The base map I use is from Hearts of Iron 4, which is set in World War II, so the borders are tailored towards that era. Paradox also made some... interesting decisions about where to put the borders (for example, New England was one state in the game, which I manually fixed in my base map, but I didn't want to bother with fixing all the ones elsewhere). I find it much easier to use a base map from grand strategy games than to draw all the borders from scratch.
The Russian Century - a TL
- Thread starter Onkel Willie
- Start date
AANW-level insanity from TTL's China, anyone? For context, AANW China is under the Cabal, a bunch of insane ultranationalists who want to kill all non-Chinese with biological weapons.
Why does it seems that Newfoundland and Labrador have the same colors as the Russian Empire?
The Russian Century - 1920I just realized that I forgot Portuguese Timor and some Indian Ocean islands. For that matter, I also accidentally swapped Dutch and Portuguese Timor. However, I think it's good enough to muster for now.
well if when Italy invaded Ethiopia, there is a chance that Yugoslavia could attack Italy possession in the Balkan and also maybe Russia could support both Ethiopia and Yugoslavia with their war against Italy
Italy probably realise that if it attacks to Ethiopia, Yugoslavia might make its move. So I guess that Italians will try deal with Yugoslavia firstly.
yes, but is it wise for the Italians to start another war in Europe, sure WW1 in this timeline isn't that destructive like what happened in OTL, but it's still an industrial war, and all of the participant probably wouldn't be happy for another war to start in Europe so soon,
I just used 1914 bases map. You can find them from AH Wiki resources page.
I hope too that OW isn't too discouraged to continue that due current events.
This time without NATO or Russian influence they should go full on non align.
Chapter XI: Rise of Russia and the Persian Crisis, 1920-1926.
Not to worry. I've had some things to do IRL like running for re-election to my city council seat. I present the next update nonetheless:
Chapter XI: Rise of Russia and the Persian Crisis, 1920-1926.
With the 1917 Russian Constitutional Reform, the last vestiges of Tsarist autocracy disappeared, completing the country’s transition to a constitutional monarchy. Russia was a democracy now, which didn’t conflict with renewed jingoism in the years to come as St. Petersburg had gained enough confidence by winning the war and expanding into China to embark on a more aggressive foreign policy.
In the long term this would mean the breakup of the Triple Entente as the unifying factor of a common enemy (Germany) was gone. At the time differences in imperial interests between the Russian Empire and the British Empire in particular were more powerful than whatever else, besides containment of Germany, they still had in common. In time, Russia even changed its position towards the German Empire: without Austria-Hungary as a junior partner anymore, Germany no longer backed interests in the Balkans opposed to Russia’s. As long as Germany didn’t covet Russian lands, it wasn’t quite the mortal threat anymore that it’d once been. France still considered Germany the primary threat to its security and furiously tried to convince their erstwhile Russian allies, but their efforts weren’t rewarded: Russia’s commitment to total isolation of Germany slowly eroded.
Meanwhile, starting in 1918, the economy rebounded as well after the difficulties caused by the Great War. The economy grew by 7% in 1918, 11% in 1919 and 13% in 1920. Growth rates in the double digits were no exception in the years that followed. Rapid industrialization continued, fuelled by exploiting more and more of the natural resources Russia was well endowed with: coal, oil, iron, copper, gold, silver, lead, zinc and manganese among others. The growth of heavy industry focusing on heavy machinery, large machine tools, big buildings and large scale infrastructure soared while coal and steel production became dominant sectors. The length of the railway network, which had stood at 64.000 kilometres in 1905, had reached 85.000 km by 1917 and grew to 115.000 km by 1925. Electricity production more than doubled from 2.9 billion to 6.2 billion kWh in the same period. Light industry more geared to the production of consumer goods also shot up as the burgeoning Russian middle class quickly grew in the 1920s.
