71, it took Germany more than half a year to accomplish a ceasefire, and even then France was only defeated in the sense that they gave up hope to win the war. They were far from unable to continue to cause rouble while waiting for the cavalry, if there had been any cavalry to wait for.

So long as they are any free harbours in France OR Belgium, Britain can use them to send supplies and reinforcements and ensure that Germany is NOT able to sent any troops to the eastern front.

2) Germany WAS able to fight a prolonged war of attrition on two fronts.
OK, the Germans lost in the end, but only after four years and with extensive support from Britain AND the US. Just assume no British blockade, and France fighting alone after Brest-Litowsk.
 
The Schlieffen plan used 300,000 troops that the German army did not possess in 1906. Schlieffen assumed they would be provided but in fact the only increase in number was 135,000 so the plan was impossible from a manpower standpoint regardless of what Moltke did to it.

As it happened the plan fell over due to the physical over-exertion of the marching troops on the right wing. The First Army's route from the concentration point to their turn inwards of Paris was about 300 miles in about 2 weeks, a superhuman effort.

What's more Schlieffen paid absolutely no attention to logistics, which was another massive problem with the plan. As it happened in with 165,000 less troops than Schlieffen assumed and with the right wing thinned out the logistics were utterly inadequate in practice even though they went better than any logical assessment should have assumed.

In fact Moltke made the plan more practical; he avoided the need for troops to mask the Dutch army and allocated less troops for certain tasks although dropping from 5 to 2 Corps for Antwerp may have been too much. The problem was in execution, he should have transferred the troops he had to the right wing rather than sending them to the Eastern Front. This would not have allowed the Germans to take Paris, but it should have won them the Race to the Sea. A better arrangement would have been to organise a proper Army Group level of command for the two German wings to properly coordinate multiple armies engaged on a continuous front of hundreds of miles.
 

Perkeo

Banned
I've always wondered what would have happened if the Germans at the fortifications had let the French slowly come into Germany. Apparently that was part of the original plan so the French funneled more troops on the "breakthrough" and weakened their forces for the main swing,

In hindsight, a German victory seems to be nearly certain. The French army runs against the German barb wire and machine guns and as we know today the barb wire and machine guns win.

Without a proper casus belli, Britain will struggle to convince domestic and international opinion that the Germans are the bad guys, and the lack of the British naval blockade and expeditionary forces should more than compensate the added strength of a more intact France. And of course no rape of Belgium and (likely) no unrestricted submarine warfare means that the US doesn't come to save the day for the Entente and seal the doom of Germany.
 
The general opinions here fall in line with what I read. Logistics and marching distances are going to doom the plan. I tend to agree with that as well. I do wonder if following the original plan more closely would leave Germany in a position to win against France in 1915? Suppose the German Army was forced to halt during the Battle of the Marne, but lost little ground and was forced to halt more due to logistics than due to the success of French counterattacks. The French people will still have a victory, but the French generals will know their victory was due more to German exhaustion and logistics issues rather than battlefield success. The German generals will know this as well. How does this effect things going forward into 1915?
 

Perkeo

Banned
The general opinions here fall in line with what I read. Logistics and marching distances are going to doom the plan.

Especially since the end of the march is in Dunkirk. Taking Paris won't help.

I tend to agree with that as well. I do wonder if following the original plan more closely would leave Germany in a position to win against France in 1915? Suppose the German Army was forced to halt during the Battle of the Marne, but lost little ground and was forced to halt more due to logistics than due to the success of French counterattacks. The French people will still have a victory, but the French generals will know their victory was due more to German exhaustion and logistics issues rather than battlefield success. The German generals will know this as well. How does this effect things going forward into 1915?

I don't think that changes a lot.

Normally one could expect a decrease in the German generals' will to admit defeat, but that was already plain zero IOTL.
 
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