The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming!

Not sure. There's always the campaigns of the next year - the army that Burgoyne lead OTL.



Note, the following is posted as someone with a low opinion of Howe - the human element that may or may not break a perfectly good plan.

Howe had enough men to hold New Jersey OTL - Raul's force at Trenton for instance is nearly as large as the force Washington managed to attack it with (1,600 vs. 2,400 I believe). I do not doubt that the arrival of more men would help if he cares to use them vigorously, but that's in doubt.

Come spring, given how badly Howe handled the beginning of that campaign, and how irrelevant reinforcing Burgoyne was to his plans . . .

Also, a minor note and a question:

Note: Accodring to this,://militaryhistory.about.com/od/americanrevolution/p/American-Revolution-Battle-Of-Brandywine.htm Howe had 15,500 men at Brandywine OTL.

Question: Where is your source for the number of men in Newport and (implied) New York?

I'm not arguing with it, as I don't have a figure myself handy, just curious as the American Revolution has at times been one of my interests in terms of military history.

Howe was a decent tactician; he never lost a battle in that war. He also learned from his mistakes; after Bunker Hill he eschewed frontal attacks. As a strategist he came up short, failing to recognize that attacking Philadelphia would preclude supporting Burgoyne with an advance up the Hudson, for one example. As a subordinate general he would have been a fine commander, but as a commander-in-chief he was not up to the task.

Clinton had occupied Rhode Island in December 1776 with an original force of 9,000 men. Allowing for wastage there should be roughly 8,000 there in the spring of 1777, although that number is my estimate in this case.

Howe's original force in August 1776 numbered 32,000; this includes the troops later sent to Rhode Island. Assuming normal wastage (battle casualties were minimal) he would have 22,000 or so in the spring of 1777, again my estimate. He took 16,000 to Philadelphia, which accords well with your figure, leaving 6,000 or so to hold New York and cooperate with Burgoyne, which is clearly inadequate.

If we add to his force 18,000 Russians this gives him 40,000 in New York plus 8,000 in Rhode Island. If he sends 10,000 up the Hudson with Clinton to cooperate with Burgoyne and takes 20,000 to Philadelphia himself that still leaves 10,000 to hold New York, which should suffice.

By the time the Russians are being shipped from England (July/August 1776) the Rebels have been chased out of Canada and Carleton is poised to advance down the lakes toward Albany. Benedict Arnold's makeshift fleet managed to delay that until October, by which time it was too late to advance, but Burgoyne is ready to advance with 7,000 in the spring while St. Leger advances from the west with 2,000 at the same time. This is all OTL, BTW. The need for the Russians there is slight; furthermore they will be more useful with Howe and the difficulty of supplying them there will be lessened.

Add to Burgoyne's and St. Leger's forces 10,000 more coming up the Hudson and the Rebels are clearly going to have to scramble to hold Albany and preserve their communications with New England. The coming campaigns should be quite interesting. Does Washington abandon Philadelphia to hold Albany? Or does he trust Gates and Arnold to deal with the threats, perhaps sending them additional forces?
 
If France and spain aly with the Colonials, there could be some action around Oregon.

Unlikely; there's nothing going on there at the time worthy of their notice. A few trading posts, perhaps, which in the scheme of things would be totally irrelevant. If a British vessel was in the area her commander might amuse himself by evicting Spanish traders and burning their buildings, but that would be the extent of any activity in the area. The real interest didn't begin until the early 1800's.
 
Howe was a decent tactician; he never lost a battle in that war. He also learned from his mistakes; after Bunker Hill he eschewed frontal attacks. As a strategist he came up short, failing to recognize that attacking Philadelphia would preclude supporting Burgoyne with an advance up the Hudson, for one example. As a subordinate general he would have been a fine commander, but as a commander-in-chief he was not up to the task.

The problem is that he eschewed aggressiveness at the same time.

He may never have lost a battle, but his record of turning his battles into really threatening triumphs is poor - you can call that poor strategy, but pursuing an enemy to the death is not even long term stuff.

Clinton had occupied Rhode Island in December 1776 with an original force of 9,000 men. Allowing for wastage there should be roughly 8,000 there in the spring of 1777, although that number is my estimate in this case.

Where's that from, though? I'm not arguing with it, just trying to find out where your information is from so I can read it.

Howe's original force in August 1776 numbered 32,000; this includes the troops later sent to Rhode Island. Assuming normal wastage (battle casualties were minimal) he would have 22,000 or so in the spring of 1777, again my estimate. He took 16,000 to Philadelphia, which accords well with your figure, leaving 6,000 or so to hold New York and cooperate with Burgoyne, which is clearly inadequate.

That makes sense.

If we add to his force 18,000 Russians this gives him 40,000 in New York plus 8,000 in Rhode Island. If he sends 10,000 up the Hudson with Clinton to cooperate with Burgoyne and takes 20,000 to Philadelphia himself that still leaves 10,000 to hold New York, which should suffice.

By the time the Russians are being shipped from England (July/August 1776) the Rebels have been chased out of Canada and Carleton is poised to advance down the lakes toward Albany. Benedict Arnold's makeshift fleet managed to delay that until October, by which time it was too late to advance, but Burgoyne is ready to advance with 7,000 in the spring while St. Leger advances from the west with 2,000 at the same time. This is all OTL, BTW. The need for the Russians there is slight; furthermore they will be more useful with Howe and the difficulty of supplying them there will be lessened.

Given who wound up being outnumbered and outfought, I'd say the one needing it is definitely Burgoyne.

Add to Burgoyne's and St. Leger's forces 10,000 more coming up the Hudson and the Rebels are clearly going to have to scramble to hold Albany and preserve their communications with New England. The coming campaigns should be quite interesting. Does Washington abandon Philadelphia to hold Albany? Or does he trust Gates and Arnold to deal with the threats, perhaps sending them additional forces?

Given how things went OTL, I don't know how much scrambling is necessary - I don't know what's in the area Clinton would be pursuing, however.
 
The problem is that he eschewed aggressiveness at the same time.

He may never have lost a battle, but his record of turning his battles into really threatening triumphs is poor - you can call that poor strategy, but pursuing an enemy to the death is not even long term stuff.



Where's that from, though? I'm not arguing with it, just trying to find out where your information is from so I can read it.



That makes sense.



Given who wound up being outnumbered and outfought, I'd say the one needing it is definitely Burgoyne.



Given how things went OTL, I don't know how much scrambling is necessary - I don't know what's in the area Clinton would be pursuing, however.

Update: It seems the original force that occupied Newport, Rhode Island was 6,000, not 9,000; my mistake. The source is here:

http://books.google.com/books?id=xx...&q=british occupation of rhode island&f=false

Reports of the Battle of Rhode Island, which are in Wikipedia, list the British forces at 6,000, so the force's numbers seemed to have remained constant during the occupation.

6,000 instead of 8,000 means an extra 2,000 in New York, not much different than my original estimate.
 
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