The first event in the Anglo-Russian “breakup” concerned Iran. Iran had fallen prey to European imperialism, with the discovery of oil in 1908 in particular spawning intense interest and resulting in the establishment of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Control of Persia remained contested between the United Kingdom and Russia, in what became known as the Great Game, and codified in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which divided Iran into spheres of influence, regardless of her national sovereignty. Domestically, the Qajar Dynasty faced the Constitutional Revolution between 1905 and 1911, which resulted in a feeble constitutional monarchy.
During the Great War (1914-1916) the neighbouring Ottoman Empire eventually joined the Entente and for good measure occupied Iran’s West Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah and Ilam provinces where significant Kurdish minorities resided (Russia and Britain also occupied parts of the country). Ottoman forces didn’t leave after 1916 on the orders of the powerful Grand Vizier Mustafa Kemal Pasha, an officer with a heroic reputation who had rapidly ascended through the ranks and enjoyed the support of Sultan Mehmed VI. Kemal knew Iran could do little about it without foreign support and maintained the Ottoman presence just in case the Kurds ever decided to rise up.
The weak reigning monarch of Iran, Ahmad Shah Qajar, proved either unable or unwilling to do much about it, but he was cast aside in a bloodless military coup d’état by his bold war minister Colonel Reza Khan, commander of the Persian Cossack Brigade. Reza Khan would become Reza Shah Pahlavi and establish a new dynasty of Shahs. He established an authoritarian government that valued nationalism, militarism and secularism combined with strict censorship and state propaganda. Reza Shah introduced many socio-economic reforms, reorganizing the army, government administration, and finances. To his supporters, his reign brought “law and order, discipline, central authority, and modern amenities – schools, trains, buses, radios, cinemas, and telephones” while opponents criticized the new regime’s authoritarianism and corruption. Many of the new laws and regulations created resentment among devout Muslims and the clergy. For example, mosques were required to use chairs; most men were required to wear western clothing, including a hat with a brim; women were encouraged to discard the hijab; men and women were allowed to freely congregate, violating Islamic mixing of the sexes.
In 1925 Reza Khan assumed the title of Shah and the first order of business of his foreign policy was to remove a thorn in Iran’s side. He mobilized five divisions equipped and trained up to modern European standards (with Russian assistance) and moved them to staging areas adjacent to the provinces under de facto Ottoman occupation, starting in May 1925. The new Shah threatened war if Ottoman forces didn’t withdraw behind their own legal border again and return the subsequently vacated provinces to Iranian sovereignty. Kemal Pasha was confident in the effects of the national modernization program of the past eight years on the Ottoman armed forces and deployed an army twice the size of the Iranian force.
The affair took on an international dimension when Russia openly sided with Iran. The Russo-Persian Treaty of Mutual Defence was signed in Teheran as a countermove against the Ottomans in June 1925 and this was one of its stipulations: “[The two High Contracting Parties undertake:]To prohibit the formation or presence within their respective territories, of any organization or groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the Allies of Russia or Persia. They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or armies within their respective territories with the aforementioned object.” With the way this provision was formulated, Russia was practically bound to intervening on Iran’s behalf if the Ottomans didn’t withdraw.
This almost automatically led to British support for the Sublime Porte to prevent a war that could result in Russian control of the Turkish Straits (even during the height of their commitment in the Great War, Britain had never been very enthusiastic about future Russian control of the Bosporus). British forces were mobilized in India and deployed to the border with Iran in the region of Baluchistan, positioning to attack from the east in the event of war. The Royal Navy deployed in the Persian Gulf in numbers, enabling the capture of the major ports by a British invasion force and the invasion of the country from the south in the event of war. By the summer of 1925, the crisis led to a major war scare in the capitals of Europe.
Both France and Germany offered to mediate, but each with their own agendas. France wanted preserve the status quo of an Iran divided into two spheres of influence and defuse the situation by pressuring Constantinople into pulling its forces out of the disputed areas peacefully. Germany was sympathetic to breaking open the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention and a division into spheres of influence that’d award the entire Ottoman Empire to Britain and Iran to Russia. Some parts of the German proposal were enticing to Britain and Russia, but other parts objectionable: Russian control over the Bosporus would be prevented, to Britain’s liking and to Russia’s dismay; in return, however, Russia would receive a warm water port on the Persian Gulf, giving it access to the Indian Ocean, which Russia was sympathetic to while the British were opposed.
In the resulting Treaty of Baghdad signed in August 1925, the pre-1914 status quo was restored as the Ottomans withdrew after Anglo-French diplomatic pressure. The French rejoiced because it appeared that cooler heads had prevailed and that they had seen things their way, i.e. that continued diplomatic isolation of Germany and thereby peace in Europe were still top priority. In reality their diplomacy had not worked. French success in staving off war was a pyrrhic victory: Russia and Britain had only agreed to this because neither was willing to compromise as the Germans had proposed, irreparably damaging Anglo-Russian relations in the process. Nicholas II wrote a sternly worded letter to his British cousin George V that clarified that Russia didn’t take well to Britain choosing the side of the aggressor (the Ottomans) in their sphere of influence and explained this was a major breach of trust between London and St. Petersburg.
Germany had achieved what it had set out to do when it interfered in the Persian Crisis: creating a rupture in the Triple Entente. France was still allied to Britain as well as Russia, but the alliance between the latter two was effectively a dead letter. This implied that in a future conflict between Russia and Great Britain the French might be forced to choose one or the other and Germany would then simply choose the side of the remaining one. Germany wanted to regain what it’d lost in the last war, but wanted to avoid a two-front war they now knew they couldn’t win.
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Mmm I'm glad there is an update, but I'm not sure I like a British - Russian falling out. However, its consistent with the Cold War and British panic when someone even looked at India. However, I also have two critiques: In my opinion Germany gets a little to much forgiveness to easily and to me the Russians are a bit too willing to rock the boat. Why would they, when they have double digit growth. Perhaps a little more on e.g. Britain closing its markets because the Russian products disrupt them, which then leads to a road of conflict during the 20-ties, then leading to the Persian conflict?
ahmedali
Banned
I don't think Russia will support Iran against the Sublime Porte
Especially since Iran has much more problems with Russia than with the Ottomans
The era of the last two czars witnessed a significant improvement in relations between the Russians and the Ottomans
So I think that a Russian invasion of Iran or its division between the Ottomans, the Russians and the British could be a more satisfactory result for all.
Especially since Iran has much more problems with Russia than with the Ottomans
The era of the last two czars witnessed a significant improvement in relations between the Russians and the Ottomans
So I think that a Russian invasion of Iran or its division between the Ottomans, the Russians and the British could be a more satisfactory result for all.
Chapter XII: Anglo-Russian Split and Renewed Naval Rivalry, 1926-1933.
Sorry I left this on hiatus for so long, but I'm picking this up again. There have been some real life concerns.
After the Persian Crisis, German Emperor Wilhelm II wrote a long letter to his Russian cousin Tsar Nicholas II, whom he hadn’t seen or spoken since before the eruption of the Great War in 1914 (the state funeral of Edward VII to be exact). The letter explained that Germany’s interest didn’t conflict with those of Russia at all, while Great Britain’s often did and led to Russia caving and losing face for the sake of their alliance to the obviously unreliable French. After all, what had they ever done to help Russia gain a warm water port on the Bosporus? The French had done nothing to realize that goal in order to avoid offending the British so they could maintain an unnatural Anglo-French-Russian alliance to assist them in their petty anti-German feud, being sore losers over 1871. France fanning the flames of irrational and uncalled for Germanophobia and using deceit to get the support of other great powers had led to the war!
Things were set into motion over lingering tensions dating back years before the crisis in the Persian Crisis: in fact Anglo-Russian had slowly been deteriorating ever since the late 1910s as British tariff walls kept the Empire from importing from the growing Russian economy. Differing economic interests were eventually going to lead to a political breakup regardless of what had happened, it is believed by historians.
Germany by contrast had aspired to peace and had never opposed Russia in the Balkans (he trivialized Germany’s alliance to Austria-Hungary). Meanwhile, Wilhelm said, the expanding British Empire was obviously blocking Russian attempts to gain a place under the sun at every turn. He pointed out that, despite earlier agreements, Britain was obviously against a Russian Bosporus and was opposed to the alternative of a Russian port on the Indian Ocean too. Germany was willing to assist in return for being enabled to realize their dream of Mittelafrika (the concurrent and competing Prussian vision of Mitteleuropa as a pan-Germanist state-centric imperium encompassing large swathes of Central and Eastern Europe was quietly shelved).
Tsar Nicholas II’s response was that Russia and Germany could indeed help each other in achieving their goals and he announced a visit. In January 1926, the Imperial Yacht Standart left port with Tsar Nicholas II, his wife and his children onboard. This ship – with mahogany panelling, crystal chandeliers, stocks of caviar and champagne and a crew of 355 men – was a suitable floating palace for the Russian Imperial Family. With eight 47 mm (1.9 inch) guns, she was well-protected too. The ship arrived in Hamburg and from there the Tsar, his family and their retinue travelled to Bonn in a column of Mercedes Benzes. There they visited the modest country estate that the Tsar had called home during his days as a student and which had since become a Russian consulate. The Tsar met some of his old professors and a handful of acquaintances that he had kept in touch with from his days in the exclusive Corps Borussia Bonn.
Nicholas II and his following arrived in Berlin on January 26th 1926 on the pretence of attending the celebration of Wilhelm II’s 67th birthday the next day, but in reality important discussions concerning a potential Russo-German alliance took place. This was demonstrated by the fact that the Tsar and his family stayed as guests for three weeks at the New Palace in Potsdam, the Kaiser’s favourite residence, and the coming and going of diplomats in between lavish banquets and balls during that time. Needless to say, the French ambassador was on the verge of a nervous breakdown, but there was nothing he could do as he couldn’t match the German offer without jeopardizing good relations with Britain. The Russo-German rapprochement didn’t lead to an alliance just yet, but led to the 1926 Reinsurance Treaty (which is not to be confused with the one that ended in 1887). It stipulated that if Russia either tried to take the Bosporus or tried to realize an Indian Ocean port through force of arms, Germany wouldn’t oppose it. In return, Russia wouldn’t oppose a renewed German naval construction program.
Though officially a secret agreement, the major powers soon became aware of the 1926 Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia and that resulted in a flurry of diplomatic activity. France witnessed the Entente – that it’d established decades ago and that they were trying to maintain even after the war – unravel. France’s allies Russia and Britain were rivals again, a situation France desperately tried to undo. As one historian has described it, French foreign policy of the late twenties consisted of “trying to bring the band back together again.”
Russia had no qualms with France and responded that it was perfectly willing to maintain the original Dual Entente between the two, but at a price France that proved unwilling to pay. What Russia wanted in return proved a breaking point in the Élysée Palace, the residence of the President of France: a Russian precondition for maintaining the Entente was French support for Russia’s plans vis-à-vis the Bosporus despite British opposition (or at least not standing in the way of said plans). The French leadership realized that agreeing to this could potentially amount to winding up in a war against Britain alongside Germany and Russia. At the minimum it meant a break in Anglo-French relations and being manoeuvred into a de facto Russo-German-French alliance, which no-one in Paris wanted. France was perfectly willing to negotiate on Russia’s behalf with Whitehall, but that wasn’t enough to St. Petersburg: Russia formally abrogated its membership of the Entente in 1927 after 33 years. The Anglo-French Entente remained.
Tensions in Europe mounted further over German naval ambitions, which would be a violation of the Treaty of Versailles if Germany ever acted on them. Despite being limited to one third of the tonnage of the Royal Navy in terms of capital ships (defined at Versailles as battleships and battlecruisers), Wilhelm II made it no secret that Germany should still have a battle fleet capable of rivalling the Royal Navy.
After Britain retired its older dreadnoughts, it was left with four King George V-class, four Iron-Duke-class, five Queen Elizabeth-class, five Revenge-class and four Saint-class battleships as well as three Courageous class, four Admiral-class and four Invincible-class battlecruisers by the late 1920s. This amounted to a grand total of 22 dreadnought battleships and eleven battlecruisers (next to this they had one fleet carrier and two light carriers and a modest submarine fleet). The admiralty continued to uphold the two-power standard, which dictated that the Royal Navy should be larger than the next two navies combined.
No navy in the world came close: the world’s second navy, the US Navy, had ten battleships and six battlecruisers thanks to the 1916 Naval Act. A proposed second naval act for an additional twelve battleships and battlecruisers was not passed: Hughes, who defeated Wilson in the 1916 Presidential election, stated “the United States shall not become the world’s most militaristic nation during my presidency and will therefore refrain from an unnecessary ruinous arms race against a country with which we have cordial relations.” During the Hughes Administration (1917-1925) the US continued its isolationist foreign policy and this didn’t really change under his Democratic successor William Gibbs McAdoo (former Secretary of the Treasury, 1913-1917). Hughes eventually did authorize the more limited 1924 Naval Act for four new battleships and six new battlecruisers to outbuild Japan.
The Treaty of Versailles limitations meant Germany would possess no more than 6-7 battleships and 3-4 battlecruisers. In 1917, Germany sold off all its older dreadnought, pre-dreadnought and battlecruisers to second and third rate naval powers such as Argentina, Peru, Spain and Iran (selling them was seen as more profitable than scrapping them, and some remained in service of foreign navies into the mid-50s). The existing battlecruisers were also all sold: Von der Tann (Spain), Moltke-class (Greece) and the Derfflinger-class (the Netherlands).
The High Seas Fleet kept its latest dreadnoughts: four 28.500 tonne 180 metre long Bayern-class battleships with eight 38 cm (15 inch) guns and a top speed of 21 knots. These would receive an overhaul to increase their speed and add anti-aircraft guns. They also completed two of their Anhalt-class super battleships (43.800 tonnes, eight 42 cm/16.5 inch main guns, 26 knots), which were superseded by the British Saint-class in armament (18 inch/45.7 cm guns) though not in speed (23 knots). Three Mackensen-class battlecruisers were completed as designed (31.000 tonnes, eight 35 cm/13.8 inch guns, 28 knots) while the remaining four were completed as aircraft carriers. The planned Yorck class battlecruisers (Yorck, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst) were re-designed, built and commissioned as aircraft carriers too, for a naval air arm totalling seven aircraft carriers. Germany had become the pioneer in naval aviation by the late 20s by necessity because it couldn’t build all-big-gun battleships as long as it abided by the Versailles restrictions. Besides that, Germany had also developed a significant force of U-boats under visionaries such as Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz, who hoped to strangle Britain with this submarine force in a future war.
Germany announced the 1927 and 1928 Naval Laws, emboldened by the 1926 Reinsurance Treaty as it guaranteed Russia wouldn’t back any steps against Germany Britain and France might take. The 1927 Naval Law envisioned doubling the battle line from one battle squadron of six battleships to twelve battleships in two squadrons. Six Kaiser Wilhelm-class ships – 60.000 tonnes each, equipped with four 46 cm (18.1 inch) twin turrets and a 28 knot top speed – were laid down. This new class followed the design philosophy behind the Bayern- and Anhalt-classes, being an enlarged version of them. Six Dohna-class battlecruisers, effectively fast battleships, were laid down too and mostly named after the Great War battlecruisers. Each one was superior to a Great War era battleship: 50.000 tonnes, three triple 42 cm (16.5 inch) gun turrets and a speed of 30 knots. They were innovative in the sense that they were the first German capital ship units with triple turrets. The 1928 Naval Law envisioned the construction of six 72.000 tonne Friedrich der Grosse- class, equipped with nine 48 cm (18.9 inch) guns. Accompanying ships such as heavy cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and U-boats were also built. Of course aircraft carriers were constructed too. These ships were to be completed by 1936.
The 1927 Naval Crisis had begun. The initial Anglo-French response to the 1927 German Naval Law, a clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles, was one of outrage. France conducted a partial mobilization of its army while the Royal Navy took to the seas in force, resulting in another European war scare only two years after the last one. France hoped that Russia, despite its decision to withdraw from the Entente, would live up to its commitments by assisting in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles that it was also a signatory of. The Russian government headed by the liberal-democratic Prime Minister Pavel Milyukov, however, did nothing of the sort. Knowing the British Army was small and that it’d need significant time to build up its strength, the French backed off and effectively forced Britain to do the same. France’s General Staff wasn’t confident in their army’s ability to hold off the Germans until British and Commonwealth/Empire reinforcements arrived in strength without a second front provided by the Russians.
Chapter XII: Anglo-Russian Split and Renewed Naval Rivalry, 1926-1933.
After the Persian Crisis, German Emperor Wilhelm II wrote a long letter to his Russian cousin Tsar Nicholas II, whom he hadn’t seen or spoken since before the eruption of the Great War in 1914 (the state funeral of Edward VII to be exact). The letter explained that Germany’s interest didn’t conflict with those of Russia at all, while Great Britain’s often did and led to Russia caving and losing face for the sake of their alliance to the obviously unreliable French. After all, what had they ever done to help Russia gain a warm water port on the Bosporus? The French had done nothing to realize that goal in order to avoid offending the British so they could maintain an unnatural Anglo-French-Russian alliance to assist them in their petty anti-German feud, being sore losers over 1871. France fanning the flames of irrational and uncalled for Germanophobia and using deceit to get the support of other great powers had led to the war!
Things were set into motion over lingering tensions dating back years before the crisis in the Persian Crisis: in fact Anglo-Russian had slowly been deteriorating ever since the late 1910s as British tariff walls kept the Empire from importing from the growing Russian economy. Differing economic interests were eventually going to lead to a political breakup regardless of what had happened, it is believed by historians.
Germany by contrast had aspired to peace and had never opposed Russia in the Balkans (he trivialized Germany’s alliance to Austria-Hungary). Meanwhile, Wilhelm said, the expanding British Empire was obviously blocking Russian attempts to gain a place under the sun at every turn. He pointed out that, despite earlier agreements, Britain was obviously against a Russian Bosporus and was opposed to the alternative of a Russian port on the Indian Ocean too. Germany was willing to assist in return for being enabled to realize their dream of Mittelafrika (the concurrent and competing Prussian vision of Mitteleuropa as a pan-Germanist state-centric imperium encompassing large swathes of Central and Eastern Europe was quietly shelved).
Tsar Nicholas II’s response was that Russia and Germany could indeed help each other in achieving their goals and he announced a visit. In January 1926, the Imperial Yacht Standart left port with Tsar Nicholas II, his wife and his children onboard. This ship – with mahogany panelling, crystal chandeliers, stocks of caviar and champagne and a crew of 355 men – was a suitable floating palace for the Russian Imperial Family. With eight 47 mm (1.9 inch) guns, she was well-protected too. The ship arrived in Hamburg and from there the Tsar, his family and their retinue travelled to Bonn in a column of Mercedes Benzes. There they visited the modest country estate that the Tsar had called home during his days as a student and which had since become a Russian consulate. The Tsar met some of his old professors and a handful of acquaintances that he had kept in touch with from his days in the exclusive Corps Borussia Bonn.
Nicholas II and his following arrived in Berlin on January 26th 1926 on the pretence of attending the celebration of Wilhelm II’s 67th birthday the next day, but in reality important discussions concerning a potential Russo-German alliance took place. This was demonstrated by the fact that the Tsar and his family stayed as guests for three weeks at the New Palace in Potsdam, the Kaiser’s favourite residence, and the coming and going of diplomats in between lavish banquets and balls during that time. Needless to say, the French ambassador was on the verge of a nervous breakdown, but there was nothing he could do as he couldn’t match the German offer without jeopardizing good relations with Britain. The Russo-German rapprochement didn’t lead to an alliance just yet, but led to the 1926 Reinsurance Treaty (which is not to be confused with the one that ended in 1887). It stipulated that if Russia either tried to take the Bosporus or tried to realize an Indian Ocean port through force of arms, Germany wouldn’t oppose it. In return, Russia wouldn’t oppose a renewed German naval construction program.
Though officially a secret agreement, the major powers soon became aware of the 1926 Reinsurance Treaty between Germany and Russia and that resulted in a flurry of diplomatic activity. France witnessed the Entente – that it’d established decades ago and that they were trying to maintain even after the war – unravel. France’s allies Russia and Britain were rivals again, a situation France desperately tried to undo. As one historian has described it, French foreign policy of the late twenties consisted of “trying to bring the band back together again.”
Russia had no qualms with France and responded that it was perfectly willing to maintain the original Dual Entente between the two, but at a price France that proved unwilling to pay. What Russia wanted in return proved a breaking point in the Élysée Palace, the residence of the President of France: a Russian precondition for maintaining the Entente was French support for Russia’s plans vis-à-vis the Bosporus despite British opposition (or at least not standing in the way of said plans). The French leadership realized that agreeing to this could potentially amount to winding up in a war against Britain alongside Germany and Russia. At the minimum it meant a break in Anglo-French relations and being manoeuvred into a de facto Russo-German-French alliance, which no-one in Paris wanted. France was perfectly willing to negotiate on Russia’s behalf with Whitehall, but that wasn’t enough to St. Petersburg: Russia formally abrogated its membership of the Entente in 1927 after 33 years. The Anglo-French Entente remained.
Tensions in Europe mounted further over German naval ambitions, which would be a violation of the Treaty of Versailles if Germany ever acted on them. Despite being limited to one third of the tonnage of the Royal Navy in terms of capital ships (defined at Versailles as battleships and battlecruisers), Wilhelm II made it no secret that Germany should still have a battle fleet capable of rivalling the Royal Navy.
After Britain retired its older dreadnoughts, it was left with four King George V-class, four Iron-Duke-class, five Queen Elizabeth-class, five Revenge-class and four Saint-class battleships as well as three Courageous class, four Admiral-class and four Invincible-class battlecruisers by the late 1920s. This amounted to a grand total of 22 dreadnought battleships and eleven battlecruisers (next to this they had one fleet carrier and two light carriers and a modest submarine fleet). The admiralty continued to uphold the two-power standard, which dictated that the Royal Navy should be larger than the next two navies combined.
No navy in the world came close: the world’s second navy, the US Navy, had ten battleships and six battlecruisers thanks to the 1916 Naval Act. A proposed second naval act for an additional twelve battleships and battlecruisers was not passed: Hughes, who defeated Wilson in the 1916 Presidential election, stated “the United States shall not become the world’s most militaristic nation during my presidency and will therefore refrain from an unnecessary ruinous arms race against a country with which we have cordial relations.” During the Hughes Administration (1917-1925) the US continued its isolationist foreign policy and this didn’t really change under his Democratic successor William Gibbs McAdoo (former Secretary of the Treasury, 1913-1917). Hughes eventually did authorize the more limited 1924 Naval Act for four new battleships and six new battlecruisers to outbuild Japan.
The Treaty of Versailles limitations meant Germany would possess no more than 6-7 battleships and 3-4 battlecruisers. In 1917, Germany sold off all its older dreadnought, pre-dreadnought and battlecruisers to second and third rate naval powers such as Argentina, Peru, Spain and Iran (selling them was seen as more profitable than scrapping them, and some remained in service of foreign navies into the mid-50s). The existing battlecruisers were also all sold: Von der Tann (Spain), Moltke-class (Greece) and the Derfflinger-class (the Netherlands).
The High Seas Fleet kept its latest dreadnoughts: four 28.500 tonne 180 metre long Bayern-class battleships with eight 38 cm (15 inch) guns and a top speed of 21 knots. These would receive an overhaul to increase their speed and add anti-aircraft guns. They also completed two of their Anhalt-class super battleships (43.800 tonnes, eight 42 cm/16.5 inch main guns, 26 knots), which were superseded by the British Saint-class in armament (18 inch/45.7 cm guns) though not in speed (23 knots). Three Mackensen-class battlecruisers were completed as designed (31.000 tonnes, eight 35 cm/13.8 inch guns, 28 knots) while the remaining four were completed as aircraft carriers. The planned Yorck class battlecruisers (Yorck, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst) were re-designed, built and commissioned as aircraft carriers too, for a naval air arm totalling seven aircraft carriers. Germany had become the pioneer in naval aviation by the late 20s by necessity because it couldn’t build all-big-gun battleships as long as it abided by the Versailles restrictions. Besides that, Germany had also developed a significant force of U-boats under visionaries such as Rear Admiral Karl Dönitz, who hoped to strangle Britain with this submarine force in a future war.
Germany announced the 1927 and 1928 Naval Laws, emboldened by the 1926 Reinsurance Treaty as it guaranteed Russia wouldn’t back any steps against Germany Britain and France might take. The 1927 Naval Law envisioned doubling the battle line from one battle squadron of six battleships to twelve battleships in two squadrons. Six Kaiser Wilhelm-class ships – 60.000 tonnes each, equipped with four 46 cm (18.1 inch) twin turrets and a 28 knot top speed – were laid down. This new class followed the design philosophy behind the Bayern- and Anhalt-classes, being an enlarged version of them. Six Dohna-class battlecruisers, effectively fast battleships, were laid down too and mostly named after the Great War battlecruisers. Each one was superior to a Great War era battleship: 50.000 tonnes, three triple 42 cm (16.5 inch) gun turrets and a speed of 30 knots. They were innovative in the sense that they were the first German capital ship units with triple turrets. The 1928 Naval Law envisioned the construction of six 72.000 tonne Friedrich der Grosse- class, equipped with nine 48 cm (18.9 inch) guns. Accompanying ships such as heavy cruisers, light cruisers, destroyers, torpedo boats, and U-boats were also built. Of course aircraft carriers were constructed too. These ships were to be completed by 1936.
The 1927 Naval Crisis had begun. The initial Anglo-French response to the 1927 German Naval Law, a clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles, was one of outrage. France conducted a partial mobilization of its army while the Royal Navy took to the seas in force, resulting in another European war scare only two years after the last one. France hoped that Russia, despite its decision to withdraw from the Entente, would live up to its commitments by assisting in enforcing the Treaty of Versailles that it was also a signatory of. The Russian government headed by the liberal-democratic Prime Minister Pavel Milyukov, however, did nothing of the sort. Knowing the British Army was small and that it’d need significant time to build up its strength, the French backed off and effectively forced Britain to do the same. France’s General Staff wasn’t confident in their army’s ability to hold off the Germans until British and Commonwealth/Empire reinforcements arrived in strength without a second front provided by the Russians.
Well, A Day In July by @Zulfurium has what amounts to a mega-Ukraine (The Don Republic). Granted, it's for all intents and purposes a German client state, but still.